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ABSTRACT 
In the literature focusing on various aspects of the twin transitions from socialism, 
development and social well-being are mainly analyzed with respect to privatization process 
(Stark and Bruszt 1998, Applegate 1994); economic growth and institutional design (North 
1990; Elster, Offe, and Preuss 1998; Kolodko 1999; Norgaard 2000); party and election 
politics, the development of social networks and deliberative associations (Stark and Bruszt 
1998); and the bargaining power of labor (Bandelj and Mahutga 2005). While the importance 
of these factors is not underestimated, this study addresses a significantly understudied theme 
– social exclusion as a consequence of overweening state power. The problem of social 
exclusion cuts to the core of the distribution of power in society; and in most of the post-
Soviet societies, there has occurred predominantly negative change in societal power after 
1990s, with vast power concentrated in the hands of governing elites. In the case of Armenia, 
the problem is specifically striking. 
This dissertation centers around durable social exclusion in post-Soviet Armenia 
generated as a consequence of the twin transition and explores the conditions that explain the 
high degree of social exclusion in contemporary Armenian society. It aims to answer the 
following research question: what factors contributed to the development of durable social 
exclusion in post-Soviet Armenia from 1988-2008? 
As an exploratory case study based on the examination of recent socio-economic and, 
more notably, political developments of post-Soviet Armenian state, this dissertation 
generates new hypotheses to study social exclusion. Appending to the mainstream literature 
that focuses on primarily the socio-economic drivers of social exclusion, I emphasize that not 
only consequences of economic reform affect the level of social exclusion, but also, and 
more significantly, the historic trajectory of the society. I argue that privatization was an 
important but not a sufficient factor in the emergence of social exclusion in post-Soviet 
Armenia. State militarization through war was another necessary and largely overlooked 
condition for the persistence of social exclusion in Armenia. The assessment of these 
hypotheses provides evidence that allows a test of whether privatization and militarization 
are plausible factors for the persistence of social exclusion in other developing countries.  
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CHAPTER 1  
Introduction 
1.1 Why Is the Study of Durable Social Exclusion Important? 
At the 2011 World Economic Forum (WEF) in Davos, income inequality and 
corruption were singled out as the two most serious challenges facing the world.1As Zhu 
Min, a special adviser of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), stated at the WEF 2011, 
“the increase in inequality isthe most serious challenge for the world" (Aldrick 2011). 
Worldwide increase in inequality in its turn feeds another societal problem — social 
exclusion. "Social exclusion is a multidimensional process of progressive social rupture, 
detaching groups and individuals from social relations and institutions and preventing them 
from full participation in the normal, normatively prescribed activities of the society in which 
they live" (Silver 2007:15). A major global issue, the problem of exclusion has become the 
focus of worldwide concern. Not only have practitioners attempted to find a panacea to the 
issue of exclusion, but recently there has been a remarkable upsurge of academic research 
focusing on social exclusion.  
The phenomenon of social exclusion has a negative impact on development, 
competitiveness, investment opportunities and allocation of public resources. Most notably, it 
deprives people of property rights, the right to education and health services, of social 
welfare and thus, creates social discontent and mass movements.  
Comparative evidence from Western Europe suggests a strong link between social 
exclusion and a variety of socio-economic ills. The problem is chiefly considered to be 
caused by an interplay of demographic, economic, social and behavioral factors, such as 
unemployment, ill-health, low educational attainment, and lack of skills. In the sphere of 
health, for example, high death rates and stress-related illnesses appear to be closely related 
with high levels of income inequality, which is an element of social exclusion. Low levels of 
education and violent crime are also correlated with income inequality.  
                                                 
1 The Conference Board of Canada, "World Income Inequality: Is the World Becoming More Unequal?" 
http://www.conferenceboard.ca/hcp/hot-topics/worldinequality.aspx. 
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Concerning democratic development, deepening inequalities within and between 
different groups in society are associated with low levels of social cohesion and participatory 
citizenship. Social exclusion may hamper democratic consolidation by stimulating social 
conflict and political instability, and in turn may act as a support for the establishment of 
authoritarian regimes. The post-Soviet transition literature attributes the rise of inequality and 
socio-economic stratification chiefly to the increase in wage dispersion and the destruction of 
old social security and government transfers (Yemelyanau 2011). Yemtsov (2001), for 
instance, attributes inequality in post-Soviet Georgia to high informal incomes and to 
significant decline in state transfers. For the problem of inequality in post-Soviet Armenia, 
Griffin/UNDP (2002) points to the changing wage structure and widening wage differentials. 
Ganguli and Terrell (2005, 2006) provide a similar argument for post-Soviet Ukraine.  
Given the negative consequences of social exclusion for achieving economic growth 
with equity, studies of durable social exclusion have significant policy implicatio ns for 
problems in democratization, human rights, and socioeconomic development, especially with 
respect to poverty reduction, the structure of private property rights, and inclusive political 
participation. Elements of the problem, such as long-term damage to living conditions, lack 
of social, economic and political participation, poor health and educational status, emotional 
and physical insecurity coupled with feelings of estrangement, isolation and unhealthy 
lifestyles require special attention.  
The study of social exclusion becomes more critical, considering the fact that the 
problem is expressed in different countries of the world in different forms and severity. 
Whereas the problem of inequality and exclusion is growing in the US and Europe, it is even 
worse in other regions of the world.2 The problem of social exclusion is more severe in South 
America and Southern Africa, where countries with extremely high inequalities are clustered. 
For decades, Latin America had the world's worst income inequality.With the breakup of the 
                                                 
2 For example, the Gini coefficient, a standard measure of income inequality that ranges from 0 (minimal 
income inequality) to 1 (maximum income inequality),stood at an average of 0.29 in OECD (Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development) countries in the mid-1980s. By the late 2000s, however, it had 
increased by almost 10% to 0.316. OECD (2011) stresses that it rose in 17 of the 22 OECD countries for which 
long-term data series are available, climbing by more than 4 percentage points in Finland, Germany, Israel, 
Luxembourg, New Zealand, Sweden, and the United States. Only Turkey, Greece, France, Hungary, and 
Belgium recorded no increase or small declines in their Gini coefficients. (OECD 2011:2)  
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USSR, post-Soviet space became another region with high levels of social inequality, and 
polarization. A few of the post-Soviet countries had income inequalities similar to the most 
unequal countries in Latin America. 
By far, it is clear that social exclusion — an outcome and a reflection of a country’s 
social, economic, cultural and political institutions — has negative implications and 
consequences for the development of egalitarian societies. Nonetheless, little is known for 
certain about what exactly determines the extent and duration of social exclusion, let alone 
about definitive measures to combat it or to construct more inclusive states and societies. 
What is more important, wider causes and consequences of social exclusion — those beyond 
poverty and deprivation — are not thoroughly researched either in Western societies or, 
particularly, in developing countries.  
Although an extensive body of literature exists on the question of social exclusion, it 
does not provide adequate theoretical tools to explain the development of durable exclusion 
in the case of Armenia. Nearly all of the recent literature on social exclusion interprets it as a 
new social problem that has arisen as a result of the economic restructuring of advanced 
capitalist democracies (Silver 1994, Atkinson 1998). Furthermore, focusing primarily on the 
socio-economic and behavioral causes, it largely disregards the political, cultural, and 
historical sources of social exclusion.It particularly overlooks the political conditions that 
cause high levels of social exclusion to persist over time, such as key critical junctures that 
affect state formation.  
This dissertation is an attempt to fill this gap. It contributes to the existing literature 
on social exclusion by examining the underlying sources of social exclusion in the context of 
post-Soviet states, focusing primarily on the case of post-Soviet Armenia. Against a 
background of rising inequalities, social exclusion, and continued waves of massive protest, 
understanding the causes and consequences of social exclusion in this tiny country is a 
central agenda of this study. 
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1.2 The Puzzle of Durable Social Exclusion in Post-Soviet Societies 
Within the wave of democratization that started around two decades ago, the 
transformation of the socialist system and the transition to capitalism have become most 
remarkable elements of research. Although the fullest coverage of international 
democratization in the Third World has been devoted to Latin America, starting from 1990s 
scholarly attention slightly shifted to the post-communist world, focusing to the 
transformation of the socialist political systems. The mainstream transition literature has been 
positive and optimistic about the rupture of the post-Soviet countries from the USSR, the 
disavowal of the Marxist-Leninist ideology by the latter, as well as the speed and quality of 
the neoliberal adjustments taking place parallel with the reinvention of politics and 
institutions in the region. While in Latin American democratization literature there have been 
strong challenges and confrontations of several aspects of the democratization, the post-
Soviet literature hardly ever contests problems of the twin transition in a systematic manner.  
The twin transition to democracy and market capitalism in the transition from 
socialism was expected to produce prosperous and socially inclusive societies. Contrary to 
this prediction, social exclusion has been a widespread problem in most of the post-socialist 
republics. The official dismantling of Soviet ideology, coupled with liberalization and 
reinvention of politics, throughout the former Soviet bloc did not produce significant 
progress towards a liberal-democratic order. The economic, political and social 
transformations of the twin transition in the post-Soviet societies, forecasted to enhance the 
speeding up of development and the reduction of poverty, had huge negative effects on these 
societies. There was a sharp and continuous decline in production and a rise in inflation. The 
economic transformations of the post-Soviet societies have also had massive political 
consequences, particularly in regard to power distribution and the use of power for self-
interest. 
This paradox of the democratization evolution and the failed process of inclusion 
pose a problem for the literature on twin transitions from socialism. The range of 
distributional outcomes evidenced in the region was not expected at all. Economic theory 
assumed that, after an initial increase, socioeconomic exclusion and inequality would 
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decrease over time (Kuznets 1995). Democratic theory reinforced this assumption.  It posited 
that newly-gained democracy would open ample opportunity for political inclusion, which 
would permit the excluded people to organize in favor of their interests and influence policy 
making (Dahl 1971, Mainwaring 1992, Huntington 1991).  
After a difficult beginning some post-Soviet countries began to approach the ideal 
market systems advocated by the western specialists. Some of them managed to 
simultaneously accomplish the task of capitalist transformation and maintenance of socially 
egalitarian societies. A few countries, such as formerly Soviet Ukraine, Georgia and 
Kyrgyzstan, changed their exclusionary ruling regimes through social mobilization and, thus, 
opened new opportunities for political expression and economic redistribution.3  However, 
others have moved in the opposite direction, not being able to counteract authoritarian states 
and prevent growing social exclusion. 
In conjunction with these developments, scholars of the post-Soviet transitions have 
identified different factors that caused massive undesirable societal developments. For 
example, the policy-oriented literature on inequality and exclusion, chiefly stemming from 
the World Bank initiatives, suggests that post-communist countries that implemented slower 
and less consistent pro-market reforms also witnessed the largest increases in overall 
inequality. The empirical evidence from a few of those countries, however, confirm the 
contrary.  Belarus and Armenia are good examples.   
Belarus, which had the lowest level of Gini coefficient of 0.24 during the Soviet 
period (in 1988), maintained social equality after its independence from the USSR (Alexeev 
and Gaddy 1993; Yemelyanau 2011).4 According to Yemelyanau (2011), the inequality 
evolution in post-Soviet Belarus was similar to those of the Czech Republic and Hungary, 
                                                 
3 Many authors of “"colored revolutions"” are hesitant to draw conclusions from the experiences of Georgia, 
Ukraine and particularly Kyrgyzstan for the future of “"color revolutions"", specifically in terms of 
consequences. It is often argued that these movements, although successful in overthrowing their regimes, d id 
not improve the lives of ordinary people. They, however, provided ordinary people in these countries with 
confidence and strength to effectively challenge and oust any regime that would endanger their rights and 
opportunities. This, if not creating greater social inclusion, at least opens a window of opportunity for excluded 
masses to try new options, new leaders and new elites that might and will finally be in favor of better policies 
for their citizens. This is, certainly, a feature and objective of any successful social movement.  
4The Gini coefficient shows the inequality of income distribution among the population. The closer this 
coefficient is to 1, the higher is the degree of income polarization of the population.  
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transition countries that had experienced rapid and significant pro-market reforms, at the 
same time maintaining their high levels of income equality and good social support systems. 
Belarus avoided mass privatization and maintained many of the Soviet social security 
features (Yemelyanau 2009:1).  
Similar to Belarus, Soviet Armenia had a low Gini coefficient of 0.28 in 1988 
(Alexeev and Gaddy 1993). But unlike Belarus, Armenia experienced significant pro-market 
reforms, including mass privatization. Despite these reforms, unlike Belarus or the Czech 
Republic and Hungary, post-Soviet Armenia did not manage to prevent largest increases in 
inequality and high levels of Gini coefficients varying from 0.56 in 1996 to 0.31 in 2007.5 
This discrepancy in the evolution of the Gini coefficients, especially since the mentioned 
countries inherited similar political and economic legacy and possessed comparable 
institutions, contradicts the scholarly assumption suggesting that countries with a slow pace 
of pro-market reforms experienced the largest increases in inequality.      
Social exclusion, including income and wealth inequality, has been particularly harsh 
in some of the Central Asian countries and South Caucasus countries, especially in Armenia 
and Azerbaijan.  There we see the development of durable social exclusion, that is, the 
persistence of high levels of exclusion over time. The unexpected development and 
persistence of social exclusion in post-Soviet Armenia, as compared to some other post-
Soviet states with similar Soviet legacy, makes the analysis of the problem critical.    
This dissertation focuses on the South Caucasus case of Armenia in the post-Soviet 
region to address the problem of durable social exclusion. More precisely, this dissertatio n 
asks the following question. What are the factors that explain the emergence of durable social 
exclusion in post-Soviet Armenia’s transition to free-market capitalism between 1988 and 
2008? Armenia offers an interesting benchmark case for studying social exclusion. The case 
is significant for three reasons.  Armenia has among the highest levels of social exclusion 
that have persisted for more than two decades since the beginning of the twin transition from 
                                                 
5 The main source for these numbers is the World Bank, Development Research Group. Data are based on 
primary household survey data obtained from government statistical agencies and World Bank country 
departments. For more information and methodology, please see PovcalNet 
(http://iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet/index.htm). 
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socialism.6 It has not changed course despite even stronger civil society opposition than 
comparable cases where the trend was reversed. The second reason for the case of Armenia 
to be a good laboratory for research on the theme is due to the fact that Armenia has earned 
the title of the 'Caucasian Tiger' among post-Soviet republics in the Caucasus region, but at 
the same time, acquired a status of a non-egalitarian society.7 Thus, opposite to the dominant 
view within the social exclusion literature that high economic growth is linked with inclus ive 
societies, Armenia— a Caucasian tiger with a stellar growth —, is characterized with high 
degrees of social exclusion. Armenia's growth, which was not economically and politically 
inclusive, is, thus, paradoxical and requires special deliberation in regard to its consequences 
on social segregation. Finally, as already discussed in the above paragraphs, Armenia 
initiated very rapid structural reforms predicted to decrease inequality, which as a matter of 
fact did not hinder the formation of social exclusion.  
Based on the Armenian case, I hypothesize that the privatization of public enterprises 
and state militarization through war were key necessary factors in the emergence and 
persistence of social exclusion in the country.  They promoted exclusionary policies and 
contained mobilization that demanded greater social equity and political reform. There may 
be many other reasons for social inequality and prevailing poverty in Armenia, such as its 
disadvantaged geopolitical setting, its diplomatic isolation by neighboring countries, and lack 
of transportation links and routes (being bypassed in the developing oil economy of the 
region). But these overlook the very significant impact of policy in the distribution of income 
and life chances, in particular the effect of capital and coercion in the policymaking process, 
                                                 
6 The situation on social exclusion in post-Soviet  Armenia is thoroughly discussed in Chapter 3. There I dwell 
more specifically on the economic, political and social dimensions of social exclusion, stressing that most of 
their elements are present in severe forms in Armenia as compared to other post -communist republics. 
Moreover, the Gini coefficient has been one of the highest in Armenia during mid 1990s. This high level of 
inequality has somehow decreased throughout 2000s, but the decrease is estimated to be chiefly due to 
remittances from abroad, rather than redistributive policies. In any case, there are no reliable and consistent data 
on inequality in Armenia for the studied years of transition in Armenia, therefore, my conclusions are base d on 
the existing ones found in the World Bank and UN reports only.  
The high level of social exclusion in Armenia is also presented in Chapter 4, where I evaluate Armenian 
students' self-perceptions of economic, social and political exclusion.  
7 Armenia has been bestowed with the title 'Caucasian Tiger' for its rapid economic growth record at the 
beginning of 2000s. The term derives from and is reminiscent of the popular term 'Asian Tigers' or 'Asian 
Dragons', used in reference to the high-growth east Asian economies of Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, 
and Taiwan. Those four Asian tigers consistently maintained high levels of economic growth since the 1960s, 
fueled by exports and rapid industrialization, which enabled these economies to join the ranks of the world 's 
richest nations. 
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which my research suggests are critical. My argument is that privatization of firms and social 
services coupled with state militarization through war are the most significant factors 
explaining the formation and persistence of social exclusion in post-Soviet Armenia. The 
privatization process created large-scale private capital and business interests that support 
crony laissez faire capitalism, while militarization is intimately intertwined with state 
coercive capacity.  
Militarization distorted the Armenian state, retarded the development of domestic 
institutions that would protect social equity, and contributed to a process of privatization that 
de-industrialized Armenia and left most of its people excluded from the economy while a few 
prospered.After the Karabakh war was finished, the Armenian state militarization became an 
instrument for safeguarding established interests of the new class of state elites and oligarchs, 
several of who rose to leadership due to the war, a matter of imposing and maintaining their 
power.  
In those circumstances, market reforms had several implications for the politics of 
inequality in post-Soviet Armenia. Most significantly, the market restructuring, particularly 
the privatization process, altered the regional class structure by shifting employment from the 
formal to the informal sector of the economy and by creating a new class of oligarchs with 
monopolistic control over resources. The privatization process, with its rent-seeking nature, 
accelerated the concentration of wealth into the hands of a few. It provided more 
advantageous economic opportunities for the powerful groups of the society, including 
government representatives, Karabakh military and para-military who were already promoted 
to political positions, and enterprise managers and directors to prosper. Powerful in both 
economic and political affairs of the newly independent country, networks of these elites 
persistently restricted other citizens' access to resources and opportunities, making social 
exclusion durable in post-Soviet Armenia. 
These alterations in the labor market generated new challenges for labor unions and 
consequently, impediments for collective action. Finally, the weakening of class-based 
collective action protected the newly ascended oligarchs and neoliberal technocrats from 
social pressure and allowed them to use the new system in their own benefit. Meanwhile, the 
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legal system, the judicial system and the armed forces, all corrupted and co-opted by the state 
leaders and their oligarchic networks, have made "opportunity hoarding" unpunished and 
voracious.   
1.3 Organization of the Study  
This dissertation engages two main themes with regard to social exclusion in post-
Soviet Armenia. The first argument stresses that the role of the privatization process during 
the neoliberal adjustment is a necessary condition for the emergence of social exclusion in 
Armenia. The privatization process largely affected the unequal distribution of economic 
resources and social opportunities. The second argument highlights the idea that privatization 
of firms and social services is not a sufficient condition for the persistence of social 
exclusion: state militarization is another key and necessary factor for the explanation of 
durable social exclusion in the case of Armenia. With the militarization of the Armenian 
state, the Armenian citizens, beyond their economic and social exclusion, became also 
politically marginalized.  
The study consists of nine chapters and is organized as follows. Having outlined the 
scope of the study in this chapter, the second chapter provides the analysis of the central 
concept of the study — durable social exclusion. It provides an overview of social exclusion 
and its definitions, analyses the three key dimensions of social exclusion, explores its various 
forms and causes, and presents available methods of measuring the problem. A major section 
of the chapter examines causes of social exclusion in post-Soviet societies. With the analysis 
of the drivers of social exclusion, I simultaneously construct the theoretical framework of the 
study. This chapter also explains what the term ‘durable social exclusion’ means and why it 
is so essential to examine it in the case of Armenia. 
Chapter Three is concerned with the problem of social exclusion in the case of 
Armenia. The historical events of Soviet disintegration that led to deepening social exclusion 
in the newly independent Armenian republic as a social consequence of the transformation 
and liberalization process is briefly analyzed. The chapter further discusses the problem by 
separately analyzing its economic, social and political dimensions in great detail. 
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Chapter Four turns to the description of the method and the hypotheses. It specifies 
the research method, followed by the formulation of the hypotheses. Each of the two main 
hypotheses is explained more thoroughly. The first hypothesis stresses that within the 
neoliberal change specifically the privatization of firms and services in Armenia is important. 
The second hypothesis deals with the central concept of state militarization and why it is 
found to be yet another and even more vital factor in sustaining social inequalities within 
Armenian society. The chapter is concluded with the operationalization of central concepts. 
An adequate understanding of the exceptionally complex theoretical issue of durable 
exclusion and domination of certain groups of a society by others requires not only the 
description of the nature of the economic and political changes occurring in the country, but 
also how ordinary people feel about their own situation. Learning people’s own feelings and  
experiences makes the story of social exclusion more complete, as well as convincing that it 
is an essential problem to draw academics’ and policy-makers’ attention to. Thus, in Chapter 
Five, a quantitative examination of a student survey is conducted with the aim of presenting 
public perceptions of social exclusion. The results of the quantitative analysis in some way 
complement the qualitative part of this dissertation. 
In efforts to demonstrate the uniqueness of the Armenian case in terms of state 
militarization, Chapter Six shares a comparative perspective of state coercion in terms of 
containment of social movements in Ukraine, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Azerbaijan and Armenia. 
The chapter situates the five country cases in an intellectual framework of state militarization 
generated in chapter two and highlights some of the principal themes we addressed in the 
state militarization and coercion hypothesis. The investigation of the various outcomes of 
success and failure of these similar post-Soviet cases confirms the militarization hypothesis. 
ChaptersSeven and Eight apply the social exclusion framework to the Armenian case. 
These chapters include the analysis of policies and historical developments that have had 
their impact on social exclusion in Armenia. Chapter Seven reviews the Karabakh war and 
the peace process after the cease-fire, stressing that this war was a catalyst for the post-war 
militaristic activism. Initial elements of Armenian state militarization began to develop due 
to the Karabakh war. This is the chapter that highlights how mechanisms of  maintaining 
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coercive power of the state  is essential in containing opposition movements, further leaving 
the discontented masses excluded and unhappy. Whereas state militarization during war can 
be strongly connected to the economic dimension of social exclusion, post-war militarization 
focuses more on the political exclusion facilitated during the post-war regimes. 
Chapter Eight discusses the main mechanisms and avenues through which industrial 
privatization and privatization of services in Armenia affected economic exclusion of 
ordinary citizens, as well as small entrepreneurs. 
The concluding chapter, Chapter Nine, discusses the key theoretical contributions of 
the dissertation. The shortcomings of the study are acknowledged with an emphasis on future 
research. The chapter ends the conclusion with a brief note on the prospects of greater social 
inclusion in Armenia. 
1.4 Conclusion 
Although some policy-oriented literature offers insights for the general problem of 
social exclusion in advanced capitalist societies, little is known about the political economy 
of persistent social exclusion in post-Soviet transitions.  This study contributes to that 
knowledge. Concretely, my dissertation contributes to the knowledge of social exclusion in 
two areas.  It develops the concept of durable social exclusion, highlighting the severity of 
the problem in post-Soviet Armenia. It then assesses durable social exclusion through not 
only the socio-economic perspective, but also through the lens of political processes that 
contain social movements in favor of more inclusionary forms of citizenship and democratic 
practices.  
My main contention throughout this dissertation is that privatization of firms and 
social services coupled with state militarization through war are the most significant factors 
explaining the formation and persistence of social exclusion in post-Soviet Armenia. The 
privatization process created large-scale private capital and business interests that support 
crony laissez faire capitalism, while militarization is intimately intertwined with state 
coercive capacity. In particular, the Armenian state militarization after the Karabakh war 
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promoted exclusionary policies and contained mobilization that demanded greater social 
equity and political reform. This is an original contribution to the social exclusion literature.  
Indeed, one of the few instances that treated the relationship between state 
militarization and social polarization claimed it was a positive one.8 Stanislav Andreski 
(1968:30) argued that higher military participation ratios decreased social stratification. 
Regarding Andreski's statement that the existence of external threat eliminates or decreases 
social stratification, based on the repressive practices of post-Soviet Armenian and 
Azerbaijani states regularly exercised against their societies, I contend that external threat 
does not decrease stratification.9 It might create a powerful sense of nationalism and strong 
national cohesion among the lower strata of the population. But for the higher ranks of the 
government, this threat serves as a motive for keeping their coercive organizatio n powerful in 
place, regardless of whether that force will be used for maintaining their domestic supremacy 
or for an external war.My study, then, is a direct challenge to the generally accepted assertion 
that high military participation ratios flatten social stratification. Consequently, advancing the 
scholarship on social exclusion will be useful for policy debates concerning the tolerable 
boundaries of militarized and repressive democratic states and its consequences on economic 
redistribution and socio-political fairness. 
                                                 
8 See Andreski (1968). There will be a more detailed analysis on the relation of state militarization to social 
exclusion in Chapter Two and Chapter Four.  
9 Both of these countries face external threat even after the cease-fire of 1994. The hazard of re-starting a war 
with each other is constantly in the air.For instance, still in 2006, Azeri president Aliyev threatened Armenia by 
stating that the overall budget of Azerbaijan was 500% bigger than the budget of Armenia and the military 
budget of Azerbaijan equaled the overall budget of Armenia (for reference, see 
http://www.armeniandiaspora.com/showthread.php?74757-Ilkham-Aliyev-Threatens-Armenians). In 2008, he 
threatened Armenia again, now with deeper isolation (for reference, see 
http://www.panarmenian.net/eng/world/news/27233). Yet again, the article entitled “Aliyev again Threatens 
Military Action” in the August 11, 2010 issue of www.asbarez.com reports Aliyev’s speech: “The war is 
continuing. We must be ready and we are ready to liberate our lands from occupiers at any moment. I want to 
once again state that this primarily requires a military might. We have for the most part created that might and 
this process is successfully continuing.” These types of military and isolationist threats by the Azerbaijani side 
have been often repeated tactics during the recent 15 years after the war ended.  
Moreover, shootings are common between the Armenian and Azerbaijani forces that are spread across a cease-
fire line in and around Nagorno-Karabakh and often face each other at close range. There have been tens of 
soldiers, as well as civilians, shot dead by both Armenian and Azerbaijani forces near the de-facto border of 
Nagorno-Karabakh. The most significant breach of the cease-fire occurred in Martakert on March 8, 2008, 
where sixteen soldiers were killed. Both sides accused the other of starting the shootings.   
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There may be many other reasons for social inequality and poverty in Armenia, such 
as its disadvantaged geopolitical setting, its diplomatic isolation by neighboring countries, 
and lack of transportation links and routes (being bypassed in the developing oil economy of 
the region). But these overlook the very significant impact of politics in the distribution of 
income and life chances, in particular the effect of capital and coercion in the policymaking 
process, which my research suggests are critical. 
The production of persuasive evidence and exploration of causal mechanisms of the 
problem are critical for reevaluating state-society relationships, power distribution patterns 
within a society, and for fostering collective awareness, willingness, and strategies to redress 
injustices at the domestic level and within international communities. Given these theoretical 
and empirical contributions, and given the lack of literature that sufficiently covers the 
relationship introduced in this dissertation, this project is essential for comparative political 
science, particularly for the analysis and understanding of the dynamics of exclusionary 
states. Its findings will help to identify policy instruments to prevent or control the 
development of durable social exclusion.  Thus, it will play a part in the search for policies 
capable of promoting market-driven economic growth with equity in this region of the world. 
On a more general note, this study is also significant, because as Asbed Kotchikyan 
(2006) mentions, the scholarship on post-Soviet Armenia has been limited to the topics of 
conflict resolution and nationalism. This limitation of themes in post-Soviet Armenian 
literature concerning economic and socio-political issues shaping the process of state-making 
is due to the fact that very few scholars try to utilize various disciplines to study the South 
Caucasus. Another limitation of the research on Armenia is that most studies tend to apply 
existing theories instead of proposing new theories and approaches. This said, my 
dissertation is an effort to devise a new approach for studying social exclusion and to 
contribute to the larger field of social exclusion study, at the same time introducing a new 
perspective of social exclusion based on the case of post-Soviet Armenia.  
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CHAPTER 2  
Durable Social Exclusion: A Theoretical Framework  
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter is devoted to the analysis of social exclusion. It presents the history and 
common definitions of the phenomenon, examines economic, social and political dimensions 
of exclusion, and explores its causes and forms. The chapter starts with definitions and main 
features of social exclusion. Because social exclusion is frequently equaled with poverty, in 
this section I provide the main distinctions between poverty and social exclusion. Having 
defined social exclusion, this chapter further deals with the drivers of social exclusion widely 
presented in literature. As a multidimensional phenomenon that is studied by various 
intellectual disciplines, such as political science, sociology, economics, and psychology, 
social exclusion has numerous causes discussed in literature. Particularly, its causes and 
consequences vary greatly in developed and developing countries.  
Stressing the multidimensional nature of social exclusion in the first sections of this 
chapter, next I proceed to survey the mainstream literature that underscores institutional and 
non-institutional sources in explaining social exclusion.  Agreeing that institutional factors 
affecting social exclusion are important, I further argue that in the post-communist region, 
similar to Latin America, institutions are not autonomous, and that, as Przeworski put it, 
certain  "conditions shape institutions" (Przeworski 2004:529). In the case of post-Soviet 
Armenia, those conditions are predominantly embedded in the nature of the state. Therefore, 
in the examination of social exclusion, the role of institutions alone is not sufficient. Beyond 
institutions, the specific features of state elites, conditions that shape those features and, most 
essentially, the interrelationship of institutions with the state are important. Contrary to the 
industrialized and developed part of the world, this premise is principally valid for the 
analysis of social exclusion in the developing and underdeveloped countries. 
Owing to the lack of social exclusion theories regarding post-Soviet democratization 
and considering the strong link between democratic consolidation and social inclusion, in the 
next section, I examine theories of democratic consolidationthat may be related to the study 
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of social exclusion in the post-Soviet societies. In a separate section, the main theories of 
political power emphasize the relation of state militarization to the defeat of social 
movements— social efforts to achieve greater inclusion. This section emphasizes the 
usefulness of the social closure and opportunity hoarding theories for the exploration of 
social exclusion in transitioning countries, in this case — Armenia.  
2.2 History, Definitions, and Durability of Social Exclusion 
The notion of social exclusion covers a remarkably wide range of social and 
economic issues. Coined and developed by French sociologists, social exclusion refers to “a 
process of ‘social disqualification’ (Paugam, 1993) or ‘social disaffiliation’ (Castel, 1995) 
leading to a breakdown of the relationship between society and the individual” (Bhala and 
Laperye, 2004:5).10 It concerns social divisions and inequalities between certain groups of 
people along economic, social, cultural and political opportunities. The concept of social 
exclusion has a relatively recent origin, but it has managed to gain substantial academic and 
policy-oriented attention. While the concept originated in discussions concerning economic 
and social inequalities in European contexts, the problem of social exclusion spans 
geographic and political boundaries and reflects universal social dynamics. The topic of 
social exclusion fuels a growing apprehension of distributive fairness of social services, 
employment and income patterns globally.  
The use of the term initially related to widespread European unemployment in mid-
1970s that provoked criticism of welfare systems’ failure to protect people from prolonged 
unemployment and states’ role in promoting social cohesion.  Exclusion was closely linked 
to diminishing labor market participation and declining welfare provision. The concept’s 
historical roots can be traced back to Aristotle; nonetheless, according to Sen (2000:1), the 
expression and notion of ‘social exclusion’, in its modern form, was first coined by René 
Lenoir, the former French Secretary of State for Social Action. The socially excluded, in 
Lenoir’s reference, were groups of people, who were excluded from state social protection 
                                                 
10 Castel (1995) defines social disaffiliation as “the particular way in which social bonds are dissolved”, which 
is characteristic of modern poverty: “To be in an area of integration means to possess guarantees of perman ent 
employment and an ability to rely on the support of firm relationships; in the area of vulnerability the precarious 
tenure of employment is doubled by weakened social supports; the situation of disaffiliation combines 
unemployment with social isolation”. 
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systems. Further, French sociologists extended the implication of the term to include people, 
who were socially and/or economically isolated. Later, in 1980s, the concept quickly spread 
beyond France to the United Kingdom, the European Union (EU) and Northern America, 
highlighting the need of adequate universal social protection policies. Social exclusion 
became a subject of interest in EU mainly due to its concern and involvement in anti-poverty 
policies. In EU anti-poverty programs, the naming of the phenomenon of interest shifted 
from ‘poverty’ to ‘exclusion’. Still currently, social exclusion is a fundamental focus of EU 
social policies.  
The phenomenon of social exclusion gained magnitude particularly after the World 
Summit for Social Development (WSSD) in Copenhagen in 1995. At the Summit, a large 
gathering of 117 world leaders, a consensus was reached on the need to put people’s well-
being at the center of development. The consensus pledged to make the conquest of poverty, 
the goal of full employment and the fostering of safe, equal and fair societies overriding 
objectives of development (UN, Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA) – 
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC)).11 
Social exclusion is often perceived as poverty or deprivation; however, these are not 
the same. Poverty is often an element of social exclusion. Social exclusion is a 
multidimensional concept, and it should be studied as a result of dynamic causal factors. The 
process includes economic marginalization, social disintegration and political polarization 
(Parkin 1979; Collins 1974; Collins 1979; Bourdieu 1984; Murphy 1988; Silver 1995; Beall 
and Piron 2005).   
In fact, we have a better understanding of social exclusion when it is compared to 
poverty and/or deprivation. Most comparisons of the two phenomena suggest that the 
primary difference between social exclusion and poverty concerns their time perspectives 
(Abrahamson 2001; Barnes 2002 & 2005; Estvill 2003; Todman 2004). Poverty is a static 
condition, while social exclusion is a dynamic process. In a more figurative language, “if 
poverty is a photograph, exclusion is a film” (Estvill 2003:21). 
                                                 
11 UN, Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA) – Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), 
http://social.un.org/index/Home/WSSD1995.aspx, last access on November 21, 2011 
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There are other distinctions between the two concepts in terms of the situations where 
they occur, their causes, the forms of social stratification they address, their prevailing policy 
prescriptions, and the key disciplinary approaches used in their analyses. Based on Table 2.1, 
which Abrahamson (2001) developed, the primary cause of poverty is unmet needs, and the 
main cause of social exclusion is discrimination and denial of access to institutions of social 
integration. The situation in which poverty typically arises is characterized by insufficient 
resources, while the situation that characterizes social exclusion is the inability to exercise 
rights. Abrahamson describes the form of stratification in the case of poverty as vertical, 
between the wealthy and the poor classes. The form of stratification in the case of social 
exclusion is horizontal, between the outsiders and the insiders. The core policy prescription 
for poverty reduction is income generation through employment and social welfare transfers. 
The core policy prescription for social exclusion is enabling access to important social 
service delivery systems and institutions. Finally, while poverty is a widely studied topic, 
mainly in economics, the major disciplinary approach of social exclusion analysis is 
sociology. Because social exclusion is focused not only on lack of sufficient resources and 
material needs, but also societal participation, and it addresses not only distributional issues 
(economic issues), but also relational issues, it is natural that economics alone cannot 
sufficiently examine the phenomenon. Sociology and political science are the disciplines that 
more accurately study social exclusion as a multi-dimensional process. 
Table 2.1: Main Distinctions between Poverty and Social Exclusion 
 Poverty Social Exclusion 
Time Perspective Static condition Dynamic process 
Situation Insufficient resources Denial of ability to exercise rights 
Cause Unmet needs Discrimination/denial of access to 
institutions of social integration 
Form of 
Stratification 
Vertical (e.g., lower vs. 
upper classes) 
Horizontal (e.g., outsiders vs. 
insiders) 
Policy Prescription Social transfers (e.g., 
minimum income 
guarantees) 
Social services (e.g., activation 
measures to ensure access to service 
delivery institutions 
Discipline Economics Sociology, Political Science 
Source: Adapted from Abrahamson (2001). 
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Social exclusion theories have evolved over time, giving birth to a number of 
definitions that are closely related to theories and definitions of poverty and deprivation, as 
well as theories of societal disintegration. These definitions and theories provide multiple 
ways of analyzing diverse forms of social disadvantage in respect to economic, social and 
political understanding of societies. Some definitions of social exclusion challenge the 
popular versions of “the underclass’ argument and refer to notions of both social structures 
and implications of agency12. They suggest that the people who are located at the other side 
of the relationship – the people who gain – have their say in the process of exclusion. These 
people “might be shaping the character of economic and social arrangements, the very stuff 
of social politics, to their own advantage and to the disadvantage of others” (Byrne 2005:2). 
Social exclusion [is] a more comprehensive formulation which refers to the dynamic process 
of being shut out, fully or partially, from any of the social, economic, political or cultural 
systems which determine the social integration of a person in society. Social exclusion may, 
therefore, be seen as the denial (or non-realization) of the civil, political and social rights of 
citizenship (Walker and Walker 1997: 8). 
Definitions and operationalization of social exclusion by many authors are very 
similar. Bhala and Laperye (2004:1) define it as “the lack of access of a growing number of 
individuals to a decent job (or simply a job), income, housing, health service or education 
and a more diffused feeling of insecurity among some portions of the population goes hand 
in hand with new opportunities for others who can take advantage of the potential for 
prosperity”. Silver (1995) adds that the material deprivation is accompanied with social 
deprivation and incomplete participation in main political institutions, which has also been 
expressed by the DFID (see Figure 2.1). Bhala and Laperye (2004:1) very accurately note 
that exclusion has two essential processes hampering social integration, those being 
exclusion from the productive system and social deprivation (italics added).  
Under certain conditions, exclusion becomes durable. Durable social exclusion is a 
persistent process of disqualification from economic opportunities, from participation in 
                                                 
12 These theories argue that exclusionary conditions are self-induced, and that the excluded are responsible for 
their miserable conditions. According to political theorists of social exclusion it is the fault of “society” as a 
whole.  
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political institutions and access to social services that endures over long periods of time, such 
as from generation to generation. It suggests a condition in which large numbers of citizens 
are not able to move along boundaries of economic, political and social mobility due to 
external circumstances rather their own intellectual abilities or moral attributes (Tilly 1998). 
Silver (1994), following the Anglo-Saxon tradition and drawing on liberal thinkers 
like Locke, perceives social actors mainly as individuals, who are able to move across 
boundaries of social differentiation and economic divisions of labor. When individuals are 
not able to move along boundaries of economic, political and social differentiation due to 
external circumstances rather their own intellectual abilities or moral characteristics, they 
become immobile in a society. Three important paradigms that attribute social exclusion to a 
different cause and different political philosophy are introduced by Silver (1994). Those 
paradigms are solidarity, specialization and monopoly.  The first paradigm, solidarity, which 
refers to social relations rather than political or market relations, is considered as social 
bonds between individuals and the larger society.13 Social exclusion from the solidarity 
perspective is viewed as a failure of this relationship because a number of institutions do not 
provide adequate mechanisms to channel the individual into the society. The second 
paradigm, specialization, deals with the incapacity of individuals to engage in contractual 
exchange and overcome barriers. Here exclusion occurs mainly through exclusion from paid 
work and the job market or imposition of rigid employment regulations.14 The third 
paradigm, monopoly or social closure paradigm, is a most essential paradigm in terms of the 
power relations analysis that will be constructed in this study. It stems from the works of 
Weber and Marx and emphasizes power relations, examining powerful class and status 
groups that use social closure to restrict the access of other groups to different resources and 
opportunities.  
                                                 
13 The name ‘solidarity’ can be traced back to the notion of solidarity by the French Republican State. Social 
provision in France is founded on the principle of solidarite´ (solidarity), which holds that all citizens face a 
series of social risks that make them dependent on one another. The commitment to social protection is 
expressed in the first article of the French Code of Social Security.  
14 Specialization has an Anglo-American origin and is based on liberal-individualism. In contrast to the notion 
of solidarity, it is more individualist. Here, the emphasis is placed on individual responsibility.  
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Levitas (1998, 2000, 2005) similarly identifies three discourses of social exclusion: 
the redistributionist discourse (RED), the moral underclass discourse (MUD), and the social 
integrationist discourse (SID). The redistributionist discourse (RED), which is similar to 
Silver’s (1994) monopoly or social closure paradigm, emphasizes poverty as a primary cause 
of social exclusion. Poverty means “something more complex than [what] is colloquially 
understood by poverty, in that it is dynamic, processual, multidimensional, and relational, 
and it allows spacefor the understanding that discriminatory and exclusionary practices may 
be causes of poverty…” (Levitas 2000:359.) Consequently, the main policy prescription to 
reduce social exclusion is to decrease poverty by increasing social benefit/welfare levels. 
RED addresses social, political, cultural and economic citizenships, broadening out into a 
critique of inequality (Levitas, 2005:14). The moral underclass discourse (MUD) emphasizes 
cultural rather than material roots of poverty. The focal point of the moral underclass 
discourse is the behavior of the poor, the moral and cultural characteristics of the excluded. 
MUD states that moral characteristics of lower class representatives, such as criminality, 
unemployment, single parenthood, lack of work ethic, and welfare dependency create social 
exclusion. The discourse argues that welfare benefits are bad for people because they weaken 
the latter’s ability to be self sufficient (Levitas 2005:21). The social integrationist discourse 
(SID), which is aligned with Silver’s solidarity paradigm, explains social exclusion largely in 
terms of labor market attachment. SID defines social exclusion as nonparticipation in the 
labor market. In this discourse, social exclusion is argued to be a consequence of 
unemployment.  
Social exclusion is not a uniform concept, and itdefinitely does not refer to the same 
thing in different cultures.Although the concept of social exclusion originated in developed 
countries and, as mentioned earlier, its original meaning was different than its modern 
meaning, there has been a wide application of the phenomenon to developing countries, both 
conceptually and empirically. Most elements of social exclusion and deprivation, such as 
unemployment, problems related to coverage of essential social services, including health 
care and education, issues of status and social empowerment, are problems of general 
concern and often do not recognize national boundaries. Today, policies to eradicate social 
exclusion are popular in most regions of the world, chiefly through the actions of United 
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Nations agencies, the International Labor Organization (ILO) and developmental programs, 
such as the Department for International Development (DFID) in the United Kingdom and 
the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The problem of exclusion 
has been specifically studied in Africa, Latin America, and Asia. Studies of social exclusion 
in those countries include topics, such as exclusion of indigenous people, rural poverty, labor 
reform (Latin America), social change and exclusion of the poor, specifically children 
(Africa), unfair provision of social services, etc.  
Some key nuances in the nature of social exclusion around the world are highlighted 
in Social Exclusion Knowledge Network (SEKN). In Sub-Saharan Africa, for example, the 
leading discourse around social exclusion is focused on poverty, marginalization, 
vulnerability, and sustainable development. In Latin America the discourse is dominated by 
the ‘social risk management’ approach, promoted by the World Bank. “The concept 
repositions the traditional areas of Social Protection (labor market intervention, social 
insurance and social safety nets) in a framework that includes three strategies to deal with 
risk (prevention, mitigation and coping), three levels of formality of risk management 
(informal, market-based, public) and many actors (individuals, households, communities, 
NGOs, governments at various levels and international organizations) against the background 
of asymmetric information and different types of risk” (Holzmann and Jørgensen, 2000:1). In 
south-east Asia, the discussion of social exclusion focuses on primarily poverty and on 
concepts of capability and resource enhancement. In Europe, the discussion of exclusion is 
deeply embedded in parallel concepts, such as social cohesion, social capital, social justice, 
empowerment, emancipation, disaffiliation and marginalization. Discussing the applicability 
of European literature on social exclusion to developing countries, Sen (2000:27) points out 
that social understanding involves give and take, stressing that “the absence of “social safety 
nets” when economic growth falters and lives are battered probably afflicts Asia and Africa 
more than western Europe because of the protection offered by certain features of the 
European “welfare state”.” 
While we can adapt and apply the European notion of social exclusion to other less 
developed regions of the world, there are certain limitations and dangers in doing so. Indeed, 
it is erroneous to apply a concept instituted in industrialized countries with appropriate, well-
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developed welfare systems to countries with poor resources, disadvantaged geopolitics, 
extremely weak governance, and basically non-existent welfare provision. Social Exclusion 
Knowledge Network (SEKN) points out that there is a “danger that ‘exclusion’ may be used 
as a screen to hide extreme poverty and as a blaming label to make the poor responsible for 
their condition” (Popay, et al. 2008:10). Gore and Figueiredo are also concerned about social 
exclusion becoming a “blaming label”, used to make “the poor responsible for the 
predicament as had happened with the term “underclass” in the USA” (Gore and Figueiredo 
1997:44). Application of the concept of social exclusion fashioned in North America and 
Western Europe to developing countries is problematic, because exclusion is often a mass 
phenomenon in many developing countries and not confined to a minority or a categorical 
boundary. Exclusion and inclusion are theoretical concepts, or as de Haan (1998:28) notes, 
exclusion and inclusion are a “lens through which people look at reality and not reality 
itself”. Their operationalization depends on our own methodological perspectives and our 
political leanings. 
The literature emphasizes that while it is normal to address the issue of social 
exclusion in different regions of the world, one should pay attention to the different nuances 
of the problem. In Europe and the US exclusion means predominantly prolonged 
unemployment, loss of rights at work, and loss of social networks. In developing and 
transitioning countries, exclusion is very much associated with the consequences of labor 
market formation and transformation. In the latter, exclusion does not refer to only the loss of 
social ties and affiliations, but also to economic, civil and political marginalization. 
Although after the breakup of the USSR, the formation of labor markets and, due to 
it, transforming employment trends have left millions of people left out of labor market or 
with extremely low salaries, as well as excluded from social services and social networks, 
there is extremely little research on social exclusion in this part of the world. There is an 
abundant literature focusing on poverty and poverty reduction, but not much that is 
concerned with the problem of social exclusion. The few articles of social exclusion in this 
region examine the issue in mainly Russia and Ukraine (Tchernina 1996; Round 2004; 
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Manning, Tikhonova, and George 2004; Rechitsky 2010), leaving ample space for further 
research and empirical analysis on other post-Soviet states.15 
2.3 Economic, Social, and Political Dimensions of Social Exclusion 
The discussion of social exclusion is often emphasized in terms of processes and 
dynamics rather than as a condition. According to UK Department for International 
Development (DFID) Social Exclusion Review, social exclusion can be a condition or an 
outcome on one hand, and a dynamic process on the other (DFID, 2005:8). In the case of 
social exclusion as a condition, groups of society are excluded from participation in their 
society, mainly due to their social identity (race, gender, nationality, religion, sexual 
orientation, etc.) or social location (remote or rural areas, poor with resources, suffering from 
war or conflict). As a dynamic process, social exclusion refers to certain relations and 
barriers that block equal opportunities and citizenship. In this case of exclusion, we deal with 
social and political relations that hinder access to organizational and institutional sites of 
power. DFID, thus, provides a good definition of social exclusion in the following way: 
“Social exclusion is a process and a state that prevents individuals or groups from 
participation in social, economic and political life and from asserting their rights. It derives 
from exclusionary relationships based on power”. (DFID, 2005:9)  
Figure 2.1 presents the three processes that comprise social exclusion. While the three 
circles of exclusion are important, the central quadrangle that deals with social relations and 
powers, organizations and institutions is the most interesting part to research. There are 
theories that examine these relations. Weber’s theory of “social closure” (1958) and Tilly’s 
theory of “opportunity hoarding” (1998) examine the interaction of groups from the point of 
view of acquiring resources and power.16 In both these cases, certain groups of people, most 
typically powerful elites, exploit and monopolize resources excluding others from sharing 
with them. 
                                                 
15To the best of my knowledge, Nazim Habibov's "Self-perceived social stratification in low-income 
transitional countries: Examining the multi-country survey in Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia" is one of the 
first studies concerned with social polarization in the South Caucasus region. The social implications and 
empirical findings of Habibov's work will be briefly described in Chapter 4, Public Perceptions of Social 
Exclusion.  
16 For a thorough discussion of Weber’s “social closure” theory, see also Collins 1974; Collins 1979; Parkin 
1979, Bourdieu 1984; and Murphy 1988. 
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Figure 2.1: Social, Economic and Political Dimensions of Social Exclusion 
Source: DFID “Social Exclusion Review”, London, 2005, page 9. 
Tilly’s exploitation or “opportunity hoarding” is defined as a situation where 
members of a network “acquire access to a resource … supportive of network activities” 
(Tilly 1998:10). To Weber, the idea of closure is related to exploitation based on both 
property advantages and forms of prestige or status. Not only power and status, but also 
ethnicity and kinship, as in the case of hoarders, may become sources of exploitation and 
exclusion. Social closure is a process of subordination, where a group closes opportunities 
for others, who are accepted as more inferior and ineligible (Murphy, 1988:8).  
Similar to DFID, Weber and Tilly, Bhala and Laperye conclude that social exclusion 
is a multidimensional concept, and that its analysis should be studied as a result of dynamic 
causal factors (as presented in Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2). This process embraces economic 
marginalization, social disintegration and political polarization. Economic exclusion mainly 
concerns the lack of employment and worsening of income distribution over time. Long 
periods of unemployment deprive people of not only income, but also social legitimacy, 
social status, prestige and participation in decision-making. These two dimensions strongly 
affect the political dimension of exclusion that according to the UNDP (1992:29) includes 
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personal security, rule of law, freedom of expression, political participation, and equality of 
opportunity. Exclusion in each dimension increases the risk of exclusion in the other two. 
However, a person who is economically excluded is not necessarily excluded in one or two 
of the other two dimensions, and vice versa.  
Figure 2.2:Economic marginalization, social disintegration and political polarization 
Source: Bhala and Laperye, “Poverty and Exclusion in a Global World”, Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2004. 
Exclusion from economic life is expressed by unequal assets, incomes and 
employment opportunities. People are economically excluded when they have limited or no 
access to material resources due to external forces. They are marginalized in the distribut ion 
of economic resources. Once this dimension of exclusion marginalizes certain groups of a 
society, they are likely to be further excluded from the other two dimensions as well. While 
many major reports on poverty, such as World Bank or UN reports indicate sharp inequalities 
of incomes between, for example rural and urban areas in developing countries, access to 
social services and political participation is often not taken into account.   
Exclusion from social services is expressed by unequal access to various public 
services. People are socially excluded if they face limited or no access to social services, 
such as education, health care and medicine, social protection, basic infrastructure and 
transport, water and energy. Here exclusion refers to not only the availability and quality, but 
Economic Marginalization 
(insecure and low-paid jobs; long-term 
and recurrentunemployment) 
Social Marginalization 
(loss of networking and 
opportunities for social participation)  
Political Marginalization 
(loss of participation andinfluence) 
Political Polarization 
(loss of social cohesion) 
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also to accessibility and affordability of those services. For example, population groups 
residing in villages or mountainous areas might have worse access to water than those living 
in urban areas. Another example of social exclusion for the same group may be rare access to 
internet technologies.  
Exclusion from political life is expressedbyinequalities in political, cultural and civic 
opportunities, liberty and justice, as well as unfair exercise of power. Political exclusion 
occurs not only through formal institutions but also may happen due to lack of access to 
informal structures and opportunities.  
There isa popular assertion within the social exclusion literature to attach more 
weight to the distributional issues when dealing with the economic dimension of exclusion. 
In the case of social and political dimensions, greater attention is paid to relational issues. 
One should not forget, though, that these two are closely correlated. Unemployment not only 
excludes the individual from having income; it is related to the concept of entitlement, which 
extends beyond the pure economic dimension. Very simply, if an individual does not have 
income, he/she is likely to be excluded of appropriate social status and social legitimacy. If 
lack of employment continues for a long period of time, the individual finds himself/herself 
within a vicious cycle of denial: denial of revenue and output, denial of other economic rights 
and opportunities, access to various social services and networks, and finally, this process 
fails to recognize the person’s productive role as a human being in a society. All of these 
significantly affect human ability, desire and inclusion in political engagement. Thus, another 
social dimension concerns participation of social groups in decision-making. Other indicators 
of the social aspect of exclusion are increasing violence and crime, and increasing number of 
prisoners. The most popular indicators of social well-being are related to the quality of health 
and educational services and whether one can access those services at all.  
Bhalla and Lapeyre (1999/2004) conclude three most important aspects of the social 
aspect of exclusion as follows: 
a) Access to social services, such as health and education; 
b) Access to the labor market; and 
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c) Level of social participation reflected in a weakening of social fabric, as measured by 
greater crime, juvenile delinquency and homelessness, etc. 
This summary yet again shows the link between the economic and social dimensions 
of exclusion; both dimensions are heavily dependent on access to the labor market, health 
and education.  
Bhalla and Laperye (2004) suggest that the distributional problems (the economic 
dimension) are more predominant in developing countries and relational problems (the social 
dimension) are more predominant in the industrialized ones. According to them, in 
developing countries the lack of the welfare state is substituted and ameliorated by social and 
family ties and kinship networks, and thus serves as risk insurance for the unemployed. The 
authors argue that the decline of social institutions, such as family and marriage and social 
support networks, as well as long-term unemployment results from the wealth and 
appropriate welfare system in the industrialized countries, while in developing countries, 
despite the newly-emerging industrialization trend, social networks continue to prevail. Here, 
people fight against exclusion through informal institutional mechanisms to substitute for the 
formal ones (Bhalla and Laperye, 2004:90-91).  
As a theoretical concept, social exclusion does not focus on bounded groups, but 
stresses social relations and processes through which people are deprived. In social 
exclusion, as a multi-dimensional concept, people can be excluded from employment, 
earnings, property, education, health services, personal contacts or respect, freedom of 
speech, political participation or activism, etc. All of these create a cycle of socio-economic 
and political disadvantages. A second aspect of the concept, which is less discussed but quite 
relevant for the theoretical contribution of the concept, considers relations and processes.  
There is a clear link between economic and social indicators and weak socio-political 
participation. Long-term unemployment, for example, has a significant effect on not only 
material deprivation but also on social marginalization and political polarization, or in other 
words, on both distributionaland relational aspects in societies where employment and 
workplace is core to not only having income but also social recognition and status. The 
workplace also provides opportunities for social networks. Employment loss, thus, results in 
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loss of solidarity networks and a sense of social inferiority, isolation and alienation. This, in 
its turn, affects the ability and extent of socially isolated and alienated people to political 
participation. The accumulation of disadvantages on each level aggravates social exclusion, 
and if this state lasts for a long time, social exclusion becomes durable.  
Defining and understanding social exclusion is much easier than measuring it. There 
have been a few efforts to measure social exclusion or roots of deprivation. Haan (1999:11-
12) mentions some sources and methods, such as UNDP’s Human Development Index and 
poverty assessments’ ‘correlates of poverty’, London Research Center’s index of deprivation 
areas that focus on the polarization within British cities, and other 30-40 quantitative 
measures created by the EU, the French Action Plan for Employment and Britain’s New 
Labor’s ‘poverty charter’. Paugam (1995) also uses a quantitative analysis of correlations 
between elements of deprivation in order to examine ‘spirals of precariousness’ of French 
deprived neighborhoods.  
Employing quantitative analysis is useful in measuring social exclusion, but again it 
does not sufficiently cover relations. It demonstrates that, for example, an individual or a 
number of individuals in a society are excluded from, for instance, employment, but it does 
not lay out the scenarios why the same people are excluded also from politics and policy 
making.  
In this study, social exclusion as an outcome or condition is analyzed through 
measuring the following phenomena, which are key elements of social exclusion and which 
include all three dimensions of social exclusion:  
 Gini coefficient rates, 
 Lack of employment or exclusion from the labor market, 
 Lack of access to education to acquire skills, 
 Lack of access to health services, and therefore inequalities in health, 
 Increasing homelessness; 
 Increasing crime rates. 
 Increased feeling of insecurity; 
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 Self-perception of lower-status social identity;17 
 Decreased freedom of speech;  
 Administrative difficulties to run for parliamentary or presidential elections and 
extremely unequal chances to win in elections by secondary political party members or 
independent candidates. 
 More cases of political arrests and uncovered cases of politicians’ and/or politically 
active citizens’ assassination.  
 Human rights abuses in general.  
2.4 Causes of Social Exclusion 
Various interpretations of social exclusion, as well as its multidimensional nature, 
allow scholars to focus on a variety of causes and multiple origins of social exclusion. Every 
human being has a set of characteristics that will create a certain threat of social exclusion for 
him/her. These features may be gender, age, language, religion, norms and values, disability, 
as well as socio-economic status, such as educational level, employment, wealth, networks. 
Any of these characteristics alone is not always enough to put a person at risk of marginality; 
most often social exclusion manifests, when these characteristics interact with other causes of 
social exclusion related to formal and informal institutions, state elites, and governmenta l 
policies. 
The causes of social exclusion have been attributed mainly to socio-economic 
changes of labor markets in free-market economies and to the flaws of government policies 
and services. Labor markets often foment social exclusion; yet, it would be erroneous to say 
that social exclusion depends on the deficiencies of labor market alone.A free-market system 
is basically an arrangement through which people interact and undertake mutually beneficial 
activities, thus theoretically, it is irrational to blame the market mechanism for social 
exclusion. Existence of free markets per se does not create inequalities. Exclusionary 
practices arise when the employment of markets is not done properly: when there are 
insufficient assets, when there is inadequate preparedness to effectively organize market 
transactions, a very limited role of the state in the market regulations, unconstrained disguise 
of information by business leaders, and financial activities that allow the powerful to exclude 
                                                 
17 By social identity I mean the devaluation of people based on who they are or rather who they are perceived to  
be.  
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others from processes and fruits of markets. This is how in practice a market mechanism 
becomes a culprit of unfairness and exclusion. The inclusiveness or exclusiveness of a 
market depends on the conditions in which social opportunities offered by the state and other 
institutions can be commonly shared instead of being reserved for a limited elite.  
Exclusion may also be reinforced by history, religion, traditions and culture of a 
country, and embedded in dominant social attitudes, behaviors and prejudicial practices. It 
may be perpetuated by authoritarian and exclusive state leaders and political elites that 
concentrate power and centralize decision making process. Social exclusion, as a process of 
discrimination on the basis of economic class, ethnic status, as well as racial and cultural 
identity, results from policies which are embedded in the formal institutions of the state. 
Weak civil society is another reason for a society not to be able to become more inclusive. 
Finally, exogenous factors, such as external shocks, are sometimes important in creating 
exclusionary practices.  
The causes of social exclusion may be systematized into three main groups: 1) causes 
that are analyzed through the lens of agency, 2) structural/institutional causes, and 3) causes 
originating from perverse, pathological, antisocial, and self-destructive values and lifestyles. 
Authors, who focus on agency as a main cause of social exclusion, argue that exclusion 
arises from discriminatory policies and actions of a state, a consequence of certain actions of 
a society’s political, social, and economic elites, who pursue privileges for themselves, 
excluding other members of a society. “Powerful class and status groups, which have distinct 
social and cultural identities as well as institutions, use social closure to restrict the access of 
outsiders to valued resources (such as jobs, good benefits, education, urban locations, valued 
patterns of consumption)” (Saraceno 2002:7-8). The disadvantaged groups of the society 
often do not challenge those elites because they are incapable of enforcing rights that 
undergird inclusion and/or power to do so. 
The second group, which possibly is the most prevalent one, explores the institutiona l 
basis of social exclusion and is popular in research analyzing exclusion in Europe.18 Authors 
that belong to this school of thought propose that an individual’s opportunities within a 
                                                 
18 A more detailed account of institutional causes of social exclusion in Europe is presented by Evans (1998).   
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society chiefly depend on the type of institutions and the way they function. Institutions are 
key instruments for promotion of social cohesion, and they are responsible for social 
exclusion, because they limit access to resources and opportunities necessary for inclusion, 
such as, for instance, adequate training and education, insurance and assistance, legal rights 
and protection, as well as property rights. It is important to mention that those limitations are 
sometimes unintended and are beyond the control of a single institution. A legal framework 
that is discriminatory or inadequate in its implementation, such as a flawed legislation, 
expands the exclusion of some social groups. Often, particularly in developing countries, 
informal rules and cultural behavior may be at the root of social exclusion. Certain values 
and norms are discriminatory against an individual or a social group, such as females in the 
labor market and/or refugees in political, social and cultural life. Minority ethnic 
communities may be denied educational opportunities available for some others. Refugees 
may be denied citizenship. People may be openly discriminated against in the labor market 
because of their nationality, language, creed, skin color, or just because they are 
handicapped. 
While unfair policies and exclusive attitudes of government authorities (agency as a 
cause of social exclusion) or bad institutional design (structural drivers of exclusion) are 
important and predominant drivers of social exclusion, there are individuals or groups of 
individuals within the society, who are themselves responsible for their own disadvantage. In 
this case, exclusion is attributed to perverse, pathological and antisocial values and behaviors 
of those groups. This perspective is equivalent to Levitas’s (1998, 2000, 2005) moral 
underclass discourse of social exclusion, which suggests that the norms, behaviors, values 
and attitudes of certain individuals or groups lead to their marginality. Those are believed to 
be low-income, drug and alcohol using people, criminals, single and underage parents, etc.  
The institutional drivers of social exclusion include various causes, among which the 
most commonly mentioned ones are globalization and economic restructuring. These two 
have a strong impact on labor markets and employment trends and undermine the role of 
state in regards to provision of welfare and social assistance. Other institutional/structural 
sources of exclusion include, but are not limited to the following: 1) advancement of the 
knowledge-based society and technological evolution, which marginalize technologically-
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challenged people and people with outdated knowledge and skills; 2) demographic changes, 
such as immigration, declining birth rates, and increasing ethnic and religious diversity; and 
3) territorialism (The European Commission (2000, 2001)).  
The 2001 Social Exclusion Unit, UK, indicates two main institutional causes. The 
first group of causes has economic and social character and includes: 1) economic 
restructuring; 2) family restructuring; and 3) community polarization with decreased and 
weak social networks and other support groups. The other group of causes originates from 
ineffective government policies, working methods, and coordination.  
A significant categorization of sources of social exclusion is offered by Atkinson and 
Davoudi (2000). Their framework includes causes that have been already identified in earlier 
paragraphs, but the organization is more clearly arranged into four key societal institutions: 
1) the legal system; 2) the labor market; 3) the social welfare system; and 4) family and 
community system. Because social rights are embedded in those institutional systems, social 
exclusion occurs if any of these institutional subsystems breaks down or becomes 
discriminatory. Atkinson and Davoudi’s framework clearly highlights the multidimensional 
nature of the phenomenon of social exclusion. 
Kaasa (2003) offers another comprehensive overview of factors affecting income 
inequality as a part of social exclusion. Kaasa organizes all of the factors thought to affect 
inequality in transition economies into five categories: (1) economic growth and overall 
development level of a country, (2) macroeconomic factors, (3) demographic factors, (4) 
political factors, and (5) historical, cultural, and natural factors.  
Within the institutional drivers of social exclusion, Keane and Prasad (2001) stress 
education to be an essential factor affecting income inequality in transition economies. The 
authors argue that the financial return to education and experience increased dramatically in 
transitioning societies, increasing labor earnings inequality. 
Besides the above-mentioned causes, exclusion is also influenced by the local 
context, such as for example type of residence (urban vs. rural, the latter of which is often 
away from industrial centers and employment opportunities, vibrant cultural and political 
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activities), existence of religious and ethnic diversity, existence of natural resource wealth, 
etc. Local context may deepen exclusion or, vice versa, promote inclusion. 
A myriad of factors that include institutional or non-institutional sources of social 
exclusion lies within each of the above mentioned categories. Addressing the particular 
effects of each of these factors lies outside of the scope of this chapter, but a few of them that 
are deemed in mainstream literature to be particularly significant in determining social 
exclusion will be addressed below. Among those are privatization and changes in market 
labor, weak/strong civil society, natural resource abundance, and finally exclusive and 
militarized state elites. 
2.4.1. Globalization, Privatization, and Labor Markets:Economic growth remains at the heart 
of strategies to decrease or eliminate poverty and social exclusion. Economic and social 
exclusion, however, persist along with economic expansion. While economic growth, 
calculated as gross national income (GNI), is strongly correlated with key human 
development indicators, the chronically poor are the least likely to benefit from growth 
(Global Chronic Poverty [GCP] 2004-5:37). An argument that economic growth increases 
inequality, giving rise to higher income poverty for an average GNI per capita, is currently 
mainstream (Global Chronic Poverty (GCP) 2004-5:37). The post-Soviet literature largely 
connects economic growth, as well as, issues of inequality, to the nature of the privatizat ion 
process that post-Soviet republics experienced.  
Privatization is broadly defined as “the shifting of a function, either in whole or in 
part, from the public sector to the private sector” (Butler, in Gormley 1991:17). Privatization 
increases reliance on the private sector and the market system, and shrinks the role of the 
state to pursue social goals. The literature on privatization is quite large and a review of it 
demonstrates that the field touches upon too many areas, and has proponents, skeptics as well 
as opponents. The theoretical framework behind the idea of privatization is largely dependent 
on understanding the concept of property rights. In order to develop a market system, people 
have to effectively deal with transactions. Competitive markets, in which transactions are 
best handled by market prices, rely heavily on formal, well-defined property rights (Mankiw, 
2001). The proponents of privatization also argue that governments have become very large 
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and quite bureaucratized and thus, are not efficient. They contend that the private sector is 
more motivated in the maximization of production and output.  
Poole (1996), a fervent supporter of privatization, mentions that by increasing the 
private sector, the government collects taxes from the privatized firms and is able to diminish 
over-borrowing and continuous national debt. He also argues that privatization provides 
ownership for a large percentage of the society, which is yet another incentive for 
underdeveloped or developing countries to take the privatization path. Another advantage of 
privatization is the emergence and boost of foreign direct investments that affects economic 
growth.  
Many of the privatization opponents would agree to some of the points expressed by 
the supporters of privatization, specifically, that private firms have a more efficient 
production and output results. Nonetheless, some of the above-presented assumptions and 
other aspects of the privatization process have been critiqued. Most essentially, the 
importance of equitable concerns, such as income distribution, has been ignored to a great 
extent by the privatization proponents. Even disregarding the issues of equality and social 
inclusion, there is literature demonstrating that the efficiency implications of private 
ownership are dubious, and there is a need for government intervention.  
In their article “From State to Market: A survey of Empirical Studies”, Megginson 
and Netter (2001) survey the rapidly growing literature on privatization and present the 
promises and perils of privatization as an economic policy in Russia and former Soviet 
republics. In doing so, the authors suggest that it is difficult to summarize privatization 
effects in post-Soviet countries, based on four reasons. 1) The transition from socialism to 
capitalism was a very complicated process in this region, because these republics had 
experienced the longest communist control, and moreover, this transition coincided with the 
breakup of the USSR as a whole economic system. 2) The contraction in output that occurred 
in the FSU was much greater than anywhere else, yet there has been no upturn, making it 
difficult to document relative performance improvement. 3) Most post-Soviet republics, 
specifically Russia, experienced worsening economies after 1997, so examining the impact 
of privatization at different time periods in the same country or region would lead to different 
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conclusions. And finally, 4) studies on the post-Soviet republics rely on survey data or 
anecdotal evidence, so the material here for empirical analysis is of much poorer quality than 
in other regions (Megginson and Netter, 2001:35). Therefore, a conclusion that economic and 
political merits of private ownership are greater than those of government ownership is 
flawed, and should not be extrapolated to individual countries or regions. Instead, each 
country’s privatization process has brought its own benefits and perils that should be studied.  
Contrary to Megginson and Netter, Nancy Birdsall and John Nellis (2002) in 
“Winners and Losers: Assessing the Distributional Impact of Privatization” conclude that 
most privatization programs have worsened the distribution of assets and income, at least in 
the short run. According to them, it has provided opportunities for the enrichment of the agile 
and corrupt, making the wealthy wealthier and the poor poorer. “The complaint is that, even 
if privatization contributes to improved efficiency and financial performance (and some 
contest this as well), it has a negative effect on the distribution of wealth, income and 
political power” (Birdsall and Nellis, 2002:2). With an overall negative attitude towards 
privatization, the authors’ conclusion, however, is that the distributional effects of 
privatization depend on initial conditions, the sale event, and the post-privatization political 
and economic environment of a country. 
Other theories of privatization and issues closely related to privatization, such as 
openness to trade and globalization, help in restricted ways to address but not adequately 
explain social exclusion in post-Soviet Armenia. Some, opposite to conventional wisdom, 
say that greater openness to trade has been accompanied with increasing rather than reducing 
wage inequality (Wood 1997), others relate globalization with less polarization of 
distribution (Aisbett 2005), while others explain the phenomenon of inequality and exclusion 
through stages of relative dependence on foreign direct investments (Kentor 1998; Alderson 
and Nielson 1999). More helpful views, which are closely related to the privatization 
hypothesis developed in this study, are stated by Branco Milanovich and Stephen Haber. 
Milanovich (1999) points out that the most important factor driving inequality upwards is 
increased inequality of wage distribution, which is, indeed, common sense. Haber (2002) 
examines distribution from quite another angle. He theorizes that crony capitalism (defined 
as a system, in which those close to the political authorities who make and enforce policies, 
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receive favors that have large economic value) has negative consequences for the distribution 
of income. In this system, which is similar to the modern Armenian state, privileged asset 
holders earn rents on behalf of everyone else in the society. 
Privatization typically modifies the institutional framework through which people 
formulate, mediate and promote their interests. The consequences of this institutional 
restructuring do not work the same way for all social groups. Some social groups and strata 
benefit more, as they find their interests more clearly defined and more easily promoted, 
while others find themselves in more disadvantaged circumstances, as they lack free access 
to social services previously arranged by the state. Although much of the literature 
deemphasizes privatization as a political process and analyzes it as “a pragmatic adaptation 
of well-tested administrative techniques or a necessary exercise in economic adjustment to 
structural constraints”, privatization should be regarded as an intensely political 
phenomenon, considering the nature of the-above mentioned consequences (Feigenbaum and 
Henig, 1994:186).  
The literature that connects privatization to social exclusion provides a variety of 
approaches to modeling social exclusion. It analyzes how different aspects of the 
privatization process cause or determine social inequalities. In their analysis of social 
inclusion Barlow, Grimalda, and Meschi (2009) regress Gini coefficient, as a determinant of 
income inequality, on globalization variables (imports, exports, and foreign direct 
investment), institutional variables (privatization and price liberalization), control variables, 
and a time trend on inequality. Their main finding is that price liberalization has the strongest 
effect on income inequality. Bennett, Estrin, and Urga (2007) similarly argue that voucher 
privatization significantly increased GDP, at the same time causing growth in inequality. 
Kornei (2006) offers a more general discussion of how privatization affects levels of income 
inequality in transition economies. He attributes most of income inequality to structural 
unemployment, which he deems an inevitable aspect of transition. Whereas a socialist 
economy typically guaranteed job security for the overwhelming percentage of its society, 
the post-transition capitalist system created unemployment that most citizens had never 
experienced. Besides the unemployment increase that the capitalist system created through 
privatization of firm and companies, people additionally were not knowledgeable about 
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important issues of the capitalist system, such as vouchers, price fluctuations, interest rates, 
and floating exchange rates. According to Kornei, the lack of knowledge on these issues most 
strongly affected income inequality. 
Privatization and free trade are associated with sharp increases in relative deprivation 
and unequal distribution of sources of wealth and prosperity, which are only intensified by 
reduced state protection (Chua 2003; Storm and Rao 2004: 573–74; Nissanke and Thorbecke 
2006). While capitalist relationships perpetuate inequalities and exclusion within a society, 
the popular idea of globalization incessantly denies capitalism as a “system of power and 
conflict” (Fine 2004: 586, 588). The logic of globalization chiefly focuses on the ways 
political economy of capitalism generates wealth, with infrequent assessments of national 
policies and domestic traditions of distribution of that wealth, and ignores the social 
irrationality of neoliberal order that brings massive suffering (Robinson 2002:1057, 1062) 
For example, the socialist economic transition to market economy was accompanied with 
loss of property and work entitlements for millions (Humphrey 1996-7, in Elyachar 2005, 
page 30).  
Exclusionary practices are thoroughly embedded in the operations of labor markets.  
A market economy is typically characterized with high rates of unemployment, 
discriminatory practices, lack of basic legal protection on the job, extremely low wages, long 
working hours, etc.  All these processes solidify social exclusion by creating segregation of 
underpaid or low-paid workers in poor neighborhoods, social stigma related to poor-quality 
jobs, low income and pitiable lifestyle. Most notoriously, market economies are also 
associated with child labor and early school leaving, which have a lifelong impact on 
opportunities.   
In conclusion, the literature identifies three major ways through which labor markets 
can become agents of social exclusion (Mazza 2004:181). Table 2.2identifies exclusion 
features of each of these three forms of social exclusion more specifically. 
 Lack of access to jobs (unemployment, severe underemployment) 
 Access to only very low wage, (“poverty” employment) 
 Lack of access to quality jobs with mobility. 
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Table 2.2: Principal Forms of Labor Market Exclusion 
Type oflabor 
market 
exclusion 
Chief labor 
marketcharacteristic 
Exclusion features 
Type 1 
Lack of access 
to jobs 
Open unemployment; 
Discouraged workers 
Discrimination; 
Family and community isolation 
Type 2 
Access to only 
low-wage 
“poverty” 
employment 
Low wage employment or 
employment under poverty 
line; 
High rates of informality; 
Very low returns to labor 
Poverty and associated social exclusion; 
Long working hours; 
Lack of benefits; 
Greater likelihood of unhealthy working 
conditions; 
Physical or spatial segregation in poor 
regions or neighborhoods 
Type 3 
Lack of access 
to quality jobs 
with mobility 
Underemployment; 
Poor quality and low 
productivity work; 
Low returns to labor 
Lack of access to social networks for 
advancement; 
Employment trap with little chance of 
improvement 
Lack of access to productivity 
enhancing training 
Source: Mazza 2004:182.  
2.4.2. Civil Society:A strong civil society provides excellent opportunities for people to join 
groups based on different causes, needs and social features. It, therefore, represents a main 
protection of rights and is an important safeguard against social exclusion. A civil society 
with strong foundations and powerful structures may encourage the adoption of more 
inclusive policies in a country. On the contrary, a weak civil society and its lack of capacity 
to act as a check on the accountability of leaders creates an environment conducive to 
inequality in various spheres of society and the persistence of exclusion. Independent and 
unbiased mass media, non-government organizations with missions oriented at inclusive 
policies, and strong social movements, specifically youth movements are important elements 
of vibrant civil society.  
Media is an important agent structuring people’s everyday life. Today’s media 
constructs the image of outer reality. In this capacity, mass media can be either objective or 
biased sources of dissemination of information. Unbiased media, especially investigative 
media, can be an essential source of social inclusion in as much as it objectively portrays new 
policies, discusses their benefits and disadvantages for the society, finds out dishonest 
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government officials and their actions, uncovers socially outlawed and taboo issues, informs 
the public about the wrongdoers, and equips people with legal or non-legal ways and 
methods to deal with them. On the other hand, biased media can contribute to discrimination 
against members of different social groups or minorities by either publishing or announcing 
predisposed and unfair information about them or in the least by failing to explicitly 
deprecate this information. Thus, mass media affects those groups’ exclusion from the 
majority of the society. The same type of biased approach can support certain candidates 
during elections, thus becoming a political source of discrimination and exclusion for the rest 
of the candidates, as well as the electorate.  
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) also play a significant role in minimizing 
social exclusion on all three levels: economic, political and social. They equip marginal 
groups, which are excluded from employment markets, political participation, social services 
and networks with knowledge and essential skills to participate in the market-place, in 
policy-making, and in social networking. Those agencies not only help the excluded groups 
indirectly by providing a set of skills, but also support those groups directly by providing 
finances, goods and products essential for survival. There are dozens of examples of the 
latter. A good example is microcredit programs that have proven to be a particularly 
successful method to enable people to improve their household situation and lifestyles. Other 
effective programs are health and education related projects that supply marginal groups in 
developing countries with medicine and medical equipment, educational materials and 
equipment. Agricultural projects immensely assist farmers in rural areas, who otherwise 
would be doomed to unemployment and lack of means to provide for their families.  
It is not disputable that the NGO sector, mainly financed and implemented by 
Western donors, such as the USAID (United States Agency for International Development), 
different UN (United Nations) agencies, World Vision, World Learning, the World Bank, 
and the Eurasia Foundation, has had a significant impact in the decrease of social exclusio n. 
While civil society efforts to create socially more inclusive societies in developing countries 
are important, they do not have a long-term impact on the reduction of social exclusion. It 
does not affect the intergenerational or durable social exclusion significantly. A popular 
Chinese proverb follows: “Give a man a fish and you feed him for a day. Teach a man to fish 
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and you feed him for a lifetime”. Most of the NGOs, for example, whether local or 
international give the developing societies ‘food’ for a day or so, but very few teach them to 
fish.  
2.4.3. Natural Resources and Resource Curse:While it is not certain that increased inequality 
may be a result of natural resource wealth, often termed as the ‘oil curse’, there is a prevalent 
assertion that natural resource wealth is related to the rise of authoritarian trends and, 
consequently, an increase of inequality (Engerman and Sokoloff 2002; Kaasa 2005; Scherbak 
2010) The abundance of natural resources is in general associated with a higher 
concentration of ownership and rent, which in their turn affect the increase of income 
inequality (Gupta, Davoodi and Alonso-Terme, 2002).   
Scherbak (2010) states that based on statistical data in the late 1990s inequality 
increased in post-Soviet countries that were rich in resources, and it decreased in post-Soviet 
countries that were poor in resources. This happened because state elites of oil-rich states aim 
to preserve their control over rents, and to maximize their share of the rent. According to 
Scherbak, all the successful post-Soviet"color revolutions" occurred in the resource-poor 
countries, such as Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan. In oil-rich countries – Azerbaijan, 
Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Russia – any social movements challenging the ruling elites 
either failed or did not take place at all. “In these countries the governments have more to 
lose if they lose power, especially with the rally of oil prices on world markets.” (Scherbak, 
2010:64)   
Scherbak is right indicating that natural resources may be related to increase of 
inequality, but he fails to notice that continued waves of social movements did not succeed in 
some resource-poor countries as well. Armenia is an example of it. This certainly points to 
the idea that being blessed with natural resources does not necessarily mean for a country to 
be highly exclusionary, or vice versa. Armenia does not possess oil or other natural 
resources, but its society is quite polarized with a high degree of social exclusion for certain 
classes of the society. Therefore, to reason that natural resource wealth is a resource curse 
and a source of social exclusion might not be universal. The effect of abundant natural 
resources on social exclusion should be examined in combination with globalization and 
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market operations, institutional weaknesses of a country, its state structure and its coercive 
strength.  
2.4.4. Nature of State Elites: Repressive States:A prodigious amount of research is available 
on the state-society relationship, and how a weak or an exclusive state can impact 
polarization and marginalization within a society. There are couple of ways a state can 
induce social exclusion, such as red tape, bureaucracy, insufficient state support related to 
social welfare and citizens’ rights protection through legal system, complete absence of 
market regulation by the state, and finally through a state leader with authoritarian 
inclinations and practices. Simply, a state can create or worsen social exclusion through 
bureaucratic tendencies, monopolization of political power, skewed state policy choices, and 
coercive practice and human rights violations towards its citizens.   
In most post-Soviet countries, for example, state bureaucracy typically revolves 
around documentation requirements.Public officials are very rigid in creating alternative 
routes or rules of gaining access to resources, besides the requirement to present certain 
documentation. Documentation as a means of excluding the poor is commonly cited in 
reports as a motive for their inability to access resources. Other bureaucratic barriers are the 
resentment and unfairness that excluded people, particularly single mothers and the elderly, 
often face. Documentation as a requirement is a device through which certain groups are 
socially excluded, a device that allows the state to deny services and resources to certain 
groups. This happens especially in the judicial and the welfare system. Another way to 
exclude people is asking for bribes in return to access to institutions or services. This is also 
practiced in most of the post-Soviet countries, where due to lack of money or connections 
people are discriminated against for nearly any kind of service, resource or life opportunity: a 
job, health care, social security, pensions, admission to universities, trading licenses, etc.  
A weak state is also a means through which social exclusion perpetuates. In this 
sense, the state does not try or is unable to intervene in unemployment and poverty reduction, 
equal access to education and health services. When the state does not intervene in reducing 
poverty, unemployment, and increasing equal access opportunities to education and health 
services, social exclusion deepens. As the formal state weakens, state elites gain increasing 
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power and they exercise it arbitrarily and without punishment. Public officials demand bribes 
without impunity or even threaten brutality by using the police or the security system in 
general. Poor and powerless citizens in this atmosphere feel unprotected and rejected as 
compared to fellow citizens who have networks and powerful resources.    
Bureaucratic states elites that support policies in favor of certain classes are typical 
not only in developing countries, but also in Western societies. This tendency, however, is 
stronger in developing countries, where the level of state elites’ power and how they choose 
to exercise that power may be a substantial means of societal polarization.  The exclusion of 
social groups occurs within a political economy that allocates scarce resources, when power 
is exerted by state officials, police, contractors, employers or traders to the disadvantage of 
poor people. It is achieved through the arrangement of formal systems of public policies and 
laws. In societies with high degrees of social exclusion, the decision making power of the 
ruling elite is manifest mainly in the skewed targeting of public services. 
The nature and extent of state repression is another important factor in explaining 
levels of social exclusion. State repression and authoritarian tendencies in their turn are 
typically related to an increase of the size of the coercive apparatus of the state. An 
authoritarian state with increased militarization is a critical causal mechanism for the rise of 
inequality and exclusion (Ross 1999, 2001; Torvik 2002; Robinson, Torvik, and Verdier 
2006; Mehlum, Moene, and Torvik 2006; Scherbak 2008).Mann defines state militarization 
as “preparation for war as a normal and desirable social activity” (Mann, 1987:35).  Other 
definitions of the concept are quite similar (Andreski 1954 and 1968, Huntington 1957, 
Janowitz 1964 and 1977, Dunne and Smith 1990, Bowman 2002).  
The foundation of the militarization scholarship is basically rooted in three authors’ 
works: Stanislav Andreski, Samuel Huntington, and Morris Janowitz. Among these founding 
works on the theme, Andreski’s “Military Organization and Society” is more appealing for 
the sake of this dissertation’s research question. He notes that war-making can either increase 
or decrease social stratification depending on the military participation ratio (MPR).The 
higher this ratio, the less stratification (1968:30). Although there is a similar line between the 
hypothesis of this study that militarization is a major factor underlying social exclusion and 
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Andreski’s judgment about the relationship between militancy and social stratification, my 
argument is a direct challenge to Andreski’s assertion that a high MPR flattens social 
stratification.  
Andreski re-examined his statement in a second edition noting that a high level of 
militarism causes less stratification, when there exists an external threat, as the latter 
heightens national cohesion. Similar to Andreski, Janowitz’s “The Military in the Political 
Development of New Nations” (1964) is also positive about the political capacity of military 
forces. It explains the greater political capacity and power of military institutions and its 
authorities. The significance of the military in internal political affairs is mainly due to the 
fact that the military has control over instruments of violence. According to Janowitz, the 
army is a device for developing a sense of identity, building morale and has the ability to 
enhance human capital by providing education and training.19 Later, in 1977, Janowitz 
reevaluates the control structure of the military in his new book “Military Institutions and 
Coercion in the Developing Nations”. Here, the military structure includes the paramilitary 
forces. Paramilitary forces are “essentially including the different types of national police 
forces and those militia personnel who have internal security functions” (Janowitz 1977:29).  
Another scholar of the field, Marek Thee, distinguishes between militarization and 
militarism. Militarism is a set of “such symptoms as rush to armaments, the growing role of 
our military  (understood as the military establishment) in national and international affairs, 
the use of force as an instrument of supremacy and political power and the increasing 
influence to civilian affairs”. Militarization is “an extension of military influence to civilian 
spheres, including economic and socio-political life” (Eide and Thee, 1980:15). In the same 
collection of essays, “Problems of Contemporary Militarism”, militarism is defined by Jan 
Oberg as “merging of major civil and military interests” (page 49). The best exposition, 
which is very elegant although again broadly expressed, is that “the militarized state-
apparatus is the weapon of the whole monopoly” (page 173). At its most extreme, 
militarization entails subservience of the entire society to the needs of the army, and finally, 
ideology promoting military ideas (Andreski, 1968:429).  
                                                 
19See Morris Janowitz's "Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait", pages 80-83.  
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2.5 Drivers of Social Exclusion in Post-Soviet Societies 
Social inclusion is a critical element of democratic consolidation; thus, existence of 
social exclusion is a deficiency of democratic consolidation, which results in popular 
mobilization. Theories of democratic consolidation may interpret durable social exclusion 
and social unrest, as its consequence, in terms of various factors. Theoretical approaches in 
regard to the foundations of sustainable democracy with equal rights and opportunities 
emphasize economic structures (Gourevitch 1986; Rogowski 1989), political 
institutions(North 1990,Haggard & Kaufman 1992; Stepan and Skach 1993; Tsebelis 1995; 
Stepan and Skach 1993), international and transnational factors (Pridham, Herring and 
Sanford 1994 (1997); Zielonka and Pravda 2001), and civil society (Nichols 1996; Diamond 
1999; O’Loughlin and Bell, 1999; Henderson 2000; Marsh 2000; Paxton 2002; Kuchukeeva 
and O’Loughlin 2003). Among political institutions the focus is on party systems, electoral 
structure, courts and the rule of law. In regard to civil society (associational life), in the 19 th 
century Alexis de Tocqueville (1835-1840) referred to the relationship between civil society 
and democracy. Since then civil society has long been identified as a link to democratic 
governance (Almond and Verba 1989; Putnam 2000 and 2002).  
The most popular insight of the democratic consolidation of post-communist states, 
specifically the Eastern Europe, rests on the process of institution building. The premise of 
the institutionalist literature in comparative politics is that democracy depends not only 
economic and social features of the country, but also on the establishment and design of 
political institutions. Weak institutions are roots of deficient democracy and mass discontent. 
Based on the new institutionalism, transitioning states everywhere – Latin America, Eastern 
Europe, as well as the rest of the post-Soviet states – have had to re-evaluate and re-establish 
not only their economic institutions, economic markets and economic institutions, but also 
their political institutions (Haggard and Kaufman 1992; Przeworski 1991; Clague and 
Rausser 1992; North 1990, Kolodko 1999). In terms of social exclusion, following this 
premise of the institutionalist scholars and practitioners, revamping institutional 
insufficiencies would restore greater social inclusion in economic resources and opportunit ies 
as well as political participation. Continued strengthening of political institutions would 
decrease social unrest and demands of better public policy and equal opportunities. 
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Whereas the widely-advocated institutionalist perspective has potentialities, in many 
post-Soviet countries its application has not resulted in desired outcomes regarding social 
inclusion, at least for the first few decades after the USSR's breakup. Eduardo Silva in his 
analysis of anti-neoliberal mass mobilization in Latin America, contends that “institutions are 
social constructs that crystallize relations of domination and subordination in society (Mann 
1993, 1986; Weber 1978). He further observes, "analysts steeped in this [institutionalist] 
perspective missed the point that the very institutions they advocated caused inequalities that 
generated the grievances that drive popular mobilization” (Silva 2009:11).  
Przeworski, stressing the importance of endogeneity, notes that, "conditions shape 
institutions and institutions only transmit the causal effects of these conditions" (Przeworski 
2004:529). Institutions that perpetuate the power and domination of the powerful and the 
exclusion of the powerless are viable under the given circumstances. In the absence of those 
conditions, the discussion of the role of institutions becomes relatively meaningless. 
Therefore, "projects of institutional reform must take as their point of departure the actual 
conditions, not blueprints based on institutions that have been successful elsewhere" 
(Przeworski 2004:540).20 
While it is indeed important to examine the post-Soviet Armenian democratization 
process, and within this process issues of social exclusion in terms of the institutional and 
structural context, we do need to recognize the political transformations that are specific to 
the post-Soviet Armenian state, as an agency. In the explanation of durable social exclusion, 
not only the economic structure and institutional design of a country are focal, but also the 
political features specific to a state are critical agents. Specifically, the state plays a central 
role in the processes of commodification of labor and social relations. From this point of 
view, state-oriented theories of democratic consolidation are worth studying. The role of the 
state, as an actor and a main generator of processes, becomes important in the discussion of 
                                                 
20 In his seminal article "Institutions Matter?",  Przeworski (2004) recollects that Guillermo O'Donnell, an 
adversary of the institutional perspective, once remarked to him: "One cannot stop a coup d’état by an article in 
the constitution’, any article in the constitution" (Przeworski 2004:529). Reckoning on O'Donnell's remark, in a 
similar vein, I add that any article of the Armenian constitution has not been able to stop state elites from using 
constitutionally banned coercive methods towards peaceful s ocial movements. Not only was  the constitution not 
able to refrain those in power, but also the actions of a vibrant civil society could not st op the latter. Ironically, 
both — the Constitution and civil society — are believed to be key institutions able to influence democracy, 
social participation, and inclusion.   
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social exclusion, because states often become engines of elimination of a large number of 
social groups in support of particular classes, or even a small number of individuals and their 
close networks. This support is typically rationalized and implemented through governmental 
policies and programs in favor of the latter groups.  
The state, other political institutes and social networks become more important when 
we look at their interrelationships. As Silva argues, “state strength also hinges on the state’s 
relationship to other organized power networks nationally and internationally, such as the 
economy, class relations, the military, and ideological production. In other words, state 
power is relational. It depends, at least in part, on its relationship to these other sources of 
power in society” (Silva 2009:13). Especially when we try to study social exclusion, it is 
impossible to look at it from one angle, and the relational approach becomes very useful. 
Policy-oriented theories of social exclusion that emphasize the multidimensional ity of the 
phenomenon offer a useful first cut into the problem by analyzing dynamic causal factors.  
These theories stress that social exclusion and its causes have economic, social, and political 
dimensions.  They take a relational approach to social exclusion that focuses not only on who 
is excluded but also on who is doing the excluding.  Moreover, they highlight the 
institutional structures that serve to include or exclude.  This relational approach to the 
problem directs our attention to crucial issues of process and power relationships that lie at 
the heart of social exclusion (DFID, 2009; Parkin 1979; Collins 1974; Collins 1979; 
Bourdieu 1984; Murphy 1988; Silver 1995; Beall and Piron 2005). 
These state-centered approaches that are at the same time relational-oriented theories 
of social exclusion fit well with the central problem of transitions to market capitalism and 
democracy in post-Soviet states. The twin transition in those cases involved the wholesale 
restructuring of economies, political regimes, and social relations.  These changes also 
involved a dramatic reconstitution of political and economic power, which had profound 
effects on patterns of socioeconomic and political exclusion in the post-Soviet nominally 
democratic regimes. 
Theoretical approaches in political economy and in contentious politics offer useful 
perspectives on the question of power from a relational point of view.  The social closure and 
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opportunity hoarding theories, mentioned before, share a central insight.  They examine the 
interaction of groups in the structuring of inequality from the point of view of acquiring 
resources and power.  In both approaches, powerful elites exploit and monopolize resources 
to the exclusion of other social groups.  Weber draws our attention to a critical factor for the 
reconstruction of power relationships in the twin transitions from post-Soviet societies.  He 
argues that social closure results from exploitation based on property advantages, as well as 
from forms of prestige or status.  Similarly, as Murphy (1988: 8) proposes, social closure is a 
process of subordination, where a group closes opportunities for others who are accepted as 
more inferior and ineligible.  Tilly introduces us to another critical dimension of power in the 
development of social exclusion: networks.  Opportunity hoarding involves a situation where 
the members of a network “acquire access to a resource… supportive of network activities”, 
which was critical to rebuilding socioeconomic and political power in the twin transitions of 
post-Soviet societies (Tilly 1998:10). 
The central role of property advantages and the constitution of networks to control it 
to the exclusion of others focuses our attention on the critical part that privatization played in 
the process of transitions from socialism. The political economy of free-market reforms in 
Latin America clearly establishes the relationship (Foxley 1983, Vanden and Prevost 2002, 
Gwynne and Kay 2005).  Political leaders in control of the privatization of state enterprises 
shape the process to benefit specific favored domestic economic interests.  This creates a 
network of powerful supporters for both the general process of market reforms and for 
incumbent political leaders. Cronyism, sweetheart deals, and generally opaque transactions 
and rules characterize the resulting power networks. 
The vast literature on privatization generally focuses on the evaluation of the process 
in terms of its contributions to the efficiency of the market economy that replaced the 
command economy.  Some conclude the process in the post-Soviet region has had largely 
positive outcomes (Poole 1996, Mankiw 2001, Aisbett 2005). Others argue it has not (Wood 
1997, Milanovich 1999, Megginson and Netter 2001, Nancy Birdsall and John Nellis 2002).  
Although many aspects of the privatization process are of great importance, this study is 
more concerned with the equality issue resulting from the privatization process. The 
privatization model that directed the post-Soviet transformation vastly ignored the 
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interrelationship between the economy and politics, as well as economic growth and social 
inequality. While most technical assessments regard privatization as a success, it remains 
increasingly and extensively unpopular, largely on the perception that it is fundamentally 
unfair, both in conception and execution.  Thus, a closer examination of the consequences of 
the privatization process for political institutions is warranted.21 
Indeed, a growing body of theory, especially related to Latin America, shows a strong 
connection between the imposition of free-market economic reforms (without adequate social 
safety nets) and defensive mass mobilization.  The contentious politics literature emphasizes 
that mobilization occurs because excluded social groups lack institutional channels to defend 
their threatened interests (Tarrow 1998; Tilly 2004; McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, 2001).  
Many studies on radical free-market economic reforms in Latin America have drawn on that 
insight.  They have shown how radical free-market economic reforms increase social 
inequality, and that when such projects are implemented by nominally democratic 
governments that effectively shut out opposition from the policy process defensive social 
movements and mass mobilization ensue (Silver 2003; Yashar 2005; Munck 2007; Silva, 
2009). The contentious politics of social movements, however, is typically ineffective in the 
presence of militarized states.  
Other factors affecting social grievances and social protestresulting from deprivation 
and exclusionare connected with military and authoritarian states. Theories of state formation 
have established a clear link between war-making and militarization on the development of 
both the state and the political regimes that link civil society to it (Tilly 1975 and 1978; 
Centeno, 2002).  Of particular concern for the twin transitions in post-Soviet societies is the 
expansion of military prerogatives.  Among others, these include direct control of economic 
resources, the military’s independent participation in domestic politics, and their deployment 
to suppress protest movements (Stepan 1988; Bowman 2003; Way 2006).  In this context, the 
intertwining of networks of political leaders and military officers can have negative 
consequences for democratic governance.  Militarization can lead to creeping 
authoritarianism. This closes the political space necessary for the political opposition – 
                                                 
21 A detailed examination of the influence of the privatization process on social exclusion in Armenia is 
conducted in Chapter 8.  
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including civil society organizations and social movements – to organize and act freely 
(Yashar 2005).  Clearly, such a condition would affect the development of durable social 
exclusion. 
While militarization has been extensively studied in regard to democracy and 
development in Latin America and the Middle East (Hewedy 1989; Burgess, Davis and Kick 
1994; Williams and Walter1998; Hashim 2003; Bowman 2002; Kick, Davis, Kiefer and 
Burns, 2006), surprisingly, the role of the state's coercive capacity as a significant force in 
shaping the path of state-building has received relatively minor attention in the context of the 
post-Soviet region.The literature on militarization in Latin America and Middle East has an 
unenthusiastic position concerning the role of the militarized states in the consolidation of 
democracy, high-quality economic transformation and social inclusion. Considering the 
experience from those countries in regard to militarization and social development, it is not 
inaccurate to link the coercive power of the state to social exclusion in post-Soviet societies. 
Hewedy (1989), for instance, argues that democracy and “its socio-economic 
requisites” are the victims of militarization. Militarization threatens not only human survival, 
but also economic welfare. In the Middle East, “it also causes the increase of illiterate adults, 
underemployment and unemployment, children who are unable to attend even primary 
schools, people who suffer from hunger or malnutrition ...” (p. 9). Hewedy further posits that 
militarization diverts resources from development and “sacrifices citizen’s security in favor 
of the state’s security or, in fact, the favor of the security of the administration” (p. 113). 
Bowman (2002) demonstrates that militarization in Latin America has had a particularly evil 
impact on three key measures of its development: democracy, economic growth, and equity. 
Hence, he challenges the classical notion that military buildup is good by showing that 
militarization has had negative consequences on these three aspects in Latin America.  
In fact, the examination of theories of political power broadens the scope and 
understanding of a state's tendency to become militarized during peacetime and its linkage to 
persistence of social exclusion. In the next section of this chapter, the main schools of power, 
related to the assessment of military states, the breakdown of social movements and the 
failure of revolutionary attempts, will be appraised. This is anessential task, because the 
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corearguments of this dissertation are basically grounded in those theories and approaches, 
and in the logical progression of this work, I often refer to them.  
2.6 Theories of State Power, Social exclusion, and Social Movements 
Whereas sometimes power can also be positive and productive, the main theories of 
political power describe the effects of power in negative terms. Power is often repressive, 
exclusionary, abstractive, and prohibitive. It typically includes state incumbents' 
organizational power, specifically how state elites exercise monopoly on violence. In this 
sense, a militarized state is similar to a Weberian type of state, which maintains a monopoly 
on violence (Weber 1919).  
An influential sociologist and political economist, Weber conceived of power as the 
capacity of a social actor to achieve a desired outcome even if confronted by resistance. 
“Power is the chance of a man or a number of men to realize their own will in a social action 
even against the resistance of others who are participating in the action" (Weber, 
1998:21).For militarized states, in the same way, power is the opportunity to achieve their 
will against opposition, regardless of what this opportunity is based on. A prominent 
behavioralist view of power was put forth by Robert Dahl, who asserted that “A has power 
over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do.” (Dahl 
1957:202) 
Scholars, such as Anthony Giddens and Barry Barnes, challenged the behavioralist 
conceptions of power and developed the structural school of political power. They examined 
structural conditions affecting the exercise of power by certain individuals and groups. 
Finally, social psychologists who explore the phenomenon of power focused on behavior in 
interpersonal relations, groups and organizations.  
Using those approaches of power, the literature on post-Soviet Union regime change 
have focused on institutional and constitutional design (Roeder 1993; McFaul 2001; Fish 
2005, 2006; Stepan 2005) and social movement theories, among those the theories of 
resource mobilization, as well as the structure and organization of movements. ""colored 
revolutions"" and the failure of protest movements have been explained through opposition 
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tactics and mobilization (McFaul 2005, Beissinger 2007; Tucker 2007).Levitsky and Way 
(2010) explain the diverging authoritarian regime trajectories based on the international 
dimension of democratization, Western linkage and leverage, and the domestic structural 
variable, that is, the organizational power of incumbents.  
There are plenty of explanations concerning the driving forces that lead some states to 
violently contain mass protests, while other states manage to deal with civil and political 
oppositions peacefully. Historically, the role of wars and the emergence of centralized 
bureaucracies has been the key answer. For the modern states, a variety of institut ional 
design explanations have been posited for understanding the differences of states to coerce 
election-related uprisings and protests resisting exclusionary policies, oppression, 
dictatorship and military rule (Roeder 2007; Grzymala-Busse 2007). Sjoberg argues that “the 
capacity of central authorities, the State, to coerce and impose its will is crucial, as is the 
capacity of societal Elites to challenge the state. Wherever there is a balance of forces, 
politics will be competitive” (Sjoberg 2010:1).  
In the comparative analysis of post-Soviet states' authoritarianism and its affect on 
social exclusion, this dissertation dwells on the organizational power of incumbents, focusing 
specifically on how state elites exercise the monopoly on violence. In this sense, a militarized 
state is similar to a Weberian type of state which claims a monopoly on violence, which it 
may therefore elect to delegate as it sees fit (Weber, 1919, “Politics as a Vocation” (Politik 
als Beruf)). The Weberian type of state is fundamental for opportunity hoarding and 
alterations in the distribution of power. “A strong, coercive apparatus enhances incumbent’s 
capacity to monitor, intimidate, and when necessary, repress opponents. The greater the 
incumbents’ capacity to crack down on opposition protest, or to prevent it from emerging in 
the first place, the greater are the prospects for stable authoritarianism” (Way, 2006:9).While 
institutions, oppositional elites, coalition building within the state, as well as among 
challenging societal actors, oppositional tactics, and organizational structure of mobilizations 
are all significant factors in explaining political power, I argue that to a great extent the 
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coercive capacity of the state itself is the most significant variable in the examination of 
protest repressions and "colored revolutions".22 
Assessing and quantifying political power is not easy. Peter Morriss (1987) noted that 
“the study of power indices is in a mess: several rival indices are in existence, each with its 
adherents who want to apply ‘their’ index to every conceivable situation” (Morriss 
1987:154)The task becomes even more complicated for the non-democratic countries, such 
as many of the post-Soviet republics. According to Kramer, “with the partial exception of 
several scales of presidential power, no indices have yet been proposed to quantify political 
power in authoritarian or semi-authoritarian countries — the sorts of countries that belong to 
the CIS.” (Kramer 2010:16) 
A good indicator and measurement of state power is perhaps the monopoly on use of 
forces developed as the World Bank Governance Indicators or Bertelsmann Transformation 
Index (BTI) democracy status.  For example, Börzel, Pamuk, and Stahn (2008), as a 
measurement of statehood, have used the ‘monopoly on use of forces’ to assess the 
performance of the three South Caucasian states – Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia.23 Based 
on the 2005 BTI indicators, the authors report that Armenia’s monopoly on use of force is 9 , 
Azerbaijan’s is 6 and Georgia’s is 4. This implies that Armenian state possesses a stronger 
capacity to deploy coercive power compared to its neighboring states. The country’s 
disturbing trend toward authoritarian rule is a result of the structural composition of 
Armenian governance, specifically characterized by a dominant executive, a submissive 
judiciary, and a powerless parliament. At the same time, political parties are weak and mass 
media is restricted.  
Having an understanding of political power, it is equally imperative to lay out core 
theories of contentious politics and social revolutions as techniques used by people against 
durable social exclusion. Contentious politics is the use of disruptive techniques that people 
have as the only resource against the better-equipped states in the construction and 
organization of social movements. According to Tarrow, social movements are not just 
                                                 
22 This argument is supported in Chapter Six.  
23The indicator “stateness” is part of the BTI Democracy Status. It includes the sub-indicators monopoly on the 
use of force, citizenship agreement, no religious dogma, and basic administration. 
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expressions of deprivation, discontent and violence, but are better defined as “collective 
challenges based on common purposes and social solidarities, in sustained interactions with 
elites, opponents and authorities” (Tarrow 1998:4). “Contentious politics is triggered when 
changing political opportunities and constraints create incentives for social actors who lack 
resources on their own” (Tarrow, 1998:2). Tilly’s and Tarrow’s contentious politics is very 
distinctive of the collective action process sprouting in many post-Soviet states for the last 
two decades.  
Most scholars define social revolutions as rapid, basic transformation of a society’s 
state and class structures that are carried through class-based revolts from below (Skocpol 
1979:4). Skocpol’s contribution to the theory of revolutions has three distinguishing features: 
1) structuralist, which identifies the objective conditions necessary for the emergence of 
revolutionary situation; 2) internationalist, which displays how transnational economic 
relations and the international structure of competing states influence domestic 
developments; and 3) statist, which explores the emergence of revolutionary situations based 
on the administrative and coercive powers of the state and its relation to classes, particularly 
the dominant landed class (1979:4). Another author similar to Skocpol in the 
conceptualization of revolutions, Goodwin, defines social revolution as a fundamental and 
relatively rapid transformation of a national society’s state structure, economic institutions 
and/or culture; these changes are initiated and/or achieved, at least in part, by popular 
mobilizations, including armed movements, strikes or demonstrations (Goodwin 2001:260). 
He believes that five main points play a significant role in the formation of the revolutio nary 
movement: state’s protection of unpopular economic and social arrangements, as well as 
cultural institutions; repression and exclusion of mobilized groups from certain resources; 
state’s violence against mobilized groups or oppositional political powers; weak policing 
capacities and infrastructure power; and corrupt and arbitrary personalistic rule that alienates, 
weakens, or divides the counterrevolutionary elites (2001:45-47). Parsa agrees to the state-
centrist approach of revolutions and adds to the analysis state repression and exclusion. In 
cases where strong state repression pertains, it is more difficult to produce a revolution (Parsa 
2000).  
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Further, state-centrist approaches add more insight to the discussion of how social 
movements, arisen as a consequence of social exclusion, are contained due to strong state 
militarization. Chandler, similar to the above-stated authors, emphasizes the 
inclusiveness/exclusiveness of the leadership/government towards opposition or challenge 
(Chandler 2005:3). Within the analysis of collective action, Tilly discusses "revolutionary" 
situations" and "revolutionary outcomes". Tilly's analysis accurately captures the moment of 
power transfers and how revolutions burst out (Tilly 1978:198). For a revolutionary situation 
to arise there should be: 1) contenders making claims, 2) significant commitment to those 
claims, and 3) repressive incapacity of the government (1978:202). Another three sets of 
conditions appear to be causes of revolutionary outcomes or transfers of power: 1) the 
presence of revolutionary situation, 2) revolutionary coalitions between challengers and 
members of the polity, and 3) control of substantial force by the revolutionary coalition 
(1978:212). 
2.7 Conclusion 
This chapter discussed the phenomenon of social exclusion in great detail, providing 
its definitions, history, measurement, causes and theories. To fully convey the importance of 
studying social exclusion as "a breakdown of the relationship between society and the 
individual", the chapter stressed the negative consequences of social exclusion. It also 
provided extended sections devoted to the multidimensional nature of social exclusion, 
highlighting the imperativeness to study exclusion as a result of dynamic causal factors. The 
process of social exclusion includes economic marginalization, social disintegration, and 
political polarization. These three dimensions are strongly interrelated. Each of them, 
however, is a cause and consequence of certain factors and conditions. I further suggest that 
when these conditions persist over long periods of time, such as from generation to 
generation, the process of exclusion becomes durable. In the presence of durable social 
exclusion, large numbers of the society are deprived of economic and social resources, as 
well as political participation due to external circumstances for more than several years. 
Based on the works of Silver (1994) and Levitas (1998, 2004, 2005), the chapter 
introduced the three paradigms/discourses of social exclusion, those being solidarity, 
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specialization and monopoly (the social integrationist discourse, the moral underclass 
discourse, and the redistributionist discourse). Levitas's social integrationist discourse argues 
that exclusion occurs mainly due to labor markets. The moral underclass discourse blames 
the poor for their exclusion, stressing the moral and cultural characteristics of the excluded. 
The redistributionist discourse emphasizes discriminatory and exclusionary practices. Silver's 
solidarity paradigm suggests that social exclusion occurs because of the insufficiency and 
inadequate function of certain institutions that fail to channel the individual into the society. 
Specialization suggests that social exclusion is mainly due to the individual's own inabilities 
to engage in contractual exchange. Finally, the monopoly or social closure paradigm implies 
that social exclusion occurs as a consequence of power relations, in which powerful social 
groups deprive other groups of resources and opportunities. Whereas one cannot reject the 
role of the first two paradigms in examining social exclusion, the evidence on the situation of 
social exclusion in post-Soviet Armenia suggests that the social closure or monopoly 
paradigm is the central discourse through which durable social exclusion should be 
examined. In the following chapters of this dissertation, I have followed the social closure 
theory of social exclusion in analyzing the persistence of the problem in Armenia. 
Considering that social exclusion is a set of various economic, political and social 
processes, theories of social exclusion are vast. Discussing some of the key theories on social 
exclusion in post-Soviet states, I particularly concentrate on the state-centered perspective, 
because insights stemming from the basic institutionalist perception have not proved to be 
valid for Armenia. The state-centered approach is more applicable to understand the social 
closure and monopoly process theorized by Marx and Weber, Tilly, Silver, Levitas and many 
others. The state-centered approach is heavily supported in Chapter Seven, where I argue that 
militarization of the post-Soviet Armenian state has been a critical factor in explaining the 
durability of social exclusion. 
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CHAPTER 3  
Social Exclusion in Armenia 
“Between persons of equal income there is no social distinction except the distinction 
of merit. Money is nothing: character, conduct, and capacity are everything.  
… That is why idiots are always in favor of inequality of income (their only chance of 
eminence), and the really great in favor of equality.”  
George Bernard Shaw 
3.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter identified theories of social exclusion, emphasizing that there is 
a gap in the scarce literature examining the problem for the post-Soviet republics. The 
existing literature focuses on the design of economic and political institutions, mainly 
ignoring the history and culture of the examined societies, and above all, disregarding the 
inherent nature of the given state. The aim of this chapter is to show that the case of Armenia 
is a good example for studying social exclusion. It specifies reasons why examining social 
exclusion in Armenia is a good way to fill the above-mentioned gap by focusing on the 
contradictions of the twin transition in Armenia. Whereas most post-Soviet countries 
experienced economic challenges and problems related to socio-economic inequality after the 
USSR breakup, some of those countries struggled with the issue of social exclusion even 
more. Armenia is one of those. 
The chapter reveals that although post-SovietArmenia is considered to be a Caucasian 
Tiger, termed by WB analysts, it has had one of the highest Gini coefficients in the world 
throughout the 1990s and in mid 2000s. The inequality levels are higher in Armenia not only 
compared to other South Caucasian countries (Azerbaijan and Georgia), but also compared to 
most of the post-Soviet republics. By providing tables and figures, the chapter further 
stresses that most of the indicators of social exclusion are present in post-Soviet Armenia. 
Moreover, compared to other Latin American, Eastern and Central European, Central Asian 
and other former Soviet Union countries, in Armenia those indicators have high levels and 
are persistent. Income distribution is unequal, access to educational and health services are 
 57 
 
not equal for all, political rights are not protected, elections are fraudulent, etc. Therefore, it 
becomes vital to find out factors that make the case of Armenian social exclusion 
unprecedented and phenomenal in a negative sense.  
This chapter also discusses the problem of exclusion in Armenia by separately 
analyzing its economic, social and political dimensions. This demarcation of social exclusion 
here is necessary, because in further chapters we can see that some factors, such as the 
privatization of firms, have affected more the worsening of economic and social exclusion, 
while other processes, such as state militarization, have more deeply impacted the 
exacerbation of political exclusion. In any case, the political lack and unwillingness of 
powerful elites to distribute assets, resources and opportunities evenly, as well as to allow 
equal political participation was essential. 
3.2 Independence and its Challenges: Contradictions of Twin Transition in Armenia 
One of the world's oldest civilizations, Armenia prides itself on being the first nation 
to formally adopt Christianity (early 4th century). Despite periods of autonomy, over 
centuries Armenia has been under the reign of various empires including the Roman, 
Byzantine, Arab, Persian and Ottoman. After the Turkish defeat in World War I, Armenia 
became independent in 1918, but survived only until 1920, when it was annexed by the 
Soviet army. In 1922, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan were joined by the Soviets to form 
the Transcaucasian Soviet Socialist Republic, which became part of the USSR. In 1936, after 
reorganization, Armenia became a separate constituent republic of the USSR. Armenia once 
again declared its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991 and is an independent 
republic today. 
Armenia's Constitution (Chapter 1. Article 1) declares Armenia as a sovereign, 
democratic, social, constitutional state, where the power belongs to the people.24 Armenia is, 
de jure, a presidential representative democratic republic, where executive power is exercised 
by the government, whereas the legislative power is vested in both the government and 
parliament. In reality, the executive's power is enormous, with huge influence over the 
                                                 
24 Please see the official website of the National Assembly of the Republic of Armenia, www.parliament.am, 
Chapter 1, The Foundations of Constitutional Order. 
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judiciary and the municipal governments. The President, who is elected by the citizens for a 
five-year term, is the head of State. The President ensures adherence to the Constitution and 
provides for regular functioning of legislative, executive and judicial authorities. The 
President also guarantees the sovereignty, territorial integrity and security of the state.   
The Government is composed of the Prime Minister and Ministers. The President 
appoints the Prime Minister, but the parliament (National Assembly) has to express a vote of 
confidence in a Prime Minster designate. He/she is also responsible for appointing and 
discharging members of the government on the Prime Minister's proposal.The National 
Assembly, elected through general elections for a five-year term, is the supreme legislative 
authority of the Republic of Armenia. It consists of 131 deputies, 90 of which are elected on 
the basis of proportional representation and 41on the basis of majority representation. 
Finally, the judicial power in the Republic of Armenia is represented and administered by the 
courts in accordance with the Constitution and the laws.25 
Armenia is engaged in a long conflict with Muslim Azerbaijan over Nagorno-
Karabakh, a primarily Armenian-populated region, assigned to Soviet Azerbaijan in the 
1920s by Moscow. Armenia and Azerbaijan began fighting over the area in 1988; the 
struggle escalated into a war after both countries seceded from the Soviet Union in 1991. The 
war ensued from 1991–1994. Armenia effectively controls the region today, although no 
formal resolution exists.  
Armenia has a territory of 11,506 sq mi (29,800 sq km) with a population of 
2,968,586.26 It is about the size of Maryland. The population is very homogenous; 98% of 
inhabitants are Armenians.  The country is not rich with natural resources. It possesses small 
deposits of gold, copper, molybdenum, zinc, and bauxite. According to the 2007 estimates, 
the GDP (purchasing power parity) per capita is $5,700. The rare sources on the Gini 
coefficient present a Gini coefficient of 0.59% for the years of 1996-1999 (WB 2000) and 
0.45% in 2005 (UNICEF 2011).  
                                                 
25 The information is presented in the official website of the Government of Armenia, 
http://www.gov.am/en/gov-system/, last accessed on December 16, 2013).   
26 The population number is an official number; some sources estimate that number to be less than 2.8 million 
due to labor migration.  
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Map 3.1: Political Map of Armenia that includes the Azerbaijani territories captured by 
Armenians during the Karabakh war 
 
Source: http://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/map/armenia_map.htm, last access 
Decmber15, 2013. 
As mentioned earlier, Armenia declared its independence in the fall of 1991, 
following a referendum which took place on September 21, 1991. There was a feeling of 
happiness and a feeling of insensible pride all around the nation rejoicing over Armenia’s 
secession from the Soviet rule. Everybody was happy; indeed, it was thought that 
independence opened up new perspectives for sovereign Armenia to engage in collaborative 
economic relations with other countries that used to be the unreachable abroad and to 
develop enormous potential for regional economic expansion; indeed, it was supposed that 
independence encouraged the establishment of a democratic system and statehood.  
A year earlier, on August 23 of 1990, Armenia’s Parliament adopted the Resolution 
of Intent to declare independence from the Soviet Union. On that day, Edmond Azadian, one 
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of the few Armenian leaders from the Diaspora addressed the Parliament, proposing “certain 
issues of vital importance to our people”, among which was the following:“Independent 
national statehood is not simply a declaration on paper. It is action and achievement. 
Therefore, the entire nation must take those actions which will lead our homeland, in 
successive stages, to the achievement of full independence, politically and economically.” 
(Azadian 1999:5) 
Alas, neither in his book “History on the Move”, nor in the mentioned speech, does 
Azadian elaborate on those actions that would lead Armenia to the achievement of full 
independence and consolidated democracy. Not only Azadian, but many others in the 
Armenian political circles have not been able to offer the steps that would encumber the 
forthcoming perils of independence and facilitate the transition to capitalism.  
The winter of the independence was cold and long. Many more winters following that 
year have been difficult for Armenians to overcome with temporary housing in the regions 
where the earthquake had struck in 1988, with scarce heating and electricity in the country. 
The period of transition in Armenia was conditioned not only by some anticipated 
consequences of the breakdown of the Soviet integrated economy, but it was also marred 
with the earthquake that left approximately 200,000 people homeless, with the Karabakh 
war, and with the blockade of the Armenian borders by Turkey and Azerbaijan. 
Ignoring the widespread poverty, destitution and inequality in post-Soviet Armenia, 
most experts of transition consider Armenia's transition from Soviet to a capitalist system as 
a smooth and positive process resulting in high economic growth. For instance, the 2007 
World Bank Publication “The Caucasian Tiger: Sustaining Economic Growth in Armenia” 
recognizes the Republic of Armenia as the Caucasian Tiger.27 The authors Mitra, Andrew and 
Kaminski highlight the stellar growth record that has led the country to the analogous label 
of tiger akin to the Asian, Anatolian, or Baltic tigers noted for maintaining exceptionally high 
economic growth rates. The publication fails to report, however, that although Armenia has 
had the highest economic growth rate of any country in the former Soviet Union, more than 
                                                 
27 The contradictions of the Armenian case as a Caucasian Tiger are further recounted in Chapter Four, 
specifically in the section where the main hypotheses are developed.  
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50% of the population still lives in poverty. It is true that Armenia experienced relatively 
high rates of macroeconomic growth and positive annual GDP growth rates – average of 5% 
in 1994-2000, then average of 12% in 2000-2005. Despite economic growth, output in 
Armenia in 2005 was still only about 65% of its 1990 level and poverty was widespread. 
While the book mentions economic growth countless times, hardly ever can you find any 
mention of inequality and/or high rates of Gini coefficient in Armenia. The World Bank 
experts dub Armenia a “Caucasian Tiger” based on purely quantitative indicators, but they 
fail and are least interested to discuss the qualitative aspect of this growth. 
According to a 2007 policy brief by Armenian International Center for Human 
Development (ICHD), Azerbaijan, Armenia and China are the countries that have surprised 
the world with their economic growth in the years of 2002-2007. In 2006 Armenia ranked 
fifth in the annual growth rate of GDP. Azerbaijan ranked first. Within the next five years 
Armenia has ranked fifth and Azerbaijan has ranked first in terms of the same indicator. The 
economic growth in Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan has been conditioned with their natural 
resources. Regarding Armenia and China, the economic experts of ICHD argue that 
Armenia’s economic growth does not possess the qualitative features China does. Factors 
accounting for the economic growth of Armenia do not target spheres and directions which 
would ensure a high level of competitiveness for the country in the context of international 
economy. On the contrary, Armenia’s current unprecedented economic growth is weakening 
the country’s competitiveness. The ICHD policy brief states that Armenia “paradoxically has 
an uncompetitive economy, uneven distribution of income and a policy (or the lack of it)” 
(ICHD 2007:2).  
The independence and transition from socialism to capitalism, thus, is characterized 
by contradictions in Armenia: on one hand it experienced a high economic growth; on the 
other hand it reinforced social exclusion, which has been durable for about 20 years now.  
3.3 Social Exclusion in Armenia as an Element of Post-Soviet Transition 
The result of the post-Soviet transition was a total disaster for many states – 
economically, socially and politically. 
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In the first year of reform, industrial output collapsed by 26 percent in Russia. Between 
1992 and 1995, Russia’s GDP fell 42 percent and industrial production fell 46 percent – far 
worse than the contraction of the U.S. economy during the Great Depression. … The 
Russian government, bankrupted by the collapse of economic activity, stopped paying the 
salaries of millions of employees and dependents. Unemployment soared, particularly 
among women. By the mid to late nineties, more than forty-four million of Russia’s 148 
million people were living in poverty (defined as living on less than thirty-two dollars per 
month [or $1 a day]); three quarters of the population live on less than one hundred dollars 
per month.” (Holmstrom and Smith, 2000:3) 
The depicted scene characterizes initial years of transition in Russia, but many other 
republics of Former Soviet Union suffered equally badly, if not more. In the transition 
countries “the worse aspect of the economic restructuring is the appalling growth in the 
number of people living in poverty” (ILO 1995:111). Armenia was among the countries with 
highest percentage of population living in absolute poverty, and in the below figure it ranks 
fourth in 1996 after Tajikistan, Moldova and Kyrgyzstan.  
Figure 3.1:Percentage of Population Living in Absolute Poverty in Eastern and Central 
Asian (ECA) Transition Countries 
Source: World Bank, 2000, Making Transition Work for Everyone, Chapter 1, page 4. 
Note: PPP stands for purchasing power parity. 
As former USSR countries shifted from state-controlled to market-driven economic 
systems, the nature of social inequalities in the post-Soviet societies started to undergo major 
changes that raise new concerns for post-Soviet studies. Income and wealth inequality have 
dramatically increased in most post-Soviet states. Many of those states are characterized by 
extremes of poverty and wealth. Access to education, health services and the labor market 
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has become highly stratified in post-socialist societies. As the market makes access to 
different services and forms of consumption dependent on individual means, the inability to 
access those services have become significantly individualized. This process boosts social 
inequalities that are apparent not only in the mentioned social domains, but also are 
expressed in the political realm – new forms of political representation and power 
distribution, as well as how citizens perceive and are able to act upon their exclusion from 
various forms of economic, social and political opportunities and services.  
Even though the transition from planned to market economy would, without doubts, 
produce changes in income and wealth, the scale and range of the distributional outcomes 
have been huge and unexpected throughout most of the USSR. A comparison of ECA, Latin 
American and Southern European Countries shows that while in countries of Central and 
South Eastern Countries and the Baltic States (CSB) the problems of transition have slowly 
decreased over time and the distribution remained fairly egalitarian, the former USSR 
countries, most notably the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) have experienced 
increasing disparities between the rich and the poor – a change of unprecedented magnitude 
and pace.  
Figure 3.2:Income Inequality: A Comparison of ECA, Latin American and Southern 
European Countries 
Source: World Bank, 2000, “Making Transition Work for Everyone”, Chapter 4, page 141. 
In Russia, Armenia, Moldova, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, where the Gini 
coefficient has been around 0.5 or above, inequality can be compared to Gini coefficients 
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observed in Latin American countries with the most unequal economies. This change has left 
millions of post-Soviet citizens with a feeling of strong deprivation and exclusion. The 
picture is even worse if we consider the social distance between the very poor and the very 
rich. As World Bank reports, the decile ratios for per capita incomes in the CIS states have 
been extremely high: for example, in Georgia, the top 10 percent earned 7 times more than 
the top 10 percent. In Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan this same ratio was 10 and in Armenia it 
was 19, which is unbelievably high.28 
In certain circumstances, income inequality is not enough to represent or measure 
inequality between the rich and the poor. When income measurements are not accurate, it is 
better to rely on measures of inequality that capture consumption or expenditures rather than 
incomes. Besides accuracy issues, consumption is less volatile than income, and thus 
consumption-based measures present a more meaningful picture. According to the World 
Bank reports, there is a big gap between income-based inequality and consumption-based 
inequality in some of the CIS countries, which means that, for example Armenia may be the 
country with highest Gini coefficient based on income measure (0.59), but not a country with 
as high Gini coefficient if we consider consumption-based measures (0.39).29 
                                                 
28 Following January-February 2011 events in Tunisia and Egypt and comparing those countries to Armenia, the 
Armenian government has made statements that Armenia is immune to social unrests and that there is no 
constituency in Armenia that is not pleased with the state of affairs in the country. In reaction to this evaluation, 
Policy Forum Armenia (PFA) presents GDP per capita values based on purchasing power parity (PPP, in 2010 
US$) for Tunisia, Egypt, and Armenia. They are as follows: 
         Tunisia            $9,488.5 
         Egypt               $6,367.4 
         Armenia          $5,178.7 
These numbers (available in the International Monetary Fund’s World Economic Outlook database at 
www.imf.org) show that an average citizen of Armenia is poorer than that of Egypt and Tunisia by a sizable 
margin. The ordering still holds if one does not account for the purchasing power of the local currency. In that 
case the numbers are equal to $4,159.9, $2,771.4, and $2,676.5 for Tunisia, Egypt, and Armenia respectively .  
It is ironic to argue that there is no constituency for social change when the Armenian Statistical Office has 
recently released social sector data reporting that 214,000 people in Armenia became poor in just one year 
(2009), raising the total in poverty to 1.1 million (for a country with a population of less than 3 million). And 
while extremely low per capita GDP alone may not be an indicator of social exclusion and social unrest, it 
generates public frustration and affects how people deal with it.  
29 The difference between countries may be explained by the fact that wages represent le ss than 40 percent of 
total incomes in CIS countries, and the cases of Armenia and Georgia even less than 15 percent. A second 
reason is that state transfers represent very little percentage of total incomes in CIS countries, such as, for 
example, 3 percent in Georgia. Yet another reason is that non-formal sources of labor in CIS states have been 
easily and often underreported, and thus decreases the total income percentage. 
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Based on this gap, Milanovich argues that “if our main interest is to understand how 
changes in distribution affect living standards and poverty, we should rely only on 
consumption-based measures of distribution” (World Bank 2000:146). While the above 
suggested explanation sounds reasonable for understanding the gap between the consumption 
and income-based inequalities in some of the CIS countries, we should not undermine the 
fact that not only are income-based measures not accurate, neither are the consumption-based 
measures. If the poor can underreport their earnings, in the same way the wealthy can and do 
misrepresent their purchases. It is not a secret that in post-Soviet countries, the wealthy 
habitually register their purchases in the name of a less wealthy relative or friend in order to 
avoid taxes or for other reasons. Thus, contrary to Milanovich, we can claim that the 
consumption-based figures of inequality can be considered even more inaccurate in 
measuring the gap between the poor and the wealthy in countries, such as, for instance, 
Armenia.  
The economic aspect of social exclusion in this dissertation deals with chiefly 
exclusion from labor market and income. In this sense, increased inequality is explained by 
earnings from labor. Wage earning and self-employment earnings account for 60 and 80 
percent of observedinequality of incomes. As we can see in the figure, earnings from self 
employment, which generally tend to be more unequally distributed than wages, account for 
most of the total inequality in Armenia (see Figure 3.3).  
Common sense and empirical evidence suggest that rising educational premiums 
could have been an important factor explaining increase in income inequality. While this has 
been true for CBS countries, such as Poland, Hungary, Slovenia, Latvia, Czech and Slovak 
republics, differences between education groups in CIS countries explain only 2-3 percent of 
inequality as illustrated in figure 3.4 (Lindauer 1998; Lehman, Wadsworth and Yemtsov 
2000; Yemtsov 2001; Alam et al. 2005). 
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 Figure 3.3:Income Inequality in Selected ECA Countries, by Income Components, Selected 
Years, 1993–98 
Source:World Bank, 2000, “Making Transition Work for Everyone”, Chapter 4, page 147.  
 
Figure 3.4: Percentage of Total Inequality Explained by Differences between Education 
Levels, Selected ECA Countries, Selected Years, 1993–98 
Source: World Bank, 2000, “Making Transition Work for Everyone”, Chapter 4, page 151. 
The decline of the formal employment market and the boost of private ownership 
created more opportunities of self-employment. Income from self-employment formed more 
than 50 percent in the South Caucasus and Central Asian countries. This self-employment 
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emergence – a consequence of liberalization and privatization – however did not provide new 
opportunities or grant advantages to the lower strata of the population. For most of the self-
employed it was merely a way of survival and not an opportunity to accrue wealth, with the 
exception of a few entrepreneurs concentrated at the top of the distribution. Incomes from 
self-employment are more unequal than wage employment even in well-functioning markets. 
Thus, in many post-Soviet countries, particularly in the South Caucasus or Central Asian 
regions, which are new to the market economy functioning and at the same time full of 
corruption, distorted and often-violated regulations and laws, as well as non-transparent 
connections playing a huge role in securing business deals, self-employment incomes are 
highly unequal.  
Exclusion from the market labor is critically tied to the emergence of private business 
as a by-product of transfer of publicly owned assets into private hands. The scale of 
enterprise privatization and asset transfers in the post-Soviet region was enormous. For 
example, in 1997 Armenians had privatized 80 percent of housing ownership (World Bank 
2000:156). But housing privatization did not have a massive or even the slightest influence 
on social exclusion of the middle-income or low-income population, because the majority of 
the citizens were able to privatize their own homes. In this way, the middle or low-income 
people who used to live in publicly provided housing became owners of their houses. There 
was no need or opportunity to seize somebody else’s house or apartment, because nearly 
everybody had their own from the Soviet period. In short, housing privatization is estimated 
to have had progressive distributional impact (Buckley and Gurenko 1997; Milanovich 
1998). 
Meanwhile, the privatization of enterprises was still in process, and according to 
Milanovich’s estimates in 1997 many CIS republics, among them Armenia, privatized about 
one-third or more of all medium- and large-scale enterprises and most of the small firms. The 
privatization hypothesis of this dissertation clearly argues that specifically enterprise 
privatization influenced the emergence of social exclusion in post-Soviet Armenia. There is 
little evidence based on quantitative data regarding this supposition, but a plethora of analysis 
of anecdotal and indirect evidence shows a negative link between privatization and the 
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distribution of wealth and income (McHale and Pankov 1999; Milanovich 1999; Ivaschenko 
2002; Birdsall and Nellis 2003; Milanovich and Ersado 2008).  
Aside from the socio-economic consequences of the transition for the majority of the 
people, particularly the low- and middle- income populations, the restructuring period has 
also impacted political processes. Thus, economic inequality turned into a bigger evil – social 
exclusion. Among political processes tax and state transfer policies significantly influenced 
the distribution of income in post-Soviet countries. The decrease of government’s ability to 
provide essential public services and, in some cases, just lack of political will to do so have 
disproportionately hurt the poor (Milanovich, 1999).  
Certain liberalization and privatization policy trends, such as reducing social 
expenditures, limiting access to social expenditures through strong selectivity criteria, and 
the introduction of fee-based access to many social services had a negative impact on socio-
economic inequality. As Ivanova (2006) argues, this contributes to inequality’s embedded 
nature in the transforming societies. Other authors (Commander and Lee 1998; Commander, 
Tolstopiatenko, and Yemtsov 1999) echo the same concern. Commander and Lee (1998), for 
example, suggest that the share of transfers, specifically through changing concentration of 
pensions, reaching the upper quintiles of the distribution grew between 1992 and 1996 in the 
CIS. Milanovich (1999:163) reports that “in most of the high inequality countries in the CIS, 
taxes and transfers have been at best neutral, and on occasion they have added to high levels 
of income inequality”. 
The analysis of post-Soviet transition literature sums that privatization process in 
post-Soviet societies has left the major coping mechanisms and the main safety nets for the 
poor to be family transfers, remittances, humanitarian assistance, and informal sector 
activities. Apparently, the very poor are the ones who do not benefit from family transfers 
and private remittances and do not receive revenue from the informal sector. 
While it is obvious that social exclusion has been a characteristic element of post-
Soviet structural reforms, it is important to discuss the problem in Armenia as a combination 
of economic, political, and social exclusion. 
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3.4 Economic exclusion in Armenia 
The economic aspect of exclusion, that is income inequality, due to lack of proper 
employment, and worsening of income distribution over time, is a most basic element of 
social exclusion. It is similar to relative poverty or deprivation and, thus alone is not 
considered as social exclusion. The economic element of exclusion is concerned with the 
concept of economic disenfranchisement, more specifically exclusion from the labor market. 
Sen (1975:5) explicates this concept of economic disenfranchisement in terms of income, 
production, and recognition. 
According to the IMF 2003 country report on Armenia “Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Paper”, there is a polarization of society to an appalling degree in Armenian. The paper 
concludes that poverty and inequality in the country may become a reason for numerous 
hazards and threats with the following consequences, which are all elements of social 
exclusion: 
 Long-term social polarization may deepen the cleavage among various social layers; 
 High poverty rates and inequality will become an obstacle for the expansion and 
flourishing of civil society; 
 The poor – a social class of many thousands – continue to lag behind general human 
development norms, which will hamper the establishment of human capital or will cause 
its degradation; 
 Widespread poverty causes increasing rates of emigration. Furthermore, the emigrant 
population represents mainly the enterprising and the most educated part of the society; 
 Persisting impoverishment enhances passiveness, psychological depression, nihilism and 
pessimism amongst the vast majority of the population. Consequently, the motivation, 
initiative, and participation of the population in the social, economic, and socio-cultural 
life of the country are reduced to a minimum (page 7). 
As in most of the Soviet republics, in its last twenty years as part of the Soviet Union, 
inequality and poverty were not major political or economic problems in Armenia. Before the 
transition to a market economy, Armenia was a remarkably equitable society (Table 3.1).  
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Table 3.1: Mean Income, Inequality Measures, and Family Size the USSR Republics, 1988 
Atkinson indices 
 Mean 
Income 
Gini A=0.5 A = 2 A = 3 Family 
Size 
1. Tajikistan 78 0.318 0.304 0.459 0.543 6.1 
2. Uzbekistan 91 0.306 0.269 0.420 0.503 5.5 
3. Kyrgyzstan 101 0.312 0.253 0.414 0.501 4.6 
4. Turkmenistan 102 0.316 0.253 0.418 0.506 5.6 
5. Azerbaijan 107 0.317 0.246 0.413 0.503 4.7 
6. Armenia 125 0.280 0.208 0.347 0.426 5.5 
7. Kazakhstan 134 0.291 0.203 0.354 0.438 3.8 
8. Moldova 132 0.264 0.194 0.321 0.393 3.1 
9. Georgia 141 0.313 0.194 0.368 0.463 3.9 
10. Ukraine 142 0.248 0.179 0.294 0.361 3.0 
11. Belarus 155 0.242 0.172 0.283 0.348 2.9 
12. Russia 159 0.264 0.176 0.305 0.380 2.9 
13. Lithuania 164 0.244 0.166 0.278 0.345 2.9 
14. Latvia 174 0.250 0.157 0.276 0.347 2.7 
15. Estonia 186 0.278 0.161 0.307 0.390 2.6 
Source:Michael V. Alexeev and Clifford Gaddy (1993), "Income Distribution in the USSR in 
the 1980s". 
The Gini coefficient for the distribution of income was only 0.28%, which means that 
Armenia used to be a sufficiently equal and fair society. During the transition from socialism, 
however, the Gini coefficient soared and is estimated to be 0.59% based on most household 
surveys. It is the highest among most of the post-Soviet countries, as seen in Table 3.2 and 
Figure 3.5 below.  
Table 3.2: Income Inequality in Selected Transition Countries in 1998 
 Gini Coefficient for  
Income 
1998 GNP per capita 
(PPP US$) 
Armenia 0.59 2,074 
Azerbaijan - 2,168 
Georgia 0.41 3,429 
Kyrgyzstan 0.44 2,247 
Moldova 0.41 1,995 
Tajikistan 0.47 1,041 
Source:World Bank,Armenia Poverty Update,2002. 
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Figure 3.5:Changes in Inequality: Small in Central Europe, Larger in Former Soviet Union 
Countries 
Source: World Bank, Armenia Poverty Update, 2002. 
The IMF country report (2003) states that in 1988 only 20% of Armenians received 
salaries lower than the poverty threshold. The composition of the income sources was the 
following: 76% salary, 11% formal transfers, 13% income from agricultural production and 
sales and other incomes. The expenses constituted: 41% food purchase, 28% non-food 
products and 9% on services. Although many analysts have argued that inequalities existed 
during the Soviet reign, considering the nature of the Soviet economic and political system, 
the inequality level in Soviet Armenia was one of the lowest in the world during 1987-1990 
(IMF 2003:16). 
There are reports that demonstrate a certain decrease of inequality in Armenia 
(particularly income inequality) from 1999 to 2001, reporting that the 0.593% of inequality 
in 1999 has decreased to 0.535 in 2001. First, it should be noted that the income 
concentration Gini coefficient persists at a socially tense value higher than 0.5 percent. The 
indicated change is an extremely minor change, and the Gini coefficient is still considered to 
be very high, indeed one of the highest in the world. Secondly, it is important to mention that 
according to many reports and accounts, the same years experienced much higher levels of 
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national wealth (GDP level increased in the republic). This means that while GDP level 
increased to a great extent, the Gini coefficient decreased by only 0.058%, making the 
inequality gap even bigger. In terms of social exclusion, this is not an achievement for which 
to be proud. 
At the beginning of the 1990s, Armenia experienced an unprecedented energy crisis. 
During the following three years, the GDP decreased to less than half, and in 1993 was about 
47% of the 1990 level of the GDP. This has been estimated to be the largest decline of GDP 
in the CIS countries. The deep and systematic economic crisis resulted in approximately 
645,000 job losses in the non-agricultural sector of the economy. Meanwhile, the agricultural 
sector was not prospering as well, significantly decreasing the share of agricultural products 
for sale (IMF 2003:17). 
It is not a surprise that income inequalities increase when there is increased 
unemployment and decreased social transfers. In post-Soviet Armenia, both income 
generated from hired employment and social transfers changed in volume, as well as in 
structure as compared to the Soviet Armenia30. Other incomes, such as property and business 
activity related incomes and informal transfers have also been distributed very unevenly.  
 “The 1991-1993 period left deep scars in the psychological and historical memory of 
the part of population that stayed in the country” (IMF 2003:17).  These scars have not been 
imprints of economic exclusion alone. Those have been costs of social legitimacy and social 
status erosion that are tightly linked to loss of employment and income. Material deprivation 
and income insecurity have not been the only consequences of the transition process in the 
post-Soviet region. Resulting from the steady loss of employment and income, health and 
education systems have deteriorated, increasing social strains. Obviously, high Gini 
coefficient is not the only indicator of extreme inequality in post-Soviet Armenia. Other 
social indicators have worsened for significant swaths of the population, on which there are 
more detailed accounts in the next part of this chapter – the social aspect of exclusion.  
 
                                                 
30 From the point of view of changing volume, absolute terms of wages, pensions and  benefits decreased 
significantly. From the point of view of structure, the unequal distribution of wages increased drastically . 
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3.5 Social Exclusion in Armenia 
The social aspect of exclusion is largely dependent on the implementation of social 
policies within a country. Social change, thus, can be achieved within a framework of 
people-centered policies and strategies that offer bargaining strength to the poor and ensure 
social cohesion and solidarity. These types of policies have been rare in post-Soviet Armenia.  
The level of public expenditures for health care in Armenia was the lowest in the 
region and the quality and utilization of the health services deteriorated during 1998-2002. In 
the 1990s, it ranked lowest among post-Soviet republics in the number of hospital beds per 
1,000 persons, and ranked average for the number of doctors per 1,000 persons (Tonoyan, 
2004:7). During 1998-2002 the highest indicator of state health budget was 1.4% of GDP 
(which according to the recommendation of WHO should not be less than 6-9%) and 
accounted for approximately 25% of total health care expenditure.  
In many developing countries, public health care institutions are typically 
characterized by what is widely known as 'informal payments'.31 “By definition, informal 
payments are those made to individuals or institutions in cash or in kind outside official 
channels for services that are meant to be covered by the public health care system” (Liu and 
Sun, 2009:1). The basic motivebehind widespread informal payments is that formal 
healthcare prices do not fully differentiate patients’ various needs. Another fundamental 
cause of informal payments is that health care providers’ salaries are very low in developing 
countries; thus, they seek other avenues of income. Subsequently, patients pay extra in order 
to get a proper treatment. Conventional wisdom suggests that the groups of the society, who 
face financial constraints, are in a disadvantaged situation in health systems that do not 
prohibit or punish the practice of informal payments. Poor patients are systematically 
eliminated from the process of receiving proper health care.The reliance on direct out-of-
pocket payments undermines the principle of equity with respect to both financing and 
access. In order to have adequate access to health care, a household must be able to afford 
informal payments to doctors, nurses, and other staff in the hospital.  
                                                 
31 Informal payments are literally out-of-pocket payments and they are often called 'out-of pockets payments'. 
Contrary to co-payments or out-of-pocket payments - popular practices of the American healthcare/ health 
insurance system, the out-of-pocket payments are not legal practices of healthcare systems in developing 
countries.      
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Informal payments account for more than 85 percent of all expenditures in the health 
sector for the countries of South Caucasus. Figure 3.6 shows that among selected ECA 
countries Armenia takes the first place regarding the share of patients making informal 
payments. It is 91%.   
Figure 3.6: Share of Patients Making Informal Payments in Selected ECA Countries 
Source:World Bank “Making Transitions Work for Everyone”, 2000 
Naturally, the poor suffer more in this type of health system, as medical care funded 
by the state is basically non-existent. The loss of access to free health care previously 
provided by the state is a significant concern for the poor of the society and creates a sense of 
vulnerability within this class. The accessibility of the most essential services has become a 
very serious problem mainly for socially vulnerable groups in the Armenian population. 
Public spending has also decreased in regard to education (8% of total government 
spending), housing (4.5%) and transport (2.9%) during 1990-2001 (Griffin/UNDP, 
2002:132). 
School enrollment in post-Soviet countries has much higher levels than in countries 
of similar income levels. However, enrollment rates have fallen in some of the poorest CIS 
countries. The World Bank 2000 report “Making Transitions Work for Everyone”notes that 
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Armenia is among those CIS countries, where the primary school enrollment rate of 90% in 
1989 has fallen by about 10 or more percent. There are signs of school attendance declining 
even further. There is evidence that poor children are the ones who often drop out of school 
or attend poorly and their parents are the least able to afford school  costs for their children, 
such as clothing, textbooks and transportation (World Bank 2000).  
Other problems concerning secondary education in Armenia are the decrease of funds 
for educational materials, unpaid teachers’ wages, and lack of heating and school 
maintenance. There are also corruption issues prevalent in the school system, such as asking 
for bribes from parents in order to send their kids to specialized schools, or demands of extra 
pay for supplemental tutoring after school by teachers, etc. These problems create unequal 
educational opportunities for children from poor families starting from primary education. 
For higher education, inequality of opportunities is even worse. Not considering similar 
issues already described for primary education, there are additional strains for both student 
and parents within the higher educational system in Armenia.  
The decrease or the removal of subsidies and many essential social services, and the 
erosion of the social safety nets have had severe implications. While at the initial period of 
the transformation and market restructuring almost everyone suffered from these changes, 
economically vulnerable social groups, who were well protected through safety nets and 
welfare programs during the USSR, suffered intolerably after independence. These include 
low-income social groups, certain groups of women, elderly and pensioners, children, and 
subaltern social groups in general. Those, who had been the beneficiaries of Soviet 
egalitarian measures, have suffered the most.32 
Among vulnerable social groups, children and young adults are increasingly at risk. A 
growing number of children live on the streets, and youth unemployment is high. Teen 
pregnancies have increased. The total abortion rate in Armenia is significantly higher than 
other Eurasian countries (Abrahamyan & Avagyan, 2000). Armenia is primarily a source 
                                                 
32 While it is often argued that there was inequality during the Soviet period, inequality was not as widespread. 
The only group of the wealthy was the Party elites, while the rest of the society was doing equally well, e ven 
the social groups mentioned in the text above. At the same time, it should be n oted that those who had more 
money had to hide it, since it was “wrong” and “illegal”, while nowadays, wealth and extreme well-being is a 
means of openly and proudly displaying their status and employing their power.  
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country for women and girls trafficked to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Turkey for 
the purpose of commercial sexual exploitation; Armenian men and women are trafficked to 
Turkey and Russia for the purpose of forced labor.33 Obviously, those trafficked are typically 
from the poor and the very poor classes; people, who are easily mouse-trapped with promises 
of making money abroad.  
The high crime rates, particularly among the youth, are another indicator of the 
expansion of poverty, inequality and lack of opportunities for a decent life. Sociological 
theories on crime suggest there is an association between inequality and crime rates. The 
feeling of disadvantage, unfairness and exclusion leads the poor to seek retribution and 
satisfaction by committing crimes. A well-known sociological paradigm on crime, the theory 
of relative deprivation, argues that inequality breeds social tensions as the poor feel 
dispossessed when compared with wealthier people.34 Other authors, among them 
Bourguignon (1998), Kelly (2000), Fajnzylber, Lederman and Loayza (2002), conclude that 
income inequality, measured by the Gini index, has a significant and positive effect on the 
incidence of crime. Braithwaite (1979) states that lower-class people, and people living in 
lower class areas, have higher official crime rates than other groups. Crime and Society: A 
Comparative Criminology Tour of the World portrays trends in crime in Armenia, reporting 
that overall crime in 1991 increased 11.5 percent over 1990; then it increased 24.8 percent 
from 1991 to 1992. ““Major” crimes (murder, robbery, armed robbery, rape, and aggravated 
assault) increased 3 percent from 1991 to 1992. The largest increases in that category were in 
murder, robbery, and armed robbery. White-collar crime (bribery and fraud) increased about 
2 percent in that time, crimes by juveniles increased about 40 percent, and drug-related 
crimes increased 240 percent”.35 The number of economic crimes has increased by 14.8% 
and constitutes around 6.3% of the overall crimes.36 A most disturbing fact concerning crime 
rates is that crime by juveniles has increased.  
                                                 
33Source: CIA World Factbook ,18 December 2003 to 18 December 2008 
34 For a more detailed view on the link between inequality and crime, see Steven Stack, Income Inequality and 
Property Crime: A Cross-National Analysis of Relative Deprivation Theory , 22 Criminology 229 (1984). 
35 Source: http://www-rohan.sdsu.edu/faculty/rwinslow/asia_pacific/armenia.html 
36 Source: http://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/seventh_survey/7sc.pdf 
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Similar to the association of inequality and crime rates, literature shows that there is a 
direct link between social exclusion and suicide, and suicide attempts are traceable to 
experiences of social exclusion, such as loss of employment. Durkheim’s (1897/1963) insight 
proposing suicide rates are highest among people, who are not well integrated into society, is 
applicable for the case of Armenia. Other sociological findings have continued to support this 
conclusion (Trout, 1980; Baumeister, 1990; Williams, Cheung, and Choi, 2000). Suicides of 
young and middle-aged males have increased in Armenia, which may be due to 
unemployment, financial problems and social isolation.The World Health Organization 
found that the suicide rate was 3.3% in 1985. It grew to 3.6% in 1992, and increased to 3.9% 
in 2006.37 According to the Armenian statistical data, the prevailing percentage of people 
committing suicide are people at the ages of 35 to 65 years old (50.8%) while people at the 
age of 18-29 make up 19.3%. Not surprisingly, 48.2% suicides were committed by the 
unemployed and 19.9% by the retired.  
Migration is another major social problem in Armenia. Gevorgyan, Mashuryan, and 
Gevorgyan (2006) reveal that while teenagers migrate for mainly family re-unions, among 
the top reasons for migration for older people, such as people in the age groups of 20-49 and 
of 50 and over, are lack of job vacancies, inability to earn a decent living and unhealthy 
moral environment. For a small percentage of people the geopolitically unstable situation and 
difficulties in carrying out entrepreneurship are among other reasons for departure. 
The above paragraphs, depicting problems concerning the quality of health and 
education services, crime and suicides rates, trafficking and migration, convey the decline of 
social cohesiveness, which is an element of social exclusion. The mentioned problems have 
weakened the ability of people to participate in informal networks of self-help. Meanwhile 
the prosperity and wealth of the rich has become more striking, contributing to a bigger gap 
between the poor and the wealthy and fueling social tensions. The very poor are starving, 
while the rich “have been plundering everything and eating so much that they cannot carry 
their own stomachs” (Institute of Philosophy and Sociology 1998:8). 
 
                                                 
37 Source: http://www.who.int/mental_health/prevention/suicide_rates/en/  
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3.6 Political Exclusion in Armenia 
The social and political dimensions of exclusion are often interrelated. The politica l 
dimension, however, specifically deals with the denial of certain political and human rights 
to individuals and groups of society. According to UNDP (1992:29),these rights are personal 
security, rule of law, freedom of expression, political participation and equality of 
opportunity. 
Political exclusion concerns the general democratization process. More specifically, 
Marshall (1964) categorizes political exclusion into: a) civil rights (freedom of speech and 
rule of law), b) political rights (right to participate in political decision-making), and c) 
socio-economic rights (personal security and equality of opportunity, right to health care and 
education, unemployment benefits, etc.). In analyzing political exclusion in this study, I 
follow Marshall’s categorization of political exclusion.  
The process of social exclusion is based predominantlyon the political process 
through which certain groups of the society, who formerly used to be well-integrated into the 
whole society, start facing social and economic vulnerability. The political aspect of social 
exclusion suggests that the state and the institutional system, both of which grant basic civil 
rights, serve as vehicles of the dominant classes instead of being either a neutral agency or an 
agency promoting equal economic opportunities and civil liberties. The state’s support for 
elites is expressed through prevailing policies and programs. Thus, from the perspective of 
political economy, it can be noted that the role of the state and its redefined framework, 
under which many of the state functions are replaced by the private sector are highly critical 
for either producing or preventing social exclusion.  
People excluded from the economic and social arenas start challenging traditional 
hegemonies through using politics as an arena within which such challenge could be 
exercised. Hegemonic elites, in their turn, are often aware of this potential challenge. The 
ruling elites begin to close political and decision-making options for others in addition to 
cornering resources and privileges for themselves. The excluded majority are left with no 
voice because there is no politically relevant representation of their interests that would make 
them a political force. Through political exclusion, such as restraining participation and 
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inhibiting policy influence of the excluded, the state creates “permanently outvoted 
minorities” (Silver 1997:60).  This generates a tendency towards shrinkage rather than 
inclusion of the excluded. A further polarization within the power structure occurs, where the 
powerful elites become more and more unwilling to increase the scope of economic and 
political opportunities through the free and fair game of the political process.  
In a similar vein, the unwillingness of the system to create new institutional modes 
and policies dealing with exclusion has produced a growing gap between the agitated restive 
masses and the political elites in Armenia during the last 15-20 years. The country has 
followed a path of state-building and a model of development that has created two 
'Armenia's: one Armenia is concerned with power preservation through draining away 
resources from the poorer masses and fighting opposition, while the other Armenia is left to 
fend for itself. This growing convergence and the failure of the new system to provide a 
relatively equal delivery of goods and opportunities result in public discontent with a 
stronger scale of demands, in which the socio-economic terms are now combined with the 
political.  
Post-Soviet Armenia has never experienced a civil war, given the dangerous contexts 
that it has faced a few times during its 20 year independence. While two of Armenia’s 
neighboring states in South Caucasus, Georgia and Azerbaijan, experienced civil wars in the 
wake of the break-up of the USSR, Armenia was able to avoid a civil war. Armenia’s most 
vulnerable moments, according to Fiarron and Laitin (2006), were in 1991-92, the point of 
independence and the period from 1996-1999, when Armenia suffered from anocracy and 
instability.38 The Fiarron and Laitin paper was written in 2006, hence we can add to these 
politically instable periods the period of 2008-present, when Armenia experienced one of its 
most serious civil and political rights crisis.  
                                                 
38 Historian and physicist Spencer Weart in his book “Never at War: Why Democracies Will Not Fight One 
Another” (1998) defines anocracies as societies, where central authority is weak or nonexistent. Kinship bonds 
extended by personal allegiances to notable leaders are the principal relations. A society may in theory be a 
state but if the above applies then Weart classifies it as an anocracy. In anocracies, influential families fight 
street battles. Importantly, there is no central authority which can effectively restrain personal violence such as 
raids which often escalate by involving friends and relatives to vendettas and wars. In anocrac ies, power is not 
vested in public institutions but spread amongst elite groups, who are constantly competing with each other  for 
power.  
By another definition, an anocracy lies midway between a democracy and an autocracy. 
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Despite the absence of a civil war in the third Republic of Armenia, political 
exclusion and human rights abuse have been common in the country during its post-
independence. The 2009 World Report of Human Rights Watch records that “Armenia 
experienced one of its most serious civil and political rights crises since independence when 
security forces used excessive force on March 1 against opposition demonstrators protesting 
the results of the February 2008 presidential election” (Human Rights Watch, 2009:334).  
There were violent clashes between police forces and the demonstrators, arrests of hundreds 
of demonstrators and opposition supporters. A state of emergency declared by the 
government restricted basic freedoms of Armenian citizens, including freedom of movement, 
freedom of assembly, expression and access to information. According to the report, there 
was an excessive international condemnation of the use of excessive coercion during the 
March 1 events and the state of emergency. The report dwells on 1) election-related violence, 
2) media freedom, 3) freedom of assembly, and 4) torture and ill-treatment. All of these 
issues generate political exclusion. 
The election-related violence in 2008 post-election events caused 10 deaths, hundreds 
of injured citizens and hundreds arrested. Police detained and charged hundreds of opposition 
supporters. There were incommunicado detentions, denial of access to counsel and failure to 
investigate claims of ill-treatment.  
The report raises a particularly serious concern regarding freedom of media in the 
country, noting that police often target journalists covering demonstrations. Under the state 
emergency, the National Security Service (NSS) banned at least seven oppositional and 
independent newspapers from publishing and blocked websites. The ban was lifted in about 
two weeks, but NSS continued to interfere with the printing of the mentioned newspapers for 
another week. Later, in the same month, tax authorities hit four of those newspapers with 
apparently politically motivated audits.  
Concerning the freedom of assembly, the restrictive amendments to the law on 
meetings passed by the National Assembly of Armenia just before the government lift of the 
state of the emergency on March 17, 2008 should be mentioned. With this law, which was 
criticized by the Council of Europe and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
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Europe (OSCE), the government denied people’s requests to hold public rallies. This law, of 
course, makes the majority of political arrests seem legitimate and the employment of police 
and military force by the state permissible. Political exclusion does not end with the 
imprisonment of hundreds of citizens contesting the repressive state regime and social 
exclusion; those in custody are often tortured and ill-treated.  
There have been past cases of demonstrator beatings and arrests in 1996 and 2004 
post-election crises. The repeated violence and coercion used against demonstrating citizens 
and social movement groups during different administrations shows the durability of political 
exclusion along with social and economic exclusion.  On the other hand, it is essential to note 
that there are stark differences in the three of those cases regarding the intensity of social 
mobilization, the organization and violence of demonstrators and coercion used by 
government elites. Armine Ishkhanyan (2008), for instance, uncovers three of those 
differences: 1) the support of the main opposition candidate by government officials, civil 
servants and diplomats; 2) the forms of media, communication, and information-sharing 
(which I call ‘the state of civil society’ here); and 3) the emergence of a generation of young 
Armenians as an active political constituency.39 
Aside from pre- and post-election beatings, threats and intimidation, arrests and 
political assassinations that constitute mainly political rights as an element of political 
exclusion, there is also widespread police abuse of prisoners in Armenia, which, based on 
Marshall’s categorization, can be considered as neglect of both civil and political rights. In 
their 2010 April statement, the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) and 
Armenian human rights groups stressed a deep concern about “the seemingly pervasive 
culture of impunity for crimes committed by or under the responsibility of law enforcement 
bodies in Armenia” (Abrahamyan, 2010). This, indeed, speaks to the flawed and rotten 
system of the rule of law in the republic.  
The European Union for Democracy and Solidarity in the country update for Armenia 
among other important political developments emphasizes clans, corruption, business 
                                                 
39 The similarities and differences of social movements and state reaction to them will be analyzed in detail in 
Chapter 5. 
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involvement of political party funding, and human rights violations.40 Further, Armenia’s 
Human Rights ombudsman states that approximately half of the 5,000 reported abuse cases 
received are police-related. These issues embody elements and interactions of capital and 
coercion in Armenia, operating as sources of political inequality.  
3.7 Conclusion 
The reality of the post-socialist transition is that most of those countries moved from 
a relatively egalitarian system to a less-egalitarian one, producing long-term social exclusion 
for certain social groups. The naive beliefs of the post-Soviet people that market system will 
cause a more equitably distributed income and wealth have been shattered after each and 
every recent election in some transition countries (e.g., in Ukraine in 1998, in Armenia in 
1998, 2003 and 2008, in Azerbaijan in 2003 and 2008, in 2003 and 2008 in Georgia).  
This chapter explored the problem of social exclusion in Armenia as an element of 
transition, depicting the main issues by which we defined and characterized social exclusion 
in Chapter Two. These issues were categorized into three main fields: economic, social and 
political. All three of these aspects of exclusion are highly critical in post-Soviet Armenia, 
based on several international reports and reviews. Armenia’s Gini coefficient of 5.6 has 
been among the highest in world, income distribution is unequal, access to education and 
health services is very limited for the poor strata of the population, migration trends have 
intensified, crime, juvenile delinquency and homelessness have increased, and civil, political 
and socio-economic rights are often violated. 
Social exclusion is durable in Armenia, because it lasts for more than 20 years after 
the Republic’s independence, and there have been rare efforts by any of the two ruling 
administrations to reduce it. The problem started to develop at the beginning of 1990s, when 
Armenia was going through both economic restructuring and a war, and has continued to 
expand into a more severe form of exclusion during the post-war period. During the latter 
period social and political exclusion exacerbated even more, as political and human rights 
violations increased and became widespread.  
                                                 
40 Source: http://www.europeanforum.net/country/armenia 
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CHAPTER 4  
Hypotheses and Methods 
Capitalism has twins, the market and war. The market converts life into commodities, 
it converts land into a commodity. And when capitalists cannot sustain this economic model 
based on looting, on exploitation, on marginalization, on exclusion, and above all, on the 
accumulation of capital, they rely on war. – Evo Morales 
Income inequality is where the capitalist system is most vulnerable. You can’t have the 
capitalist system if an increasing number of people think it is unjust. - Alan Greenspan 
The military caste did not originate as a party of patriots, but as a party of bandits. 
– Henry Louis Mencken 
4.1 Introduction  
This chapter describes the steps I have undertaken to address the research question of 
the dissertation. It starts with a brief section presenting the research design and explaining 
why the chosen research design isadequate for studying social exclusion in post-Soviet 
Armenia. The research design is a case study utilizing both quantitative and qualitative 
research methods. The quantitative analysis is based on the results of a student survey that I 
carried out in Armenia in 2009. The qualitative research includes historical analysis, elite 
interviewing, and newspaper content analysis. This mixed research design was necessary in 
order to demonstrate not only social exclusion and deprivation indicators, described in 
Chapter Two, but it also enabled me to identify the processes and relations that tend to cause 
exclusion in the specific context. This way, we can understand social exclusion as a dynamic 
process. 
The second part of the chapter formulates the two main hypotheses of the dissertation, 
speculating that privatization was an important factor in the formation of social exclusion in 
post-Soviet Armenia, particularly its economic dimension, and that state militarization 
through war has further exacerbated social exclusion, affecting most heavily on its social and 
political dimensions. Further, the development of these hypotheses offers a theoretical 
framework through which durable social exclusion in post-Soviet Armenia will be examined. 
This section assesses existing theories of privatization and state militarization, and whether 
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they can sufficiently explain the problem of exclusion and inequality. It reargues that from a 
qualitative research perspective, using Weber’s concept of social closure and Tilly’s concept 
of opportunity hoarding can make a valuable contribution to enhancing understanding about 
the processes that result in the formation, reinforcement and durability of social exclusio n. 
Adapting these theories helps to establish the interrelations between the Armenian post-
independence state building, privatization process, the Karabakh war and consequent state 
militarization that are designed by state elites and business oligarchs in a specific way to 
exclude others. The mentioned conditions and processes are examined through a 20 year 
period, in an effort to capture the durability of exclusion in post-Soviet Armenia. 
4.2 Research Design 
This study is an exploratory case study.41I chose this research design for two main 
reasons. First, because social exclusion is a rarely-studied problem in not only post-Soviet 
Armenia, but also in most of the post-Soviet space, there is a shortage of data concerning the 
topic, and therefore an exploratory study seemed to be the most appropriate and available 
method. As Russel Schutt (2006) put it, the goal of an exploratory study is "to investigate 
social phenomena without explicit expectations", which I have tried to do for studying social 
exclusion in post-Soviet Armenia. Secondly, exploratory research is considered to be a good 
method for social scientists who seek to examine social issues that are difficult to quantify, 
such as processes and relations. In this sense, the use of an exploratory study seems to be an 
appropriate method to study social exclusion, especially since I intend to examine how 
political processes that involve issues of power, domination and hegemony affect the 
polarization and marginalization of certain groups within a society. As an exploratory case 
study, this research provides significant insight into the problem of social exclusion in post-
Soviet Armenia and is a rare effort to generate formal hypotheses for studying social 
exclusion in the post-Soviet space. It is an attempt to develop a preliminary theory on the 
problem of social exclusion in developing countries, based on the case of post-Soviet 
Armenia.  
                                                 
41An exploratory study is generally conducted for a problem that has not been clearly defined, particularly for 
the case in which the researcher is interested. Whereas an exploratory study may produce important 
observations about the problem, it should represent definitive conclusions with extreme caution.  
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The research design combines qualitative historical analysis, as well as a survey of 
university students, and interviewing party elite and leaders of research organizations.42 The 
aim of the student survey was to evaluate public perceptions of social exclusion 
quantitatively. Undertaking interviews with political party elites and heads of research 
organizations in Armenia enabled me to better assess coalition-building processes between 
the military and state elites, and how they transform the Armenian state and class structures, 
creating social mobilization and state repression against this mobilization.43 On the basis of 
the data gathered in these interviews, I was able to pinpoint key (para)military leaders active 
in state politics, and the type of interactions between state elites and those (para)military 
figures, that act as obstacles of social inclusion. The interviews also helped me better assess 
the connection of the Armenian elites' rigid position on the Karabakh question and its 
resolution to the militarization and autocracy of the Armenian state, the use of the Karabakh 
issue by the same elites to maintain their power and to restrain social discontent.   Finally, 
through these interviews I discovered more details and specifics of the privatization process, 
and how the latter generated widespread unemployment, increased low-wage employment, 
black markets, etc.  
The historical analysis is based on previous literature covering the period of 1988-
2008. The information collected from the historical analysis, as well as interviews and 
surveys, although valid and helpful in uncovering the relationships of underlying forces, were 
not sufficient. Academic books and articles that focus on latest political events in Armenia 
are limited. This lack was ameliorated by the Armenian media, which is a good commentator 
on the Armenian and South Caucasus socio-economic and political development process. To 
fill the gap, I also employed mass media content analysis, concerning events related to the 
                                                 
42 During the summers of 2009, 2011 and 2012, I conducted several interviews on themes of privatization, the 
Karabakh war, state militarization, and social movements.  State elites for interviewing were chosen from major 
political parties, both pro-government and oppositional. Among interviewees there were former and current 
state elites, such as three of the former Prime Ministers of the Republic of Armenia (RA), a senior advisor to 
President Levon Ter-Petrosyan, and several pro-government and oppositional political party leaders.  
Leaders and representatives of research organizations were chosen based on the lev el of their political 
awareness, active participation in the socio-political life of the republic, as well as their research input in the 
academic realm and policy-making. The initial list of the interviewees, particularly the state elites, included 
more individuals, but because of the unavailability and/or unwillingness of some of them to discuss the topic 
with me, I managed to interview only 15 of them. Most of the interviews were conducted in Armenia, except 
two of them, which were conducted in the US.  
43 The interview and survey questions can be found in the Appendix.  
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Karabakh movement, Armenia’s independence in September 1991, the privatization process 
and the emergence of oligarchic echelon, Karabakh war and the peace process, social 
movements and their repression, starting from year of 1988.  Specifically, articles from the 
following newspaper sources were used: Armenia Liberty (Radio Free Europe/ Radio 
Liberty), Hetq Investigative News, Azg, Haykakan Jamanak, Tert, Hayastani Hanrapetutyun, 
Aravot, EuraisNetand ArmeniaPedia.  
A few of the chosen newspapers, such as Hayastani Hanrapetutyun, are considered to 
be main official information sources in Armenia. They are not privately owned and present 
the pro-government view on events. Some newspapers and online media sources, such as 
Haykakan Jamanak, have been used because they articulate the views of oppositional forces. 
Others, such asRFE/RL, are considered to be fairly unbiased sources of news. A few of those 
mass media sources are external and express foreign analysts', as well as diaspora Armenians' 
observations on Armenia's political developments. In rare cases of information deficiency, I 
have consulted WikiLeaks, which presents information that is common knowledge in 
Armenia, but is not published by journalists due to fear of potential intimidation and 
suppression. In this way, by consulting a variety of pro-government, oppositional and 
external sources, I intended to present a comparatively realistic and an unbiased picture of 
events. 
4.3 Hypotheses 
Given the theoretical framework around the phenomenon of durable social exclusion 
presented in Chapter Two (Durable Social Exclusion), this study proposes to test two 
hypotheses related to the development of durable social exclusion in Armenia. They are: 
 (1) As a critical component of free-market economic reforms, the privatization of 
firms and social services was a necessary but not a sufficient factor in the formation of social 
exclusion, particularly the economic dimension of social exclusion. The relative absence of 
policies to promote social equity and political inclusion were intended consequences of a 
market model that concentrated wealth and life chances at the top of the income scale. In the 
process of industrial privatization, particularly of the largest firms and industries since the 
beginning of 2000, government officials spun firms off to political supporters who became 
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large-scale entrepreneurs. The critical point is that these “oligarchs” also participated in the 
policy process of free-market reforms. Their networks with policymakers provided crucial 
political and material support for market reforms beneficial to oligarchs. This relationship 
was also favorable for state elites in maintaining their power.   
 (2) State militarization through war is a second necessary and largely overlooked 
condition for the persistence of social exclusion, particularly the social and political 
dimensions of social exclusion, in Armenia over more than two decades.  It consolidated an 
authoritarian and repressive electoral political regime.  This militarized form of democracy 
defeated strong social movements pressing for social equity and political inclusion. A 
militarized state also resulted in an extreme sense of nationalism and an uncompromising 
position on the Karabakh question, which in their turn affected the deepening of social 
exclusion in Armenia, as well as the insecurity of the South Caucasus region.    
Development of the Privatization Hypothesis: 
If the great scenarios teach us anything, it is that the problems that threaten 
capitalism arise from the private sector, not the public. The saturation of demand 
and the degradation of the labor force that are the great difficulties of Smith’s 
conception; the crises and contradictions of Marx’s model; the inability to reach 
full employment that Keynes selected as the great cultural erosion of Schumpeter’s 
scenario – these are all failures that arise from the workings of the capitalist 
economy, not from any interference with those workings by the polity. What 
solutions, what counter-measures can there be to problems caused by the private 
realm except those that originate in the public realm? (Heilbroner as cited in Byrne 
2005)  
At the same time, it is argued within the policy documents of the European 
Union:The cause of exclusion is not the fundamental nature of capitalism (which never gets 
discussed) but the ‘contemporary economic and social conditions’ which tend to exclude 
some groups from the cycle of opportunities. (Byrne 2005, italics added)  
Nonetheless, it is undeniable that there are fundamental problems inherent in the 
nature of the capitalist system, the balance of power of labor and capital within this system 
and the privatization process as a critical component of this system, particularly in the post-
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Soviet space.44 A comprehensive program of free market economic reforms to a great degree 
caused the initial deterioration of income, labor, and social indicators in post-Soviet 
transitions. That program included the introduction of the price system, the privatization of 
firms and social services, financial and trade liberalization, fiscal retrenchment, tight 
monetary policy, and deregulation. In particular, the privatization process has been 
significant for the transition of post-Soviet societies. 
While the post-Soviet literature has a mixed stance in regard to consequences and 
outcomes of privatization, there is an extensive literature, which shows that economic reform 
produced significant social exclusion and challenges neoliberalism through focusing on anti-
neoliberal protest and mobilization in Latin America (Lopez Maya 1999; Wood and Roberts 
2005; Munck 2005; Yashar 2005; Dello Buono, de la Barra, 2009; Silva 2009)45. For 
instance, Silva (2009) challenges neoliberalism in Latin America, arguing that neoliberal 
reforms commodified labor by restructuring the state in support of market efficiency to the 
exclusion of other values. "Free market policies severed the connections of organized 
subaltern social groups to the state, leaving them to fend for themselves against capital in the 
market” (Silva 2009:266). Yashar (1998, 1999) strikes a similar chord in her analysis of 
Latin American indigenous rights movements arguing that the adoption of neoliberal 
economic policies and privatized public assets and commonly held land, states threaten the 
coherence of indigenous communities.   
Within the framework of the privatization argument, I follow the Latin American 
literature in proposing that privatization, as a critical component of neoliberal reform, 
affected the economic, political and social sphere in Armenia, threatened live lihoods and 
interests of middle classes and a wide variety of popular sectors and raised a range of 
grievances, giving rise to waves of social mobilization. Referring to Silva (2009:266) again, 
we can speculate that these waves of “anti-neoliberal contention suggest the dawning of a 
Polanyian countermovement to contemporary market society” in Armenia. Indeed, post-
                                                 
44 The major theories of privatization have been discussed in Chapter 2, in the section where I examined the 
causes and drivers of social exclusion in post-Soviet countries. 
45 For further empirical findings and conclusions on privatization in post-Soviet republics, please see Barberis, 
Boyko, Shleifer, and Tsukarova (1996); Earle (1998); Earle and Estrin (1998); Djankov (1999a); Djankov 
(1999b); and Black, Kraakman and Tarassova (2000). For example, Black, Kraakman and Tarassova (2000) 
imply that Russian privatization has created “kleptocracy” and has essentially failed. 
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Soviet Armenia is one of the countries where neoliberal globalization assumed its most 
pernicious form. Uneven rates of economic growth were accompanied with extreme poverty 
and a tremendous expansion of social exclusion.  
The political results of privatization can be studied through different political theories 
and perspectives, among which is dependency theory. Many scholars of the dependency or 
world systems and neo-dependency theories, such as Rostow (1960), Gunder (1966, 1967, 
1969), Sunkel (1969), Cardoso (1972), Amin (1974, 1977), Cardoso and Falleto (1979), 
Wallerstein (1974, 1979, 1980), and Tausch (1992, 1993, 2003) trace the world system 
perspective to the writings of Karl Polanyi. In opposition to free market economists, the work 
of Polanyi (1944) argues that structural change within any one country or a region cannot be 
adequately understood apart from the specific features of the country/region and the domestic 
processes that involve local actors, such as social classes, state policies, civil society, the 
military, etc. In regard to dependency theory, subsequent research has more specifically 
argued that more subordinated and dependant countries within the world system experience a 
number of problems, such as slow economic growth (Bornschier et al., 1978, as cited in 
Timberlake and Williams, 1984:141), increased levels of income inequality (Rubinson, 1976, 
as cited in Timberlake and Williams, 1984:141) and distorted labor force structure (Fiala, 
1983, as cited in Timberlake and Williams, 1984:141). Particularly, since the evolution of the 
capitalist system in third world countries dependency theory has favored the appearance of 
specific patterns of class relations in the latter.  
Dependency theory is closely related to the advancement of the neoliberal order, 
chiefly the privatization process in post-Soviet region. In this regard, Timberlake and 
Williams’ (1984) main finding that dependence contributes directly to political exclusion and 
government repression supports the privatization hypothesis developed in this study. More 
specifically, Timberlake and Williams argue that “the degree of penetration of peripheral 
countries by foreign capital contributes to the formal exclusion of non-elite political 
participation and to the greater frequency with which governments actively repress 
opposition” (Timberlake and Williams 1984:141).  
 90 
 
The exclusion of non-elite political participation and the greater frequency and 
strength of opposition repression by the state hold true not only in the case of foreign capital 
penetration as a consequence of privatization, but also in the case of the emergence of a new 
class of oligarchs and the accumulation of capital in their hands, again as a consequence of 
privatization. The elite, who are enriched by the penetration of the foreign capital or through 
the attainment of assets and with political power, have an interest in assuring the security and 
longevity of that capital and power. The “important ways these interests are pursued include 
promoting political structures and supporting repressive regimes which will impose negative 
sanctions when opposition is organized” (Timberlake and Williams, 1984:142).  
Armenia can be considered a case of a peripheral country, where during the neoliberal 
restructuring, privatization played a special political role. It created large-scale private capital 
and, therefore, important business interests desirous of advancing their policy preferences in 
pursuit of profit. As a result, the privatization hypothesis involves an examination of the 
evolution of business-state relations during the privatization of firms and services in 
Armenia.  
Privatization provided informal avenues of influence for business communities to 
affect policymaking and guarantee a "privileged position" for them in terms of policy output 
(Lindblom 1977). Due to the boom of oligarchy and kinship networks resulting from the 
privatization process, access to economic assets, financial institutions and business 
development was not equal for all. Current structural issues, such as corruption, 
protectionism and other challenges create privileges for a few, while restricting the potential 
of development for others. Frequently laws are approved for particular people. A high level 
of corruption in tax administration and budget expenditures facilitates the increase in 
inequality. As a result of corruption, the tax system actually becomes regressive, which 
directly increases income inequality. Investments in human capital and social programs 
financed from the government budget are biased in favor of financing the projects, where the 
level of corruption tends to be high. 
According to one of my interviewees, during the 1990s there was a well-known 
rhymed phrase in Russian often used by the Armenians, which is the following: 
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“приватизация это прихватизациая” (privatizatsiya eto prixvatizatsiya).46 It is translated 
into English as “privatization is usurpation” or “privatization is a means to usurp”.  
Another interviewee, Richard Giragosian, comments more specifically on the 
privatization process like this:47 
“During the government of Prime Minister Hrant Bagratyan, Armenia was a leading reformer 
in the post-Soviet states.48 Privatization went further and faster than in many similar 
countries. The reason I mention the success of privatization, is also because it demonstrates 
what Armenia could have ensured and accomplished in other sectors of privatization, because 
it was land privatization and only land privatization that was transparent and successful. The 
later industrial privatization opened a way for the formation of oligarchic cartels” (italics 
added). 
Here is another quote from the same interview with Giragosian: 
“During the Kocharyan period (1998-2008), when the country enjoyed seven years of double 
digit economic growth, that economic growth was more a paradox; it was not growth that 
filtered down to the general population and it was sector-specific, for example construction 
and services sector. It was not a rising tide that lifted all boats” (italics added).  
On the contrary, “The Caucasian Tiger” (Mitra et al.:2007) mentions that due to the 
recent period of growth in Armenia there has been a sharp rise in consumption by the poor. 
The World Bank authors further state that the poorer quintiles of the income distribution 
have gained more from this growth than the richer quintiles, with the extremely poor 
enjoying the greatest gain. This finding is, without doubt, consistent with other IMF and 
World Bank reports. In the same section, however, the authors discuss high unemployment 
rates, which according to survey data stand at about one-fifth of the labor force. The wonder, 
thus is, how do the country’s poor and the very poor gain from the economic growth more 
                                                 
46Gevork Manoukyan is Chairman of the Armenian Constitutional Legal Protection Centre (ACPRC). 
Manukyan is an internationally recognized human rights advocate and activist. Manoukyan was interviewed on 
May 20, 2009 in Vanadzor, Armenia.  
47 Richard Giragosian, Director of the Armenian Center for National and International Studies (ACNIS), 
Armenia. Girgosyan was interviewed in Yerevan, Armenia on August 2, 2009. 
48 Hrant Bagratyan was the 4th Prime Minister of post-independent Armenia in 1993-1996. Before this position, 
Bagratyan was Minister of Economy, Vice-Prime Minister of Armenia (1991–1993). Since 1996, he has been 
Consultant of the International Monetary Fund as an energy expert, professor of economics at the Russian -
Armenian University in Armenia, at Kiev International University, and at the University of Banking Affairs of 
National Bank of Ukraine. In 2006 Bagratyan was recognized by the independent journalists as the best 
economic public man of Armenia during the whole period of the independency of the country in 1991-2006. 
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than the rich do in the presence of high unemployment rates?49 The persistence of 
unemployment in Armenia is explained by Mitra et al. (2007) by the incompleteness of the 
structural reforms and inadequacies of institutions and practices that encourage competition. 
Commenting on “The Caucasian Tiger” and Armenia’s unprecedented economic 
growth, ICHD experts call it “high but disturbing economic growth” (ICHD 2007:1-2).They 
bring up seven symptoms of the issue, a few of which deserve mentioning here, because they 
are directly or indirectly linked with the privatization process and its consequences in 
Armenia. Those points support the arguments made in disagreement to the World Bank 
assumption that the continuation of the neoliberal reforms, specifically privatization and 
economic growth as a consequence of it, was a positive experience for Armenia.  
1. Capital is centralized and circulated primarily in one city – Yerevan. Economic 
growth is not evenly distributed in Armenia both in terms of geography and social layers of 
the population. The growth is skewed and pregnant with a series of consequences, including 
the poor quality of the national security, which in its turn is specifically associated with 
increase of migration. 
2. In terms of expenditure components, GDP mostly grows due to import, or more 
precisely, due to the difference between current consumption, construction expenditures and 
imports. The major source of economic growth of Armenia is direct or indirect expenditures 
resulting from remittances. 
3. In terms of income components, it is the wealthy social layers that are affected by 
the present pace of the economic growth.  
4. Improvement of the welfare of the poor and the middle classes is defined with 
remittances. The present economic growth is not conditioned with the development of a 
competitive real sector. (ICHD 2007:1-2) 
The analysis of the impact of privatization and subsequently emerged oligarchic elites 
on social exclusion in post-Soviet Armenia, as well as a exhaustive discussion of the above-
stated points will be detailed in Chapter 8, Privatization and Social Exclusion in Post-Soviet 
Armenia. 
                                                 
49 My explanation to this question would be that the consumption numbers are easier and more frequently 
secreted by the wealthy than by the poor, whether those numbers are based on survey data or other official 
statistics. Moreover, higher consumption rates reported by the poor may be due to remittances, rather than 
redistributive policies. Hence, we get higher consumption numbers for the poor than for the wealthy.  
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Development of the Militarization Hypothesis:It is indisputable that war and the 
military can become a critical element and a significant force in shaping the path of state-
building. It only remains a question of whether it is a positive or a negative force for 
development, for consolidation of democracy, and for social inclusion. Contending that in the 
case of post-Soviet Armenia state militarization after the Karabakh war has been a critical 
factor for maintaining elite power and domination and, consequently, for the durability of 
social exclusion, the second hypothesis of the dissertation explores the conditions that make 
the Armenian state so repressive and able to contain strong mass mobilization by civil society 
that demands for greater social inclusion. Several questions here become important. Under 
what conditions do military institutions or leaders gain privileges that allow them to be 
actively involved in domestic politics? What are the factors that make some military states 
more stable than others, maintaining their hegemonic power? And if state militarization 
causes social exclusion to become durable, how does it do it?  
These questions will be explored mainly in the fifth and sixth chapters, where a 
comparative analysis of five post-Soviet states and their repressive power is examined, and a 
discussion of the Karabakh war and after-war political events is developed. But before we try 
to search answers to these questions, it is essential to succinctly present how state 
militarization is expressed in modern Armenia.  
The definitions and theories of state militarization discussed in Chapter Two are 
significantly related and serve as the foundation for the development of our state 
militarization hypothesis. For evaluating the state of growth and equity in post-Soviet 
Armenia, Ioppose the acknowledged association between the increased militarization and 
less stratification.50 Instead, I consent to Hewedy’s (1989) and Bowman’s (2002) assertion 
that if a country wants to grow democratically, protect its citizens’ well-being, and restore 
equity, it should minimize its armed forces and decrease nationalist sentiments. Similarly, my 
hypothesis argues that a militarized form of democracy defeats strong social movements that 
press for socio-economic equity and demand political inclusion. A strong, coercive apparatus 
enhances incumbent’s capacity to repress opponents. The greater the incumbents’ capacity to  
                                                 
50 The major theories of political power, state militarization and militarism, which suggest that militarization 
decreases social stratification,were discussed in Chapter Two.  
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crack down on opposition protest, or to prevent it from emerging in the first place, the greater 
are the prospects for stable authoritarianism (Way, 2006:9). Stable authoritarianism in its turn 
exhibits prolonged exclusive, unaccountable and arbitrary power against potential 
challengers, therefore closing opportunities for those who are excluded and making social 
exclusion durable. 
Employing the military, not only serves the purpose of repressing oppositions, but as 
many prominent authors have observed, military and police forces are the key instruments of 
state power in general (Katzenstein 1996, Bowman 2002, Way 2006). This is the case of 
post-Soviet Armenia, especially after the end of the Karabakh war. According to Richard 
Giragosian, “the Armenian military is more than a fundamental pillar of the state; it has 
become a foundational agent of the state” (Giragosian, 2005:13). 
Janowitz's (1977) argument that paramilitary forces have been developing quickly in 
the Third World countries and that their rapid growth has contributed to “the regimes’ 
stability, that is, their ability to maintain themselves in power” contributes to a fundamental 
part of my dissertation, regarding the hegemonic power of the state-military elite networking 
and merger in Armenia (Janowitz 1977:5). Military elites and Karabkah war commanders, as 
well as other representatives of security forces including national police forces and militia 
personnel rose not only to the domestic political arena, but also became actively involved in 
the economic realm during the state reformation of post-Soviet Armenia. This has been 
mutually beneficial to both state leaders and militaries, because while the former have 
secured political and economic resources for the military leaders, the latter have provided 
coercive instruments and power for the incumbent governments’ security. In this way, 
military choices have been vehicles of popular politics throughout the democratization of 
Armenia after the Karabakh war’s cease-fire.  
The Karabakh war and the strong coercive power of the Armenian state gained due to 
the war enabled Armenian state elites to contain mass protests against mounting 
socioeconomic and political exclusion, as a result contributing to the perpetuation of high 
levels of social exclusion.  In successive waves of mobilization, protesters framed their 
struggle in terms of inclusion, redistribution, and recognition.  Indeed, Armenia experienced 
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a higher degree of social exclusion, and consequently a higher degree of social mobilizatio n 
than other post-Soviet countries that passed through similar processes of economic and 
political transformation. Here, research suggests that despite waves of well-structured and 
strong mobilization and demonstrations, Armenian social movements have failed to achieve 
changes of regime or increase in social inclusion, which other post-Soviet countries have 
managed to achieve in some degrees.51 
Through comparison of five post-Soviet countries – Ukraine, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, 
Azerbaijan and Armenia – I show that only Armenia and Azerbaijan, which have had the 
most mobilized opposition movements (even in absolute terms), have been unable to achieve 
change. As a result of social movements, the other three cases experienced "colorful 
revolutions", that is, effective transfers of state power to new state actors (Tarrow, 1998:157). 
In other words, the Armenian and Azeri waves of social movements have been futile as 
compared to the Ukrainian, Georgian and Kyrgyz movements (Way 2006; Beachain and 
Polese 2010). The reason for this lies in the success with which states break down 
oppositions, a major characterization of modern state militarization. The type of relations and 
coalitions that may be established between the state, the army and the society is largely 
dependent on the strength of the military. If a state is founded on a powerful army, which is 
well-funded by the state, then army may potentially become an agent of socio-economic 
change. Further, I argue that the success of opposition repression in the case of the mentioned 
five cases depend on the fact whether the country has recently been involved in an external 
war or not. Both Armenia and Azerbaijan were engaged in an interstate war, the Karabakh 
war, and regardless of the war outcome, both states have used the war outcome for promoting 
military prerogatives and for strengthening their coercive apparatus.52 
                                                 
51 A change of regime does not necessarily cause a positive change in social inclusion, but it brings new 
political forces and discourses, which allow for more social participation in economic and/or political dec ision-
making process.  
52 Though the war ended with Armenia’s victory with the signing of a cease-fire between Armenia and 
Azerbaijan and the de facto independence of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, the Azerbaijani leadership has 
repeatedly threatened to restart hostilities to retake the region. Since the cease-fire, the territorial question has 
been skillfully used by the Azeri authorities as part of their campaign. As Cheterian (2010) reports, they 
increased their militaristic declarations and emphasized the need to reinforce the Azerbaijani army. They insist 
that they will seek a military solution in case diplomatic negotiations with Armenia do not work.  
Meanwhile, Armenian authorities, backed by nationalist sentiments in the country, also worked on 
strengthening military ideology, as well as the state budget spent on military. In the absence of war, the ruling 
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According to Arman Grgoryan, the monopolization of resources in favor of a few had 
chiefly to do with war and the war economy both during the war and after it.53 War affected 
the unhealthy distortions of economic behavior in Armenia by several ways. The first reason, 
Grigoryan mentions in his interview, is similar to that mentioned in the classical 
militarization literature. War in general tends to strengthen states, tends to lead to more 
centralization, tends to lead to more control. This is the universal logic of the war that was 
introduced in the Armenian economy. “Particularly, when you have a country at war that 
does not have a central budget, to speak of, it has to be very concerned about controlling as 
much as it can to finance the war. And this led to the concentration of economic power in the 
hands of the few” (Grigoryan, interviewed on 03.24.2010).54 
The second avenue by which Grigoryan finds the war affected the economic behavior 
of the country concerns the fact that it was not the best economic actors that gained access to 
economic means but those that were connected to the war effort. For example, the most 
important economic ministry in Armenia in mid 1990s was the Defense Ministry. It was not a 
well-publicized, nonetheless, a well-known fact that certain imports essentially were 
monopolies of the Defense Ministry and connected businessmen.  
Finally, another reason why military leaders were fairly or unfairly rewarded with 
economic assets was the victory of Armenia in the war. The first stage of the privatization 
process of state properties coincided with the immediate period after the war in Armenia, and 
certain military actors were awarded economic resources. Very few in Armenia dispute that 
                                                                                                                                                       
elites of both countries thus strengthened their coercive apparatus. The Armenian political system in this way 
has also gravitated towards an openly authoritarian regime, similar to the Azerbaijani political structure.   
53With a PhD in Political Science from Columbia University and the MA in International Relations from 
University of Chicago, Arman Grigoryan is currently an assistant professor of International Relations 
department at the Lehigh University. He is the main oppositional political party “Hayoc Azgayin Kongress” 
(Armenian National Congress) representative to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE). 
Grigoryan has previously worked as an analyst in the Department of Research and Analysis of President’s 
Office in Armenia (1991-1993) and later as Second Secretary in the Middle East Department of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of Armenia.  
The interview with Grigoryan was conducted in Ann Arbor, Michigan, on March 24, 2010. 
54 When the war broke out, Armenia was already facing tremendous constraints: the consequences of the 1988 
earthquake that destroyed more than 30% of Armenia’s industrial capacity, the secession from the USSR and 
the first generation structural reforms, the widespread poverty, weak institutions and energy crisis. “The 
problems were staggering, and the expectations of what the first administration could have done to be match ed 
to the constraints are typically not discussed in the Armenian political discourse or even in some studies of the  
origins of corruption, poverty, social exclusion and economic distortions” (cited from the interview with Arman 
Grigoryan in Ann Arbor, Michigan, March 24, 2010).  
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the military should have been rewarded for their efforts and victory in the fight for the 
homeland, but since the country did not have adequate resources at the time, it was done by 
awards to these people through non-transparent privatization auctions. 
Thus, it can be said that the economic dimension of social exclusion started during 
the Karabakh war. The leadership that came after the first president of post-Soviet Armenia, 
Levon Ter-Petrossian, further used the economic distortions that resulted as a consequence of 
war and relied on the existing system to strengthen the coercive capacity of the state. “Robert 
Kocharyan’s administration saw it as an opportunity, not a problem; they in fact exploited 
this opportunity for more centralization, for dolling out benefits to themselves and to strong 
militaries and pliant businessmen, who would economically as well as politically support 
them”55 
To conclude the discussion of the state militarization hypothesis, it is imperative to 
stress that the Armenian state militarization, contrary to the conventional view of 
militarization presented in Chapter Two, was established and enhanced by the field 
commanders of the Karabakh war, rather than professional militaries. Based on the 
etymology of the term, military spelled as militaris in Latin and meaning “soldier” implies 
that militarization can be organized by individuals, who are skilled in arms, engaged in 
military service or in warfare. Subsequently, in most literature of state militarization, the 
discussion develops around control of politics by a professional army that is engaged in no 
other profession than preparing for and engaging in warfare.Opposite to this traditional view, 
the post-Soviet Armenian government has had several high ranking military officers who 
have not been trained as professional soldiers. During the Soviet times, Armenia did not have 
a purely Armenian or an autonomous Armenian army.The first post-Soviet Armenian army, 
that is the army that fought during the Karabakh war, was formed and developed by mainly 
civilians or field commanders, who  became “militaries or militarized” due to their 
participation in the Karabakh conflict.  
As Libaridian recollects, “the military in Armenia, had at that time, and to some 
extent continues to have, the Soviet model of non-intervention in political affairs; by and 
                                                 
55Cited from the interview with Arman Grigoryan in Ann Arbor, Michicgan, March24, 2010. 
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large, the military officer corps has stayed aloof” (italics added).56  According to him, it was 
not the traditional officers of the military, but ordinary civilians, who got involved in the war, 
became field commanders and then ended up dominating the economy and politics of 
Armenia.  Indeed, during and after the war, Armenia has had Defense Ministers, Generals, 
Heads of Police and other high ranking military officials, who were not military officers with 
any military training. Examples include Vazgen Sargsyan, Manvel Grigoryan, Seyran 
Saroyan in Armenia, Samvel Babayan in Karabakh, and Robert Kocharyan, Serzh Sargsyan 
both in Karabakh and Armenia57.  
4.4 Operationalization of Important Concepts 
The literature on social exclusion and inequality typically mentions bounded 
categories, such as black/white, male/female, Muslim/Christian, peasant/landlord, etc. 
Authors that include developing countries in their analysis mostly discuss social exclusion in 
terms of the categorically bounded groups with different ethnicity and culture (Stewart, 
Brown and Langer 2008), caste and religion (Thorat, Attewell and Rizvi 2009), age and 
gender (Gomes da Conceição 2002), rural-urban residence, disabilities, etc. Although one 
may not deny the fact that in Armenia there exist certain inequalities in terms of categorically 
bounded groups, such as females versus males, people with urban residence versus those 
with rural residence, or groups with disabilities versus those without, the focus of social 
exclusion in this study is not based on any of these categories. The exclusion examined in 
this study concerns a group of people that may represent, for example, a female or in the 
same way a male category, a person with urban or rural residence; exclusion is studied 
through what Sen (1998) calls “relational roots of deprivation” and not through bounded or 
categorical groups of excluded people. The political processes and power relations described 
                                                 
56 Gerard J. Libaridian is an outstanding Armenian American historian and politician. From 2007- 2011, Dr. 
Libaridian was the director of the Armenian Studies Program and the Alex Manoogian Chair in Modern 
Armenian History at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. Libaridian taught previously at a number of 
universities, and has lectured and written extensively. From 1991 to 1997, Libaridian served as adviser, an d 
then senior adviser to the former President of Armenia, Levon Ter-Petrossian, as First Deputy Minister of 
Foreign Affairs (1993-1994). His role was invaluable in the state-making of the independent Armenia, as well 
as the Karabakh peace negotiations during the presidency of Levon Ter-Petrossian. Gerard Libaridian is the 
founder of the Zoryan Institute (1982) http://zoryaninstitute.org/.  
The interview with Dr. Libaridian was conducted in Ann Arbor, Michigan on April 14, 2010. 
57 These individuals' professional backgrounds and their relation to Armenian state militarizat ion will be 
addressed in detail in Chapter Seven, State Militarization and Social Exclusion .   
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in the study, although affecting social exclusion in both urban and rural areas, are particularly 
relevant to the urban category. 
Durable social exclusion in this study is measured by the Gini coefficient, wage 
distribution, unemployment rates over a period of around 20 years.58 Other indicators, such 
as government expenditures on health, education, housing and welfare, which have 
deteriorated, are evaluated, as well.59While standardized inequality indicators, such as the 
Gini coefficient, distribution of income, access to social goods and employability, are 
measurable outcomes of social status, they are unable to uncover the popular perceptions of 
how inequality and exclusion are created and inherited from cohort to cohort. Hence, it is 
important to present not only those indicators, but also public reaction that plainly captures 
the transitional exclusion of Armenian people. This is done through surveying a group of 
students, as a representative cluster of the society. Three hundred students participated in the 
survey.60 
With respect to privatization, the opaque process by which public assets were sold to 
certain individuals is analyzed. State administrators allowed friends and relatives to buy 
lucrative companies. A discussion concerning the huge amount of industries held by 
individuals close to the state elites is developed. The generation of oligarchic strata, as a 
social class prone to social closure and opportunity hoarding, is a core investigation of the 
chapter examining the impact of privatization on social exclusion. I also discuss the social 
impact of privatization of the energy and telecommunications sectors. Furthermore, 
administrative barriers to foreign investment are emphasized.  
Because there are no sound and complete studies on militarization in the post-Soviet 
region (except, perhaps Way and Levitsky 2006 and 2010; and  Ó Beacháin, Donnacha and 
                                                 
58 Because there is a shortage or unavailability of data on these indicators in post-Soviet Armenia as in most of 
the post-Soviet countries, it was impossible to compile a consistent and up-to-date presentation of economic 
inequality based on only these indicators. Specifically, it was very difficult to find data on the Gini coefficient 
in post-Soviet Armenia for different years. Therefore, I have tried to include the best available data related t o 
these indicators, most of which were found and retrieved from the World Bank, IMF and UN publications and 
reports.  
59 The complete list of social exclusion indicators used in this study was presented at the end of Chapter Two, 
when I discussed measuring social exclusion.   
60 The survey and a more detailed discussion around it can be found in the Appendix and in Chapter Four, 
"Public Perceptions of Social Exclusion”.  
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Abel Polese 2010), the operationalization of the phenomenon in this dissertation is anchored 
in some of the popular theories of militarism and militarization (Andreski 1954 and 1968, 
Janowitz 1964 and 1977, Eide and Thee 1980, Mann 1987,  Dunne and Smith 1990 ), as well 
as studies of militarization in Latin America and Middle East (Hurewitz 1969, Hewdey 1989, 
Bowman 2002).  
State militarization in this study is defined as: a) state’s readiness for war, increase in 
military budgets and military participation ratios due to war, and b) a continued extension of 
unfavorable state influence in civilian spheres, including economic and socio-political life, 
by use of coercion via the security sector. While the first part of this definition may not 
always result in social exclusion, and thus is not as central in explaining it, the second part of 
the definition treats state militarization as fundamental for authoritarian stability, and 
therefore, also for alterations in the distribution of power. 
State militarization is measured on two levels, based on the above-provided 
definition. First, the conventional definition of militarization would include indicators such 
as military expenditures as a percentage of overall GDP; military expenditures as a 
percentage of overall public expenditures; and armed manpower ratios, otherwise called 
military participation ratios.61 Most of these data are available in Stockholm International 
Peace Research Institute’s (SIPRI) Military Expenditure Database. Second, the security 
sector and state coercion will be measured by the number of regular military and paramilitary 
Karabakh war leaders in government (the National Assembly of Armenia and Ministries); 
and the level of state repression used against oppositional movements, specifically their 
leaders, in terms of the number of political arrests and physical or political intimidation.62 
Finally I draw freely from a rich literature on contentious politics (Tilly 1978, 2001, 
2004, 2007; Tarrow, 1998; McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001; McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 
1996), discussed at length in Chapter 2, because the latter fits well with the collective action 
process that has gripped Armenia since the transition from socialism. Social mobilization, its 
                                                 
61 Data on military expenditures can be found in the comparative chapter on social movements and revolutions, 
Chapter 5.  
62 As defined by the UK Department for International Development (DFID), the security sector in this study 
includes armed forces; police; paramilitary forces; intelligence and security services (both military and c ivilian); 
customs authorities. 
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organization, and the intensity of discontent is measured by the number of demonstrations 
and the number of demonstrators during the 1996, 2004 and 2008 movements. I also discuss 
the repertoire of contention expressed during those movements. Most often, the 
demonstrators did not violate limits and respected norms, but there have been cases when 
they sought to enact disruption and transgression. In addition, I investigate the linkage 
between demands of social movement organizations and economic and political exclusion. It 
supports the hypothesis that sociopolitical exclusion contributed to mobilization. The 
strength of social mobilization will also be assessed according to the formation of horizontal 
linkages among diverse social movement organizations and between these and opposition 
political parties.  
4.5 Conclusion 
This chapter was divided into three main parts. The first part dealt with the research 
method and design of this dissertation. It is an exploratory case study, based on a historical 
analysis, state elite interviews, a quantitative analysis of a student survey, and newspaper 
content analysis.   
The second part was concerned with the main hypotheses and their concise 
analysis.The main contention of the first hypothesis in the second part of this chapter is that 
privatization negatively affected the economic, political and social sphere in Armenia, 
generating continued waves of social mobilization. The consequences of the privatization 
process, as an element of the neoliberal restructuring in post-Soviet Armenia, were 
particularly harmful in the economic sphere, chiefly in the labor market. It created massive 
unemployment, low-wage employment, and income and wealth inequality. As a consequence 
of the privatization process, the emergence of a new class of oligarchs and the accumulation 
of capital in their hands occurred. The new wealthy, practically the new class of oligarchs, 
aggravate social polarization by assuring the maintenance of their newly acquired resources 
and power. 
In regard to the state militarization hypothesis, this part concluded that the peculiar 
distinction of the Armenian state militarization is not merely the state’s readiness or strength 
to protect the country in case of external war, but also the state's readiness to rely on the 
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coercive apparatus to repress social protests. The militarization process started as a 
consequence of Armenia’s active involvement in the Karabakh war, but it continued after the  
war in a different way. Exercising supremacy in military policy and decision making, as well 
as a tight control of army and in general the security sector by the state elites at the end of 
1990s, turned into a ‘militarization for internal matters’, when the leaders of the Karabakh 
movement weakened and the state power passed into the hands of the leaders of the Karabkh 
Party. In this case, the armed forces became concentrated on internal order and often were 
used to prey on the society rather than to protect it.  
The third partof the chapter operationalized the important concepts of the study, 
describing how these concepts were measured.   
The specific steps described in this chapter are the roadmap for the following four 
chapters, which center on the examination of the public perceptions of social exclusion in 
Armenia; the comparative strength of the Armenian state to repress social discontent 
(expressed through the comparison  of success and failure of social revolutions in five post-
Soviet states); the processes that made the Armenian state militarized and exclusive; and 
finally the thorough evaluation of the privatization process.  
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CHAPTER 5  
Public Perceptions of Exclusion 
Not everything that can be counted counts,  
and not everything that counts can be counted.  
Albert Einstein 
5.1 Introduction 
It is a difficult task to measure the magnitude of social exclusion due to the inherently 
complicated nature of the phenomenon and its dynamic character. Social exclusion can be 
measured and evaluated quantitatively and qualitatively. In both cases, it is very complicated 
to document evidence of links between levels and depth of exclusion and factors assumed to 
be affecting it. Most of the literature on inequality and exclusion has focused on Gini 
coefficient, income and wage differences across social classes, and finally the difference of 
the richest and poorest quintiles of the society. However, national or cross-sectional surveys 
that capture people's feelings about inequality and exclusion are not widely available.  
One of the first instances to measure social polarization in the South Caucasus region 
and to suggest recommendations is  Nazim Habibov's (2011) "Self-perceived social 
stratification in low-income transitional countries: Examining the multi-country survey in 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia". Based on the latest comparative survey conducted in 
Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, Habibov (2011) examines the factors explaining self-
perceived stratification in South Caucasus. Whereas Habibov examines social polarization 
and exclusion based on merely the self-perceived standpoint, in the analysis of the problem 
this dissertation incorporates both public perceptions of exclusion and a reasonably factual 
presentation of social exclusion based on both quantitative and qualitative measures (beyond 
public perceptions). The author'smost significant finding is that the majority of the people in 
the examined region consider themselves as middle class, although a substantial share of the 
population are in fact at the lowest level of society. Another essential conclusion of 
Habibov's study is that self-perceived social stratification in those three countries can largely 
be explained by a set of factors within the direct social policy domain and that the problem 
can be mitigated by promotion of job-intensive economic growth, supporting small 
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businesses, improving effectiveness of social protection policies, affordability of healthcare 
and education, and active integration of migrants and investment in public infrastructure.  
Most of theabove-prescribed policy improvements are orthodox recommendations for 
the problem of poverty, social exclusion and stratification promoted by the western analysts. 
Contrary to those prescriptions, several programs aimed at the above-advocated 
recommendations, such as programs of the Millennium Challenge Corporation in Armenia, 
have not been successful in alleviating the problem.63 They are designed well, but do not 
always perform effectively in developing countries. This inefficiency may have resulted from 
the nature of non-egalitarian and non-democratic states, as well as ineffectiveness of the 
institutions designed to regulate the functions of the state. The purpose of this chapter is to 
analyze the self-perceived social exclusion inpost-SovietArmenia and to find out factors, 
beyond the mentioned policy-related fields, that Armenian students, a representative cluster 
of the Armenian society, believe are essential in explaining their exclusion from certain 
resources and activities. 
In a brief section, I first specify the method and objectives of the survey, mentioning 
the number of respondents and the city of their residence. Here, I also explain why 
descriptive and regression analyses were chosen. Further, I discuss the dependent and 
independent variables. This section is followed by the analysis of the descriptive and 
regression statistics, main findings and implications. First, a significant number of student 
respondents in all the three cities, more than 80%, believe that there is a high degree of social 
exclusion in Armenia. Around 70% of them perceive social exclusion to be a combination of 
economic, social and political exclusion. The majority of the 80%, who agree that there is 
social exclusion in Armenia, think that the main cause of social exclusion is the deficiency of 
the labor market.The respondents' estimation that their family's socio-economic status and 
well-being have not improved much over the last 10 years shows the durability of the 
                                                 
63 The Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) is a bilateral United States foreign aid agency, which was 
established by Congress in 2004. It is separate from the State Department, as well as the US Agency for 
International Development (USAID). In  spring of 2004, Armenia was chosen to be among a select group of 16 
countries eligible for Millennium Challenge Corporation funding. Other low-income countries with a strong 
commitment toward good governance and economic growth and reform were Benin, Bolivia, Cape Verde, 
Georgia, Ghana, Honduras, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mali, Mongolia, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Senegal, Sri 
Lanka, and Vanuatu.  
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surveyed students' self-perceived exclusion. Their high level of demonstration participation 
also indicates strong public aggravation due to economic, social and political exclusion.  
Finally, the survey results lead to the conclusion that the type and nature of state elites 
are fundamental for the explanation of self-perceived social exclusion in Armenia,because 
among several factors, ‘the President’ and ‘the National Assembly (NA) of Armenia’ hold 
the first positions, with an equal, about 22%, participant reply rate. Another 13%indicates 
‘the domestic security system’ as important in causing social exclusion. 
In the concluding section, I focus on the limitations and shortcomings of the student 
survey process and results. The conclusion stresses that, although this survey managed to 
confirm that Armenians feel socially, economically and politically excluded, it failed to find 
valid evidence of the hypothesized affect of the privatization process and state militarization 
on social exclusion.64 
5.2 The Objective and Methodology of Student Surveys 
In order to capture public perceptions of durability of exclusion, I have compiled an 
original dataset through on-site student surveys on social exclusion conducted in the period 
of February-April 2009. The surveys were conducted by me in the three main cities of 
Armenia: the capital city Yerevan as the center where most repressive acts by the state and 
military elites have been carried out and in two other cities of Armenia, Vanadzor and 
Gyumri, cities with high levels of poverty, crime and political apathy.65 The number of 
observations is 300; those are individuals aged 18 and higher. 108 students represent 
                                                 
64 This failure is an indication for me as the author of the survey that design of the survey questions was 
incomplete and could not lead to definitive correlations between the hypothesized indirect and direct variables. 
In fact, initially when designing the survey questions, I did not have an intention to measure this relationship. 
However, after collecting the filled questionnaires , it turned out that if I had incorporated more specific 
questions, the public perceptions  could also lead to evidence or denial of the hypothesized relationship. In  the 
future, a more adequately designed questionnaire can possibly help me find evidence to confirm or disconfirm 
the relationship of the independent and dependent variables.  
65 In Yerevan and Gyumri, the student surveys were conducted with the help of student friends and relatives, 
who distributed the survey questionnaires among their student circles and returned the filled questionnaires to 
me. As a former student of Vanadzor State Teachers' Training Institute (VSTTI), in the distribution and 
collection of the student surveys I got invaluable help from professors of the department of Foreign Langua ges, 
English Faculty of VSSTI.  
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Yerevan, 98 students represent Gyumri, and 94 students represent Vanadzor. These three 
cities represent different marzes of the Republic of Armenia.66 
The quantitative analysis first of all tackles the descriptive statistics of student 
perceptions of social exclusion through contingency tables. Further, the research 
methodology of the analysis utilizes logistic regression, since both the dependent and the 
main seven independent variables are categorical in nature. In regards to the regression 
analysis, we should note that the results are presented in odds ratios. There are two models 
constructed, one model tests the association of the dependent variable with the primary 
independent variables alone. The second model incorporates two socio-demographic control 
variables to find if the influence of the latter can change results obtained in the first model. 
The dependent variable of the study is perception of [existence of] social exclusion in 
Armenia. The independent variables of the study are constructed based on questions the 
answers to which are related to all three aspects of social exclusion discussed in the second 
chapter of this dissertation: economic aspect, social aspect and the political. Perceptions of 
economic exclusion are based on respondents’ (1) parents’ employment status, (2) own 
employment status, and (3) relative poverty level of household. Perceptions of social and 
political exclusion are based on respondents’ answers to a question that asks: (4) “Have you 
or a family member currently or in recent years been (actively) involved in civil and political 
activities or organizations, such as, for example, labor unions, social clubs, a political party 
or parties, pre-election campaign, women’s organizations?” The measurement of those two 
aspects of social exclusion (social and political) becomes more complete if we also analyze 
patterns of (5) respondents’ demonstration participation (or inaction), and(6) demonstrators’ 
socio-economic status improvement within the last 10 years due to socio-political events. (7) 
The perception of self-exclusion is a combination variable measuring the economic, social 
and political perceptions of exclusion.  
The control variables are (1) age and (2) residence. All of those variables might not 
match the real picture of social exclusion in post-Soviet Armenia; this part of the study, 
                                                 
66 In Armenia, marz is a territorial-administrative subdivision equaling a region: there are 11 marzes, including 
the city of Yerevan with its outskirts. Marzes are sometimes also called regions.   
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however, is more concerned with the public perceptions of social exclusion and not actual 
social exclusion. 
“Perceptions of [existence] of social exclusion”, a dummy variable, is constructed 
based on the answers to the question: “Do you think there is social exclusion in 
Armenia?”For answers “yes”, the variable is coded as 0, and for answers “no”, it is coded as 
1.   
The independent variable “relative poverty level of household” is coded in the 
following manner: answer ‘considerably above’ is coded as 1, ‘a little above’ is coded as 2, 
‘about the same’ is coded as 3, ‘a little below’ as 4, ‘considerably below’ is coded as 5, and 
‘don’t know’ as 6. The variable “parent employment status” is coded 0 for the answer ‘yes’ 
and 1 for the answer ‘no’. The variable “own employment status” is coded likewise. Variable 
“self-exclusion” is coded 1 for the answer ‘yes’ and 0 for the answers ‘no’.  
The independent variable highlighting the socio-political aspect of exclusion, “socio-
economic status improvement” is coded 0 for answers ‘no' and 1 for answers ‘yes’. The 
variable “demonstration participation” is coded 0 for answers ‘yes” and 1 for answers ‘no'. 
In the regression analysis, the variable “cannot answer” is coded 0 ('yes'), meaning that those 
students, who could not or did not want to answer to this question, participated in a 
demonstration.67 
The variable “change needed to make Armenia more inclusive and egalitarian” is 
coded as follows: 
a. The President (1) 
b. The National Assembly of Armenia (2) 
c. The domestic security system (3) 
d. Political parties (4) 
e. Mass media (5) 
                                                 
67 A student has either participated or has not participated in a demonstration. A "cannot answer" reply does not 
seem to be applicable to this type of question, therefore, I tend to assume that the students who provideda 
“cannot answer”reply to this question participated in at least one demonstration. As it is typical of surveys, 
anonymity does not often help the surveyor to obtain either objective or true data from respondents, becaus e of 
respondents’ fear of bearing responsibility for their answers, because of their emotions and judgments at t he 
moment of taking the survey, etc. More on the illusive nature of the public opinion can be found in John 
Zaller’s “The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion"(Cambridge, 1992).  
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f. Human rights organizations and the Ombudsman (6) 
g. Local NGOs (7) 
h. The international NGOs (8) 
i. Diaspora Armenians (9) 
j. Market relations/businesses (10) 
k. Other (11) 
l. N/A (12)  
5.3 Descriptive and Regression Statistics, Findings and Implications  
The overall descriptive statistics of the variables are listed in Table 5.1 below. Each 
of the included variables is also presented in a separate contingency table, where the variable 
is summarized based on the category of residence. This additionally helps us discern patterns 
of social exclusion through the urban-rural category, although the analysis of social exclusion 
based on the urban-rural category is not the main purpose of this survey. As it was expected, 
we can see that 83% of the respondents think that there is social exclusion in Armenia. This 
is a significantly high number. 
Table 5.1: Descriptive Statistics (in percents, unless noted otherwise) 
Perception of (existence) of Social Exclusion in Armenia  
Think there is social exclusion in Armenia 83 
Perception of Economic Exclusion  
Household poverty level is about the same or considerably below relative poverty 
level 17 
Respondents are employed 10 
Respondents’ parents are employed 31 
Perception of Social and Political Exclusion  
Think their (their households’) socio-economic status improved in the last 10 years 18 
Participated in a demonstration / cannot answer if participated in a demonstration 26 /35 
Perception of overall Self-Exclusion  
Think they are excluded of having or doing something they deserve to have or to do 71 
Socio-demographic characteristics  
Age of the respondent (mean) 20 
Age of respondent by categories  
18-20 69 
20-25 27 
      25 and older 5 
Residence of the respondent   
1= Vanadzor 31 
2= Yerevan 36 
3= Gyumri 33 
Source: Student surveys conducted by the author, 2009. 
 109 
 
Table 5.2 also shows that there is not much difference of public attitudes concerning 
social exclusion between urban and rural residence.68 In all three cities, around 80% of 
students accept that there is social exclusion. 
Table 5.2: Perception of Armenian students on social exclusion existence in Armenia 
Perception of 
Exclusion Existence Gyumri 
Residence 
Vanadzor Yerevan Total Percent 
Yes 86 79 83 248 82.67 
No 12 15 25 52 17.33 
Total 98 94 108 300 100.00 
Source: Student surveys conducted by the author, 2009. 
There was no explanation or definition of social exclusion provided in the survey for 
the respondents, which makes us wonder whether the respondents have understood correctly 
what social exclusion is. Although there was no definition of social exclusion provided, the 
survey very explicitly focused on all elements of social exclusion in the provided multiple 
choice answers for the second question. Hence, 72% of the students understand social 
exclusion as the combination of economic, social and political exclusion, which means that 
the majority of the students have a correct perception of what social exclusion is as defined in 
this study (Table 5.3). But it is important not only to assure that the respondents understand 
what we mean by ‘social exclusion’ in this project and to find out what portion of 
respondents in fact have evaluated social exclusion exactly the same way as we have defined 
in the study, but at the same time to discover which aspect of social exclusion perception is 
more appealing among the respondents.   
                                                 
68Yerevan is considered the only urban residence in Armenia. Although Gyumri and Vanadzo r are the second 
and third biggest cities, they are considered to be rural. Employment opportunities, as well as cultural, political 
and intellectual events and opportunities are centered in the capital city Yerevan.  
 110 
 
Table 5.3: What is social exclusion according to Armenian students? 
Understanding of 
Social Exclusion Frequencies Percent 
Labor Market Exclusion 
Service Exclusion 
35 
15 
11.67 
5.00 
Political Incapacity /Passiveness 
Exclusion from social relationships and networks 
All of the above 
First and second 
First and third 
First, second and third 
19 
7 
215 
4 
4 
1 
6.33 
2.33 
1.67 
1.33 
1.33 
0.33 
Total 300 100.00 
Source: Student surveys conducted by the author, 2009. 
As we can see from Table 5.3, those respondents that do not think social exclusion is 
the combination of economic, social and political exclusion can be classified into three 
groups: a) those who acknowledge social exclusion to be mainly economic exclusion or 
deprivation from job market, b) those who believe social exclusion to be a result of only 
service exclusion and exclusion from social relationships and networking, and c) those who 
understand social exclusion as exclusion only from political activity, as well as decision and 
policy making. About 12% believe that the labor market is the most significant force for 
creating social exclusion; more than 6% think that political exclusion creates social 
exclusion; and 5% think that social exclusion results from lack of services or unequal 
opportunities for services. Surprisingly, only 2%, respectively 7 people among 300 
respondents, gave some importance to the phenomenon of social networks. My speculation 
for this low number is that Armenians, as it is typical of many collectivist cultures, tend to 
view themselves as members of groups, such as family, a religious group, or a work 
unit/collective, and usually consider the needs of the group to be more important than the 
needs of individuals. This trend is slowly changing with the country’s transition to capitalism 
and to a more individualist culture; yet, Armenian culture is still highly collectivist and 
highlights public and collective interests, thus there is less fear of being excluded from social 
networks.  
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Table 5.4: Opinion or attitudes of Armenian students on self-exclusion 
Opinion on  
Self-exclusion Gyumri 
Residence 
Vanadzor Yerevan Total Percent 
Yes 66 68 79 213 71.00 
No 32 26 29 87 29.00 
Total 98 94 108 300 100.00 
Source: Student surveys conducted by the author, 2009. 
It is interesting to note that while the majority of the respondents (83%) find social 
exclusion a serious problem in the country (Table 5.1 and Table 5.2) and 71% mentions that 
they feel they are excluded of doing or having something they deserve to do or to have 
(Table 5.4), only 13% acknowledged that their own household poverty level is about the 
same or below the overall poverty level (Table 5.5).69 This has couple of implications. The 
first and most important implication is that students do not identify social exclusion as 
poverty alone. The second implication is that respondents have not presented their household 
poverty level correctly. Further, if they did present the latter correctly, then it means that 
economic exclusion, measured as overall poverty level, is not the most important aspect of 
social exclusion for the surveyed students. Third, we can assume that students have evaluated 
the country’s situation in regard to social exclusion (at least economic exclusion) fairly and 
without a bias based on merely their own household’s poverty level. While for many other 
variables the experiences of the students’ families or their own experiences of deprivation 
drives students’ perception of the existence and nature of social exclusion, it seems like their 
own households’ poverty/prosperity level has not mattered much. 
Table 5.5: Overall poverty level of their households based on Armenian students’ estimates 
Overall Poverty 
Level of Households Gyumri 
Residence 
Vanadzor Yerevan Total Percent 
Considerably above 51 42 68 161 53.67 
A little above 32 34 22 88 29.33 
About the same 8 10 11 29 9.67 
A little below 1 1 1 3 1.00 
Considerably below 0 2 4 6 2.00 
Don’t know 6 5 2 13 4.33 
Total 98 94 108 300 100.00 
Source: Student surveys conducted by the author, 2009. 
                                                 
69 In Table 5.5, I have added the percentages of 4 answers (“about the same” - 9.67%, “a little below” - 1%, and 
“considerably below” - 2%) to get the 13%.  
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The picture changes when we look at the employment numbers (Table 5.6). 10% of 
the surveyed students are employed. This seems to be a small number, but it was expected 
and is not surprising. In Armenia, all students are enrolled full-time and their main 
responsibility is studying. Most of them do not worry about their tuition or living expenses as 
it is considered to be the parents’ ‘duty’. Also, some percentage of university students is 
state-funded and receives stipends.70 Therefore, we find the 10% student employment to be 
quite a high number. In contrast, only 31% of the parents are employed and 69% are 
unemployed. This is a very high unemployment percent and coincides with the soaring 
unemployment situation recorded in Chapter Two.  
Table 5.6: Employment status of respondent students 
Employment  
Status Gyumri 
Residence 
Vanadzor Yerevan Total Percent 
Yes 9 6 15 30 10 
No 89 88 93 270 90 
Total 98 94 108 300 100.00 
Source: Student surveys conducted by the author, 2009. 
While the economic aspect of exclusion, specifically labor market exclusion, in our 
respondent answers was most frequently noted to be equal to social exclusion, the analysis 
ofperception of social and political exclusion based on their estimation of own socio-
economic status improvement and demonstration participation shows that there is also strong 
public aggravation due to lack of political opportunities and social advancement (Table 5.7 
and Table 5.8).   
Table 5.7: Students’ (households’)status change (in terms of improvement) in 10 years 
Status  
improved Gyumri 
Residence 
Vanadzor Yerevan Total Percent 
Yes 18 8 28 54 18.00 
No 80 86 80 246 82.00 
Total 98 94 108 300 100.00 
Source: Student surveys conducted by the author, 2009. 
Both in Gyumri and Yerevan, 80 people, which is about 75% of the Yerevan sample 
and about 82% of the Gyumri sample, state that their families members’ socio-political 
                                                 
70 Exact data for current percentage of state-funded university students are unavailable, but during 1990s, 20-
25% of the top students (with best university admission exam grades) in each group were state-funded.  
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situation has not improved in the last 10 years. In Vanadzor, the socio-political situation is 
even worse, since more than 90% of respondents complained about improvement 
opportunities in this realm. Only 8 people out of 94 respondents have noted that their 
households’ status in terms of socio-economic well-being has improved in the last 10 years 
(Table 5.7).  
This strong sense of exclusion in terms of social and particularly economic and 
political comfort and security acknowledged by the student sample may rationally propel a 
common logic of grievance. If exclusion is soaring, the frustration of the excluded becomes 
unbearable, and the urge for action vital.  This, as expected, is the case among the surveyed 
students in Armenia. The percent of people who have participated in demonstrations during 
recent years seems to be high, around 26% (Table 5.8).71 
Table 5.8: Demonstration participation by Armenian students 
Demonstration 
Participation Gyumri 
Residence 
Vanadzor Yerevan Total Percent 
Yes 17 26 36 79 26.33 
No 76 59 60 195 65.00 
Don't want to answer 5 9 12 26 8.67 
Total 98 94 108 300 100.00 
Source: Student surveys conducted by the author, 2009. 
Since demonstration participation is a sensitive topic, I have included a “don’t want to 
answer” choice together with “yes” and “no” answers. If we exclude the “don’t want to 
answer” option from our analysis, only 26% of the students have participated in any 
demonstration. 65% mentioned that they have never participated in any demonstration. These 
numbers reveal that although more people are angry about their situation, they still do not go 
out to the streets for demands of greater inclusion; this may be due to fear of being ignored 
and/or fear of being repressed. Nevertheless, assuming that the students who have replied 
“don’t want to answer” have participated in one or more demonstrations, but are scared to be 
identified as anti-government or oppositional constituents, we can say that 35% (26% + 9% 
in Table 4.8) of the respondents have been demonstration participants. In this case, we get 
one third of the sample, which is a big percentage. Therefore, while initially the observation 
                                                 
71 The expectation was to get even higher percentages of demonstration participation, based on the extremely 
large percentage of self-perception of exclusion, around 72%.   
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of the Table 5.8 data does not seem to imply very high demonstration participation, a closer 
examination of the numbers reveals the opposite.72 
Reactions have been mixed among the surveyed population concerning what/who 
they would change in order to make Armenia economically, politically and socially a more 
egalitarian country to live in. Among the options for a potential change in the country 
mentioned in Table 5.9, ‘the President’ and ‘the National Assembly (NA) of Armenia’ hold 
the first positions, with an equal, about 22%, participant reply rate. 15% of the respondents 
think that many factors are essential in building a more inclusive and egalitarian homeland ; 
among those ‘own lifestyle’, the ‘president of the country’, the ‘NA of Armenia’, ‘domestic 
security system’, ‘political parties’, ‘mass media’, ‘human rights organizations’, ‘local 
nongovernmental organizations’ and the ‘international approach to Armenia’. Finally, the 
next highest percentage of answers, 13%, indicates that another factor to blame for the 
exclusionary nature of the Armenia state is the ‘domestic security system’. The rest of the 
factors counts for 1% -7% of the sample response. 
Table 5.9: Change needed in order to make Armenia economically, politically and socially 
more egalitarian/inclusive society 
Change for Greater 
Inclusion Frequencies Percent 
Own lifestyle 
The President 
National Assembly of Armenia 
Domestic security system  
Political Parties 
Mass Media 
Human Rights Organizations  
Local NGOs 
The International Approach to Armenia  
All of the above 
Other 
N/A 
5 
66 
67 
39 
22 
3 
12 
9 
7 
46 
9 
15 
1.67 
22.00 
22.33 
13.00 
7.33 
1.00 
4.00 
3.00 
2.33 
15.33 
3.00 
5.00 
Total 300 100.00 
Source: Student surveys conducted by the author, 2009. 
                                                 
72This is a typical trend in surveys, called Social Desirability Bias – a tendencyfor respondents to reply in a 
manner that they feel will be viewed favorably by others. See also, John Zaller’s “The Nature and Origins of 
Mass Opinion”, where Zaller argues that public opinion on issues is unreliable, primarily because elite sources 
of information provide competing or multiple considerations causing public opinion polls to measure whateve r 
recent elite message an individual has stored in their short term memory.  
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The relatively high rates of students identifying the President, the Parliament and the 
domestic security system as main causes of self-perceived exclusion by the surveyed 
Armenians imply that we should particularly concentrate on these three branches of the 
Armenian state apparatus in the explanation of the durable social exclusion in Armenia. 
Based on the theoretical framework of this study presented earlier, the privatization and the 
state militarization increased social exclusion in Armenia through inequitable power and 
opportunity distribution practiced by the Armenian state elites. Following the same 
framework, the President, the National Assembly, and the security system of the Armenian 
state are the central forces in these unfair power distribution processes, and their role in 
generating social exclusion is critical.Therefore, the above-mentionedfinding of the survey is 
not unexpected. 
Based on not only the descriptive, but also the regression results, one can make an 
assumption that the factors affecting student perceptions of social exclusion are obviously 
related to the labor markets, altered after the privatization process, as well as the nature of 
state elites and institutions.  
Before presenting the findings of the statistical models, it is important to mention that 
the independent variables are notably inter-correlated.  As a result, statistical tests were 
conducted to determine if multi-collinearity is a problem for the data.  After reviewing the 
collinearity diagnostics, none of the variance inflation factors (VIF) was over ten.  
Consequently, it was concluded that collinearity amongst the independent variables should 
not be a problem amongst this data. 
Only the second model, which takes into consideration also the control independent 
variables of age and residence, will be discussed because there is no difference in statistical 
and very little difference in substantive significance between the independent and dependent 
variables for both models. Specifically statistical significance does not change. There is 
statistical significance between only four of the independent primary variables and the 
dependent variable. Those variables are ‘household’s overall poverty level’, ‘parents’ 
employment status’, ‘status change in recent years politically, socially or economically’and 
‘whether the student feels he/she is excluded of having or doing something that he/she 
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deserves to have or to do’. Obviously, these variables relate to all three aspects of social 
exclusion: economic, political and social.  
Statistically, there is no association between the variables of ‘student employment’, 
‘demonstration participation’ and the perception of social exclusion. While it is expected to 
find no statistical significance for the variable of ‘student employment’ due to the fact that as 
a general rule Armenian students do not work during their student years, it is astonishing to 
find absence of association between ‘demonstration participation’and‘perception of social 
exclusion’. Assumingly, the lack of statistical significance in this case is due to the fact that 
the answers regarding demonstration participation by the students do not represent the 
reality.73 Another possible explanation to the absence of relationship between these two 
variables, noted by one of the reviewers of this dissertation, may be the fact that those who 
feel social exclusion is a serious problem also believe that they are powerless to change 
anything, so they do not participate in demonstrations.  
Unpredictably, both of the control variables, which are age and residence, have no 
influence on the perception of social exclusion.  Since the surveyed population consists of 
only students, the age range varies mainly from 17-22 years. Obviously, the surveyed 
population does not consist of different generations, and unfortunately, we cannot observe 
any differences of mentality and attitudes towards economic, political and social 
developments and phenomena.74 The absence of statistical significance for the ‘age’ variable, 
thus, is natural.  
Social exclusion is often characterized by the dimension of urban-rural residence. It is 
popular to assume that inequality appears to arise largely from the absence of opportunitie s 
for large segments of the population residing in rural areas. The statistical evidence in the 
                                                 
73 This issue has been discussed more in detail in the descriptive part of the survey analysis. 
74 As compared to many western countries, particularly the United States, where university student age varies 
widely, in most post-Soviet countries the typical student age is 17-22. Some exceptional cases are when a 
person serves in the army and continues education after the army or when a person pursues a second or third  
education. Even in those cases the student age will not exceed 30 years.  
It is a very recent, nonetheless infrequent, phenomenon to find 40-50 year old students in Armenian 
universities. Those are generally public officials, such as for example, a parliamentary deputy, who after 
gaining high ranks and/or government positions, aim to attach a certain education to their resume/profile. In any 
case, their studentship is not a formal one; most often they hardly ever attend classes.  
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case of post-Soviet Armenia, based on this student survey, does not validate this popular 
assumption. Through this point one can detect the demarcation between poverty and social 
exclusion. Although poverty level is much higher in rural areas of Armenia, there is not 
much difference in the perceptions of social exclusion between rural and urban populations. 
It is not as much poverty that matters to people, as the absence of power, voice and 
independence, and vulnerability to exploitation and humiliation. The absence of statistical 
significance between variables ‘residence’ and ‘perceptions of social exclusion’ highlights 
the importance of social inclusion for poor people, the importance of securing respect and 
dignity for themselves, irrespective of residence. 
The regression results are not much different in the two models; the control variables 
do not change either the statistical or the substantive strength of the relationships tested. To 
better understand the estimated substantive impact of the variables of interest, I have 
interpreted the results of the second model with socio-demographic characteristics (Table 
5.10): 
1. The odds that a person, whose household poverty level is a little below the overall 
poverty level, will think there exists social exclusion as a serious problems in Armenia 
decreases by 41 percent on average as compared to that of a person, whose  household 
poverty level is considerably below the overall poverty level, holding all other variables 
constant.  
2. The odds that a person thinks there exists social exclusion as a serious problem in 
Armenia decreases by 95 percent on average, if a person’s parents are employed, holding 
all other variables constant.  
3. The odds that a person thinks there exists social exclusion as a serious problem in 
Armenia increases by 237 percent on average, if the person’s household’s status has not 
improved (economically, socially and/or politically) within the last 10 years, holding all 
other variables constant. 
4. The odds that a person thinks there exists social exclusion as a serious problem in 
Armenia increases by 1761 percent on average, if  a person feels that he is excluded of 
having and/or doing something that he deserves to have or to do.  
While in earlier chapters of this dissertation, social exclusion in Armenia had 
discussed in terms high Gini coefficient rates throughout different years, persistent problems 
in health care, and education, growing rates of homelessness, crime rates and migration rates, 
the above statements clearly come to add further evidence that social exclusion exists in 
 118 
 
Armenia as a multifaceted problem consisting of social, political and economic elimination. 
Indeed, students’ perceptions of social exclusion are highly affected by their families’ 
poverty level, their parents’ employment level, their household levels’ stagnant situation over 
a long period of time, such as 10 years, and finally their own exclusion of having and/or 
doing something that they deserve to have or to do. This coincidence of public grievances 
regarding exclusion and factual substantiation mentioned earlier in this paragraph increases 
confidence in claiming that social exclusion subsists and is an acute problem in post-Soviet 
Armenia.  
Table 5.10: Odds ratios of logistic regression of considering the existence of social exclusion 
as a serious problem in Armenia on indicators of perception of economic, social and political 
exclusion, perception of self-exclusion, and socio-demographic indicators  
 Model 1 Model 2 
Perception of economic exclusion   
Household’s overall poverty level 39.8* 40.7* 
Student’s employment status 303.2 194.1 
Parents’ employment status 95.1* 95.0* 
Perception of social and political exclusion   
Status change in recent years politically, socially or economically 241.1* 236.6* 
Demonstration participation 24.5 27.9 
Perception of self-exclusion   
Student’s perception of self-exclusion 1667.2* 1761.3* 
Socio-demographic characteristics   
Age of the respondent  36.2 
Residence of the respondent  20.5 
N of cases 300 300 
R square 895.0** 814.8** 
Significance level: ** p<0.01; * p<0.05; † p<0.1. 
5.4 Conclusion  
This chapter developed a quantitative analysis of a survey conducted with students of 
Armenian universities about social exclusion, factors affecting social exclusion and social 
movements. The public perceptions primarily coincide with other accounts of poverty and 
inequality, increasingly deteriorating socio-economic conditions for the middle and poor 
classes, amplified sense of helplessness and despair felt by people due to their inactiveness in 
politics, lack of employment and income to sustain themselves and their households. 
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Some limitations of the results of this survey research should be acknowledged. The 
dependent variable cannot be considered as a very accurate and reliable measure or an 
indicator of actual social exclusion in Armenia; it is a perceptual measure and has been 
defined as such in this part of the paper. In any case, it may not reflect the actual extent of 
social exclusion in the country; the latter may be more or less pervasive than actually 
observed based on the survey answers, depending on the bias, trust, mood and some other 
characteristics of the surveyed individuals during the time of taking the surveys.   
Another shortcoming of this survey is that the data may be subject to bias and error 
due to the fact that a statistically random sample of the Armenian population was not utilized 
because of scarce time and resources during my field trips in Armenia. As a sample of 
student population, the surveyed groupwasan opportunistic sample.  
Yet another limitation originates from the chosen sample of our survey. It would have 
been very interesting and important to provide statistical evidence confirming the two 
hypotheses of the study concerning the privatization and state militarization explaining 
durable social exclusion in Armenia. But because privatization of firms and services started 
in 1994-1995 in Armenia, our respondents would have no or very limited knowledge on 
whether and/or how privatization of firms has affected the emergence of social exclusion. 
The majority of the surveyed students were between 4-8 years old, when the privatization 
process started in the country. Similarly, the Karabakh war started in 1991 and state 
militarization process was initiated during the same period. In this case again, the surveyed 
population was too young to remember much and would be incompetent to provide correct 
information and enlightening answers regarding how those two variables explain the 
emergence of social exclusion. 
The next limitation is closely related to the one detected in the above paragraph. 
Authors often rely on the feelings of older generations to conclude that inequality, 
particularly its economic dimension, was lower during Soviet times. At the same time, the 
younger generation, who has not experienced the Soviet lifestyle may not properly comment 
on the difference. To make things more complicated, statistics and consistent data related to 
Gini coefficients, wage equality, and unemployment rates prior and after socialism are rare, 
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and it is difficult to find a benchmark for comparison of social exclusion and inequality 
before and after the USSR based on this survey. A larger survey, that can be carried out for 
several years and between different generations (particularly the generation of 1960s and 
1970s, who experienced both the socialist and the capitalist systems) wouldmore sufficiently 
address this gap.  
Also it is recognizes that the dependent and some of the independent variables of the 
survey regression are quite interrelated and the causal direction of influence may be contrary 
than the assumed one. This is true particularly for the ‘demonstration participation’ and 
‘perception of social exclusion’ variables; a person’s perception of exclusion may be 
affecting his/her participation in demonstrations, and not the opposite.  
Clearly, a future study needs to examine the longitudinal nature of these relationships 
in order to verify causality. Moreover, while a student survey is helpful, students’ knowledge 
on social exclusion is incomplete and limited. The causes of social exclusion, which may be 
important from the point of a student, for example, may not be relevant from the point of 
view of a housewife, a teacher, a retired politician, or a businessman. The selection of 
respondents from more diverse backgrounds and of a wider outlook may foster new insights 
and theories of social exclusion.  
Despite these limitations, this survey analysis makes some important contributions to 
the social exclusion literature in Armenia.  First, it concludes that social exclusion exists in 
Armenia as a serious problem, and that the problem is expressed not only by high Gini 
coefficient rates, as well as statistics showing the shrinkage of labor market and increased 
unemployment, the growing levels of crime, migration, homelessness, human trafficking, 
human rights abuse and political arrests, lack of access to education and health services, but 
also that it is a problem intensely acknowledged by ordinary citizens. The public judgment 
about unemployment, poverty, family status improvement, political participation and 
exclusion from certain things and activities tells us a plain story of social exclusion; it tells 
the story even more lucidly than the numbers illustrated in previous chapters.  
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Secondly, based on the results of this survey, I could assert that Armenian people are 
mostly discontent with the presidency, the parliament, and the security sector of their 
country, more than any other institution or factor, local or international. The survey 
demonstrates that the exclusionary policies of these institutions create frustration and a need 
to protest among people, and that the majority of the people indeed go out to the streets with 
demands of greater inclusion in the economic, political and cultural live of the country. The 
goal of examining the power of the elites representing those institutionsand uncovering 
relations between them and the rest of the society will be the major task of the following 
three chapters, which are qualitative in nature. 
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CHAPTER 6  
Power, Contentious Politics, and Repressive Capacity of the State  
 “Revolution is the sex of politics: All the governments that we know today owe their 
origin to it.”  
– Henry Louis Mencken 
 
“Post-socialist revolutions stemmed from people’s desire for fair and equal income 
distribution and the growing disparity in real income.” 
– Grzegorz Kołodko  
 
“A nation that continues year after year to spend more money on military defense 
than on programs of social uplift is approaching spiritual death.” 
– Martin Luther King, Jr. 
6.1 Introduction 
With the breakdown of the USSR’s communist regime, political scientists started 
producing a plethora of theories concerning the consequences of this breakdown. Among 
those theories a prevalent one was concerning the diversity of post-Soviet trajectories and 
why some post-Soviet states were more democratic than others. While many scholars still 
meditated over the issue in efforts to find causes of democratization in those countries, the 
post-Soviet space experienced a couple of “colored revolutions”: the “Rose Revolution” in 
Georgia in 2003, the “Orange Revolution” in Ukraine in 2004, and then, most surprisingly, 
the “Tulip Revolution” in 2005 in Kyrgyzstan, a stronghold of post-communist 
authoritarianism in Central Asia. People inother post-Soviet republics, such as Armenia and 
Azerbaijan, were steadily struggling to accomplish a peaceful revolution. In these countries, 
as in most of the post-Soviet republics, the initial hopes of freedom, democracy and 
development nurtured after the fall of communism and the collapse of the USSR remained 
hopes merely; they did not turn into a reality. With the promised democracy the neoliberal 
order provided freedom without opportunity, a devil’s gift.  Along with this, the need and 
efforts of “the society [to] protect itself against the perils inherent in a self-regulating market 
system” was gradually mounting (Polanyi 1957:76).  
As an expression of their anger and desperation, crowds of angry citizens in different 
post-Soviet countries took to the streets of their respective capital cities to protest against 
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their incumbent governments. Ordinary people, tired of waiting for economic benefits and 
new opportunities promised through privatization, called for political candidates and policies 
that promised a return to traditional social democratic values and enhanced social welfare. In 
this headway of resentment and contestation, groups of rioters have stormed parliament 
buildings, blocked central roads, organized marches, strikes and sit-ins for days and nights. 
These collective actions carried a continued character in several of the cases, turning into a 
wave of conflict, complaint and contention. Some of the movements were violent and 
disruptive riots, whiel others have been peaceful demonstrations and marches. Some of them 
succeeded in producing revolutions and changing the ruling regimes, yet others failed and 
have continued to insurrect.  
While the emergence, organization and outcome of these movements considerably 
varied in post-Soviet societies, they possessed something in common in their nature; most of 
those movements challenged transformational processes and relationships within the state 
and society that inhibit social inclusion. In particular, they demanded for equal social 
inclusion and equal access to opportunity and resources, new distribution of income and 
wealth. Although some scholars, such as Henry E. Hale (2005), argue that those revolutions 
“are not democratic breakthroughs”, there is an extensive literature speculating about a new 
democratic ascendancy and suggesting that those events are democratic breakthroughs.75 
According to Hale, "colored revolutions" are “contestation phases in regime cycles where the 
opposition wins” (Hale 2005:134). Nonetheless, treating those movementsas contestation 
phases does not curtail the democratization drive in which they are embedded.  
This chapter observes "colored revolutions" as democratic breakthroughs, because the 
importance of public opinion in deciding whether the opposition wins and whether there is a 
turndown of an ineffective government isa critical element of political inclusion and 
deliberative democracy. Based on the success or failure of revolutionary attempts in the post-
Soviet states, one can also look at how the power of individuals and groups is affected by the 
social and historical context in which they are embedded. Those countries that witnessed 
                                                 
75See Michael McFaul, "Transitions from Communism," Journal of Democracy 16 (July 2005); Adrian 
Karatnycky, "Ukraine's Orange Revolution," Foreign Affairs (March-April 2005); and Vitali Silitski, "Beware 
the People," Transitions Online, March 21, 2005 
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revolutionary outcomes (through peaceful means andtactics) versus only revolutionary 
situations may be considered less autocratic and sociallymore inclusive. 
The success of "colored revolutions" is closely related with and is examined here 
through the phenomenon of political power and state militarization. As mentioned in earlier 
chapters, political power is an essential element of state militarization. The issue of power 
and how certain states manage to exercise power is a central theme of this chapter. The 
chapter focuses on the social implication of militarization, namely: the reproduction of social 
inequalities based on the repressive capacity of the state. “When a dominant group is able 
effectively to convert its legitimately established privileged position in the military into 
social dominance outside the military, the military is functioning as a state mechanism 
involved in the reproduction of inequality. … Militarism and social inequalities are then 
structurally binding.” (Yagil 1998:874)  
Due to the absence and shortcomings of appropriate power measurements, I do not try 
to quantify state's repressive power in this dissertation. It is evaluated here mainly 
qualitatively based on the assessment of political events, socio-political context and the 
relationships of state elites, oppositional elites and other societal actors. The next chapter is a 
detailed account of those events in post-Soviet Armenia. The current chapter is an effort to 
provide a comparative power of the state, considering the strength of protest repressions in a 
five post-Soviet states. Power, therefore, is based on the level and intensity of militarization 
of a state. The argument is that the more militarized a state is, the more powerful its coercive 
strength is and the more easily it restrains mass protests and challenging oppositions.   
In order to provide evidence of the Armenian state militarization comparatively, I 
proceed in two directions. First, I display a brief quantitative analysis of military budgets and 
manpower ratios in Georgia, Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan, Armenia and Azerbaijan. Those are post-
Soviet states that have experienced strong social movements, as a result of public reaction to 
social exclusion and opposition to electoral fraud. The statistics related to the militarization 
of those countries indicate that Armenia along with Azerbaijan lead the list in terms of very 
high military budgets, as well as manpower ratios. 
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Secondly, I conduct a comparative analysis of revolutionary situations and outcomes 
in the mentioned countries, concluding that those countries with more exclusionary states 
based on strong security sectors have been more successful in containing social protest, and 
therefore less inclined towards greater social inclusion. The comparative examination of the 
five post-Soviet countries yet again confirm that Armenia and Azerbaijan are more 
militarized than Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan, because they had warred against an 
external enemy. Due this feature, the former two have successfully defeated repeated waves 
of social protests, whereas the latter three have not been able to do so.On the contrary, 
Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan experienced revolutionary outcomes, the Rose Revolution, 
The Orange Revolution, and the Tulip Revolution.76Throughout the chapter, my main 
contention is that those states that are more repressive and militarized, restrain mass 
movements more easily, relatively irrespective of other national or international factors. 
6.2 A Comparative Analysis of Conventional Military Power  
I use the state-centrist approach of power (Skocpol 1979; Parsa 2000; Goodwin 2001) 
coupled with Tilly’s (1978) revolutionary situations and revolutionary outcomes discussed 
thoroughly in the theoretical framework of this dissertation to explain the differences of 
Georgian, Ukrainian, Kyrgyz, Azeri and Armenian movements and revolutions, focusing 
specifically on the repressive capacity of the government/state. As mentioned earlier in the 
chapter, the differences of repressive (in)capacity of the governments of the compared 
countries will be studied through the degree of their state militarization.  
 
 
                                                 
76Here, one can argue that Georgia has passed through privatization and had a  war, but is contrasted to Armenia 
in this study as a case with less social exclusion. The counterargument is the following: 1) While Armenia’s war 
(1991-1994) was against external enemy Azerbaijan, Georgia’s wars of 1988-1992 and 1992-1993 are 
considered as civil wars consisting of inter-ethnic and intra-national conflicts in the regions of South Ossetia 
and Abkhazia; 2) While both these ethnic conflicts in Georgia occurred before 2008, the Georgian -Russian war 
of 2008 falls out of this research time span. If it occurred during the period covered in this dissertation, I assume 
research could find evidence that Georgia would become a similar case to Armenia and Azerbaijan in regards to 
state militarization and social exclusion. Perhaps, further research can focus on whether the consequences of 
this war (against Russia as an external enemy), such as, for instance increased military budgets and military 
participation ratios have changed or will soon be changing power relations domestically in Georgia  
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Figure 6.1: Opposition Mobilization in Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Russia and 
Ukraine, 1992-2006 
Source: Lucan Way, CDDRL Working Paper, June 2006, page 10. 
Comparing Armenia, Ukraine and Georgia on the above figure of opposition 
mobilization during 1992-2006 among the post-Soviet countries (Figure 6.1), we see that 
Armenia has had the most mobilized opposition(Way 2006).77 Kyrgyz opposition 
demonstrations are not illustrated in the figure, but the reason for this could be the fact that it 
did not include a big number of demonstrators. Sources mention about tens of thousands of 
Kyrgyz opposition demonstrators. Mcglinchey (2003) mentions of some 5000-10000 crowds. 
The Azeri protests are not displayed either, but sources mention of 20,000 -25,000 people. 
Military power of the states, first of all, stemming from the traditional definitions of 
state militarization, is compared based on their military budgets.78Stockholm International 
Peace Research Institute’s time series on military expenditure for the years of 1988 to 2006 
shows that, as expected, Armenia’s military budget as a share % of GDP is very stable and 
                                                 
77 Based on Figure 6.1, between 1992 and 2006, the occurrence of demonstrations was more frequent in 
Armenia than in any of the selected countries in the figure. Even in absolute terms, Armenia has had the mo st 
mobilized opposition. Per capita number of demonstrators  is the most in Armenia (Way 2006).   
78The SIPRI definition of military expenditure is as follows and where possible, SIPRI military expenditures 
include all current and capital expenditure on: 
 the armed forces, including peace keeping forces  
 defense ministries and other government agencies engaged in defense projects  
 paramilitary forces when judged to be trained, equipped and available for military operations  
 military space activities 
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higher in most years than in Ukraine, Georgia or Kyrgyzstan, which similar to Armenia, have 
faced prolonged oppositions towards their ruling elites (Figure 6.2).79The average military 
expenditures in Armenia for the observed years are 3.1%, in Georgia they are 1.3%, in 
Kyrgyzstan 2.6%, in Ukraine 2.8%, and in Azerbaijan 2.7%. 
Table 6.1: Military Expenditure as Percentage of GDP: Armenia, Georgia, 
Kyrgyzstan, Ukraine, 1992-2007 
 Azerbaijana Armeniab Georgiac Kyrgyzstan Ukrained 
1992 [2.5] 2.2 .. 1.6 .. 
1993 [4.9] 2.3 .. 1.5 .5 
1994 [3.7] .. .. 2.6 2.5 
1995 [2.7] 4.1 .. 3.5 2.8 
1996 [2.3] 3.1 2.2 3 3.3 
1997 [2.3] 3.9 [1.3] 3.1 4.1 
1998 [2.4] 3.5 [1.1] 2.7 3.4 
1999 [2.6] 3.7 [.9] 2.6 3 
2000 [2.3] 3.6 [.6] 2.9 3.6 
2001 [2.3] 3.1 [.7] 2.3 2.9 
2002 [2.2] 2.7 1 2.7 2.8 
2003 [2.4] 2.7 1.1 2.9 2.8 
2004 [2.6] 2.7 1.4 2.8 2.6 
2005 [2.3] 2.7 3.5 3.1 [2.4] 
2006 3.4 2.9 5.2 3.2 2.8 
2007 .. 3 9.2 3.1 2.9 
Average 2.7 3.1 1.3 2.6 2.8 
a Azerbaijan changed or redenominated its currency during the period; all current price local currency 
figures have been converted to the latest currency. 
b Figures for Armenia do not include military pensions. For 2004-2006 these amounted to 9979, 1113 
and 12440 b. drams respectively. 
c Figures for Georgia from 2002 are for the budgeted expenditure. The budget figure for 2003 is 
believed to be an underestimation of actual spending because of the political turmoil during the ye ar. 
dFigures for Ukraine are for the adopted budget for the Ministry of Defense, military pensions and 
paramilitary forces. Actual expenditure was reportedly 95-99% of that budgeted for 1996-99. 
Note:US$ m. = Million US dollars; - = Empty cell; ... = Data not available or not 
applicable; ( ) = Uncertain figure; [ ] = SIPRI estimate 
Source:Updated from Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). 
 
Another source comparing only the South Caucasus three republics’ public spending 
confirms that in the year of 2000, Armenia’s military spending is the highest.  
 
                                                 
79 Pay attention to the fact that figures for Armenian expenditures do not even include military pensions.  
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Table 6.2: Public Spending (education, health and military) in Armenia, Azerbaijan and 
Georgia, 1995-2000 
1.3 Public Spending Armenia Azerbaijan Georgia 
Public expenditures 
Education (% of GNP), 1985-1987 .. 5.8 .. 
Education (% of GNP), 1995-1997 2 3 5.2I 
Health (% of GNP), 1990 .. 2.7 3 
Health (% of GNP), 1999 4 1 0.8 
Military (% of GDP), 1990 .. .. .. 
Military (% of GDP), 2000 4.4 2.7 0.9 
Total debt service (% of DGP), 1990 .. .. .. 
Total debt service (% of DGP), 2000 2.2 3.4 3.9 
Notes: I Data refer to a year or period other than that specified 
Source: United Nations, “Republic of Armenia: Public Administration Country Profile”, 
January 2004. 
As a percentage of GDP Armenian military spending is 4.4, while Azerbaijan’s is 2.7 
(the opponent country that similarly needs strong military in case of war to restart with 
Armenia) and Georgia’s is 0.9. Not only is the Armenian military spending highest among 
the three republics, it is also highest as compared to other public expenditures within the 
country, such as health and education.     
The World Bank’s indicators on Defense and Arms (Figure 6.2 - Figure 6.6) also 
show that average armed forces personnel as the percentage of total labor force is highest in 
Armenia for the observed years.80 Azerbaijan follows. In Armenia it is 2.6%, in Azerbaijan it 
is 2%, in Georgia it is 1.4-1.5%, in Kyrgyzstan it is 1%, and in Ukraine it is 0.9%.  
                                                 
80 Armed forces personnel are active duty military personnel, including paramilitary forces if the training, 
organization, equipment, and control sugges t they may be used to support or replace regular military forces. 
Labor force comprises all people who meet the International Labor Organization's definition of the 
economically active population. 
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Figure 6.2: Armed Forces Personnel as a Percentage of Total Labor Force in Armenia, 1992-
2008 
 
Figure 6.3: Armed Forces Personnel as a Percentage of Total Labor Force in Azerbaijan, 
1992-2008
 
 
Figure 6.4: Armed Forces Personnel as a Percentage of Total Labor Force in Georgia, 1992-
2008
 
Figure 6.5: Armed Forces Personnel as a Percentage of Total Labor Force in Kyrgyzstan, 
1992-2008
 
 130 
 
 
Figure 6.6: Armed Forces Personnel as a Percentage of Total Labor Force in Ukraine, 1992-
2008
 
Source: http://www.tradingeconomics.com/armenia/armed-forces-personnel-total-wb-
data.html 
6.3 A Comparative Analysis of Contentious Politics and Coercive States 
After presenting a comparative evidence of the strong military capacity of the 
Armenian state in the previous section, this section tries to argue that more military and 
repressive regimes are triumphant at hampering the development of human rights, 
fundamental elements of social exclusion, in their respective societies by suppressing social 
protest. While some autocratic regimes, being quite weak, collapse in case of even minimal 
social movement, others are based on more solid foundations and can simply crack down 
oppositional movements. As Lucan Way writes, “backed by well financed states, strong 
coercive apparatuses, and/or cohesive ruling parties, such regimes have either survived 
serious opposition challenges or successfully beat back serious opposition before it could 
emerge” (Way 2006:8). For example, discussed further in the chapter, in 2003 Georgian 
President Shevardnadze was displaced in the face of “undersized” crowds, mainly because he 
“no longer controlled the military and security forces” and, thus, was “too politically weak” 
to repress the crowds (Mitchell 2004:345-348). The explosion of a movement into a 
revolution protest in the examined countries for the studied period was possible only in cases 
where the regimes under threat did not resort to machine guns or tanks. Illustrated in this 
section, Armenian elites always resorted to guns and tanks. As we can observe in Table 6.3 
and Table 6.4, only in the absence of tough authoritarianism and a militarized state (after an 
interstate war), was a revolution possible. 
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Table 6.3: "Color revolutions" accomplished and attempted, 2000-2008 
State Success Period Elections Crowd Victims War81 
Armenia No April 12, 2004 
__________ 
20-February-02 
March, 2008 
Feb, 2003 
_________ 
19 February, 
2008 
25,000 
 
100,000 
 
Few 
1991-94 
(Yes) 
Azerbaijan No 16 September- 20 
October, 2003 
___________ 
08 Aug -26 Nov, 
2005 
15 October, 
2003 
__________ 
06 Nov., 
2005 
25,000 
 
20,000 
Few 
 
Few 
1991-94 
(Yes) 
Georgia Yes 15-23 November, 
2003 
02 Nov., 
2003 
100,000 None No 
Ukraine Yes 22 November- 04 
December, 2004 
21 Nov., 
2004 
500,000 None No 
Kyrgyzstan Yes 18-24 March, 
2005 
13 March, 
2005 
25,000 Few No 
Source: Adapted from Baev, 2010. 
 
Table6.4: State Militarization Levels and Failure/Success of Social Movements, 2000-2008 
State Armenia Azerbaijan Georgia Ukraine Kyrgyzstan 
Military budgets Very high High Low High High 
Ratio of manpower Very high High Low Very low Low 
(Threat of) External war yes yes no no no 
Authoritarian state yes yes partly partly yes 
Revolution occurred no no yes yes yes 
Source: Created by the author. 
6.3.1. Georgia:November 23, 2003 was a noteworthy day in the history of Georgia. For the 
first time in Georgian history a revolution exploded in Georgia, the first non-violent change 
of regime in the Caucasus. This was an event not predicted by scholars, as many were 
anticipating a more violent turn of events in this small post-Soviet country.  
On November 2, 2003, Georgia held parliamentary elections. As in other cases 
studied in this chapter, the election was controlled by the incumbent, President Eduard 
Shevardnadze. Tens of thousands of demonstrators took to the streets of Tbilisi, the capital 
                                                 
81 Baev (2010) included only ‘civil war’ in the table. I have changed the author’s mentioning of civil war with 
external war, because in this dissertation Armenian state militarizat ion started after the Karabakh war (not a 
civil war), which Baev categorized as a civil war. Therefore, I am more interested to see th e affect of external 
wars on post-war state militarizat ion and a state’s ability to crack down potential revolutions/potential civil wars 
during 2000-2008. 
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city, to protest against the flawed results of a parliamentary election in Georgia. They 
demanded Shevardnadze’s resignation. Peaceful protests lasted for 20 days. The 
demonstrations were in full swing for three days on November 20, 21 and 22. After Mikheil 
Saakashvili’s public announcement that all negotiations with the President were halted 
because the President did not accept the protestors’ demands, people grew more aggravated 
and filled the streets.82 On the morning of November 23 the demonstrations became larger. 
Protestors came from different classes and different social groups, of different ages and 
ideologies: students, teachers and professors, workers, young people and the elderly.  
As typical of threatened governments, the government ordered the security forces to 
defend constitutional order. Shevardnadze deployed soldiers in the streets, but did not dare to 
order for violence. He refused to order his troops to shoot the people. Meanwhile, protestors, 
the majority of them students, distributed red roses to the soldiers. The latter chose not to use 
their guns. State efforts to contain mass mobilization were unsuccessful. On November 24, 
Shevardnadze’s regime was brought down by about 100,000 people. Shevardnadze left his 
office peacefully, similar to Armenia's President Ter-Petrosyan’s resignation in 
1998.83According to Cohen (2004), "a wise man", Shevardnadze, who led Georgia, "on and 
off, for 31 years decided to bow out gracefully." He "was not ready for the role of a Slobodan 
Milosevic or a Nicolae Ceausescu". The opposition came to power and in January 2004, one 
of the opposition leaders, Mikhail Saakashvili was elected as president of Georgia.  
The success of the 2004 Georgian movement can be credited to a couple of factors. A 
most vital circumstance was the pressure from below. An important factor for the movement 
to start was the economic situation of the country, more specifically the uneven distribution 
of wealth between the society’s different groups. Although Georgia witnessed economic 
growth during Shevardnadze’s years, most of the population still lived in poverty and social 
problems were become quite severe. Corruption and bribery were widespread. The state, 
                                                 
82 Saakashvili is a Georgian politician, the founder and leader of the United National Movement Party . He 
became the third President of Georgia in January 2004 and has led Georgia till November 2013. 
83 The similarity of regime change in Armenia in 1998 and in Georgia in 2003 is that in both cases the 
incumbents left their office as Presidents. Nonetheless , there is a significant difference: in the Armenian case, 
the president resigned because of pure political pressure and this happened approximately two years after t he 
1996 post-electoral mass protests, while in the Georgian case Shevardnadze gave up because of public pressure 
and under people’s power.  
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instead of feeding its people, was more interested in enriching its oligarchs. The level of 
social exclusion in all its dimensions was becoming very high, and people needed to express 
their frustration. This expression of public aggravation burst into mass protests after the 2003 
parliamentary elections.  
The input of “Kmara”, a civic resistance movement created by Georgian university 
students, was enormous in undermining the government.84  The literature on Rose revolution 
repeatedly highlights that Kmara led the demonstrations. Kmara is quoted to have been 
supported, financed and trained by several Western organizations and foundations, such as 
Goorge Soros’s “Open Society - Georgia Foundation”, Freedom House, the National 
Democratic Institute, European Union, USAID, National Endowment for Democracy, 
International Republican Institute, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and 
the Council of Europe.  
The success of the Rose Revolution ignited a debate about the importance of the 
international actors, such as diplomatic, financial and other forms of support from the West, 
specifically from the USA, in transforming local politics in developing countries. The 
November 24, 2003 Wall Street Journal acclaims the breakdown of the old regime to the 
non-governmental sector in the country, supported by Western and particularly American 
foundations. NGOs had “spawned a class of young, English-speaking intellectuals hungry for 
pro-Western reforms", who organized a peaceful coup. While many scholars overestimate the 
international factor in Georgia’s, likewise in Ukraine’s revolutions, Kandelaki argues that 
“foreign actors played a limited role because they lacked information or were overly cautious 
about fostering significant political change” (Kandelaki 2006:2). He contends that most of 
the civil society organizations in Georgia were constrained by the priorities and requireme nts 
of foreign donors and ‘their own elitism’.  
Georgia’s Rose Revolution and Ukraine’s Orange Revolution are very similar in 
many aspects. Like the Orange Revolution, the Rose Revolution did not experience any 
violence from either the protestors or the state authorities. Three key reasons lie behind the 
                                                 
84 “Kmara” was the Georgian version of the Serbian "OTPOR" and the Ukrainian “Pora”. Translation of 
“Kmara” into English is “Enough”.  
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logic of non-violence from Georgian security forces. The first reason is that the armed forces 
were not supporting the autocratic regime and they made clear that they would defend the 
protestors; in fact they joined the demonstrators in Georgia. The second reason for the 
absence of violence was due to a divided ruling elite. Finally, a third factor widely acclaimed 
to have driven the security forces not to exercise use of power was the opposition’s strong 
efforts to develop “sympathy for their cause while downplaying the threat posed by political 
change” (Kandelaki 2006:3).  
6.3.2. Ukraine:After the breakdown of the USSR, there occurred tens of protests, 
demonstrations and attempts of "color revolutions" in the post-Soviet space. Ukraine’s 
Orange Revolutions in November-December of 2004 was the second revolution after the 
popular Georgian Rose Revolution of 2003. The two revolutions had many similar aspects, 
but Ukraine’s Orange Revolution was much larger than Georgia’s Rose Revolution, which 
caused analysts and scholars to treat Ukraine’s case as a new trend-setter, “a new landmark in 
the post-communist history of Eastern Europe, a seismic shift Westward in the geopolitics of 
the region” (Karatnycky 2005: 1). As Andrew Wilson observes: 
“It took real people power to challenge the Ukrainian system, which was much stronger than 
the eleven-year Shevardnadze regime. There was certainly no bloodbath, no Terror, no set-
piece storming of buildings, though revolutions often have to be non-revolutionary in order to 
succeed. Ukraine’s negotiated path to peaceful settlement stood in marked contrast to 
Kyrgyzstan or even Georgia, certainly in contrast to the bloody events and suppression of 
protests in Uzbekistan”. (Wilson 2005:198) 
The Orange revolution, as all the revolutions and revolutionary situations examined in 
this chapter, was initiated as a post-election reaction. However, while all the other cases of 
mobilization were caused not only by flawed elections and political exclusion and they 
embraced also economic and social exclusion, Ukraine was the only country that had a strong 
economy. In Ukraine’s case it was not economic stagnation and socio-economic exclusion 
that led the masses to the revolution. Although Kuzio (2006) mentions about “popular 
perceptions of unjust privatizations and the rise of Ukrainian’s oligarchic class,” “a growing 
gulf between the ruling elite and society,”“economic growth was not felt by the population,” 
and that “most Ukrainians looked negatively at the 1990s as a decade of the “primitive 
accumulation of capital” (Bandit Capitalism),” he still believes that economic issues as such 
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did not play a major role in the 2004 elections and post-election events in Ukraine (Kuzio 
2006, pp 45-49).  
Åslund likewise points out that the Ukrainian revolution did not seem to have any 
class identity at all. “Hardly any names of businesses, parties, or organizations were to be 
seen. No one talked of social or economic issues. This was pure politics” (Åslund 2007:175). 
Therefore, this is the only country where the phenomenon of durable social exclusion does 
not apply; here we talk about only the political exclusion aspect of social exclusion. 
The Ukrainian presidential elections of November, 2004 witnessed a massive 
mobilization against the incumbent President Kuchma. Kuchma was considered a corrupt and 
authoritarian leader with oligarchic ties. Under his government, the judiciary was malleable, 
mass media controlled to the level that defiant or investigative reporters could have been 
murdered. The massive uprising of the 2004 in Ukraine was in support of Viktor 
Yushchenko, the main oppositional candidate against Viktor Yanukovich, the presidential 
candidate who was widely known as handpicked by the incumbent president Kuchma. 
Election fraud and vote rigging served as an opportunity window for the public outrage to 
burst leading to the Orange Revolution. 
The demonstrations included about 40,000 university students with a sea of orange 
flags, hundreds of Ukrainians who arrived from other cities of the country to Kyiv, the 
capital city, over one million Ukrainian citizens who went out to the streets in support of 
their candidate. 
C. J. Chivers of the New York Times reveals that as the protesters gained momentum, 
Ukraine’s military and security services began to fragment. Although state elites demanded 
to use force to disperse the demonstrations, the authorities did not dare to intervene with the 
military and the SBU (Security Service of Ukraine). Ukrainian security agencies played an 
instrumental role in the Orange Revolution, as they provided support to the political 
opposition. According to Chivers (2005), after the Interior Ministry marshaled troops to 
attack the protestors, SBU leaders proclaimed that they would use force to protect the 
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protestors. Ukrainians went to vote in a re-run election on December 26, and the next day 
Yushchcenko became the elected President of Ukraine.  
Unlike for other countries that witnessed high levels of social mobilization, there is an 
abundant literature on the causes and consequences of the Orange Revolution in Ukraine. 
Some discuss only the domestic context, others emphasize the international context. A very 
popular reason that many authors find primary is the civil society, particularly youth groups, 
such as “Pora”.85 Polese (2009) argues that the crucial factor in the Orange Revolution was 
the transformation of informal social networks into a formalized civil society. Others ascribe 
an essential role to Ukrainian nationalism. Dominique Arel suggests that “nationalism 
produced the Orange Revolution. … if Ukraine is now on the road to an open society, it is 
largely thanks to the strength of its nationalism” (Arel 2005:1). Another factor that Arel finds 
important is a “polarized society”.  
Kuzio’s thorough assessment of the Orange Revolution indicates eight necessary 
factors for this revolution: competitive authoritarian regime, preceding political crisis, 
charismatic candidate, sympathetic capital city, disunited and dispirited ruling elites, united 
opposition, new generation, and civic nationalism. As contributing factors that are 
noteworthy, Kuzio states another set of five variables. Those are the economic factor, modern 
communications, the public mood, security forces and the international involvement.  
While it is necessary to mention factors that the literature finds significant for the 
success of the Ukrainian social mobilization, it is not the aim of this chapter to discuss all of 
these factors at length. A required task here is to discover the differences that led the 
Ukrainians to a successful color revolution, that is, the removal of authoritarian leadership by 
means of non-violent techniques, as compared to the Armenian case. Based on the reviewed 
literature, we can assess that the necessary but missing condition for the Armenian 
revolutionary situations to turn into a revolution was the international factor. But since this 
dissertation does not deal with the international factor due to the fact that I am concerned 
with the domestic context of social exclusion, I leave the involvement and the role of the 
international community to future research.  
                                                 
85 The translation of “Pora” is “It’s time!” or “It’s enough!”  
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The basic premise shared in earlier parts of this study focuses on state militarization 
as a leading factor to the failure of social movements. Now, revisiting the two cases, Ukraine 
and Armenia, through the state militarization lenses, it becomes obvious that the level of 
state’s repressive power has been the primary factor for the differences in outcomes.86 
Similar to the Georgian case, the Ukrainian security forces remained neutral or ‘defected’.  
Binnendijk and Marovic (2006) examine the explicit strategies developed by protestors in 
Ukraine to increase the costs of repression and reduce the willingness of state security forces 
to resort to violence. Through means of persuasion, organizers averted major repression of 
their movements. However, it is contestable whether the armed forces did not intervene 
because of the protestors’ persuasion skills or because the Security Service and the military 
were sympathetic to Yushchenko. In a similar method, Armenian protestors have tried 
extraordinary methods of attracting the Armenian armed forces, but in vain. The Armenian 
military leaders are people with close ties to government authorities. Armenian military, 
particularly those officials, who have been appointed after the Karabakh war and are not the 
classic Soviet officers with proper military training, but civilians who turned into military 
officials, are extremely subordinate to the state, because they have their stake to lose if there 
is a regime overturn. State-military relationship is tightly interrelated and inter-dependent in 
today's Armenia. 
Another reason for the Ukrainian state’s inability to use force may be due to the fact 
that Ukraine’s Interior Ministry was divided.  Crucially, the Ukrainian elite was divided; 
some politicians joined the main opposition candidate’s camp before the election and others 
defected to Yushchenko’s camp when it was evident that the Orange victory was a likely 
outcome of the post-election movement. Divided elite means a divided state. A divided state 
means weaker state capacity for repression, unlike post-Soviet Armenian and Azerbaijani 
cases. Armenian governing authorities during the latest two post-electoral protests have had a 
very strong cohesion of state elites; there was a state elite fragmentation only during the 1996 
demonstrations in Armenia, and which like in other cases of revolutions resulted in 
                                                 
86 As already mentioned in an earlier part of the dissertation, it is imperative to re-state that ‘success’ does not 
explicitly refer to more social inclusion after the specific revolution. It does not refer to the reforms or 
effectiveness of the post-revolutionary government. It only refers to the effective overthrow of a non-
democratic and illiberal regime, in as much as it is based on the desire and decision of the larger part of the 
society. 
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theincumbent President Ter-Petrossian’s resignation in 1998. In short, state militarization is 
the main difference between the Georgian and Armenian causes that led to success in one 
case, and to failure in the other. 
6.3.3. Kyrgyzstan:Thepost-Soviet revolutions of colors and flowers continued with the 
“Tulip Revolution” of 2005 in Kyrgyzstan. For the third time in two years people overthrew 
their governments in CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) countries, and for the first 
time this has occurred in the post-Soviet central Asian region. The “Tulip Revolution” 
happened as a reaction against rigged elections in Kyrgyzstan; its causes, however, are not 
rooted only in electoral fraud, but as in many cases of mass protests, stem from social, 
economic, as well as political segregation. The revolution in Kyrgyzstan was conditioned by 
widespread discontent not only in the political elite, but in the wider society. 
A central position and role in the Kyrgyz events carried the People’s Movement of 
Kyrgyzstan (PMK). The movement included many of the opposition’s prominent figures. 
Many important movements and parties joined the PMK, among those the Ata-Jurt 
movement, the “For Fair Elections” bloc, Jany Bagyt, the National Movement of Kyrgyzstan 
and the National Congress of Kyrgyzstan. In early November the opposition demanded that 
the President sign a new constitution limiting his powers. Akaev signed it on November 9, 
yet tensions between pro- and anti-government demonstrators threatened political 
breakdown.  
Unlike its predecessor cases, Georgia and Ukraine, the literature on the Kyrgyz caseis 
limited. Authors chiefly lay out a chronology of events leading to the revolution, the 
escalation of protests and a description of the Tulip Revolution itself. There are few authors 
who discuss any other causes of this revolution, except the political tensions between the 
government and oppositional leaders. The main focus of scholarly and policymaking 
discussion revolves around its consequences, particularly regarding democratization. Many 
skeptically wonder if the Kyrgyz revolution has brought any real changes for its people and 
whether it has affected the consolidation of democracy in this country. Whereas a few 
consider the Kyrgyz events of 2005 as “little more than a coup d’etat" (Knyazev 2005), or an 
event "orchestrated by external forces, primarily the US" (Peters 2005)", many analysts 
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mention that, the international community had little influence and was not a primary driver of 
the regime change for the Tulip Revolution (Saidazimova 2005; Radnitz 2006; Lewis 2010).  
According to Marat (2006) the rise of political violence is one of several negative 
repercussions resulting from this sudden transformation. Based on her accounts, post-
revolutionary Kyrgyzstan has been experiencing violent activity of organized criminal groups 
and widespread corruption in the public and economic sectors. But as Martha Brill Olcott 
believes, the consequences of the “Tulip Revolution” can still lead to the development of a 
democratic political system in Kyrgyzstan, “something that was unlikely to have been the 
case had Askar Akayev been allowed to complete his term of office” (Olcott, 2005). 
A very good analysis of the Tulip Revolution is presented by Radnitz (2006), who 
argues that the overthrow of the government was possible due to an “improvised alliance of 
opposition leaders and business elites”. Unlike Georgia and Ukraine’s revolutions, as well as 
contained mass mobilizations in Armenia and Azerbaijan, in Kyrgyzstan civil society 
networks, students, and urban residents played a minimal role. Informal ties have been vital.  
For the sake of the militarization argument put forward in the introduction of this 
chapter, a point that is worth underscoring is that similar to Georgia and Ukraine, Kyrgyz 
armed forces also joined the protestors. Otunbaeva said that police officers had joined the 
opposition team in massive numbers. "Policemen, including high-ranking officers, took off 
their uniforms, changed into civilian clothes and joined our ranks. So we have substantial 
support" (Saidazimova, 2005). Lewis (2010) also contends that it was not very difficult for 
the mobilization to defeat the state, because Akaev refused to order the security forces to use 
force, and the latter were reluctant to exercise force. Thus, the regime had limited ability to 
oppose the mobilization. “In fact, there was no cost attached  to participation in 
demonstrations, and much greater costs in some communities (social ostracism, loss of 
access to local leaders) associated with opposing anti-government protests” (Lewis 2010:59).  
6.3.4. Armenia:After its independence from the USSR, the Armenian Republic has witnessed 
repeated cycles of demonstrations. Except for the year of 1988 that was marked with 
demonstrations for the liberation and reunification of Karabakh with Armenia (widely known 
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as “Karabakh” or “National” movement), all the subsequent small or major demonstrations 
and insurgencies throughout 1998-2008 were directed towards state elites on economic, 
political and ideological grounds.87Most typically, thelatter demonstrations were followed 
with hundreds of troops in Armenia’s capital and clashes between opposition activists and 
government forces. Those, therefore, have been failed efforts of contentious politics and 
revolutionary outcomes by the demonstrators.  
The 1995 parliamentary elections were announced by the UN and other observers to 
be free but not fair. These elections were followed by the presidential elections in 1996 that 
were also disputed to beunfair. Official results announced that incumbent Levon Ter-
Petrossian received 51.75% of the votes and his main opponent, Vazgen Manukyan received 
41.29%. International observers’ assessments mentioned irregularities, procedural violations 
and breaches of the election law.88 According to Manukyan’s supporters their candidate had 
gained 60% of the votes, so the opposition rejected the official results. Mass protests 
followed.  
The protestors used violence, and breaking through police lines, entered the 
government building. They took hostage Babken Ararktsyan, the speaker of the Parliament, 
and beat up his two deputies. Because of this violence on behalf of the protestors and the 
government’s assumption that the demonstrators attempted to seize a government building, 
the riot was dispersed by the police. Zolyan (2010) argues that the post-election protests of 
1996 in Armenia had the characteristics of “the "color revolutions"”: claimed fraudulent 
elections, mass protests, and an attempt to overthrow the government. “The events of 1996 
proved to be a pattern that in the years to come repeated itself in different post-socialist 
countries, albeit though with different outcomes” (Zolyan 2010:89).  
The next major state repression scene repeated in February of 2003 when 
Kocharyan’s re-election as president (elected in 1998 after Ter-Petrossian's resignation) was 
followed by widespread allegations of voter bribery and ballot-rigging. The opposition 
campaign peaked into a massive, yet peaceful, protest on April 12, 2004. Some sources 
                                                 
87 The national movement of 1988, surpassing the mark of one million citizens from all over Armenia and 
abroad, will be discussed more in detail in Chapter 7.    
88 OSCE ODIHR “Election Observation Mission in Armenia”, September 1996, 
http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/armenia/14148 
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estimate the number of protestors to around 10-15,000 (Eurasia Insight, 13 April, 2004), 
others to about 25,000 (Karapetyan, 15 April, 2004). The Rose Revolutions had just occurred 
in Georgia, and the Armenian opposition, inspired by the neighboring country’s success, 
tried to imitate the Georgian revolutionary tactics, among those peaceful mass protests and 
rallies, blocking government buildings and streets. Although the demonstrators were 
peaceful, the protest was dispersed by use of excessive force and in a very brutal way 
(Human Rights Watch 2005). There were more than 200 arrests, among those ordinary 
protestors, opposition leaders, and even three members of the National Assembly.   
Although opposition tactics and organization have been similar in Armenia and 
Georgia in 2003-2004, the state’s reaction has been totally different. While the Georgian 
incumbent President, Eduard Shevardnadze, showed an excessively mild attitude towards 
demonstrators and did not resort to repressive methods, the Armenian government under the 
guidance of President Kocharyan has used violence and suppression to crush down any 
challenges against the Executive, both in the parliament and on the streets.  
The Parliamentary elections of May 2007 and specifically the Presidential elections 
of February 2008 have also been a sharp example of political exclusion.89 The alleged 
electoral violations and fraud proceeded with mass protests in the capital city Yerevan. This 
time again, the protestors were extremely peaceful and no violence was used as a social 
movement tactic. People began the demonstrations on February 20in the Liberty Square of 
Yerevan, and continued their demands of inclusion, equal rights, and fair political 
participation. Approximately 25,000 opposition supporters were reportedly present on the 
first days of the protest. Some hundreds of people were protesting in the Square even 
overnight.  
During the 2008 protests, the demonstratorsdid not seek to enact disruption and 
transgression. In general, the protests of the 2008 were considered to be non-violent from the 
side of the protesting people. Demonstrations consisted of several groups and interests, such 
                                                 
89 The elections of 2008 and its consequences on political exclusion in the Armenian society is a major theme of 
discussion and will be thoroughly analyzed in Chapter 7.    
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as youth movements HIMA and SKSELA which were greatly frustrated.90There were elderly 
people in the streets, students and teenagers, intellectuals, and finally, the political 
opposition. There was also a new force: the Armenian workers of Russia, who losing their 
jobs in Russia, had returned home. This is significant because they returned to Armenia 
unemployed and weredisappointed with the economic opportunities in the homeland.  
Despite government urges to go home, the angry, discontented crowds continued their 
only way towards building a more inclusive homeland, demanding a new government that in 
their beliefs would be more inclined to meeting their needs; economic, political and societal. 
Their demands, however, were soon crushed. On the morning of March 1, police and army 
units dispersed the 700-1000 persons who had camped overnight, beating them with 
truncheons and electric-shock devices.91 Eight protestors died during those clashes, dozens 
were injured.   
Zharangutyun (Heritage) party’s leader Raffi Hovhannisyan’s statement on the post-
election situation in the country mentioned that "the schism between the Armenian people 
and its government continues to expand". Zharangutyun, which was then the only opposition 
party represented in the National Assembly, believed that the presidential election was 
fraudulent, and that Armenian people had a legitimate right to dispute its official results in 
demonstrations. Hovhannisyan’s statement continued: “The unconscionability displayed on 
February 19 and the brutality used to protect it on March 1 remain unresolved issues. No 
state of emergency, accompanied as it is by an aggressive, one-sided ‘public information’ 
vertical which deepens the public divide rather than healing it, will succeed in securing the 
collective amnesia of state and society.”92 
According to state elites, the events of March, 2008, were efforts to overthrow the 
government, an attempt of coup d'état.93 Hundreds of the supporters of the main opposition 
candidate Levon Ter-Petrossian were arrested and jailed on charges of attempts to seize the 
                                                 
90 'Hima' means 'now' and 'sksela' means 'it has started'. 
91"Protestor on the Scene Tells of Melee”, www.armenianow.com, March 1, 2008  
“Ter-Petrosyan 'Under House Arrest' Rally Broken Up", Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), March 1, 
2008; "Armenia: Police Beat Peaceful Protestors in Yerevan", Human Rights W atch (NY), March 2, 2008 
92 "Ter-Petrosyan, Allies Discuss Next Steps", Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), March 17, 2008,  
retrieved from http://www.armtown.com/news/en/rfe/20080317/, last access on August 17, 2011  
93"Armenia: Officials, Opposition Take Tentative Steps Toward Conciliation", Eurasianet.org, March 13, 2008 
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government. Sources estimate over 400 hundred citizens’ arrest following March 1. The 
National assembly, controlled and governed by the President, stripped four deputies allied to 
Ter-Petrossian of their legal immunity from prosecution. While three of them were detained 
by the police, the fourth was able to hide and for the following couple of years remained on 
the run.94 
Several local and international media sources and reports have exposed and 
condemned the state violence exercised by the Armenian state in the aftermath of the 2008 
elections. They have mentioned about beatings during the protests by the police and army 
representatives, illegal political arrests, police brutality against the detainees, and 
discrimination of political elites who supported the opposition candidate.    
The 2008 post-election crisis and the state of emergency announced in Armenia as the 
state elite’s reaction to thousands of protestors obviously supports the main argument of this 
dissertation that coercive state apparatus merged with its military high rank authorities is a 
significant factor in creating political exclusion of large masses. The President’s imposition 
of a state of emergency complete with bans on the freedoms of assembly and speech coupled 
with sweeping media censorship, in response to an internal political crisis that has cost at 
least eight lives is a combination of most of the elements mentioned in the political exclusion 
indicators in earlier chapters of this study.  
Zolyan’s (2010) research on the Armenian caseevaluates the capacity of a few factors 
commonly associated with the effectiveness of social movements in Armenia and 
acknowledges only one of them,an openly authoritarian and militarized regime, as a truly 
significant factor in breeding revolutionary situations. For instance, although many would 
think that leaders of the opposition and their ideology are a key determinant of the social 
movements’ success, he suggests that the oppositional discourse does not matter much in 
Armenia. Zolyan also argues that the rivalry between the West and Russia as wellis not an 
essential cause of the political crises that could have led to a color revolution in Armenia. 
Next, in spite of the fact that the international community’s engagement is instrumental for 
                                                 
94 "Fugitive Opposition MP Arrested",  Armenia Liberty (RFE/RL), March 13, 2008, retrieved from  
http://www.armtown.com/news/en/rfe/20080313/200803132/, last access on August 17, 2011 
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the success of a social movement to become a revolution,international engagement cannot be 
considered a necessary and a sufficient cause for the emergence of a political situation in 
which a color revolution may occur. The most significant factor determining the failure 
and/or success of a social movement is an “openly authoritarian regime”, a regime that 
“strives to ensure stability at the expense of pluralism and liberty ..., which might be the 
preferred outcome for some members of the ruling elites in Armenia, who tend to equate 
‘stability’ with maintaining their grip on power, but it can prove disastrous for the country in 
the long run” (Zolyan 2010:97-98). 
In the case of Armenia, variables such as 1) opposition leadership and a leader’s 
ideology, 2) organization and structure of a social movement, as well as 3) the international 
factor are not as important in determining the success of a social movement, as 4) the 
authoritarian mechanisms of the state’s decision-making and a state’s organizational base. 
Börzel, Pamuk, and Stahn (2008:19) likewise mention that the Armenian state holds a strong, 
well-established and unchallenged monopoly on violence throughout the country.  
6.3.5. Azerbaijan:There was a phenomenal growth of economy in 2005 in Azerbaijan. 
Butsimilar to Armenia, Azerbaijan has experienced a high degree of inequality, and over 40 
percent of the population was estimated to live in poverty (Alieva 2006). As a product of 
industrialization, there was a sudden rise of clans, and a radical change of social structure.  
The opportunities among different classes changed, leaving the poorest in poverty and 
socially vulnerable. There have been many efforts in Azerbaijan to overthrow the regime, 
such as in 2003 and in 2005; however none was successful. 95Armenia and Azerbaijan are the 
only countries among the chosen cases that have had very mobilized social movements but at 
the same time the respective states contained those movements, shutting down protestors.   
The presidential elections of 2003 have been considered not fair; the results of votes 
confirmed that Ilham Aliyev, the son of President Heydar Aliyev, was the ‘elected’ President, 
a successor to his father. This election was condemned by the OSCE, yet it was accepted 
internationally. The international observers and Western diplomats criticized human rights 
                                                 
95For example, protests in 2005followed by 196 protestors’ immediate arrests, about 600 opposition su pporters’ 
arrests in the following two months and over 100 imprisonments after unfair trials (Alieva 2006). 
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violations and voting manipulation by the government but still advised opposition leaders to 
stop their protests. International refusal to acknowledge the unfair elections left Azeri people 
disillusioned. As a result, only 50% of the electorate turned out to vote in the parliamentary 
elections of November 2005 in Azerbaijan.   
Similar to Georgia and Ukraine, several youth movements such as Yox, Yeni Fekir, 
Magam and Dalga, were created in Azerbaijan.96 Many of those groups used the same tactics 
as the Ukrainian Pora and Georgian Kmara. The Yox movement chose green as its color, 
similar to Ukrainian revolution’s orange color. In November 2005, thousands of young 
people took to the streets. On 26 November, the police cracked down demonstrations that had 
high promises and potential of becoming a color revolution. The police used teargas and 
water cannons; dozens of protesters were injured.    
In Azerbaijan, there was a lack of international community support to affect the 
realization of a color revolution. There was no critical action and active involvement on their 
behalf towards changing the autocratic regime of Aliyev, because they were not committed to 
a regime change due to the existing business arrangements regarding Azerbaijani oil. Sources 
even mention that Western governments and non-governmental organizations in some cases 
were even opposed to the regime change. “Arguing that Azerbaijan needed “evolutionary” 
rather than revolutionary change, they put other, higher priority interests above 
democratization in Azerbaijan.” (Bunce and Volchik 2008:4) Azerbaijan lacked the external 
influences that weakened autocrats in other post-Soviet countries through effective 
revolutions. 
In the analysis of "color revolutions", the greatest threat to the stability of autocratic 
regimes lies not in the organization of the political opposition or the socio-economic 
challenge from below, but more significantly in the informal mechanisms by which the 
leader maintains cohesion within the ruling coalition and in the means of sustaining the 
armed forces. In Azerbaijan, oil revenues allowed the regime to provide benefits to its 
supporters at both domestic and international levels and maintain elite cohesion. There was a 
                                                 
96 In this case again, the youth groups named themselves very symbolically; for example, “Yox” means “no!”, 
“Yeni fekir” means “new idea”, “Magma” means “it’s time!”, an “Dalga” means “wave”.  
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failure of the business community to support the opposition, because it was not independent 
of the regime. There was also unwillingness from the external community to intervene for the 
same reason (dependence on the Azeri state leaders based on oil interests).  
On the other hand, like in post-war Armenia, the post-war Azeri state was able to 
keep a strong grip on political power due to the existence of external threat from Armenia. 
The security forces remained loyal to the regime and followed orders to use force against 
protesters, rather than defect to the opposition as they did in Georgia and Ukraine. Thus, the 
government control of the business elites, as well as the security forces, insulated Aliyev’s 
regime from being overthrown. Several times during demonstration riots, the Azeri state did 
not hesitate to defend its interests with force.  
6.4 Conclusion 
The body of literature on democratization stresses how economic crises inevitably 
lead to general crisis in a regime and the ouster of the ruling elite. Many of the countries, 
where people were driven to break down authoritarian or quasi-democratic governments, had 
suffered acute economic depression and loss of political power for the majority of their 
citizens. And although in my assessment the "color revolutions" are not true social 
revolutions, famously defined by Skocpol as “rapid, basic transformations of a society’s state 
and class structures … accompanied and in part carried through by class-based revolts from 
below”, the "color revolutions" have been aimed at more inclusion and a fairer share of 
opportunities between social classes. Timothy Garton Ash has accurately coined the term 
‘refolution’ to describe the hybrid form of change that had taken place in the post-Soviet 
space, a mix of reform and revolution. Be they revolution or 'refolution', those do bring hopes 
for ordinary people to defeat violent states and to some extent transform their societies.  
Every color revolution is indeed unique with its specific trajectory and its particular 
emotional catharsis. The discussed post-Soviet revolutions and attempts of revolutions have 
several characteristic features. I have already mentioned some of those similar features, 
among which international involvement is of utmost importance in most of the “color 
revolution” literature. Baev (2010) for example, highlights the international factor, in 
particular posing that the unconditional support by either Russia or the West to leaders 
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seeking to face down potential “color revolutionaries” is the main determinant of a color 
revolution. While international involvement has been relatively important in some cases, 
such as Georgia, Ukraine, and perhaps in Azerbaijan because of the interests in its large oil 
and gas supplies, in Armenia and to a lesser degree in Kyrgyzstan, its role was minimal.97A 
most prominently stood out feature in containing social movements was the level of violence 
used by the state. As shown in previous sections of this chapter, the Armenian state along 
with its neighbor Azerbaijan has excelled at it. 
This chapter focused on the importance of the coercive power of the state in the 
failure of revolutionary attempts. With a comparative chapter on the military statistics, 
history of social movements of the studied countries and the respective states' repressive 
power for the period of 2000-2008, I intended to re-emphasize the military power of Armenia 
and Azerbaijan as compared to other similar post-Sovietstates. Before a more systematic 
examination of the post-Soviet Armenian state militarization beyond the conventional 
perspective, there is a need to mention that the course of the militarization of the Armenian 
state is chiefly rooted in Armenian history, which was heavily influenced by the tragic fate of 
the nation as a perpetual victim. This historic legacy only fostered a vibrant and militant 
nationalism among the nation. The Armenian military in later years gained more power from 
the outbreak of the Karabakh conflict and the ascendance of a newly dynamic militant 
nationalism, which actually preceded the birth of the modern post-Soviet Armenian 
independent state. These historical narratives will be the main discussion of the following 
chapter, with a substantial focus on the Karabakh conflict, and its consequences on the 
Armenian democratization, peace prospects, economic development, andsocial inclusion. 
  
                                                 
97 This minimal role in Armenia may be explained by Armenia's lack of resources such as oil and gas. One may 
argue that the country also has limited strategic value.   
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CHAPTER 7  
State Militarization and Social Exclusion 
War is the engine of state building, but it is also good for business.  
Historically, the three have often amounted to the same thing. The consolidation  
of national states  in Western Europe was in part a  function  of  the  interests   
of royal leaders  in securing sufficient  revenue  for war making. In turn, costly  
military engagements were highly profitable enterprises for the suppliers of men, 
 ships, and weaponry. …  
 The distinction between freebooter and founding father, privateer and president,  
has  often been  far murkier  in  fact  than  national mythmaking  normally allows. 
Charles King 
7.1 Introduction 
In “Benefits of Ethnic War: Understanding Eurasia’s Unrecognized States”, Charles 
King argues that there is a political economy to warfare that produces positive externalities 
for its perpetrators. Wars and post-war aggression in many of Eurasia’s separatist states, 
similar to perpetual violence in Sierra Leone, Myanmar, Liberia, Angola, Cambodia, 
Colombia and elsewhere in the world, have less to do with social or institutional anarchy than 
with the rational calculations of elites about the use of violence as a tool for extracting and 
redistributing resources. “Conflicts, in this sense, may not “burn themselves out”, precisely 
because it is in the interests of their makers, on all sides, to stoke them” (King 2001:528). At 
the same time, conflicts may continue for reasons that are different than those that started it, 
and with actors who were relevant at the time the conflict started. In this sense, while the 
Karabakh war (1991-1994) was inevitable between the Armenian and Azeri people in 1991, 
the long-lasting non-resolution of the conflict could have been avoided if Armenian political 
elites had the will and ability to find a compromise solution.  
This chapter evaluates Armenian citizens' social exclusion with its multidimensional 
nature and dynamic process of "being shut out, fully or partially, from social, economic, 
political and cultural systems that determine the social integration of a person in a society", 
by primarily analyzing the promotion of nationalist policies that deprived Armenia of 
economic development and Armenians of employment opportunities; the weakening of civil 
society and participatory politics by the breakdown of peaceful opposition and 
 149 
 
demonstrations; and unfair exercise of power by the governing leaders. It argues that the 
militarization of the Armenian state through the Karabakh war led to the social and political 
exclusion of the wider Armenian society by forcefully eliminating political opposition, 
suppressingindependent judiciary and curtailing the independence of the media. The prospect 
of free and competitive elections that would result in fair and peaceful rotation of power and 
accountability clearly failed. These processes have further polarized the wealthy and the 
poor, increasing economic exclusion of the latter. A vicious circle of economic, political and 
social dimensions of exclusion was conceived.   
Furthermore, a long-lasting absence of peace resolution over the Karabakh conflict 
maintained by a nationalist ideology that was reinforced during the Kocharyan administratio n 
undermined the formation of peaceful foreign policy and security, market reform, 
democracy, and social inclusion in post-Soviet Armenia. The frozen state of the Karabakh 
conflict has led to certain distortions in the post-Soviet Armenian political system. It was a 
springboard for the post-war state militarization in Armenia. Prolonging the dispute and 
shunning a final settlement by central policy elites since and during the presidency of Robert 
Kocharyan has also prolonged the durability of social exclusion in the Armenian society. Key 
elites got major benefits from stalemate, and had an incentive to prolong it. A final settlement 
for the Karabakh conflict has become an outcome from which ordinary people would greatly 
benefit, but which entails much sacrifice from elites who maintain not only control over 
armed forces, but also accrue resources through political support and financial assistance of 
the international community as long as they prolong a resolution. Meanwhile, Armenia is in a 
"form of self-imposed isolation, an isolation that is leading to economic, political, and 
strategic strangulation" (Libaridian 2007:301).  
The analysis of social exclusion through state militarization is examined through four 
main events in post-Soviet Armenia: 1) TheKarabakh war of 1991-1994; 2) the resignation of 
first President of the Republic of Armenia, Levon Ter-Petrossian, in 1998; 3) the 1999 
Parliament shooting, and 4) 2008 March repression of post-electoral protests. These events, 
characterized with many elements of militarization discussed in the definition and 
theorization of the term in Chapter Four, are rooted in militarization and routed to social 
exclusion. Particularly, the three post-war events – Ter-Petrossian’s resignation; the 1999 
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Parliament murders; and the March 1, 2008 post-electoral turmoil – were infamous events 
that impacted the Armenian state militarization and its effect on social decay.  
This chapter interprets the above-mentioned three political events as significant 
junctures in post-Soviet Armenian politics and relates them to the non-conventional 
development of state militarization in Armenia.98 In this regard, all three of these events were 
allegedly initiated and pressured by politicians, who had been seriously involved in the 
martial activities of Karabakh war, were considered as some of the most revered military 
figures for Armenians, and had afterwards gained control over the armed forces. Being 
related to the Karabakh war and having some 'military' background,99 Armenian high-ranking 
political elites influenced military leaders to support them in maintaining their political 
hegemony through containing mass mobilizations, repression of opposition, election fraud, 
and other human rights violations. Their regimes heavily depended on the loyalty of the army 
and police and employed rigid authoritarianism and a constant need for coercion or its threat. 
In exchange to the services of the military, certain individuals in the military were rewarded 
with higher ranks, higher positions and other resources.100 
Most of the politicians I have interviewed for this dissertation agree that post-war 
Armenia is a militarized state, and that the state militarization adversely impacted a 
beneficial foreign policy that would positively affect Armenia's socio-economic 
development. They also agree that this type of regime has continuously closed opportunities 
of political power and policy-making for oppositional politicians and has excluded the 
majority of Armenian citizens from political participation. Only one of the interviewees, 
                                                 
98 In the conventional militarization sense, only the Karabakh war can be considered an element of true state 
militarizat ion. But as stressed in the state militarization literature discussed earlier in this dissertation, any other 
political event that intervenes with domestic politics through the use of military affairs or armed tactics may be 
characterized as state militarization.  
99 We should emphasize that ‘military’ here denotes a field commander, rather than a traditional combatant with 
military training background. Field commanders during the Karabakh war were similar to fedayees (Ֆիդայի), 
also known as the Armenian irregular units  or Armenian militia, who were civilians that voluntarily left their 
families to form self-defense armed units against the enemy.  
100 Gabrielyan (2011) describes a process of clientelistic relationship between the Kocharyan administration and 
the military, which strongly resembles the “feudalization of the state” in the military realm. Kocharyan, for 
example, formed a loyal army team by granting titles of “General” to several soldiers. Later they were 
appointed to various positions in the Armed Forces (Gabrielyan 2011). Since 2000, position appointments and  
sponsorship entitlements in the Armed Forces became increasingly popular. “Huge amounts of money to 
expend from the Army, not targeted funds, profits from the abuse, became common practice during their 
[Kocharyan-Sargsyan] government” (ibid).  
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Chairman of the Armenian Constitutional Legal Protection Centre (ACPRC)Gevorg 
Manoukyan rejected the idea that post-war Armenia has been militarized.101 According to 
him, after every war, even after World War II, during Stalin’s dictatorial regime, war 
soldiers/heroes or so called frontaviks earned great respect and gained much authority. 
Manoukyan claimed that it was normal for Armenian warriors of Karabakh war to enjoy 
respect and more resources than other citizens, because they put their lives at danger during 
war for the safety and security of the Armenian nation. But Manoukyan, as most of the other 
interviewed politicians and analysts, think that war leaders, such as Samvel Babayan, for 
example have gone too far by acquiring too much power, wealth and violence.102 
Stepan Safaryan and Gerard Libaridian confirmed that there is state militarization but 
both stressed that the power is, by and large, not the military itself but the top-rank officers, 
mostly "field commanders", not the professional officers.103 Libaridian brought the examples 
of Vazgen Sargsyan joining Kocharyan in the critical period of Ter-Petrossian’s resignation, 
Samvel Babayan of Karabakh, Manvel Grigoryan of Ejmiatsin, calling the latter two 
“disastrous and cruel characters”.  Libaridian also added that it was a conscious decision to 
do special favors to the Yerkrapah fighters during the privatization of small industries. “I 
remember Vazgen [Sargsyan] saying “we need to do something for these boys, they gave 
their youth…” So, there was, I’d say, a privileged treatment of the Yerkrapah. But I don’t 
know if they benefitted in the privatization of the big industry.”104 
Jirair Sefilyan agreed with Safaryan and Libaridian by focusing on corrupt generals 
("field commanders") hailing from Karabakh war, who want to control the power system of 
the country.105 He, however, stressed that there does not exists a “Mussolini-type system” in 
Armenia, because current Armenian militiamen do not possess adequate ideology and ideas 
                                                 
101 Gevork Manoukyan, Personal interview with author, Vanadzor, Armenia, May 20, 2009. 
102 Many of the interviewees mentioned Samvel Babayan when discussing state militarization in Karabakh. The 
following sections of this chapter will dwell more extensively on his role on the relation of post-war 
militarizat ion and social exclusion.     
103 Stepan Safaryan, Personal interview with author, Yerevan, Armenia, September 6, 2011; 
Gerard Libaridian, Personal interview with author, Ann Arbor, Michigan, April 14, 2010. 
104 The quote is derived from the author’s interview with Libaridian, Ann Arbor, Michigan , April 14, 2010. 
105 Jirayr Sefilyan, Personal interview with author, Yerevan, Armenia, August17, 2011. 
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as Mussolini and similar dictators employed in controlling the system.106 Instead, the 
Armenian elites excel at using force.  
According to Arman Grigoryan and Armen Darbinian, after the Karabakh war, 
certain actors were rewarded with economic assets. This was not done through auctions as a 
normal way of privatizing certain assets; the state simply gave those rewards to people that 
had been connected to the war, that had to be rewarded.107 The resources for rewarding them 
were extremely scarce at the time (in mid 1990s). All those things introduced terribly 
unhealthy distortions in the economy and created economic exclusion for the rest of the 
society. Grigoryan emphasized that it was not the most meritorious economic actors that 
gained access to economic means but those that were connected to the war effort. This is how 
war affected centralization of assets into a few hands and increased economic exclusion.  
Paruyr Hayrikyan indicated that, if we characterize Armenia as militarized due to the 
activities of the Yerkrapah and several field commanders who later turned into corrupt and 
authoritarian politicians, he would substitute the term “state militarization” with the term 
“state criminalization.”108 To explain his reasoning, Hayrikyan opposed the example of Israel 
as a militarized state to the case of Armenia as an extremely authoritarian country or 
dictatorship. I argue, however, that authoritarianism turns into militarism, when the leaders of 
                                                 
106Benito Mussolini was an Italian politician, considered to be a central figure in the creation of fascism. 
Mussolini is said to have had major influence on Adolf Hitler, and was a close ally of Hitler’s during World 
War II. He led the National Fascist Party of Italy, ruling the country from 1922 to 1943. He was able to destroy 
all political opposition and transform the country into a one-party dictatorship. Mussolini was executed in 1945 
by Italian partisans.   
107Armen Darbinian was the 7th Prime Minister of post-independent Armenia in 1998-1999. An economics 
graduate from Moscow State University, he was appointed First Deputy Chairman of the Armenian Central 
Bank in 1994 and Minister of Finance in 1997. Since 2001, Darbinian has been the President of the Russian -
Armenian Slavonic University. In 2005, the World Economic Forum awarded him the title of Young Global 
Leader. Currently Darbinian is on board of several thinks tanks and research organizations. The interview with 
Darbinian was conducted in Yerevan, Armenia, September 3, 2011; 
Arman Grigoryan, personal interview with author, Ann Arbor, Michigan, March 24, 2010. 
108Paruyr Hayrikyan was one of the founders and most active leaders of the democratic movement in the Soviet 
Union. Since 1987, Hayrikyan established the Union for National Self-Determination (UNSD) party, which was 
the first openly operating democratic organization within the territory of the former USSR. During the Soviet 
rule, Mr. Hayrikyan spent 17 years in prisons, labor camps, and exile for his political activities and eventually 
was stripped of Soviet citizenship and exiled to Ethiopia. In 1990, following pressure of a group of United 
States senators led by Bob Dole, Mikhail Gorbachev restored Hayrikyan’s citizenship and allowed him to return 
to Armenia. Since then Hayrikyan has taken an active part in Armenian political life. He was twice elected into 
the Armenian National Assembly, ran for presidency, and served as a human rights ombudsman. The interview 
with Hayrikyan was conducted in Yerevan, Armenia, August 8, 2011. 
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an authoritarian state, who have fought in a war of critical significance for the country’s 
security, use their authority, military networks, weaponry, and above all the armed forces to 
control internal politics. Then the country becomes militarized, as it happened with the 
Armenian state.109 
It is indisputable that the Karabakh war, although won by Armenians, had a 
tremendously adverse impact on the Armenian people’s lives. Besides creating poverty and 
deprivation, the war produced a generation of a new type of military class – the army of field 
commanders of war – who after the war became the Armenian state elites and political 
leaders. During their service in the Armenian government, those politicians had a tendency of 
exploiting their military networks and authority gained during war, as well as power to use 
armed forces for local politics, specifically during times of elections. It can be said that the 
victory in war and its political circumstances shaped a militarized state.  
The summary of Karabakh war and negotiations for peace after war, examination of 
President Ter-Petrossian’s resignation in 1998, the analysis of the 2001 Parliament shooting, 
and 2008 post-electoral violence in Armenia show that the fate of political regimes in 
democratizing and changing states ultimately rests with people who bear arms.  As Zoltan 
Barany (2011) argues, the military is the most important state institution in transitioning 
states because democracy cannot be consolidated if military elites do not support democracy. 
“No institution matters more to a state’s survival than its military, and no revolution within a 
state can succeed without the support or at least the acquiescence of its armed forces” 
(Barany 2011:28). This is true particularly for the post-communist regimes. Therefore, 
examining politics and political exclusion in post-Soviet Armenia will be problematic if 
military-related people and their activities are extracted from politics.  
7.2 The Karabakh Conflict: Origins, Dynamics, and Perceptions 
 
7.2.1. Pre-Soviet Historical context of the Karabakh conflict 
Karabakh is a landlocked region in the South Caucasus with a population of 140,000.  
The total size of Karabakh is 4,800 square kilometers and it is only 1.5 times bigger than the 
                                                 
109 Since these individuals have fought in the war, whether with or without military training, military education 
or occupation, they become soldiers. They are not simply civilian leaders any more.  
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state of Rhode Island (Croissant, 1998:10). It is separated by 3.726 miles from the south-
eastern border of Armenia. Armenians have lived in the Karabakh region since Roman times. 
In the early Middle Ages the native Albanian population of upper (mountainous) Karabakh 
merged into the Armenian population, and after 1300, Islamic Turks moved into the steppes 
of lower Karabakh (Ruthland 1994:841).  
This tiny territory has a symbolic importance for both Armenians and Azeris. 
Although Karabakh has been under the reign of Muslim invaders for centuries, it has 
managed to maintain its remarkable Christian cultural heritage.110Karabakh symbolizes 
freedom and independence for Armenians (Hunter, 1994:97).  For Azeris, Karabakh became 
culturally and nationalistically significant in the 19th century. It occupied a special place in 
the Azerbaijani national consciousness (ibid). Nowadays, Armenians reject Azerbaijan's 
authority and control over Karabakh. Both peoples accept this region as an essential 
historical site intrinsic of ethno-cultural identity. Whereas the Karabakh conflict has an old 
history, it resurfaced at the end of 1980s, turning into the Karabakh war in 1991. Since the 
end of the Karabakh war in 1994, Karabakh is a de facto independent state, governed by the 
Nagorno-Karabakh Republic. 
There is ample coverage of the Karabakh conflict focusing on its historical, territorial, 
demographic, ethno-religious, socio-economic and political dimensions.111 Whereas most of 
the literature focuses on the sudden explosion of the conflict, it should be noted that there 
was very little that could be considered sudden about this conflict.112 Saparov (2012), for 
example, contends that while the Western literature addresses the Karabakh conflict based on 
the events of the post-Stalinist period, there is a need to venture as far back as the period of 
civil war of 1918-1921. He argues that vast amount of literature ignores the examination of 
Bolsheviks decision to grant autonomous status to Nagorno-Karabakh. Therefore, "it has 
                                                 
110 The genesis of the Karabakh conflict has decades of history. For a very detailed chronology of events 
referring to the history of autonomous region of Mountainous (Nagorno-) Karabakh, see Libaridian's (1988) The 
Karabagh File: Documents and Facts on the Region of Mountainous Karabagh 1918-1988 (pages 145-
154).Libarid ian presents documents and facts on the topic beginning with the 7th century A.D. 
111 The list of authors on the Karabakh conflict is exhaustive. For most popular and serious examinations of the 
Karabakh conflict, please see (Hovannisian 1997; Yamskov 1991, 1992; Altstadt 1992; Hunter 1993; Suny 
1996, 1999-2000; MacFarlane, & Minear 1997;Laitin and Suny 1999; Libaridian 1999 & 2004; Mooradian & 
Druckman 1999; Cornell 2001; Papazian 2001; De Waal 2003).  
112 Acknowledging that the origins of the conflict date back to the pre-Sovietization of the region, I primarily 
concentrate on its history and roots after the Sovietization of the region.   
 155 
 
become almost a cliche´ to blame the creation of the ethnic Armenian autonomy within 
Azerbaijan on Stalin, who by doing this created leverage against both republics" (Saparov 
2012:282).  
Whereas the historical battle of Armenians of Karabakh against Muslim invaders and 
the struggle for national liberation has an older history, the genuine roots of the Karabakh 
conflict may be traced back to the collapse of the Russian Empire and the fragmentation of 
the South Caucasus (Saparov 2012). The conflict complicated further with the application of 
Leninist nationality policy and Stalin's "principle of divide-and-rule" (which is also called 
"combine-and-rule") in the Transcaucasus region inthe beginning of the 20th century 
(Croissant 1998:19).113 As a result of strategic and economic calculations of Soviet 
authorities, this policy contained several anomalies, one of which was the attachment of 
Nagorno-Karabakh as an autonomous region to Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan by Joseph 
Stalin in 1921.114 
Karabakh was conquered by Arabs in the 7th century, invaded by Seljuk Turks in the 
11th century and overtaken by Mongols from the 13-15th centuries. The Mongol rule of the 
region was terminated in the 16th century, when the Ottoman Turks conquered the region. 
Early in the 16th century, Armenians initiated tentative ineffective steps towards liberation. 
In 1639, the Armenian Plateau was divided between Ottoman Turkey and Safavid Persia. 
Persia andthe Ottoman Empire agreed to cede Karabakh to the Khanate of Ganja, a tributary 
of Persia (Libaridian 1988:145-146). It was during this period when Armenians were granted 
greater privileges by Persian rulers. Karabakh was the only Armenian-populated territory that 
                                                 
113 The ultimate goal of the Soviet nationality policies was to maintain a multi-ethnic Soviet empire. Soviet 
nationality policies were characterized by three key objectives: (1) nation-building through institutionalization 
of territorialized ethno-cultural identity, (2) homogenization through Russification, and (3) nation-destroying 
through demographic manipulations and carving of territorial-administrative units cutting across ethno-cultural 
lines (Harutyunyan 2010:135). These policies fundamentally defined inter-ethnic relations in the Soviet region. 
Even after the breakup of the USSR, the legacy of Soviet nationality policies, continues to affect the ethno-
territorial tensions in post-Soviet republics. The case of the Karabakh conflict is a good example. 
114"The great irony of Soviet nationality policy was that a program that was intended to eradicate nationalism, 
eventually meld all these ethnicities into a single "Soviet people," and reduce the political salience of 
nationlaity, in fact embedded ethnicity into politics, granting advantag es to some and disabilities to others" 
(Laitin and Suny, 1999:149). The USSR, in this way, became a ‘prison house of nations', with inherently 
inequitable political relations between the center and the republics. There were inequalities also within the 
republics, which increasingly became intolerable. At the end of 1980s, the anomalies of the Leninist -Stalinist 
nationality policy have grown into nationalist activities as soon as the Soviet Republics attained the opportunity 
of self-development (Suny 1993b).  
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was independent while the rest of Armenia was under the Iranian rule in pre-Soviet era. In 
1603, Shah Abbas the Great of Persia allowed local Armenian rule in Karabakh under five 
meliks.115 These five kinglets later joined – but not supplanted – by a Muslim khanate, 
survived until the Russian conquest of Karabakh (ibid). With Russian Empire's annexation of 
the region in 1805, Armenian meliks of Karabakh lost their autonomy and power that was 
granted to them by the Persian Shah (Bournatian, 2002). In 1813, Persia and Russia signed 
the Treaty of Gulistan, as a result of which Karabakh as well as most of the territories of 
Azerbaijan were ceded to Tsarist Russia (Libaridian 1988:146).  
Until 1905 there were no reports of Armeno-Tatar mass clashes. Since 1880s, Russian 
"fondness" of Armenians had begun to decrease116 and the new Russian policy of seeking to 
avoid conflict with the Ottoman Empire favored the Tatars of Transcaucasia as opposed to 
the Armenians.117 The anti-Armenian policy, particularly the confiscation of the property of 
the Armenian Church and the closing of Armenian schools, provoked Armenian anger and 
uprisings. In the period of 1905-1907, clashes between Armenians and Tatars or "Azeris" 
broke out throughout Transcaucasia, Karabakh being one of the bloodiestscenes of fighting. 
Tsarist authorities did not intervene in order to curb Armenian activism, and Armenians were 
massacred in areas where Tatars outnumbered Armenians (Libaridian 1988:146).      
Following the Russian Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, the situation in Transcaucasia 
was further complicated by the involvement of several great powers – the Ottoman Empire, 
Great Britain, Soviet Russia and Kemalist Turkey. These powers pursued their own goals in 
the region; however, they did not always possess sufficient power to impose their will in an 
unconditional manner. Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan accordingly cooperated with this or 
the other major actor in order to advance their own goals and territorial claims (Saparov 
2010). In March of 1918 Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia formed the Transcaucasian 
Confederation as an independent multiethnic republic. The Confederation dissolved in May 
of the same year due to conflicting interests. The Republic of Georgia declared its 
                                                 
115The word "melik" in Arabic means "ruler." In this case, the title "melik" de facto referred to the equivalent of 
princes or local overlords, leftovers from the medieval Armenian feudal system.  
116 One of the reasons for this was the dismissal of the liberal Chief Minister Lorris -Melikov after the 
assassination of Tsar Alexander II in 1881. 
117 Azeris were generally referred to as Tatars or Tartars in Czarist Russia.  
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independence on May 26, 1918. The Republic of Azerbaijan declared independence on May 
27, 1918. Despite Armenian fears of Ottoman Turkey's eastward expansion, Armenia 
declared its independence on May 28, 1918.118 The Armenian fear of Ottoman Turkey 
became real, when the Ottoman Turkish army invaded most of the Eastern Armenian 
territories. On June 4, 1918, the Turko-Armenian Treaty of Batum was signed, as a result of 
which Armenia was compelled to cede large territories to Turkey, Georgia, and Azerbaijan. 
Armenian territory decreased to 4,500 square miles. Karabakh then obtained the status of 
autonomous district under the protectorate of Azerbaijan (Saparov 2010).  
In September of 1918, Turks and Azerbaijanis launched systematic massacres of the 
Armenian population. 15,000 - 20,000 Armenians were killed (Walker 1980, Libaridian 
1988, Payaslian 2007). In October, Turkish massacres intensified in Karabakh (Libaridian 
1988). Armenians, initially resisting Turko-Tartar attackers, eventually surrendered 
(Harutunyan 2009). Armenian compliance was due to the intervention of the British High 
Commander of Caucasus, General Thomspon, who promised Armenians that the problem 
would be mediated in the Paris Peace Conference (Libaridian 1988). British intervention was 
then irresistable, because following the surrender of Central Powers after the World War I, 
the British Empire had emerged as the dominant player in the region.119 Despite British 
assurances and despite strong resistance by Armenians, the final decision was to leave 
Karabakh and Zangezur as autonomous regions within Azerbaijani jurisdiction.120  In August 
of 1919, Armenians were forced to accept Azerbaijani authority over Karabakh.  
After the British left the region failing to impose a settlement, Bolsheviks became the 
imperial arbiters in the Transcaucasus, as a result of which Armenia had to accept a 
“temporary” Bolshevik occupation of Karabakh, Zangezur, and Nakhijevan on August 10, 
                                                 
118 With this independence, the First Republic of Armenia was established. Armenia's first statehood lasted very 
short, only two years, before Armenia became a Soviet Socialist Republic in 1920.  
119The Central Powers were one of the two warring factions in World War I (1914-1918), composed of the 
German Empire, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Ottoman Empire, and the Kingdom of Bulgaria.  
120 Armenia and Azerbaijan historically have had three disputed regions: Zangezur, Nakhijevan, and Karabakh. 
Zangezur and Nakhijevan had mixed populations. Karabakh, on the contrary, has always been predominantly 
and overwhelmingly Armenian populated. As a result of the Treaty of Kars in 1921 and the Soviet-Turkish 
Treaty in 1921, Nakhijevan – an exclave bordered by Armenia, Iran and a 6.21-mile (7-km) frontier with 
Turkey – was granted the status of an Autonomous Soviet Republic within Azerbaijan in 1924. Karabakh was 
made an Autonomous Oblast (region) of Azerbaijan in July 1923. Zangezur, which separates mainland 
Azerbaijan from Nakhijevan, was returned to the Armenian SSR (Harutyunyan 2009). 
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1920. The same day, the Treaty of Sevres was signed, according to which Turkey would 
recognize Armenia as a free and independent state. The Treaty of Sevres stipulated that the 
President of the United States, Woodrow Wilson, would determine the boundaries of the 
proposed Armenian state. Wilson designed a state which would include portions of Eastern 
Anatolia, or what Armenians call Western Armenia. Moreover, it was designed to include 
Nakhijevan, despite its predominantly Turkic population, as well as most of Karabakh's 
territory. According to the Treaty of Sevres, Turkey would renounce any claim to the ceded 
land (Hovannisian 1967; 1997; Walker 1980). However, “Wilsonian Armenia” was never 
realized, since neither European powers nor the United States had enough political will to 
commit to this task against the Ottoman Empire.121 
The Treaty of Sevres ignited a strong wave of Turkish nationalism. Turks, ensuring 
the support of Bolsheviks through a secret pact signed between the Grand National Assembly 
of Turkey and Soviet Russia in August 1920, attacked Armenians in the autumn of 1920.122 
To avoid the potential annihilation of Eastern Armenians, the government of the Republic of 
Armenia decided to relinquish power to the Bolsheviks. For the next seventy years, Armenia 
was a Soviet Socialist Republic.  
7.2.2. Karabakh conflict during the Soviet Period 
After Sovietization, the Bolshevik position in Azerbaijan was weak and in order to 
gain stronger control in Azerbaijan, Bolsheviks had to support Azerbaijani territorial claims. 
They supported Azerbaijani claims to the disputed regions of Karabakh, Zangezur and 
Nakhijevan until December 1920, when the Bolsheviks, trying to facilita te the Sovietization 
of Armenia, forced Azerbaijan to renounce its claim on the disputed territories (Saparov 
2012:320-321). But due to the slow reaction of the Armenian Bolsheviks, Armenians failed 
to use this opportunity to extend their rule to Karabakh (ibid). On December 3, 1920, 
Armenia signed another peace treaty, the Treaty of Alexandrapol, which obliged Armenia to 
renounce the Treaty of Sevres, surrender Western Armenian territories, the province of Kars 
in Eastern Armenia, and accept temporary Turkish jurisdiction over Nakhijevan 
                                                 
121 The Treaty of Sevres was annulled when the Turkish government and Entente Powers ratified the Treaty of 
Lausanne in 1923. 
122 The conflict between the First Republic of Armenia and the Turkish nationalists following the s igning of the 
Treaty of Sevres is often referred to as Turkish-Armenian War. 
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(Hovannisian 1967, 1997; Walker 1980).123 Four months later, the pendulum that initially 
favored Armenians, swung back again. In March, 1921, the "Treaty of Brotherhood and 
Friendship" between the Soviet Union and republican Turkey included a provision that both 
Nakhijevan and Karabakh were to be placed under the control of the Azerbaijani SSR 
(Cornell 1999:8). Azerbaijan, therefore, continued to remain in control of Karabakh (Saparov 
2012).124 
Bolshevik policy changed after the complete conquest of the South Caucasus. In May 
1921, Moscow was once again intending to grant Karabakh to Armenia, and on July 3, 1921, 
a decision was made by Stalin to assign Karabakh to Soviet Armenia. Two days later, on July 
5, 1921, Stalin and Kavburo once again reversed their decision, agreeing to Karabakh’s 
remaining in the Azerbaijani SSR (Cornell 1999; Saparov 2012). "To sweeten the pill for 
Armenians, Karabakh was to receive autonomy" (Saparov 2012:321). 
The placement of Karabakh in Azerbaijan altered the boundaries of Karabakh. 
Autonomous Karabakh was separated from Armenia by a six-mile swath of land, called the 
Lachin corridor.125 As a result of the Soviet authoritative decision, Lachin became part of the 
Republic of Azerbaijan, thus Armenia had no contiguous border with Karabakh (Laitin and 
Suny 1999).  Karabakh also became subservient to Azerbaijan. On July 7, 1923, a decision 
was made to give the region the status of an autonomous Oblast.  Nagorny Karabakh 
Autonomous Region (NKAO), which included the mountainous part of Karabakh, was 
created within Azerbaijan, with an overwhelming Armenian population of 94% of the total 
population. In 1924, NKAO was officially declared as a constituent part of the Azerbaija ni 
SSR. 
                                                 
123The Treaty of Alexandrapol was never ratified and was replaced by the Treaty of Kars in October, 1921. 
124It is considered that Stalin's decision was, one on hand, a concession to the newly -founded Turkish republic 
and its leader Kemal Atatürk, whom Stalin regarded as a potential ally at the time and who was hostile to a ny 
territorial arrangements favoring Soviet Armenia. On the other hand, given Stalin's tendency to divide the 
Caucasian people in order to control them easily, separation of the Armenian republic and Karabakh, was an 
element of his divide-and-rule policy (Cornell 1999).  
125 The fate of the Lachin corridor has become one of the significant issues during the OSCE Minks Groups' 
negotiations over the Karabakh peace settlement. More details on the territory of Lachin will be presented in the  
analysis of those negotiations.    
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The decision to assign Karabakh to Azerbaijan has been justified by the Soviets on 
the grounds of acknowledging Karabakh’s economic ties to Azerbaijan, and reportedly to 
please Turkey. Others also mention a justification referring to the necessity to create 
harmony and advancing peace between Muslims and Armenians for the “Sovietconstruction” 
(Altstadt 1992:117; Suny 1993). But as mentioned before, the attachment of Karabakh to 
Azerbaijan had anomalies that the Soviet authorities had ignored. Harutunyan (2009) mentions 
that NKAO was an anomalous arrangement within the Soviet ethno-territorial politics. “It 
was the only case in the USSR where a national group (i.e., Armenian ethnic group) was 
endowed with both a republic (i.e., Armenian SSR) and an autonomous region (i.e., NKAO) 
in another republic (i.e., Azerbaijani SSR). As a general rule commonly practiced in Soviet 
ethno-territorial federalism, only minority groups without a titular republic were given 
autonomous status either in a form of republic, region (oblast), or area (okrug)” (Harutunyan 
2009:134). Suny writes, it was “the only autonomous national region with a majority that was 
of the same ethnicity as a neighboring Soviet republic [Armenia] yet was not permitted to 
join that republic” (Suny 1993:194).126 De Waal (2003) has also indicated that the above-
mentioned 1921 arrangement made by Stalin turned the NKAO into one of the only two 
instances in the Soviet system of an autonomous province inside one republic that had a 
strong affiliation to another republic.127 
Since Stalin's above-mentioned decision in 1921, the Nagorno-Karabakh issue has 
been intensely disputed. Armenians viewed the incorporation of the mainly Armenian 
populated region into Soviet Azerbaijan as unjust and never accepted the 1921 decision. 
They used every opportunity to challenge the status quo. Protests against it were made 
several times, first in 1945 and later after Stalin’s death in 1963, 1965 and 1977 (Libaridian 
1988; Fraser et al., 1990; Suny 1993; Hunter 1994; DeWaal 2003). Armenians have 
continuously and persistently requested the reunification of Karabakh with Armenia. The 
requests were sent to Moscow particularly during Krushchev’s “destalinization” era with 
                                                 
126 Another anomaly, albeit of a different type, is the Ossetian case. Ossetians were not granted with a titular 
republic, but were divided into two political units between two different titular republics: an 
AutonomousRepublic in Russia and an Autonomous Region in Georgia. Finally, another odd arrangement was 
the creation of Nakhijevan’s AutonomousRepublic within Azerbaijani SSR. As a result, Armenia is positioned 
in the middle of the mainland and the Nakhijevan exclave since 1924.   
127 The other instance, Russian-majority Crimea, though also unstable, has proved a less divisive case. 
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aims to revisit the status of Karabakh. The 'matrimony' of Karabakh with Azerbaijan has 
been a point of contention throughout the Cold War era. This 'matrimony' could not last long 
due to several differences between the two ethnic groups, and grievances began to emerge in 
1988 with the epoch of perestroika (restructuring) in the USSR.128 
7.2.3. The Karabakh Movement and the Post-Soviet Dynamics of the Conflict 
Before proceeding to the analysis of the post-Soviet context of the conflict, it is 
important to present a brief description of the causes of the conflict, highlighting those that 
were prevalent during the Soviet period. The history of the Karbakh conflict demonstrates 
that it has passed through different stages, and was exacerbated by territorial, economic, 
linguistic, and national-cultural causes. The most significant source of the Karabakh conflict 
revolves around territorial demands, as well as state-administrative affiliation of Karabakh.  
The economic roots of the conflict are believed to be reflected by the real and 
perceived differences of living standards and socio-economic conditions of Armenian and 
Azeri populations residing in Nagorno-Karabakh, as well as in Armenia and Azerbaijan 
respectively (Yamskov 1991:640; Yamskov 1992:134). According to Yamskov, the most 
fundamental economic cause underlying the conflict was the "significant lag in the standard 
of living or quality of life in Azerbaijan relative to that in Armenia" coupled with the fact that 
the population of Nagorno-Karabakh "enjoy[ed] a level of social and economic development 
that is somewhat higher than that of the general population of Azerbaijan" (Yamskov 
1991:640).Nonetheless, the Armenians in Karabakh, aware that life in Armenia is even 
better, felt "dissatisfied with the deliberate policies of the Azerbaijani government, which 
controlled the economy ... of their oblast." Meanwhile, the Azbaijani government, concluding 
that the quality of life was better in Karabakh than in other backward regions of Azerbaijan, 
directed funds received from businesses in Karabakh to the development of other poorer 
regions of Azerbaijan (Yamskov 1991). 
                                                 
128Soviet nationality policies contributed to the institutionalization of ethnic identities both in Armenia and 
Azerbaijan. Both republics also developed a strong sense of territorial ownership and entitlements over 
Karabakh. Armenians in Armenia and Karabakh never settled for Soviet colonial cartography. Azeris, on the 
other hand, strongly believe Karabakh was an integral part of Azerbaijan since ancient times. (Harutyunyan 
2009:152).   
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Another significant cause was a national-cultural cause. According to Yamskov 
(1991) there is a clear difference in the perception of modern urban culture and lifestyle 
priorities by the two peoples. Whereas Armenians along with Georgians are considered to be 
the most "Europeanized" in the Transcaucasus region, the Azeris are the least (Yamskov 
1991:657). In terms of values and behavioral stereotypes, modem Armenians and Azeris 
differ significantly. The education level of Soviet Armenian population was also much 
higher. They had better knowledge of the Russian language, which provided them with 
greater mobility (Yamskov 1991:647; Yamskov 1992:135). 
Besides cultural and educational differences, the linguistic issue was of major concern 
to the Armenians in Soviet Azerbaijan. The use of the Armenian language was allowed in 
Soviet Azerbaijan, however education in the Armenian language was not available. 
Moreover, Armenian mass media, particularly TV channels were limited. Armenian history 
was excluded from the school curriculum (Yamskov 1991:643; Kaufman 2001:58).  
Surprisingly, religion and struggle for faith has not been a significant factor in 
aggravating the Karabakh conflict.129 Although an overwhelming majority of Armenians are 
Christian, and Azeris are Muslim, slogans of religious intolerance have rarely been advocated 
by either ethnic group during the conflict.  Moreover, Muslim Kurds continue to live 
undisturbed in Armenia after the expulsion of the Muslim Azeris during the Karabakh war, 
and Christian Udins remain in Azerbaijan (Yamskov 1991)130.  
An alarming issue for Armenians was also the ethnographic shift in population of 
Nagorno-Karabakh. “The size and share of Armenians in the total population decreased from 
124,100 persons (96%) to 123,000 persons (76%) between 1921 and 1979, while the 
Azerbaijani population at the same period increased from 7,400 persons (6%) to 37,000 
persons (23%)” (Yamskov 1992:135). One of the reasons for this ethnographic shift was due 
to qualitative differences of the two ethnic groups; Azerbaijanis were mostly peasants, while 
                                                 
129 The international media often made statements about the Karabakh conflict stressing that it is  a conflict 
being between ‘Christian Armenia and Muslim Azerbaijan’. This is a false characterization, because, as was 
already illustrated briefly in this dissertation, the roots of the conflict are far more complex. 
130The Udins are a small ethnic and linguistic group with Armenian names that belong to the Armenian 
Gregorian faith. 
 
 163 
 
Armenians were more urban (Fraser et al. 1990:655). Another reason was due to central 
government policies. In any case, if the tendency of decreasing Armenian population would 
continue, the overwhelming Armenian predominance in Nagorno-Karabakh would swiftly 
disappear. With an insignificant percentage of Armenian population, Karabakh Armenians' 
grounds for uniting with Armenian SSR would diminish as well.    
Given all those differences between the two peoples and the strong belief held by 
both sides that Karabakh belongs to them, the Karabakh issue needed a trigger to resurface. 
Glasnost and perestroika ("liberalization/openness" and "restructuring")advocated by 
Mikhail Gorbachev in the late 1980s became a window of opportunity for Armenians to once 
again address the “territorial ‘injustice’ imposed by Stalin” and claim their demands for 
Karabakh’s reunification with Armenia (Croissant 1998:26). It was safer to express demands 
in the new, more open atmosphere of a weakening Soviet Union. In August of 1987, a 
petition for annexation of Karabakh to be annexed to Armenia was signed by 100.000 
Armenians. Other sources mention 75,000-400,000 (Libaridian 1988:152).  
On February 20, 1988, the Nagorno-KarabakhSoviet voted to request the Soviet 
government to allow Karabakh to leave Soviet Azerbaijan and become part of Soviet 
Armenia (Libaridian 1999:5; MacFarlane & Minear 1997:13). Karabakh’s request to be 
united with Armenia was supported in Armenia. Most importantly, the Armenian intellectual 
elite played a central role in appealing to Moscow to unite Karabakh with Armenia 
(Kaufman, 2001:61). Despite Gorbachev's negative stance towards Soviet policy of 
nationalities and his campaign for free development of national cultures, the Politburo 
decided not to return Karabakh to Armenia.  A movement started with a chain of 
demonstrations and massive rallies in Armenia. “Unusual in their character and sheer 
volume, these demonstrations received worldwide attention. They were, in fact, the first such 
movement by a people in what was then the Soviet bloc” (Libaridian 1999:6). Among all of 
the Soviet republics, Armenia was the first to see the emergence of the first and most 
widespread mass movement for democratization (Ruthland 1994:839). The events that 
followed these mass rallies are characterized by Gerard Libaridian (1999) as a “political 
earthquake” (p. 5).  
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The Soviet leadership was not then ready to deal with separate demands of the USSR 
republics, and it was taken aback by the audacious demand of Armenians. Meanwhile, 
Azerbaijan was outraged. Within hours, violence between the two ethnic groups began both 
in Armenia and Azerbaijan. “In the wake of the February 1988 demonstrations, Armenian 
and Azeri residents engaged in communal violence, characterized by individual attacks 
‘mainly at night, aimed at destroying livestock and harassing people’” (Human Rights 
Watch, 1994:3). Violent clashes occurred in the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh, namely the 
Azeri town of Aghdam and the Armenian town of Askeran (Kaufman 2001:63; Nadein-
Raevski 1992:120).  
On February 27-28 of 1988, Azeris launched deadly violence against the Armenian 
population of the Azeri industrial city of Sumgait, a city north of Baku (Nadein-Raevski 
1992:120). Soviet authorities did not prevent the Azeri pogroms. Dozens of Armenians were 
killed.131 "The tragic events of Sumgait instantaneously evoked existential concerns and fears 
among many Armenians who drew parallels between Sumgait and the 1915 Genocide" 
(Harutyunyan 1999:156). Following Sumgait, there were killings of Azeris in some villages 
and towns of Armenia. 
The events of 1988 can be considered the first serious nationalist clash in the late 
Soviet era, and the Karabakh conflict the “most predominant” of all of the Soviet disputes.  
“More than any others in Yugoslavia or the Soviet Union, the conflict was all but inevitable 
because its causes lay in the 'deep structure' of the relationship between its two parties in late 
Communist times. Four elements – divergent national narratives, a disputed territorial 
boundary, an unstable security arrangement and lack of dialogue between the two parties – 
had made fissures that would break Armenia and Azerbaijan apart, as soon as trouble began. 
Yet because the problem was both so new and so profound, no mechanism was found – or 
has yet been found – to repair the damage” (De Waal 2005:12).132 
                                                 
131Tass reported 31 people dead (Libaridian 1988:154). Other mass media sources estimated the number of 
murdered Armenians up to 53. 
132 As the history of Karabakh conflict demonstrates, the breakup of the conflict was neither new nor 
unexpected. However, most of the western literature considers the problem as new and unpredictable.  
 165 
 
The Armenian dispute was an unprecedented move in the Soviet hierarchical political 
atmosphere; Soviet authorities were startled by the Armenian challenge. The Soviet 
authorities' inability to deal with the movement amplified the latter's inspiration, strength and 
volume. Massive in volume, the Karabakh movement had an extraordinarily non-violent and 
peaceful character. The movement of Karabakh very quickly became the most essential 
political issue for the Armenians over the globe. Diaspora Armenians joined their brethren in 
Armenia and Karabakh by organizing demonstrations across the world requesting Soviet 
authorities to redress the historical injustice.  
In Karabakh, the movement was called Krunk ("Crane") and led by Robert 
Kocharyan. Krunk’s main interest and concentration was Karabakh’s unification with 
Armenia. In Armenia, the movement was called the Karabakh movement. It was led by the 
“Karabakh Committee”, consisting of mainly popular Soviet Armenian intellectuals, such as 
Zori Balayan (a journalist) and Silva Kaputikyan (a poetess), whose main agenda was 
similarly the unification of Karabakh with Armenia. Late in 1988, the “Karabakh 
Committee” underwent ideological restructuring and replacement. The original group was 
replaced by new, less well-known members: Levon Ter-Petrossian (a philologist and 
historian); Vazgen Manukyan and Babken Ararktsyan (professors of mathematics at the 
Yerevan State University); David Vardanyan (a biologist); Ashot Manucharyan (a teacher and 
vice-principal of a high-school as well as a Communist Party Youth activist); Raphael 
Ghazaryan (a physicist); Hambartsum Galstyan (an ethnologist, who before his assassination 
in 1994 had become the Mayor of Yerevan); Vano Siradeghyan (a writer); Samvel Gevorg-
yan (a journalist); Alexan Hakobian (a historian); and Samson Ghazaryan (a history teacher). 
The reformed committee did not have a single leader. The agenda of this reformed Karabakh 
Committee was not merely the Karabakh issue, but also, and more importantly, democratic 
reforms and independence of Armenia133.  
                                                 
133 The Karabakh Committee had a strong democratic structure, where ideas not only were a result of common 
deliberation but also required an approval of all members. It was due to this democratic nature that the 
Committee was able to appeal to tens of thousands of people to demonstrate peacefully from 1988 to 1990 in 
Armenia. Leaders and people were in a continuous exchange of ideas; in this participatory democracy, public  
deliberation was an essential component for resolving issues. Popular opinions and suggestions were vital in the 
Karabakh Committe's tactics. One of the illustrative examples was the decision to open a “table of sug gestions”, 
where people could submit their ideas for future actions. Several observers  from the Baltic States and other 
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In December of 1988, a notorious earthquake devastated Armenia, resulting with 
more than 25,000 deaths, thousands of homeless and a complete destruction of industry and 
production. Soviet authorities, taking advantage of the disaster and chaos in Armenia, 
managed to arrest Karabakh Committee members. Those members were shortly released 
under international pressure, and in 1989, the Karabakh Committee institutionalized its 
activities under the name of Armenian National Movement (ANM).134 
The inter-ethnic fight between Armenians and Azeris soon worsened. By the end of 
1989, most Armenians residing in Azerbaijan and Azeris residing in Armenia had fled their 
homes in Armenia and Azerbaijan respectively. “Armenians were expelled en masse from 
Azerbaijan and vice versa” (MacFarlane & Minear 1997:14). The situation was so dramatic, 
that in January of 1989, Soviet authorities decided to take control of the region by deploying 
their Interior Ministry and army troops. In September, Azerbaijani Popular Front (APF) 
leaders initiated a railway blockade against Armenia and Karabakh, successfully 
degenerating Armenia’s economy.135 
In January 1990, Azeris waged another slaughter of Armenians in the capital city of 
Azerbaijan. The attacks towards Armenians continued for three days, and local police or 
Soviet troops did not intervene. Similar to Sumgait's violence, killings of defenseless 
Armenians in Baku were considered by Armenians to be a “new act of genocide against the 
Armenian people, planned and organized by the Azerbaijani state and party leaders” 
(Nadein-Raevski 1992:120). After about a week of violence, Russian authorities declared a 
state of emergency. Soviet troops finally entered Baku on January 19th in order to stop the 
violence. It is argued that the real objective of the Soviet authorities was not to prevent Azeri 
violence against Armenians. Instead, they intended to punish Azeris, who passed a law on 
sovereignty in September of 1989, for their anti-Soviet actions.136 Violent clashes started 
                                                                                                                                                       
Soviet republics admired the non-violent, constitutional, democratic nature of these demonstrations led by the 
Karabakh Committee and were hoping that this method of social movement would set a precedent in other 
Soviet republics (Harutyunyan, 1999:155). 
134 Armenian National Movement (ANM) is the English translation of the movement's name. In Armenian, the 
name of the movement is Hayoc Hamazgayin Sharzhum (HHSh) – ՀայոցՀամազգայինՇարժում. 
135 85% of cargo and goods arrived to Armenia by means of railway.  
136Soviet authorities similarly crashed protesters in Tbilisi, Georgia, 1990, where hundreds of people were killed. 
They also intended to curb Armenian disobedience since February 1988. With a pretext to 'restore order' in 
Armenia, Soviet troops were deployed to Armenia in July and later in November, 1988. Thousands of Armenian 
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between the Russian troops and Azerbaijani fighters; about 130 people were killed.137January 
19, 1990 is known in Azerbaijan as “Black January”. Soviet's ruthless punishment of Azeri 
masses completely destructed Azeri public's trust towards the Soviet regime and made 
relations between Moscow and Azerbaijan very tense (De Waal 2003).  
Meanwhile, the movement for Karabakh in Armenia had transformed into a 
movement for independence. Armenia started its transition to statehood, as the Communist 
Party of Armenia relatively peacefully surrendered power to the Armenian National 
Movement. By the summer of 1990, ANM was elected to the Supreme Soviet of Armenia. In 
July 1990, Levon Ter-Petrossian became elected President of Armenia’s Supreme Soviet. 
Despite many efforts, the Soviet government was unable to oppose Armenia’s independence, 
and on September 21 of 1991, Armenia enthusiastically declared its independence. In 
October 1991, Levon Ter-Petrossian was elected as the first executive-style President of 
independent Armenia. On September 2 of 1991, Karabakh had announced its secession from 
Azerbaijan and, therefore, its independence. Azerbaijan nullified Karabakh’s autonomous 
status and declared direct rule on November 26, 1991. On December 10, 1991, Karabakh 
chose independence through a referendum. Karabakh officially declared independence on 
January 6, 1992, although this independence remains unrecognized by the international 
community, including Armenia. President Ter-Petrossian refrained from recognizing 
Karabakh's declaration of independence, arguing that "a permanent and durable solution 
would require reaching a solution through negotiations based necessarily on compromises on 
both sides, that Armenia's recognition of Karabakh's independence would foreclose all 
negotiations and the problem would remain unresolved" (Libaridian 1999:30).  Karabakh 
leaders, nonetheless, insist that statehood is conferred by history and not by international 
resolutions (de Waal 2013:256). 
                                                                                                                                                       
protesters gathered at Yerevan's International Zvartnots Airport to block the entrance of the Soviet troops in 
July. As a result of provocations, a clash occurred between the Soviet troops and the demonstrators at the airport 
on July 5. The security forces opened fire killing one person and injuring several people (Galstyan 2002).  
137 Some sources mention the number of killed Azeris up to 200.  
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7.3 The Karabakh War, Social Change, and Peace Mediation 
 
7.3.1. The War (1991-1994) 
What had started as a peaceful political upheaval quickly transformed into ethnic 
violence. "A local political conflict quickly turned brutal and was soon militarized, 
nationalized, regionalized, and internationalized" (Libaridian 1999:92). By early 1992, with 
the breakup of the Soviet Union and the withdrawal of the formerly Soviet forces, the 
Karabakh movement increasingly escalated into an undeclared, full- fledged war between 
Armenia and Azerbaijan. In February 1992, Armenians had already conquered and evicted 
the populations of Azeri villages Malybeili, Karadagly, and Agdaban (Cornell 1999:31). On 
27 February, Armenian forces seized the small but strategically important town of Khojaly 
(Khojalu), on the Agdam-Stepanakert road (Walker 1996:109).138 Khojaly was the second 
largest Azeri town in Karabakh, which had the only airport of the region. Khojaly was also 
important, as it served at the time as an artillery base, where Armenian and Russian units 
were kept. As a result of the capture of Khojaly, hundreds of Azeri civilians were mutilated 
and killed, and thousands were forced to flee their homes. "As is the case in most instances of 
ethnic cleansing, the atrocities carried out by the aggressor served a double purpose: to force 
the population to flee and never to come back, but also to intimidate other inhabitants of 
nearby villages to leave their homes, fearing similar actions." (Cornell 1999:32) Whereas 
Armenians tend to understate the number of Azeri deaths during the Khojaly atrocities, Azeri 
sources estimate the number of death to be over 600 (Pope 1992). Human Rights Watch has 
estimated the figure of killed to be between 200 and 1000.139 
In May 1992, Armenians captured the towns of Shushi/Shusha and Lachin, creating a 
corridor between Armenia and Karabakh.140 Before their conquest by Armenians, Shushi and 
Lachin, dominated by Azeri military presence, used to separate Karabakh from Armenia, 
making it difficult for Armenian supplies to reach Karabakh (Human Rights Watch, 1994:5; 
                                                 
138 For more details on the capture of Khojaly by Armenians, please see Hugh Pope, ”600 Azerbaijanis slain at 
Khojaly, investigator says”, in The Los Angeles Times, 12 June1992; Thomas Goltz, ”Armenian Soldiers 
Massacre Hundreds of Fleeing Families”, The Sunday Times, 1 March, 1992; Anatol Lieven, ”Corpses Litter 
Hills in Karabakh”, The Times, 2 March 1992; ”The Face of a Massacre”, Newsweek , 16 March 1992; 
”Massacre by Armenians”, The New York Times, 3 March 1992; The Age, (Melbourne), 6 March 1992.  
139 See Human Rights Watch/Helsinki, Azerbaijan: Seven Years of Conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, 1994. 
140 Shushi/Shusha was the last Azeri town in Karabakh.  
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Cornell 1999:33). The capture of Shushi and Lachin was militarily, politically and 
logistically of utmost importance for the future development of war; Armenians now could 
prevent any possibility by Azeris to open the road linking the region to Armenia, and 
Karabakh could now be integrated into Armenia.141 The Armenian control of Shushi and 
Lachin aggravated a crisis within political circles in Azerbaijan leading to government 
changes. The fall of Lachin was a severe blow to the Azerbaijani president Ayaz Mutalibov’s 
regime. The Khojaly events and the capture of Lachin generated Azeri public outrage leading 
to the dismissal of President Mutalibov. In June 1992, Abulfaz Elchibey became the 
president of Azerbaijan, and many political leaders representing the Azerbaijani Popular 
Front Party (APF) were elected into the Parliament.  
The capture of the above-mentioned Azeri territories by Armenians provoked the 
neighboring countries' condemnation towards Armenia. Mainly, neighboring Muslim 
countries such as Iran, Turkey and Chechnya tried to support Azerbaijan. Iran condemned 
Armenia, calling Armenians as aggressors. As a loyal neighbor and ally of Azerbaijan, 
Turkey defended the  Azerbaijani position. Turks also denounced the Armenian aggression. 
Turkey did not intervene militarily, such as providing troops, but it provided military aid to 
Azerbaijan. It has been documented that Chechens as well provided invaluable assistance to 
Azerbaijan, basically supplying Azeris with Chechen fighters in battles. Chechens later 
withdrew realizing that the Karabakh war is not around religion, but around territorial dispute 
and nationalism (Bodansky 2008).142 Another key mediator has been Russia. In1992, Russia 
issued a warning to Western nations, particularly, the United States, not to interfere with the 
conflict, highlighting that it would possibly turn into the third world war (Croissant 1998). 
In June 1992, Azeris recaptured Agdere/Mardakert, as well as the Shahumian region 
in the North of Karabakh (Cornell 1999:33). However, the Azeri counter-offensive was 
                                                 
141 Internationally, this integration is still not accepted. According to Cornell (1999), the refusal of Armenian 
representatives to even discuss renouncing the Lachin area in international negotiations implies the critical 
significance of the issue for the Armenian side.   
142 In an interview to Azeri ANS TV company, Chechen field commander Shamil Basayev (a militant Islamist 
and the leader of the Chechen rebel movement) stated that there were rare officers in the Azeri army, especially 
among the top leadership, who he could trust. Basayev also declared that "the Armenians were prepared bette r 
for the war". According to the commander, the fall of Shushi occurred due to the ineffective organization of the 
Azeri troops. Basayev added that he decided to withdraw from Karabakh his fighters due to the above -
mentioned reasons. (http://www.panarmenian.net, 2000). 
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short-lived. In February 1993, Armenians once again captured most of the Agdere/Mardakert 
region lost in June 1992. Together with Agdere/Mardakert, the eastern part of the Kelbajar 
region of the Azerbaijani republic was captured.143 In April 1993, Armenian forces initiated 
yet another major offensive, gaining control over Kelbajar province, with a mixed population 
of around 60,000 Azeris and Kurds (MacFarlane & Minear, 1997:17). The population of the 
province was forced to flee (Human Rights Watch 1994:9). The capture of Kelbajar was 
followed by the capture of Fizuli, another homogeneously Azeri area to the Southeast of 
Karabakh. Fizuli as well was cleansed from its Azeri population in a few days (Cornell 
1999:33).  
At this stage, a negative reaction of the larger international community was emerging. 
Even Russians, that typically used to be on Armenia's side, thought that Armenians had gone 
too far. The United Nations Security Council issued Resolution 822 that demanded 
withdrawal of forces from Kelbajar province (Cornell 1999; Tadevosyan 2010). Despite the 
international condemnation, Armenian forces, taking advantage of the internal political 
turmoil in Azerbaijan, gained control of Aghdam at the eastern border of Karabakh. The 
Armenian side continued its impressive military victories until an official cease-fire was 
signed on April 16, 1994. But as Druckman and Lyons point out, thiscease-fire between 
Armenia and Azerbaijan was a “backward-looking cease-fire”, because it stopped the 
immediate military action but failed to address the root causes of the hostilities (Druckman & 
Lyons, 2005:267).144 Before the cease-fire was announced, the UN Security Council issued 
two other Resolutions – Resolutions 853 and 884 – condemning the hostilities and the 
military actions. Similar to Resolution 822, these Resolutions did not affect the warring 
parties and failed to produce any positive results (UNSC 1993a; UNSC 1993b). Armenians 
managed to de facto alter "internationally recognized borders" by force. "In this sense, the 
Armenian campaign was a clear-cut success" (Cornell 1999:42).  
Many were surprised by the victory of Armenians in the Karabakh war. Armenia and 
Karabakh together had less military personnel and even less weaponry than Azerbaijan. 
                                                 
143 In fact, Kelbajar was outside Karabakh's territory.  
144 There will be more details about why this cease-fire is considered a "backward-looking cease-fire" in the 
following sections of the dissertation.  
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Azeris not only possessed more manpower and more arms, they were also economically in a 
better situation; yet Armenians turned out to be stronger with their comparatively fewer 
troops and less weaponry. One of the reasons for the Armenian success was due to the fact 
that Armenian state authorities, specifically the members of the Karabakh Committee, 
successfully managed to turn the issue of Karabakh into a matter of national pride and 
politics, into the rebirth of the Armenian state. Armenians, both volunteer fighters from 
Armenia and local residents fromKarabakh, were ready to fight and die for Karabakh. Andrei 
Sakharov claimed that “for Azerbaijan the issue of Karabakh is a matter of ambition, for the 
Armenians of Karabakh, it is a matter of life and death” (Chorbajian 2001:161). For the 
Armenians from Armenia it was a matter of national identity and the establishment of the 
Armenian state.  
7.3.2. Socio-Economic Consequences of the Karabakh War 
Armenia came out of the war with a military victory, taking control over Karabakh 
and the Lachin corridor connecting it to mainland Armenia. In the course of the war, 
Armenia also occupied seven Azeri districts (about 20% of Azeri territory) surrounding 
Karabakh145. But the Armenian victory put Armenia in an economically disadvantageous 
position. The country was paralyzed by refugee flows and energy crises. Isolations and war 
consequences devastated urban and industrial infrastructure. Between 1991 and 1994, the 
economy decreased 61% (Sarian 1996). By 1994, the GDP had fallen nearly 60% from its 
1989 level. The war in Karbakh had brought little material benefit to Armenia(Laitin and 
Suny 1999). 
The Nagorno-Karabakhwar was the most destructive ethnic conflict in terms of lives 
and property in the post-Soviet region. Nonetheless, it is 'less well-known' among other 
similar conflicts in the world. The effect of the conflict in terms of damage was huge; equal 
or “greater than [it was] in and around Kosovo” (Kazimirov 1999:93). Furman and Åsenius 
(1996) mention that the “Karabakh conflict, comparable to that in Yugoslavia in the scale of 
military action and the number of victims, has drawn much less attention from the world than 
it deserves" (p. 139). 
                                                 
145 Those seven districts are Kelbajar, Lachin, Kubatly, Zangelan, Jebrail, Fizuli, and Aghdam.  
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The Karabakh conflict resulted in an estimated 25,000-30,000 casualties and more 
than one million refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) on both sides (Human 
Rights Watch 1994:vii; MacFarlane & Minear, 1997:1). According to MacFarlane & 
Minear's (1997) estimates the war caused around 25,000 deaths and the uprooting of around 
1,250,000 -1,500,000 refugees and IDPs. "Approximate figures include 350,000–400,000 
refugees in Armenia; 600,000–650,000 IDPs and 200,000 refugees in Azerbaijan; and 15,000 
IDPs in Nagorno-Karabakh” (MacFarlane & Minear, 1997:20).  Laitin and Suny mention 
233,700 refugees along with 251,000IDPs (Laitin and Suny 1999:153). After the Sumgait 
and Baku pogroms alone about 300,000 Armenians left Azerbaijan (Libaridian 1999:7). In 
response to the anti-Armenian aggression in Sumgait and Baku, violence against Azeris 
broke out in Armenia, and as a result, around 160,000 mostly rural Azerbaijanis left their 
homes in Armenia (Kaufman 2001:67; Libaridian 1999:7). Azeri attacks against the 
Armenian population in early summer of 1992 created “40,000 Armenian IDPs who 
remained in Nagorno-Karabakh and refugees who fled to Armenia” (MacFarlane & Minear, 
1997:17). During the capture of Kelbajar in April 1993, hundreds of Azeris were forced to 
flee, thus producing a huge wave of refugees from the Azeri side (Human Rights Watch 
1994:9). The Armenian offensive in Agdam added approximately 50,000 to the IDP 
population, most of who settled in temporary camps in Azerbaijan (MacFarlane & Minear 
1997:18).  
Azerbaijan currently has 600,000-1,000,000 refugees, Armenia 400,000 refugees, and 
Nagorno-Karabakh 60,000 refugees (Tadevosyan 2010, IDMC 2010). Tadevosyan 
demonstrates the humanitarian challenges resulting from the war in Armenia, pointing that 
Armenia – a small country with less than 3 million people – was facing a real humanitarian 
issue as the refugee and IDP population in the need of assistance made up more than 10% of 
the population resident in Armenia (Tadevosyan 2010). Moreover, those refugees have not 
fully embedded in their new societies. Their socio-economic, as well as often the political 
inclusion, has frequently been neglected in both Armenia and Azerbaijan. The issue of 
refugees in both countries directly depends on the resolution of the conflict. 
The refugees and IDPs were faced with legal, cultural, political, and socio-economic 
problems, such as language barriers, limited employment opportunities, lack of 
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transportation, and other problems. The Armenian legal system, being still in an infantile 
developmental phase, left many refugees out of the legal framework. The refugees from 
Karabakh were chiefly excluded from the new Armenian citizenship law that basically did 
not give any rights to them (MacFarlane & Minear, 1997:40).146 Whereas Azerbaijan set up 
refugee camps, Armenia never did so. Therefore, a large number of refugees had to rent 
accommodations, live in converted shipping containers, or reside with relatives and friends in 
Armenia (IMDC, 2010:8). A major obstacle was that UNHCR was not allowed to build new 
homes for refugees and IDPs, defined under strict terms, as the Armenian government had 
prohibited constructing homes for refugees from Karabakh proper. Similar to the case of 
Armenian citizenship, people displaced from Karabakh could not be called refugees, "as that 
would imply the territory was considered part of Azerbaijan, or IDPs, as that meant it wasn’t" 
(Krikorian 2003). Instead, those people were referred to as Displaced Persons (DPs) (ibid). In 
these circumstances, many refugees, particularly the elderly, dreamed of returning to their 
former homes.  
Integrating into Armenian society became a huge challenge for many refugees. "They 
associate[d] their successful integration not with acquiring Armenian citizenship, but with 
getting jobs and permanent housing" (Sahakyan, 2003). According to Sahakyan, international 
surveys placed refugees in the ranks of the poorest in Armenian society (UNHCR, Sahakyan 
2003). 
In his interview Artur Sakunc, head of the “Helsinki Citizens' Assembly Vanadzor 
Office", touched upon two main challenges that the refugee population experienced: 
language barrier and cultural obstacles.147According to Sakunc, the refugees, first of all, 
experienced language discrimination, because living all their lives in Azerbaijan, they were 
                                                 
146 Refugees from Sumgait and Baku were not expected to go back to Azerbaijan (Baku and Sumgait are within 
Azerbaijan's territory, Baku being its capital city), but the same expectation did not apply to Karabakhi 
refugees. This ambivalence towards refugees  from Karabakh, on one hand, and refugees from Azerbaijani 
territories, on the other, has complicated the integration of refugees into the society in Armenia. By 2004, 
however, Armenia had naturalized about 65,000 refugees. This is considered to be one of the most successful 
voluntary naturalizations in the last decade (UNHCR 2004, para. 1, in Tadevosyan 2010). But at the same time, 
many refugees, like thousands of other citizens, emigrated from Armenia to find better lives abroad. The 
International Displaced Monitoring Center (IDMC) states that in 2006, there were around 8,400 displaced 
people left in Armenia (IDMC 2006, par. 1). 
147 Artur Sakunc, personal interview with author, Vanadzor, Armenia, June 2, 2011. 
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educated in Russian schools and spoke little or no Armenian.148 Being forced to adapt to 
living in Armenia was very difficult for refugees as Russian-speakers (Helton & Voronina, 
2000:89).  It was also problematic for refugees to adjust to life in urban parts of Armenia 
"due to their predominantly rural background (MacFarlane & Minear 1997:40).  
The director of the Sakharov Armenian Human Rights Centre, Levon Nersisyan, also 
divided the problems that impeded the successful integration of Armenian refugees into two 
groups – "socio-economic and cultural". The socio-economic problems included the 
provision of permanent housing for refugees, employment, and access to social welfare and 
health care. Among the cultural obstacles Nersisyan, similar to Sakunc, stressed the langua ge 
barrier, which further narrowed refugees' employment opportunities as they could not 
compete with the local population on the domestic labor. In this way, they were excluded 
from adequate employment opportunities, qualifying only for low-paying jobs (UNHCR, 
Sahakyan 2003). 
7.3.3. An Overview of the Conflict Negotiations 
Whereas several efforts were made from the early stages of the conflict to negotiate a 
peace agreement, no peace agreement has been achieved by either the two governments, or 
by the mediation of any other external force or great powers.149 Laitin and Suny (1999) 
summarize the failure of negotiation attempts as follows:  
                                                 
148 Armenia was the first among other post-Soviet republics to ratify the European Charter for Regional or 
Minority Languages in January 2002. This treaty was adopted in 1992 under the auspices of the Council of 
Europe to protect and promote historical regional and minority languages in Europe.  At the s ame time, 
Armenia is homogenous like no other nation among post-Soviet nations. More than 97% of the population is 
Armenian. This mono-ethnic feature of the Armenian people and the fact that Armenians, although fluent in 
Russian, chiefly speak Armenian put the Russian-speaking refugee population at unease in Armenia. 
149 The main stages of the Karabakh peace process were the following: 1991 - Zheleznovodsk (Russia) 
declaration; 1992 - Minsk Group launched; 1992 - Tehran declaration; 1992 - Villa Madama (Rome, Italy) talks 
commence; November 1992- April 1993 secret negotiations of Russia, Turkey, US, Armenia, Azerbaijan; 1994 
- Bishkek protocol signed; 1994 - Budapest summit declaration; 1995-1996: the Guluzade-Libaridian 
confidential talks;1996 - Lisbon summit statement; 1997 - Denver statement; 2001 - Key West summit; 2004 - 
Prague process begins; 2006 - Rambouillet round held; 2007 - Madrid principles submitted; 2008 - Meiendorf 
(Moscow) declaration; 2009 - L'Aquila (Italy) statement (Sanamyan 2009). For a discussion of the various 
stages of the negotiations for the years of 1994-2008, see Tatul Hakobyan's "Mediator's Play Down Prospects of 
Early Karabakh Settlement", the Armenian Reporter, November 22, 2008, online at www.reporter.am.Very 
little is written about a few of those negotiation stages, such as the secret negotiations of the group of five 
(1992-1993) and the Guluzade-Libarid ian confidential talks, but they were considered quite significant. No 
details have really been made public regarding the content of these negotiation stages . 
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"A close review of the negotiations convinces us that the break-down of these attempts stem 
not from intractable, irresolvable differences - nor even from fear on either side that the 
security of their populations would be threatened by a post-settlement regime - but rather 
from contingent political factors. At first, the situation on the ground was in such flux that the 
side having the military advantage was unwilling to make concessions. Then, when the 
military situation stabilized, the international community was divided and sent mixed 
messages to the combatants, making it difficult to structure a peace plan. Finally, once a 
cease-fire was put in place and the international community unified around common 
principles, its proposed solutions failed to balance the goals of territorial integrity and self-
determination in a way that all parties could accept." (Laitin and Suny 1999:157-158) 
The earliest effort of mediation was initiated by President Boris Yeltsin of Russia and 
Nursultan Nazarbaev of Kazakhstan in September of 1991 (Mooradian & Druckman 1999; 
MacFarlane & Minear, 1997).  Mooradian and Druckman mention that "the personal 
ambitions of these presidents, more than the fate of Nagorno-Karabakh motivated them to 
intervene in the conflict".After three months of mediation, these mediators gave up their 
efforts (Mooradian & Druckman 1999:710).  
The Yeltsin and Nazarbaev mediation attempt was soon followed by the Iranian 
mediation, which lasted from February to May, 1992. Iran's desire to maintain its historical 
relationship with both Armenia and Azerbaijan, to bolster its standing as a regional power, 
and to prevent Turkey from gaining regional dominance prompted Iran to intervene 
(Mooradian & Druckman 1999:710).  
In June, 1992, efforts at mediation by Russia and Iran were replaced by negotiations 
mediated by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE, CSCE at the 
time) (Dehdashti 1997:464; Libaridian 1999:29; Mooradian and Druckman 1999:710; Laitin 
and Suny 1999:158-159).150 OSCE involvement was justified by its status as a regional 
organization in which all parties to the dispute were members, as well as by its "competence 
to solve disputes and to prevent conflicts” (Freire, 2003:464).151 In March 1992, 
                                                 
150Both Armenia and Azerbaijan had joined the CSCE after gaining independence. 
151 France, Russia and the United States are permanent co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group (the OSCE Troika). 
The permanent members of the Group include the following participating states: Belarus, Germany, Italy, 
Sweden, Finland and Turkey, as well as Armenia and Azerbaijan and, on a rotating basis, the OSCE Troika 
(www.osce.org). As a multinational organization that does not have a direct interest in the region, OSCE might 
seem to have been an impartial mediator. Nonetheless, the individual member states of th e Minsk Group have 
their own national agendas and interests that may affect the objective process of negotiations. 
The United States has a direct economic interest in the oil reserves in the Caspian Sea. The US, thus, is 
considered to lean towards Azerbaijan, particularly since 2000. But there is literature that considers the US to be 
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OSCE/CSCE planned to organize a peace conference in Minsk, Belarus in order to find a 
peaceful solution to the problem of the status of the Karabakh. The conference did not take 
place, but the future political framework for peace negotiations is still called the Minsk 
Group peace process.  
In 1995, another channel of negotiations was set up between Armenia and Azerbaijan, 
with the special advisors of the Armenian and Azerbaijani presidents, Gerard Libaridian and 
Vafa Guluzade as the principal negotiators (Carley 1998; De Waal 2013). According to de 
Waal, Libaridian and Guluzade began to meet informally every month to work on the status 
question in particular and made substantial progress" (De Waal 2013:267). The Libaridian-
Guluzade negotiating track ended with the Lisbon Summit of 1996.  Since then, the Minsk 
Group has come up with several proposals, none of which could achieve a final peace 
settlement for the conflict because each side of the conflict has continuously insisted on 
incompatible conditions that the other would not accept. 
The Karabakh conflict refers to two competing principles of international law: the 
right of self-determination on one hand and the right of territorial integrity on the other 
(Hunter 1994:105). OSCE, as a mediator organization needs to respect both of those rights, 
which makes the resolution of the conflict more complicated. OSCE pledges to “refrain from 
making each other’s territory the object of military occupation or other direct or indirect 
measures of force in contravention of international law, or the object of acquisition by means 
of such measures or the threat of them” (OSCE 1975:5). At the same time, OSCE states: “By 
                                                                                                                                                       
pro-Armenian due to diaspora Armenian lobbying in the US. Cutler (1998), for instance, states that the US 
policy on Karabakh through much of the 1990s was dominated by politically well connected diaspora 
Armenians. The Freedom Support Act, a long-term program of economic assistance to the former Soviet Union 
(enacted in 1992 by the US), included a section - section 907(a) - which prohibited all US assistance to 
Azerbaijan due to its blockade of Armenia. The Congress defined Azerbaijan as the aggressor in the conflict, 
and legislation was passed penalizing Azerbaijan and Turkey for their bans on trade with Armenia (Cutler 
1998:136; Cornell 1999:99). 
France, which has historic ties with Armenia, supports the latter.  
Turkey is pro-Azeri (Freire, 2003:465-466). Turkey sides with Azerbaijan on the account of the two countries' 
ethno-linguistic and religious ties. It therefore militarily and diplomatically supported Azerbaijan and imposed 
an economic blockade on Armenia. 
Russia, as a major power in the region, sometimes leans towards Armenia, and other times towards Azerbaijan , 
depending on its agenda in the region respectively. Similar to the US, Russia's primary objective in mainta ining 
its presence in the Caucasian "Near Abroad" has been to obtain its share of the Caspian Sea oil proceeds. But 
there is more than just oil for Russia's interests in the region. It has also sought to maintain military dominance 
in the borders of its former Soviet republics, as it is essential to its security. Other economic incentives have 
also influenced Russia's activities, such as its control of the entire energy sector of Armenia.  
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virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, all peoples always 
have the right, in full freedom, to determine, when and as they wish, their internal and 
external political status, without external interference, and to pursue as they wish their 
political, economic, social and cultural development” (OSCE, 1975:7). It is extremely 
difficult to propose a solution that would equally satisfy both Armenians and Azeris, because 
in any type of resolution one of those rights should dominate.   
Another obstacle for the OSCE to achieve a peace settlement is that it has no military 
capabilities and functions, such as NATO does (Freire 2003:37). The OSCE’s efforts are 
based on unanimous consensus, which grants equal status to all participating states. 
Therefore, even if one of the participating states disagrees to a peacekeeping plan, no 
peacekeeping mission can be implemented (Freire 2003:22). 
7.3.4. "Package" versus "Step-by-Step" Approaches  
The issues related to Karabakh were divided into two categories. The first category 
was defined as the Karabakhconflict and referred to military-technical issues, such as ending 
blockades and the return of refugees and IDPs on both sides; measures to strengthen the 
cease-fire; the issue of hostages and prisoners of war. The second category referred to the 
status of Nagorno Karabakh and was known as the problem of Karabakh (Libaridian 
1999:55-56). Armenian political discourse has been strongly focused on two of the OSCE's 
several proposals, called "package approach" and "step-by-step approach", that deliberated 
both the Karabakhconflict and problem of Karabakh.152 The "step-by-step" approach 
envisaged first negotiating and implementing one category of issues, and later undertaking 
the second category of issues. It focused on eliminating the consequences of war in the first 
phase. The question of the status would be negotiated after the first phase. "Step-by-step" 
approach constituted the "land-for-peace" approach.153 The package proposal, on the 
contrary, constituted the "land-for-status" approach", which envisaged tackling issues of both 
                                                 
152 The "package/step-by-step approaches" are also known as the "package /step-by-step deals, proposals, 
solutions and formulas". The "step-by-step approach" is often referred to as the "phased approach". Throughout 
the chapter, I may use any and all of those terms. Other, less well-known proposals include the "Common State" 
and "Land Swap", also known as the "Goble plan".  
153 Libaridian mentions that certainly not all occupied territories would be returned to Azerbaijan based on the 
step-by-step solution (Libaridian 1999:56).  
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categories simultaneously (Libaridian 1999:56). In the package proposal, occupied territories 
have been considered to be "the most valuable bargaining chips to secure the status" 
preferred by Armenians as winners of the war (ibid).  
In 1997, the Minks Group offered three draft proposals to the parties (in May, July, 
and September), the two of which (in May and July) were basically package proposals.154 In 
May 1997, the main features of the framework that would serve as a basis for renewed 
negotiations, included:  
1. The withdrawal of Karabakh troops from occupied territories, including the Lachin 
corridor. 
2. The deployment of a peacekeeping force to patrol the buffer zone between the two 
armies, under a one-year renewable mandate. 
3. The leasing of the Lachin corridor by Azerbaijan to the OSCE, who in turn would lease it 
to Karabakh. 
4. The repatriation of Azeri displaced persons (DPs) in the occupied districts; 
5. An end to the blockade on Armenia and Karabakh (a commitment to which Turkey later 
subscribed as well).155 
6. Finally, the provision that Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity would be formerly preserved, 
but that Karabakh would be effectively self-governing, including a “national guard’ at the 
minimum necessary level. (Tavitian, 2000:15) 
Concerning the status of Karabakh, the July 1997 draft read as follows: "Nagorniy 
Karabakh is a state and territorial formation within the confines of Azerbaijan." (RFE/RL, 
February 2001). The May and July proposals, thus, sought to retain Azerbaijan’s territorial 
integrity. Karabakh, at the same time, would have virtual sovereignty over its domestic 
affairs. Armenia accepted the first two proposals with significant reservations as bases for 
                                                 
154 I will briefly demonstrate key points regarding the proposals of 1997. For a detailed summary of the three 
successive proposals, please see RFE/RL Caucasus Report of February 3, 2001, Volume 4, Number 8 
(http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1341889.html); Tavitian (2000); Laitin and Suny (1999); Zourabian 
(2006); Website of Conciliation Resources: Working for Peace at http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/nagorny-
karabakh/keytexts18.php; Website the Conflict of Nagorno-Karabagh at http://www.mountainous-
karabakh.org; Website of the OSCE, http://www.osce.org. 
155 When Armenia declared independence in 1991, Turkey was one of the first countries to recognize it. The 
border between the two countries was open until 1993, before Armenia occupied around 20% of the Azerbaijani 
territory. Turkey closed its border with Armenia in a show of support for Azerbaijan. Although there have been 
a few reconciliation efforts between the two countries, Normalization of relations and reconciliation has n ot 
been established, as Turkey sets a precondition of official abandonment of Armenia’s territorial claims about 
eastern Anatolia and Genocide recognition. Turkey also injects the Karabakh issue into the reconciliation 
process, which makes the normalization process even more complicated.  
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negotiations (Libaridian 1999). Azerbaijan accepted it, but “with such reservations that its 
acceptance amounted to a rejection” (ibid).  Karabakh rejected the two proposals outright. As 
Ter-Petrossian’s senior advisor Gerard Libaridian notes, after the rejection of the May and 
July drafts based on the "package approach", the President became certain that the "step-by-
step" approach, if coupled with the necessary security guarantees for the people of Karabakh, 
was the best approach (Libaridian 1999:57).  
The September 1997 proposal was based on the "step-by-step" rather than the 
"package" approach (RFE/RL, 2001). Based on the September draft of the proposal, the 
parties would address first consequences of the war and security issues, mentioned in the 
previous package deals. In the second phase of negotiations, political issues, such as 
Karabakh’s final legal-political status, and the issue of the Lachin land corridor would be 
negotiated or “just postponed for an indefinite period until confidence building would enable 
the possibility of reaching further agreement” (Zourabian 2006:259). As compared to the 
May and July drafts, the September draft contained more extensive security guarantees for 
Karabakh and, most significantly, did not define the future status of Karabakh. Instead, the 
three sides, "having put an end to the military aspect of the conflict, agree[d] to continue 
conducting negotiations in good faith ... to speedily attain an all-encompassing regulation of 
all other aspects of the conflict, including the political aspect, which include[d] defining the 
status of Nagorno-Karabakh and resolving the problem of Lachin, Shusha and Shaumian" 
(RFE/RL, 2001).  
The September 1997 draft proposal was accepted by Azerbaijan and Armenia as a 
basis for negotiations, with reservations by Armenia. Despite the evident advantage of the 
agreement, the Karabakh government together with some high-ranking officials in Armenia 
opposed the proposal.156Karabakh rejected it probabaly because it was based on the idea that 
Karabakh would remain within the boundaries of Azerbaijan. "Fearful that by giving up the 
occupied lands it would lose its leverage over the status question (despite the OSCE's 
granting of a veto over status to Karabakh), the Karabakh government came out once again 
                                                 
156 According to the "conventional wisdom", it was Ter-Petrossian's agreement to this plan that became the 
critical reason for his government members' antagonism towards Ter-Petrossian, resulting in the resignation.   
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for a “package” deal calling for resolution of both the status issue and the question of 
withdrawals simultanously" (Laitin 1999:164). 
After the failure of the negotiations in the summer and the autumn of 1997 to secure a 
comprehensive agreement, a new plan was proposed in December, 1997. The new plan 
chiefly corresponded to the previously proposed “package” agreement, with the following 
differences: 
 Gradual withdrawal of the armed forces in different phases to ensure that the full 
demilitarization of the region would not be abused by either side in a surprise attack;  
 The Lachin corridor would remain under the control of Nagorno-Karabakh armed forces;  
 Establishment of a joint commission between Armenia and Azerbaijan to resolve the final 
status of Nagorno-Karabakh and the remaining issues, such as the status of Lachin, 
Shushi and Shahumian.157 
Karabakh again rejected the proposal, justifying its rejection by the fact that the 
proposal left Karabakh's status and the question of the Lachin corridor connecting Karabakh 
with Armenia to the indefinite future. 
There have been other proposals drafted since 1997, but none of those proposals was 
able to bring the sides close to agreement on status by reconciling the needs of self-
determination with territorial integrity to the liking of all parties.158It is argued that the 
                                                 
157 Minsk Group Proposal at the website of Conciliation Resources; available at: http://www.cr.org/our-
work/accord/nagorny-karabakh/keytexts19.php  
158Since 1998, three major proposals have been discussed, those being the "Common State", the Key West, and 
the Prague Process (a series of negotiations that began in May, 2002). The "Common State", presented in 
November 1998, proposed a vaguely defined common state between Azerbaijan and Nagorny Karabakh, 
featuring more or less ‘horizontal’ relations between Azerbaijan and Karabakh (Jacoby 2005:32). Based  on the 
"common state" proposal, Karabakh would have received de facto independence within a loose confederation 
with Azerbaijan. Karabakh would have the internationally recognized status of a republic with its own 
constitution, armed forces, and power to veto any legislation passed by Azerbaijani authorities (RFE/RL, 
February 2001).  
The provisions of the proposal discussions in Key West, Florida in April 2001, are widely believed to grant  
Azerbaijan use of a land corridor across southern Armenia to link Azerbaijan with Nakhijevan. According to 
Volker Jacoby, who worked as Assistant to the Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairman -in-Office for 
the Nagorny Karabakh conflict 1998-99,  "in the course of the domestic debates launched only after the talks, 
Aliyev reported (and Kocharyan denied) that it [the "Goble Plan" or "Land Swap"] had involved Armenia 
surrendering access to a strip of its southern district of Meghri, offering Azerbaijan direct access to Nakhijevan, 
in return for accepting Armenian control over the Lachin corridor connecting Karabakh with Armenia" (Jacoby 
2005:32). The plan was named "Goble" after a former U.S. State Department specialist on the Caucasus, Paul 
Goble, who had written a paper in 1992, proposing the idea of a territorial exchange to resolve the Karabakh 
dispute.  
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summer and early fall of 1997 was the moment when two of the three sides came closest to a 
settlement of the Karabakh conflict, once Ter-Petrossian suggested the "step-by-step" 
approach as basis for negotiations (Laitin and Suny 1999:164; Libaridian 1999). Any other 
significant proposal that was close to a peace settlement has not been documented or 
available to the public after 1997. As Radio Free Europe reporter Liz Fuller observes, "in 
terms of the Karabakh peace process, the most fundamental change probably is that the 
Minsk Group has apparently given up its attempts to craft a proposal that would be 
acceptable to all three parties" (Fuller in RFE/RL, 2004). 
7.4 Post-War Militarization and Social Exclusion   
Strong disagreements around the above-discussed package and step-by-step 
approaches in Armenia escalated into Ter-Petrossian’s resignation on February 3, 1998. The 
following sections of the chapter will discuss how this divergence between the President and 
his opponents became the turning point for limited prospects of Armenia's security and 
economic development, as well as the beginning of a series of human and political rights 
serious violations of the Armenia people. Levon Ter-Petrossian's resignation, and his 
successor  presidents' reluctance of concessions for a peace agreement, coupled with their 
authoritarian tendencies, have created massive social, political and economic problems for 
the Armenian society. In order to better understand Ter-Petrossian’s resignation, we must 
consider the pre-resignation political developments, and most significantly, analyze the 
rationale of "package" versus "step-by-step" supporters in greater detail. 
7.4.1. Levon-Ter Petrossian’s Resignation 
In addition to coping with war, independent Armenia was facing immediate tasks, the 
most important ones of which were rebuilding its devastated economy and strengthening its 
democratic institutions. By mid-1990s, the Armenian government headed by Levon Ter-
Petrossian was facing mounting economic problems, including an economic blockade by 
                                                                                                                                                       
For both 1998 and 2001 cases, Baku later reneged on the tentative agreement reached (Fuller in RFL/RE, May 
2009). 
Finally, during the Prague Process a new method of negotiation involved "no agenda, no commitment, no 
negotiation, but a free discussion, on any issue proposed by Armenia, Azerbaijan, or by the [OSCE Minsk 
Group] co-chairs (German, 2005). The Prague Process culminated in Warsaw on May 15, 2005, and was 
followed by the Madrid Principles.  
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Azerbaijan and Turkey, an energy crisis and cold winters, and relative material deprivation of 
the Armenian people. In February 1993, the first wave of demonstrations resulting from 
poverty and scarcity demanded the resignation of the government. President Ter-Petrossian 
formed a new cabinet with economist Hrant Bagratian as the Prime Minister, intending to 
improve the country’s economy. But this was not an easy task. The war had been all 
consuming, and the remaining resources in the government budget were scarce. The war and 
its consequences made it very difficult to concentrate state resources on strengthening the 
economy.   
Meanwhile, some tensions had emerged among different government members, who 
started to express conflicting political ambitions and disagreements about the course of action 
of the country’s development. By the cease fire of 1994, elite fragmentation had already 
taken place within the Armenian ruling circles. “The political consensus had disappeared as 
soon as some major items on the agenda (independence, basic laws on political and economic 
reforms) were resolved” (Libaridian 1999:10).  Already between 1991 and 1993, some ANM 
members joined the opposition or distanced themselves from ANM. Among those members 
were Vazgen Manukyan (the first Prime Minister) and Davit Vardanyan (Head of Supreme 
Soviet’s Permanent Committee on Foreign Relations), who formed the National Democratic 
Union (NDU), Hambardzum Galstyan (mayor of Yerevan during the Ter-Petrossian years), 
Samson Ghazaryan (a member of the Supreme Soviet), and Davit Shahnazaryan (Minister of 
Security in the Ter-Petrossian government). More specifically, Vazgen Manukyan had been 
an ardent critic of the Ter-Petrossian administration since 1991, when he thought to assume 
the presidency instead of Levon Ter-Petrossian. 
In 1994, Ter-Petrossian banned the ARF (Armenian Revolutionary Federation) – an 
extremely nationalist party – on national security grounds. First, the banning of ARF was 
based on the idea of terminating terroristic activities and criminal acts often organized by the 
ARF.  The second reason for banning the party was that the ARF had failed, despite two 
warnings from the Ministry of Justice, that according to the law no party could function in 
Armenia if the majority of the members of the ruling body were not citizens of Armenia and 
residents of Armenia. Ter-Petrossian decreed the banning but turned it over immediately to 
the Supreme Court for adjudication. (The Supreme Court was not a constitutional court.) The 
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Court determined that the president was wrong to decide that criminal acts were committed 
that such issues should be determined in courts of law. But the Court agreed with the 
President regarding the second charge and that in that respect the banning was within the 
jurisdiction of the executive as the party had failed to comply. The banning of the ARF 
created a fervent opposition led by ARF against the Ter-Petrossian administration.  
As already mentioned, besides ARF, President Ter-Petrossian was facing another 
major opposition by once a fellow ANM member, a former Prime Minister and Armenian 
Defense Minister, Vazgen Manukyan, who had created his own political party, the National 
Democratic Union (NDU). By 1996, the ANM had lost its main positions of power in the 
government. As Libaridian recalls, “the governing party had become complacent, arrogant, 
self-confident, and careless, while the opposition had turned impatient.” (Libaridian 1999:11) 
According to RFE/RL (July 05, 1994), Noyan Tapan (September 19, 1994) and 
Hailour (October 21, 1994), anti-government rallies and demonstrations convened by NDU 
of Vazgen Manukyan were massive and frequent in 1994. In October a demonstration of 
50,000 called for the resignation of Levon Ter-Petrossian. Members of the Parliament were 
reportedly victims of armed attacks (Balian 1995). Demonstrations continued through the 
spring, organized by the main opposition parties, the ARF and the NDU.  
Amidst this political and economic situation, in September of 1996, presidential 
elections took place. Ter-Petrossian won the elections with 51.75% of the vote, winning over 
his main opponent Vazgen Manukyan. Following the victory of Ter-Petrossian, a violent and 
disorderly protest broke out in the streets of the capital city, organized by the coalition 
opposition of NDU and ARF. Protestors stormed the Parliament building, physically attacked 
members of the National Assembly, beat two Vice-presidents of the National Assembly, and 
kidnapped the President of the National Assembly. Manukyan had determined, even before 
the ballots were cast, that if he lost the elections, it could only be due to fraudulent elections. 
He announced himself a winner and urged "the people" to take matters into their hands. The 
tendency to resort to violence and rebellion, advocated and implemented by NDU, was 
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unacceptable.159 The government had to order troops into the streets to control the crowds 
(Freedom House Report 1998; Armenia This Week, September 25, 1996).  
But it was not in 1996, under the pressure of his traditional antagonists, NDU or ARF, 
or the impoverished masses that President Levon Ter-Petrossian resigned. It was only two 
years later, in 1998, when he resigned. It was not because of Ter-Petrossian’s ‘unpopularity’ 
among the Armenian citizens that he resigned. It is believed that the "people" had very little 
to do with Ter-Petrossian's resignation. After about a decade of leadership under the most 
challenging circumstances, Ter-Petrossian managed to receive the support of about half the 
voters against a united opposition (Libaridian 1999; Suny 1999). Poor socio-economic 
conditions were not the key factors for the political weakness of Ter-Petrossian 
administration. Neither was Ter-Petrossian's stance on the Karabakh conflict. Ter-
Petrossian’s foreign policy, particularly his preference of the "step-by-step" approach for the 
Karabakh conflict resolution, was a pretext to be used by the opposition coalition in order to 
oust Ter-Petrossian. 
On 26 September 1997, during a press conference, still president Levon Ter-
Petrossian argued that Armenia should agree to the "step-by-step" peace proposal 
recommended by the Minsk Group earlier that month. He based his argument by providing a 
comprehensive analysis of five options available to the Armenian nation.  
1. To maintain the status quo - no peace and, hopefully, no resumption of war.  
2. To have Armenia recognize Karabakh as an independent state or annex NK to Armenia.  
3. To renew the war to force a final settlement on Azerbaijan.  
4. To return to the “package” approach.   
5. To accept the “step-by-step” approach. (Sargsyan 2006) 
 
Ter-Petrossian reasoned that it was unfeasible to preserve the status quo indefinitely, 
because Armenia would not be able to survive the economic pressures of blockades imposed 
                                                 
159 Since 2004, the Armenian people have organized an extraordinarily powerful and massive wave of social 
movements aimed against the socio-economic, political and environmental policies of the subsequent, 
Kocharyan and Sargsyan, administrations. Those movements, however, as opposed to the September 1996 post-
election turmoil, have been characterized by their non-violent nature. A detailed description of the February-
March 2008 demonstrations that will be presented in a following section of this chapter is a stark example of 
that.   
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by Azerbaijan and Turkey (the first option);160 that for Armenia to formally recognize the 
independence of Karabakh would put Armenia in the risk of decades-lasting imposition of 
international community's harsh sanctions (the second option). This option would be 
perceived as an ultimatum to Azerbaijan and to the international community, and would 
ultimately fail. He also stressed that it would be difficult, if not impossible, for Armenia and 
Karabakh together to win a new war against Azerbaijan (the third option), as it required a 
complete defeat and capitulation of Azerbaijan, which would be impossible. Ter-Petrossian 
announced: "We must be realistic and understand that the international community will not 
tolerate the situation around Nagorny Karabakh for a long time, since this situation represents 
a threat to regional cooperation, security and the West's oil interests." More importantly, the 
President asserted that the Armenian nation faced a choice to either compromise on the 
Karabakh problem, or accept economic stagnation and socio-economic problems for the 
Armenian people for the years to come.  
"Armenia will not become a normal state. We will not live well until the Karabakh problem is 
solved and the blockade is eliminated. Either - or. Or we should tell the world: move over, we 
ourselves will solve our problems, we are confident in our abilities and will not go for 
concessions. But in this case, no-one has the right to demand better living standards; on the 
contrary, we will have to get used to the idea that living standards will decline even further. 
Or, if we want to live well and develop our economy, we should have the courage to go for 
serious mutual concessions." (Ter-Petrossian, 2006:610-611) 
The fourth (the "package" approach) and the fifth (the "step-by-step" approach) 
options for resolving the Karabakh conflict were deemed as the only two “realistic 
approaches.” Outlining merits of both approaches, the President pointed out that since 
Azerbaijan and Karabakh had irreconcilable disagreements regarding Karabakh's final legal-
political status, the only realistic approach left was the step-by-step approach.161Negotiating 
                                                 
160 For a more detailed analysis of Levon Ter-Petrossian's calculations of economic prospects of Armenia versus 
Azerbaijan, see Arus Harutyunyan (2010:168-170). Briefly, Ter-Petrossian argued that even investments from 
diaspora Armenians (at the time around $10 million annually) would not compensate for Armenia's economic 
losses, let alone boost up the infrastructure, if Turkey and Azerbaijan would not end their blockade. Meanwhile, 
Azerbaijan, already in 1994, attracted more than $35 billion investments by international oil companies. In 
1994, Azerbaijan signed the "Contract of the Century" with powerful oil companies from the US, UK, Norway, 
Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Japan (ibid). 
161Despite Ter-Petrossian's unspecified reservations about the September draft, it was considerably more 
advantageous to Armenia than the two preceding "package" proposals. Specifically, a) it provided enhanced 
security guarantees for the population of Karabakh, Armenia and Azerbaijan;  b) it did not call for a withd rawal 
of Armenian forces from the key districts of Shushi and Lachin; c) it did not explicitly insist that the final 
settlement must respect Azerbaijan's territorial integrity; and d) it envisaged Karabakh's de facto independence 
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the complicated issue of Karabakh's status and land simultaneously seemed to be an unlikely 
prospect. 
The President's arguments triggered a storm of dissent across the Armenian political 
spectrum. The "step-by-step" approach of conflict resolution was unacceptable for the 
Karabakh leadership and their allies in Armenia. Ter-Petrossian’s compromising stance was 
termed as ‘defeatist’ by some of the governing elites.  Among the most fervent antagonists of 
the "phased" approach were Robert Kocharyan (Prime Minister of Armenia), Serzh Sargsyan 
(Minister of Internal Affairs and Security of Armenia), Vazgen Sargsyan (Defense Minister 
of Armenia), and Arkady Ghukasyan (the newly elected president of Karabakh). Karabakh’s 
president Ghukasyan announced that “however badly the people live, there are holy things, 
there are positions that they will never surrender under any circumstances” (De Waal 
2003:260). At the same time, the opposition parties in Armenia, taking advantage of the 
situation, accused the President of giving up on national ideals. Vazgen Manukyan of the 
NDU, a long-time challenger and opponent of the President, announced the latter's reasoning 
as "capitulation" and "treason" (RFE/RL, 1 October 1997). 
Ter-Petrossian's opponents insisted on the "package" solution, strenuously avoiding 
and rejecting any kind of subordination of Karabakh to Azerbaijan. "Fear is fertile ground for 
nationalist politics, and Ter-Petrossian found it increasingly difficult to promote his own 
more compromising line in the face of opposition from many Parliamentary parties, and even 
from members of his own cabinet, such as regime strongmen Serzh Sarkissian, Vasken 
Sarkissian and Robert Kotcharian" (Tavitian, 2000:11). 
While Ter-Petrosian linked Armenia's future stability and economic development to 
the resolution of the Karabakh conflict, his adversaries believed that Armenia could develop 
politically and economically without any concessions in the Karabakh issue. Those, who 
disagreed with the President, assumed that Armenia’s and particularly Karabakh’s economic 
well-being would be fine even without a lifting of Turkey’s embargo, as well as the 
resolution of the Karabakh issue. They were willing to wait while the international mediators 
                                                                                                                                                       
remaining unchallenged until such time as final status negotiations produced a mutually acceptable treaty 
(Libaridian 1999:58; Laitin and Suny 1999:165; Fuller, 2004).   
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rethought their position (Suny 1999:169).Prime Minister Kocharyan specifically argued that 
"negotiations should consolidate the victory and give Armenians time to cash in" (Libaridian 
1999:66). He and his allies 'believed' that even in the case of a renewed war with Azerbaijan, 
Armenia would be secure, because as the Karabakh war showed, Azeris lacked will and 
ability to excel Armenians militarily and that Azeris could not retake Karabakh by force.162 
Vazgen Sargsyan condemned the step-by-step approach and opposed Ter-Petrossian by 
announcing: “Certain people should not be allowed to resolve the Karabakh problem on 
behalf of the whole Armenian nation . . . . Armenia and the ‘Nagorno-Karabakh Republic’ 
should be prepared for a protracted conflict not only by rejecting concessions to Baku, but 
also by annexing Shusha and Lachin in the interests of Karabakh’s security” (Croissant 
1998:122; Baghdasaryan in Hayastani Hanrapetutyun, 1998; Gayane Karapetyan in 
Hayastani Hanrapetutyun, 1999). According to Ter-Petrossian's opponents, Azerbaijan 
would also be reluctant to start any military action against Armenia or Karabakh fearing to 
make their oil assets, oil production facilities, and international business deals vulnerab le.  
In response to the speculations raised by the opposition, Ter-Petrossian published an 
essay titled "War or Peace? Time for Thoughtfulness.” The essay, which was published in 
most Armenian newspapers on November 1, 1997, addressed anew the benefits of the "step-
by-step" approach and argued that a final resolution of the conflict was in the interests of 
both Armenia and Karabakh, highlighting that the conflict should be resolved peacefully, 
rather than militarily. Once again, Ter-Petrossian stressed the urgency of compromise. He 
wrote: 
To solve the question of Karabakh we have only one option, a compromise solution, which 
does not mean that one side is the victor and the other the loser; it does mean finding an 
agreement based on what is possible when the conflict has reached maturity ... The opposition 
                                                 
162 In her dissertation, Harutyunyan (2010) presents an excellent overview of the ethno-nationalistic discourse in 
Armenia. According to Harutyunyan, the denouncement of the "step-by-step" solution was accompanied by the 
rhetoric of national self-affirmation and resentment. This discourse believed that Karbakh was the first step 
towards the establishment of the "United Armenia", as well as towards the restitution of historical injustices. 
The ethno-nationalists denied territorial concessions based on the rhetoric of Armenia's recent military success 
and the winning of war.  
This nationalist assumption, as well as the rejection of concessions in the Karabakh conflict, was referred by 
Ter-Petrossian and his supporters as erroneous and irrelevant respectively, arguing that winning the battle 
should not be equated to winning the war.  Ter-Petrossian said:  “Unfortunately, Karabagh has  won the battle, 
not the war. A war is considered won only when the foe has been forced into capitulation. The confusion between 
battle and war has brought misfortune to many.” (Ter-Petrossian, 1997, 2006) 
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should not mislead the people by arguing that there is an alternative to the compromise: the 
alternative to compromise is war. The rejection of compromise and maximalism (the drive to 
obtain the maximum rather than the possible) is the shortest path to the final destruction of 
Karabakh and the worsening of the situation in Armenia ... That which we are rejecting today, 
we will be asking for tomorrow, but we will not get it, as has often happened in our history. 
We must be realistic and understand that the international community will not for long tolerate 
the situation created around NagornoKarabakh because that is threatening regional 
cooperation and security as well as the West’s oil interests ... Compromise is not a choice 
between the good and the bad, but rather between the bad and the worse; that is, compromise 
is just a means to avoid the worst, from which parties benefit when they have become 
conscious of the worst and are able to display the necessary political will and courage ... On 
the issue of Karabakh’s independence we have no allies. No one will resolve the present 
enigma but us. We are the ones who must resolve it, and we will resolve it to the extent that 
our capabilities allow us. Our only ally is our rejection of adventurism.163 
In "War and Peace," Ter-Petrossian mentioned that by rejecting May and July 1997 
"package" peace plans and later also the Minsk Group's September "step-by-step" plan, the 
leadership of Karabakh had placed both Armenia and themselves in "an uncomfortable 
situation."164 Ter-Petrossian was also surprised that his opponents (several of his own 
ministers) interpreted his endorsement of the September 1997 "step-by-step" plan as 
something new and unexpected for them. In fact, the 26 September press conference was not 
the first occasion when Ter-Petrossian expressed his preference for a compromise peace 
resolution, and the ministers in question had not previously argued against the issue (Fuller, 
2004). Moreover, the disagreement between the President and his opponents did not center 
on the relative merits of the "step-by-step" versus the "package" approaches. Instead, it 
centered on methodology rather than specifics. Thus, a question remains unanswered as to 
why those, who opposed the September proposal's methodology (i.e., the "step-by-step" 
deal), had not tried to transform the May or July draft proposals ("package" deals) into an 
acceptable basis for a peace resolution.  
Ter-Petrossian's arguments during the September press conference, as well as his 
logic in "War or Peace? Time for Thoughtfulness", allegedlyfailed to persuade other state 
elites that the compromise resolution of the Karabakh conflict was in the best intersts of the 
Armenian Republic. On January 28, 1998, the Defense Minister Vazgen Sargsyan claimed 
                                                 
163Levon Ter-Petrossian, "Paterazm te Khaghaghutyun, Lrjanalu Pahe'"[War or Peace? Time for 
Thoughtfulness], Hayastani Hanrapetutyun, November 2, 1997; See also Ashot Sargsyan, "Yntrani: Eluytner' 
Hodvatsner, Harcazruycner" [Selected Speeches, Articles, Interviews], Erevan, 2006, pages 625-639. 
164 I have earlier noted in this chapter that the Karabakah leadership had practically rejected the first two draft 
proposals in May and July 1997, both of which were based on the "package approach". 
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that the President should adjust his Karabakh policy or else he would be ousted.165 In early 
February, two of Ter Petrossian’s closest allies in government, Vano Siradeghyan and 
Alexander Arzumanyan, resigned from government. 
The political crisis was increasingly becoming severe, especially after the Defense 
Minister Vazgen Sargsyan threatened that he would not step aside, even if asked to do so by 
the President. The confrontation between Ter-Petrossian and the Kocharyan team worsened 
at an Armenian Security Council meeting in February, when Kocharyan announced that he 
would resign over the President’s position on Karabakh (Tavitian 2000). Whereas "the 
normal course of action for subordinates who disagree with their President on substantial 
issues and whom they failed to convince to change course would have been, of course, to 
resign themselves" (Libaridian 1999:50), the mentioned subordinates, on the contrary, 
intended to create a political crisis. In these circumstances, on February 3 of 1998, Ter-
Petrossian resigned under pressure from “powerful members of his own cabinet” (Libaridian 
1999:48). 
In his resignation speech, Ter-Petrossian stated that "well-known bodies of power 
demanded [his] resignation" (Walker 2011:1). He added: "Taking into account the fact that 
the fulfillment of the president's constitutional duties under the current situation is fraught 
with a real danger of destabilization in the country, I accept that demand and announce my 
resignation” (ibid). He then called upon the Armenian people to “display restraint” (ibid).  By 
these words, the President was clearly indicating that he could no longer exercise his 
constitutional power, particularly the right to fire his Prime Minister. 
The president has a right to resign, and when he does so, the presidency passes to the 
head of the National Assembly. If the latter is unable to perform the presidential duties, the 
prime minister becomes the acting president. In this instance, the National Assembly voted to 
accept not only Ter-Petrossian’s resignation but also the resignation of the Head of the 
                                                 
165 It is essential to note that only six people in Armenia and Karabakh were fully informed about the state of the 
ongoing negotiations (Ter-Petrossian 1997; 2006). Kocharyan was among one of those six, but neither Serzh 
Sargsyan nor Vazgen Sargsyan was. Therefore, it is possible that "either Kocharyan violated the confidentiality 
of the peace process by divulging details to Sarkisian [the Minister of Internal Affairs] and Sargsian [the 
Defense Minister], after which the collective decision was taken to push for Ter-Petrossian's resignation; or 
alternatively, the debate about the Karabakh peace process was only tangential, or possibly even irrelevant, to 
the move to oust Ter-Petrossian" (Fuller, 2004 in RFL/RE).  
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National Assembly, Babken Ararktsyan, who was Ter-Petrossian’s ally. Armenia’s Prime 
Minister Robert Kocharyan, thus, backed by the influential coalition of ‘power ministers’, 
became acting president of Armenia "in his own right" (Laitin and Suny 1999:199). Both 
Vazgen Sargsyan and Robert Kocharyan 'believed' that the resignation was constitutional. 
However, as Libaridian asserts "the process seems to have technically followed the 
constitutional order, but doubts remain whether the spirit of the Constitution was 
respected"(Libaridian 1999: 50), (italics added). The circumstances were not constitutional, 
and by resigning, "Ter-Petrossian avoided a constitutional crisis and a potentially disastrous 
confrontation" (Libaridian, 1999:51). Ter-Petrossian was compelled to step down, which was 
essentially a "constitutional coup d'état." (Suny 1999:158) 
In essence, the President's resignation was mainly about his political opponent's 
desire and struggle for power. It was about a struggle, in which the winners had coercive 
supremacy and not just political will for power. They had control over arms, as well as 
popular authority gained during the Karabakh war. At this point, more comprehensive 
observations about the people inside the power coalition and how they obtained the above-
mentioned coercive powers are in order. How did it happen that whereas other political 
leaders such as Vazgen Manukyan, the leader of NDU, and other influential political parties, 
such as ARF or less influential Communist party could not win over the ANM and its leader 
Levon Ter-Petrossian, the coalition of Robert Kocharyan, Vazgen Sargsyan and Serzh 
Sargsyan was able to do it? Was war or victory in war important factors in the explanation of 
those politicians’ power? And are the former or their war background, experience and 
political activities in any way related to the development of social exclusion in Armenia? The 
brief outline of some of the war-related people that cultivated a political agenda and formed a 
party, the "Party of Karabakh", is an important contribution to this part of the dissertation.166 
It highlights the power through which these individuals could make decisions affecting 
important political events that have notoriously affected social, economic, and particularly 
political exclusion in the country. 
                                                 
166 Libaridian underlines that "the best way to understand Karbakh is to look at it as a party, "the Party of 
Karabagh" (Libaridian 1999:90). Within the Party, "Karabakh is at the top of the hierarchy of concerns; all else 
is subject to its logic" (Libairdian 1999:94). The army, as a most powerful institution in Armenia, formed the 
backbone of the "Karabakh Party" (de Waal 2003:257).  
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7.4.2. The Power Coalition and the "Party of Karabakh" 
Throughout the 1990s, the "Party of Karabakh" included a few strong-minded 
personalities both from Karabakh and Armenia, whose position on the issue of Karabakh has 
been centered on no concessions (Libaridian 1999). In Karabakh, it consisted of Robert 
Kocharyan, Serzh Sargsyan, Samvel Babayan, and Arkadi Ghukasyan. Kocharyan was the 
most important character among the mentioned ones in Karabakh (since 1997, also in 
Armenia). In Armenia, it was Vazgen Sargsyan.  
Robert Kocharyan, a native of Nagorno-Karabakh, became the President of 
KarabakhDefense Committee in 1992 and by the end of the same year he became the 
President of Karabakh. Levon Ter-Petrossian appointed him the Prime Minister of Armenia 
in March of 1997. Some observers assume that this appointment meant a strengthening of 
Karabakh’s interests and position in Armenia, because with his roots in Karabakh, 
Kocharyan would never agree to concede the independence and/or territorial achievements of 
Karabakh won in the war effort, in which Kocharyan himself played an important role 
(Cornell 1999).  
Ter-Petrossian was aware of Kocharyan's stance on Karabakh. He knew well that on 
the issue of Karbakh, the difference between himself and Kocharyan concerned the type of 
compromise each was willing to accept. For Ter-Petrossian, beyond the problem of 
Karabakh, there was the problem of the socio-economic well-being of the Armenian people 
in Armenia and in Karabakh – poverty, unemployment, low wages, etc. For Kocharyan, 
above all, maintaining Karabakh's territorial achievements was significant, regardless of what 
it might cost to the Armenian people (Libaridian 1999; Suny 1999; Laitin and Suny 1999).  
Since the mid-1990s, specifically after the cease-fire, the divergence of thought 
concerning peace, security, and economic development of Armenia and Karabakh had 
increased between the two men – the leader of Armenia and the leader of Karabakh. 
Kocharyan argued that the conflict and its circumstances were not the key factors explaining 
Armenia's poor economic situation. Instead, he argued that Armenian government should get 
rid of corruption and introduce a stronger discipline within the government. He proposed that 
"with better management, more discipline, strong anti-corruption policies, a forceful effort to 
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achieve unity, and the coordination of the resources of the state of Armenia and the 
Diaspora", Armenia could improve its economic performance (Libaridian 1999:65). 
Knowing that Kocharyan assumed anticorruption policies, coupled with strengthening the 
state and the rule of law, could do as much for the Armenian economy as lifting the 
blockade, Ter Petrossian, presumably, intended to put Kocharyan to the test when he invited 
the latter to serve as Prime Minister of Armenia in the spring of 1997. In this way, 
Kocharyan, would have authority over socio-economic issues and would have the 
opportunity to prove his position (Libaridian 1999; Laitin and Suny 1999; Tavitian 2000; 
Fuller 2004).  
In any case, Kocharyan's position as Prime Minister and his subsequent elevation to 
the presidency through a ‘palace coup’ turned out to be a challenge to Ter-Petrossian’s more 
liberal position (Cornell 1999). After Ter-Petrossian’s resignation, Robert Kocharyan began 
to use the authorization and power of the presidency. It is important to note here that 
Kocharyan's candidacy to the Presidency was then technically illegitimate.The Armenian 
Constitution explicitly forbade non-citizen Armenians (at least for ten years) from the 
presidency. Article 50 of the 1999 Constitution stipulates: "Every person having attained the 
age of thirty five, having been a citizen of the Republic of Armenia for the preceding ten 
years, having permanently resided in the Republic for the preceding ten years, and having the 
right to vote is eligible for the Presidency."167 Kocharyan was not an Armenian citizen in 
March of 1998, neither had he been a permanent resident of Armenia for ten years. This 
means that, then a citizen of Azerbaijan, Kocharyan became a President of Armenia illegally.  
Since the first days of Kocharyan's presidency, his government reverted to a strong 
traditional nationalism, which was in accord with hard-liners of the Karabakh government 
and was very amiable to the Armenian Diaspora.168It is considered that the diaspora 
Armenians' support strengthened Kocharyan's hand in domestic politics. 
                                                 
167 See the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Armenia, available online at 
http://www.concourt.am/english/constitutions/index.htm#3  
168Armenians have established communities throughout the world since ancient times, creating a 2,000 year-old 
Diaspora (BBC, February 2007). But the size of the Armenian communities around the world dramatically 
increased since the Armenian Genocide of 1915, when the Armenians living in their ancestral homeland 
(eastern Turkey, known as Western Armenia among Armenians) were systematically exterminated by Ottoman 
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The Armenian diaspora is divided into two communities – those from Ottoman 
Armenia or Western Armenia (the "old" Diaspora) and those who have migrated from 
Armenia during the late 1980s, especially after the earthquake and after the independence of 
Armenia (the "new" Diaspora).169 Feeling strong ties with their historic homeland, both 
Diasporas have showed strong interest in the social, political and economic developments of 
Armenia, particularly after the country's independence in 1991. The Diaspora Armenians 
have been a critical part of the FDI and aid in the republic of Armenia. Particularly, the 
"new" Diaspora's remittances have recently been crucial for Armenia's economy. However, 
there is a difference in the nature of the "old" and "new" Dasiporas' involvement. Because the 
"old" Diaspora had a very strong political identity, which was shaped by the "victim" identity 
that in turn was formed by the forced emigration experience, its involvement in the homeland 
has been largely political and thus the perceptions of Armenia's investment climate has been 
greatly dependent upon the political realities (Chakhalyan, 2007:54). This attitude and 
perceptions of the "old" Diaspora have stood in sharp contrast to the "new" Diaspora, which 
has not been political, owing to a large extent to a different historical experience of migration 
that has been voluntary and conditioned by economic considerations (ibid).   
Due to its economic and political involvement and influence, the Diaspora has always 
been an important element of the Armenian foreign policy.Specifically Kocharyan's foreign 
policy, as well as economic policies, was heavily influenced by largely nationalist Armenian 
Diaspora communities.The Armenian national identity was more powerfully and coherently 
articulated, the images of Genocide were projected into the Karabakh conflict, and the 
prospects of improved relations with Turkey closed off(Suny 1999:158-159). The new 
                                                                                                                                                       
Turks. The modern Armenian Diaspora was chiefly formed as a result of this Genocide. The survivors of the 
Genocide (about 400,000) settled in Eastern Armenia and the Caucasus as well as in a number of Middle 
Eastern and European countries. Required to cope with and adapt to unfamiliar environments, the resistance and 
discrimination of the recipient states, "the post-Genocide diaspora adopted socio-cultural and political 
peculiarities of their various host states and eventually emerged as a multi-local heterogeneous entity" 
(Harutyunyan 2009:58).  
Although it is an impossible task to compile an accurate count of all Armenians in the Diaspora, Armenian 
worldwide population is estimated to be around 11 million, out of which about 3 million reside in Armenia, 
130,000 in Karabakh and 120,000 in the region of Javakhk in Georgia.There areapproximately 8,000,000 
diaspora Armenians living abroad. The largest Armenian communities are in Russia, the United States, France , 
Ukraine, Georgia, Argentina, Lebanon, Syria, Iran, Turkey, Canada, Ukraine, Greece, and Australia.  
169 According to some historians, even if this taxonomy refers to the weaved emigration out of historic Armenia, 
including present day Armenia, there are at least three diasporas: pre-Genocide, post genocide, and post 
independence. 
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president called for the right to self-determination for Karabakh, and pledged to support its 
independence. 
Soon after Kocharyan’s election, frequent cases of human rights violations in 
Armenia were documented. In one of my interviews, a former Prime Minister, Hrant 
Bagratyan, recollected the most notorious incident related directly to Kocharyan and his staff. 
The Armenian people were legitimately alarmed, when in September 2001 a bodyguard of 
then president Kocharyan attacked and killed a man in a café restroom. The victim, Poghos 
Poghosyan, had reportedly addressed the president with the words, “Hi, Rob.” Witnesses 
mentioned that Poghosyan was assaulted by presidential bodyguards, who thought that "Hi, 
Rob" was an offensive greeting of the Armenian president. The 43-year-old Poghosyan was 
found dead in the cafe’s restroom at night, shortly after Kocharyan left the place. Kocharyan 
later admitted that the victim died as a result of a "scuffle" with his security service. RFE/RL 
reported that state prosecutors investigating the politically embarrassing murder charged the 
bodyguard with "involuntary manslaughter," a crime punishable by up to three years in 
prison. They further sought an even shorter jail term by citing some "mitigating 
circumstances." According to the Institute of War and Peace Reporting, the bodyguard 
convicted of murdering Poghosyan received a suspended sentence of two years.170 
The domestic political atmosphere started to change swiftly as well. There appeared 
reports of arrests of political nature, dismissal and assassinations of several government top 
officials. In August, 1998, Henrikh Khachatryan, Armenia's Prosecutor-General was 
murdered in his office "in murky circumstances" (TheNew York Times, August 7, 1998). 
Deputy Defense Minister Vahan Khorkhoruni was assassinated in December, 1998 (Asbarez, 
December 12, 1998). Shortly, in February 1999, the Deputy Minister of Interior Artsrun 
Margaryan was murdered (Asbarez, February 10, 1999). Following these mysterious political 
assassinations, on October 27, 1999, Armenia witnessed a terrible tragedy - a massacre in the 
Parliament. This mysterious attack was the beginning of another period of political instability 
                                                 
170 For a more detailed account of this case, see the Institute for Peace and War Reporting, CRS Issue 649, 
"Restaurant Killing Raises Broader Concerns," by Nvard Hovhannisyan, July 6, 2012, available online at: 
http://iwpr.net/report-news/armenia-restaurant-killing-raises-broader-concerns; and Asbarez News, "Kocharyan 
Bodyguard to be Charged Cafe Death Probe," November 28, 2001, available online at 
http://asbarez.com/45848/Kocharyan-bodyguard-to-be-charged-cafe-death-probe 
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in Armenia that gradually led to President Kocharyan’s becoming politica lly more powerful. 
There have been assumptions and opposition charges that Robert Kocharyan and his allies 
masterminded the attack in order to destroy his main opposition at the time.171 
Kocharyan further strengthened his regime by replacing former government members 
with new people and forming a loyal team that included long-time allies and Karabakh war 
comrades, among who was the newly appointed Defense Minister, Serzh Sargsyan. Like 
many of the newly appointed government members, Sargsyan’s political career began with 
the tensions over Karabakh. Sargsyan participated, organized and led a number of battles in 
the Karabakh war as a field commander. Sargsyan was the chairman of Karabakh’s Self 
Defense Forces Committee and he is considered to be one of the founders of Karabakh’s 
armed forces. In 1990 he was elected to the Supreme Council of Armenia. Since the 
independence of Armenia, he has held several cabinet positions in the Armenian government: 
Minister of Defense (1993-95), Minister of Interior and National Security (1996-99), 
Secretary of the National Security Council (1999-2007), Minister of Defense (2000-2007), 
and Prime Minister (2007-2008). In 2008, Sargsyan was elected President of Armenia, 
despite massive popular opposition and elections, which were marred with irregularities and 
fraud, denounced by election observers.172 
Another member of the "Party of Karabakh", who also rose to prominence during the 
Karabakh conflict, was Samvel Babayan from Karabakh.173 Babayan, a car mechanic barely 
out of high school, was a competent paramilitary officer. In 1991, he joined a paramilitary 
unit, and quickly became a significant figure among the field commanders. He had his own 
battalion and led it very courageously. He “made courageous and uncommon decisions 
without any academic and military knowledge” (Shahnazaryan 2010:3). The young 
commander actively participated in the capture of Shushi in 1992, one of the highest 
                                                 
171 The Parliament massacre, which has been a crucial event in the history of post-Soviet Armenian politics, 
highlights the growing supremacy of coercive powers in Armenia. The Parliament shooting and its 
consequences will be detailed in further pages of the chapter.  
172 The February 19, 2008 presidential elections in Armenia can be a separate subject of research regarding 
political exclusion, social movements, and state violence. This presidential election will be described and 
analyzed more in detail in the next chapter.  
173 Samvel Babayan, among a few others, belonged to the category of non-traditional, self-taught and war-
disciplined commanders (paramilitaries), who later entered into politics.  
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achievements of the war by Armenians.174 Babayan's contribution in the capture of Shushi 
bestowed him with an extraordinary reputation. Despite his young age, he became the 
commander of Karabakh’s army in 1992 and later in 1995 the Minister of Defense after his 
predecessor Serzh Sargsyan became Armenia’s Defense Minister.   
Besides the honor and image of being a capable commander, Babayan managed to 
obtain the reputation of a shrewd businessman. As Lynch states, "the armed forces are 
always very well protected in separatist states", and Babayan's security as a political-
economic actor was also well protected (Lynch 2002:842). After the ceasefire of 1994, but 
with Karabakh on war footing, Babayan maintained considerable power with little oversight 
from civilian authorities. Using his power, he managed to acquire huge amount of wealth, 
such as industries, land, houses, as well as tax and customs privileges for himself and his 
cronies (de Waal 2000). "Despite Babayan's warlordish behavior, which in a short period of 
time managed to offend a large number of people, he was treated quite softly in light of his 
infinite popularity stemming from his wartime leadership" (Shahanzaryan 2010:3). The 
allegiance of war veterans and people of Karabakh to the acclaimed war hero, particularly of 
villagers from his native village of Mysmyna, was beyond primordial loyalty to a patron. 
Based on his military identity and commitment in war, Babayan concluded: "I am the very 
Samvel Babayan on whose shoulders the destiny of the nation was laid down in 1992. ... My 
main mistake was continuing to work with people who did not accept my views after the 
cessation of military action.” (ibid) 
Babayan’s exploitation of his military position became even more overt, when 
Kocharyan became the Prime Minister of Armenia in 1997. Kocharyan away from Karabakh, 
there was no other person strong enough to intervene with Babayan’s machinations. At the 
time, Babayan was a leading importer of gasoline and tobacco products in Armenia; in fact 
he secured a monopoly over these businesses (Shanazaryan 2010). It has been claimed that 
he used Karabakh Army military trucks to transport the cigarette and petrol cargo. Also, he 
had businesses related to the construction sector of Karabakh. Babayan and his family also 
controlled most job appointments in the region (ibid). An example of Babayan’s exploitation 
of his wartime achievements and abuse of his position after war has been the widely known 
                                                 
174 The geopolitical significance of Shushi's capture for the Armenian side has been noted earlier in this chapter.  
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"Babayan Underpass" in Stepanakert, the capital city of Karabakh (Lynch 2002:842). The 
"Babayan Underpass" was a major underpass, the construction of which lasted years. It was 
built by military-related contractors in a location, where the traffic is not very busy and there 
was no need for an underpass (ibid).  
De Waal (2000) claims that Babayan was far more than a military leader; he was the 
de facto overlord of the region, running the local economy (de Waal 2000). He made money 
out of both war and peace. He was one of the paramilitary elites that initiated the merger of 
black markets and war (Shahnazaryan 2010). Trading hostages during wartime had become a 
business for this warlord. Sources mention that Babayan’s family members extorted bribes to  
release from prison people who they themselves took into custody (Shahnazaryan 2010:4). 
Babayan eliminated all his opponents through moral and physical threats, pressure, as well as 
assassinations (ibid).  
In Karabakh, Babayan's authority and power allowed him to interfere with state 
affairs. He forced the Prime Minister of Karabakh, Leonard Petrosyan, to resign in June of 
1998.175 Similar to many government leaders of Karabakh, Babayan intended to become a 
part of the Armenian government. He did so by forming and financing two Armenian 
political parties and entering into the Armenian Parliament through those parties in 1999. 
Babayan’s intrusion into Armenian politics perhaps was a potential challenge to Kocharyan's 
growing power in Armenia. With the support of Karabakh's President Arkadi Ghukasyan and 
Armenia's Defense Minister Vazgen Sargsyan, Kocharyan managed to restrain Babayan’s 
authority not only in Armenia, but also decreased his powers in Karabakh. In 1999, Babayan 
was dismissed as Defense Minister of Karabakh. In 2000, he was charged with the March 
2000 assassination attempt against Arkadi Ghukasyan and sentenced to 14 years 
                                                 
175 Ironically, both Ter-Petrossian (in Armenia) and Leonard Petrosyan (in Karabakh) resigned in the same year 
under the influence of former warlords, who after war were influencing the political affairs of their respective 
republics. 
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imprisonment.176In 2004, however, Babayan was released from prison due to deteriorating 
health.177 
In accord with Kocharyan and others from the "Party of Karabakh", Babayan was an 
ardent opponent of territorial concessions to Azerbaijan. As Defense Minister of Karabakh, 
Babayan, argued in an interview in October 1997 that the chances of renewed war with 
Azerbaijan were high, and in case of a war, Azerbaijan would have to accept military defeat. 
He added that a renewed war would finally result in a decisive victory by one side or the 
other (Walker 1998). According to the Armenian News Network Groong, when top officials 
in Armenia were initially reluctant to openly display disloyalty to the President regarding 
step-by-step proposal, they urged Babayan to challenge Ter-Petrossian's inner circle. In the 
joint session of National Security Councils of Armenia and Artsakh in January 1998, it was 
Babayan who most vociferously opposed Ter-Petrossian (Groong News, October 6, 2004)178.   
The Babayan phenomenon is a striking example of a wider postwar phenomenon – 
postwar militarization – when victory allowed the Armenian military commanders to control 
the peace (de Waal 2010).  In Armenia, the Karabakh war veterans' organization the 
Yerkrapah, also known as the Yerkrapah Battalion or the Union of the Yerkrapah Volunteers, 
became a core element of the postwar militarization in Armenia after the cease-fire.179 The 
                                                 
176Babayan was Arkadi Ghukasyan’s most formidable political opponent. Babayan was in power struggle with 
Ghukasyan and attempted to assassinate the latter with the support of people from his inner circle. 
177 Unofficial sources mentioned health issues, but the release of the former military leader was not given an 
official explanation. Babayan's amnesty, thus, appears to have been an act of clemency. It is argued that 
Babayan's release from prison was engineered by Kocharyan and Arkadi Ghukasyan. Babayan's release 
occurred in the backdrop of a politically sensitive time for Karabakh. During the 2004 municipal elections, 
public discontent burst in Karabakh concerning the pace of democratic and social-economic progress. The 
election of the independent opposition candidate Eduard Aghabekyan as Mayor of Stepanakert (capital city of  
Karabakh) and his defeat over the incumbent – a well-funded ruling party candidate – was an unexpected event 
for both Karabakh and Armenian leaders. Aghabekyan's victory emboldened citizens of Karabakh. After Major 
General Movses Hakobyan was quoted by journalists  that Karabakh was not ready for full democracy as long as 
war was not over, Hakobyan was obligated through a special session of the legislature to declare that he wa s 
misquoted. Meanwhile, Ghukasyan and his political mentor Kocharyan were serving their la st terms in 
presidential office, one in Karabakh, the other in Armenia respectively. Since Babayan had been punished 
already for his oppositional attitude against Ghukasyan, and there was no "political niche" left vacant for 
Babayan either in Karabakh or Armenia, Kocharyan and Ghukasyan decided to pardon Babayan. This was or 
seemed to be a sound political move on their behalf, rather than being forced to do so by Babayan's support ers. 
(Groong News, October 6, 2004) 
178 Retreived from: http://www.groong.org/ro/ro-20041006.html 
179 "The “Yerkrapah” is translated as homeland protectors/defenders.  
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Yerkrapah was led by Vazgen Sargsyan, one of the strongest and most talented, if not the 
most significant figure that rose to power out of the Karabakh conflict.   
Vazgen Sargsyan’s political activity started when he joined the movement for 
Karabakh. In 1990, he was elected to the Armenian Parliament, and became a member of the 
Internal Affairs and State Defense Committee. He was very active during the first years of 
the war, and since 1990-1992 he was commanding voluntary and paramilitary troops in 
Karabakh. He inspired the “battalion of kamikazes”, a very important battalion during 
battles.  In 1992, Sargsyan became Defense Minister of Armenia, and from 1993-1995 he 
was State Minister in charge of Defense. In 1995, during the restructuring of government 
ministries, he again became Defense Minister. In 1999, President Kocharyan appointed 
Sargsyan as Prime Minister.  
The Ministry of Defense created the Yerkrapah in 1993, when Vazgen Sargsyan was 
the Minister of Defense.180 The Yerkrapah emerged as an overtly nationalist force, directly 
tied to the war rather than the Karabakh movement. "Essentially an organization of soldiers, 
with limited intellectual leadership (unlike the early ANM or other parties, the Yerkrapah has 
been militant in its views on national issues and Karabakh" (Panossian 2006:241). Sargsyan 
had control and full authority of the organization, with over 10,000 members. While the 
Yerkrapah was initially created to be a social organization with its main objective to solve 
social problems of Karabakh war veterans, it later became involved in political affairs of the 
country. The leadership of the organization was politicized, turning into a military political 
organization implementing political functions. Since the Yerkrapah members had fought in 
the war, the majority of them retained their weapons, and this granted the organization 
special power. De Waal mentions that the Yerkrapah became the most powerful and a very 
influential organization in the country and took over some areas of the economy (de Waal 
2004:244). De Waal also calls the Yerkrapah's leader Sarsgyan the "chief generalissimo [of 
the army], Armenia’s charismatic first defense minister, most prominent military leader, and 
emerging feudal baron" (de Waal 2004:257). 
                                                 
180 Some sources mention 1993 as the year Yerkrapahwas established 1993 (de Waal 2003). Libaridian 
recollects that the organization started in May of 1992, during the Nakhijevan border skirmishes.  
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According to Human Rights Watch, the Yerkrapah posed a serious threat to the rule 
of law in Armenia. It is considered that the Yerkrapah managed to develop into a quasi-
criminal, quasi-political organization under the protection and support of the army. In 1995, 
the Yerkrapah members allegedly attacked offices of foreign religious groups (mostly 
Christian sects) in Armenia, because the latter discouraged military services. In July 1997, 
the Yerkrapah also reportedly broke into a human rights library in Vanadzor and ransacked it 
(Human Rights Watch 1999, US State Department Report 1997). The library break-in was 
primarily aimed at control of the space rather than the activities of the center; nonetheless, 
"the incident underscored the freedom of these local militias [the Yerkrapah] to act outside 
the law (U.S. State Department Armenia Country Report on Human Rights Practices, 1998). 
Yerkrapah’s relation to these human rights violations brought even international 
attention to the activities of the organization, highlighting the necessity to reduce any 
patronage of the Yerkrapah on behalf of the Armenian government, specifically the Defense 
Ministry. Holly Cartner, executive director of Human Rights Watch’s Europe and Central 
Division stated:  
“Militia groups like the Yerkrapah Battalion are a threat to Armenia’s nascent civil society. 
The Clinton Administration should lead the international community in sending a clear 
message to the Armenian Defense Ministry: human rights abuses by vigilante groups will not 
be tolerated. The Yerkrapah members should not be allowed into government security forces 
or other official positions without a thorough review of each applicant’s record” (Human 
Rights Watch 1998)  
In the fall of 1997, the organization registered as a political party and entered 
Parliament with seventeen seats. Yerkrapah merged with the Republican Party of Armenia 
and became the largest group in the National Assembly in the summer of 1998.181  Regarding 
his decision to merge the Yerkrapah into the Republican Party of Armenia to establish a 
political base in the Parliament, Sargsyan announced: "From the very beginning there was a 
wrong impression that the Yerkrapah can do nothing – but fight, however – time has shown 
that the Yerkrapah can not only perform feats on battlefields - but also have a say in peaceful 
                                                 
181 The Republican Party of Armenia was a small nationalist party established in 1990. Its ideology was similar 
to Yerkrapah's ideology and slogans (Panossian 2006). Yerkrapah adopted the name and the legal status of the 
party (Jamestwon Foundation 1998; The Republican Party of Armenia).   
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development."182 By 1998, the organization had become Armenia’s most influential 'political' 
factor and, as it grew more representative, its political muscle started to influence the 
Armenian political life. When Ter-Petrossian and his party ANM were on the verge of 
weakening, many defectors from the ANM joined the Yerkrapah. At some point, the 
organization had become an alternative force structure and a coercive resource in the hands 
of certain political elites. Ter-Petrossian particularly paid a high a price by allowing Vazgen 
Sargsyan to involve the Yerkrapah veterans in politics. Although initially supportive of Ter-
Petrossian, the Yerkrapah had a share in ousting the former President from power and 
placing Kocharyan in the presidency. It was only after Vazgen Sargsyan's death in 1999, that 
the Yerkrapah weakened and ceased to pose any threat to the executive or other political 
powers.  
There has always been a big divergence of public attitude towards Yerkrapah and 
their leader Vazgen Sargsyan in Armenia. Some consider Sargsyan as the victorious 
Sparapet183 and the most important person of post-independent Armenia's defense; whereas, 
in the words of another renowned hero of the Karabakh war Arkady Ter-Tadevosyan 
(nicknamed Commandos), "Vazgen’s strength continues to worry certain people or systems, 
which, for some reason, continue to keep a sense of fear from the dead Vazgen" (Jebejyan 
2013). Many remember Sargsyan as the founder of the modern Armenian army, as the chief 
architect of the Karabakh war victory, and an outstanding soldier.184 Yet again, many others 
would agree to Ara Sanjian’s recollection that there was another side to Sargsyan. "He was 
extremely ambitious and did not always shun non-democratic methods to attain his political 
and personal goals” (Sanjian 1999). Hardly anybody would ever challenge or oppose Vazgen 
Sargsyan. “The lack of open criticism against him was motivated not only by the genuinely 
deep respect towards his achievements as Defense Minister but also by fear of his all-
reaching hand” (ibid). Although quite lengthy, I find it very important to quote some pieces 
                                                 
182 Vazgen Sargsyan was cited in Asbarez news, May 10, 1999, retrieved from: 
http://asbarez.com/39846/sargsyan-campaigns-stresses-veteran-benefits/ 
183 As a national hero of the war, Sargsyan was nicknamed "Sparapet Hayotc", which may be translated into 
English as the "Armenian Commander-in-Chief".  
184 In fact, the same type of diverging public attitude exists around the “Yerkrapah” and its role for post -
independent Armenia.  
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of his speech during the Fifth Extraordinary Congress of the Republican Party of Armenia, in 
January of 1999, almost a year after Ter-Petrossian's resignation.  
My role in political developments has been grossly exaggerated. Neither under Levon Ter-
Petrossian, nor under Robert Kocharyan, I participated in the economic policy. … I worked 
with seven Prime Ministers and didn’t have personal conflict with any of them, you can ask 
them. I never beat any of them; I never forced anybody out of the country. … I never 
participated in the privatization, and I myself privatized nothing. I didn’t create clans and 
have no intention to do so, since I regard clans as the greatest danger to this country. 
As an acting Defense Minister of a belligerent country, I can’t help participating in the 
political process. … The army is a component of this society, the mirror of the society, and 
economic, social, political drawbacks hit the army directly. If the army shed blood for this 
country, then, naturally, the army, when its destiny is concerned, must participate in these 
processes. …  
About my relations with Robert Kocharyan. I say, once and for all, because I don’t need 
excessive blabber, we are close friends, we are combat comrades, we have common destiny. I 
shall never oppose Robert Kocharyan, don’t hope for that. …  
About my relations with Levon Ter-Petrossian. He is a wise and moral man and statesman. 
Levon Ter-Petrossian has left and took his convictions with him, leaving the field to us. If 
Levon Ter-Petrossian didn’t want to leave, no one would be able to force him out. About the 
rumors that Levon Ter-Petrossian was forced out, and who forced him out. Vazgen Sargsyan? 
It is absurd and ludicrous. If Levon Ter-Petrossian didn’t resign, no one could make him 
resign. If he dismissed me as Defense minister, I would resign. But in this case the 
responsibility would be on him. Now he resigned and we are responsible. There is a problem 
of responsibility, not of dismissal of each other. I did not rise against Levon Ter-Petrossian, I 
defended the idea. Our dispute was about Karabakh problem and some people in Levon Ter-
Petrossian’s entourage.”(Vazgen Sargsyan, Fifth Extraordinary RPA Congress of 1999) 
The Defense Minister’s speech reflects his influential role in Armenia's political arena 
and that he strongly opposed Ter-Petrossian's policy on the problem of Karabakh. Sargsyan's 
speech also expresses his change of support and collaboration to Robert Kocharyan. Whereas 
there is ample anecdotal evidence that Sargsyan had strong influence in the 
economy/business, and that he benefited from the privatization process, in this speech he 
denied any involvement in privatization or any wealth obtained as a result of privatization. 
Grigoryan, for example, states that “it was a well-known fact, if not well-publicized, that 
certain imports essentially were monopolies (mainly sugar and flour) of the Defense Ministry 
and connected businessmen under the patronage of then Defense Minister V. Sargsyan. And 
again, this was not necessarily done for reasons of introducing corruption, for reasons of 
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benefitting unfairly by the leaders of the time; it was the logic of the war that dictated such 
actions and such centralization.”185 
7.4.3. Foundation of Armenian Democracy and Abortion of its Consolidation 
Papazian (2008) focusing on the evolution of the Armenian national identity during 
perestroika, displays how claims for reforms in the nationality issue transformed into 
national self determination and democratization. The Karabakh movement, initially a 
contestant political movement, laid the foundation of the Armenian sovereign nation-state. 
Supporters of the movements redefined the terms of the national debate around Karabakhin 
purely political terms, eventually to be expressed by a sovereign national state (Papazian 
2008). 
After independence, the Armenian National Movement, under the leadership of Ter-
Petrossian, enjoyed extraordinary popular support and legitimacy as the anticommunist 
leader of the nation. The platform of the Armenian National Movement called for 
democratization, social justice, national sovereignty, and economic reform. "Real social 
change was possible and would be evident, he [Ter-Petrossian] argued, only with the gradual 
buildup of institutions and economic strength, both of which would enable reformist policies 
to take root" (Libaridian 1999:53). "For the first four years of its existence, ... despite the 
war, blockade, and failure to repair the damage suffered in the December 1988 earthquake, ... 
the government of Armenia under Levon Ter Petrosian displayed an enviable stability and an 
apparently steady trajectory toward democracy and capitalism" (Suny, 1999:156). Initially it 
faced little internal opposition, if any (Suny 1999). 
Between 1990 and 1997, despite the adverse consequences of the Karabakh war on 
the Armenian society, Armenia was steadily transitioning into a democracy. The country 
followed principles of democracy without breaching its citizens’ rights and without 
discriminating opportunities within its society. But with the absence of a resolution to the 
Karabakh conflict, Armenia did not fully consolidate into a democratic system. "Levon Ter-
Petrossian's resignation halted the march in that direction" (Libaridian 1999:16).  
                                                 
185 Cited from the interview with Arman Grigoryan, Ann Arbor, Michigan, March 24, 2010. 
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Within a few years of independence, serious strains affected the government's efforts 
to create a democratic state with legitimacy. Privileged elites, particularly those from the 
"Party of Karabakh", resisted change, and their resistance became an obstacle for Armenia's 
change to a democratic and dignified society.  
The political crisis of 1998, followed by the President’s resignation in Armenia, can 
be characterized by a wave of a few military and security-related developments that were 
focal in the failure of the development of economic and political institutions. These events 
are composed below by the ascendance of their significance. 
 A coalition of power ministers comprising of political elites, who all gained authority and 
popularity in the Karabakh war, was formed against Levon Ter-Petrossian administration; 
 Vazgen Sargsyan, the leader of the paramilitary organization Yerkrapah, announced that 
the Yerkrapah had switched their support from Ter-Petrossian to Kocharyan; and 
 Forty members of the National Assembly of Armenia reportedly quit the ruling coalition 
in order to join the Yerkrapah parliamentary faction, later making it the largest 
parliamentary bloc (Astourian 2001:57; Croissant 1998:123). 
It can be said that Levon Ter-Petrossian’s resignation highlighted the limits of 
international pressure on Armenia as a country with several autocratic elites related to war, 
and stressed the dangers inherent in ignoring those limits. At the time of his resignation, Ter-
Petrossian predicted that the ‘party of peace’ was being replaced by the ‘party of war’. It is 
perhaps true that the change of political elites in 1998 cost the Armenian people the long-
term absence of peace settlement, economic insecurity and democratic norms. Today on the 
negotiating table are proposals, whose essence is nearly the same as the "stage-by-stage" plan 
that was discussed in September, 1997. The proposals have remained almost unchanged, but 
the regional balance of power has transformed much. Socio-economic matters have worsened 
for ordinary citizens on the domestic scene as well. Armenia's first president's caution about 
the change became obvious not too long after his resignation. 
It was only a year after Kocharyan’s presidency, in October of 2000, when thousands 
of people took out to streets, calling for President Kocharyan’s resignation. Despite his 
pledges to fight against corruption and to boost the economy, President Kocharyan was not 
displaying any intentions or actions to keep his promises. There was little, if any economic 
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progress, which, however, was mainly due to remittances from abroad and foreign assistance 
or, more specifically, foreign debt.186The government had failed to improve the country’s 
economy. What is more, political exclusion was aggravating. Now not only material 
deprivation was widespread, but there was also an agonizing intensity of political arrests, 
murders, intimidations, and other human rights violations. Since 2000, authoritarian 
tendencies emerged in Armenia; restrictions on political freedom and freedom of speech 
surfaced. Extensive accusations of electoral irregularities and fraud, as well as violations of 
the Armenian Constitution, were common.  
7.4.4. The Armenian Parliament Attack of October 27, 1999 
Soon after Kocharyan's election as President, V. Sargsyan started to diverge from 
Kocharyan's aspirations. Their relations quickly deteriorated. Sargsyan, whose role was 
instrumental in the palace coup against Ter-Petrossian, was gradually persuaded of the 
advantages of the peace deal on the resolution of the Karabakh conflict (de Waal 2013:275). 
Ironically, Sargsyan found himself drawn to the resigned president's position, and seemed to 
understand that peace was the key to solving much of Armenia's problems, and that the 
"frozen" state of the conflict kept the country in misery, degrading the economy and fueling 
corruption (Sifakis, 2001). A popular assumption circulated within media that Sargsyan 
received substantial backing from both the World Bank and IMF, presumably to reinforce his 
reassessment on the Karabakh conflict.187 
                                                 
186 The economy grew by 6.2 percent in the first nine months of 1999 compared to same period of the previous 
year. However, real GDP fell by 2.3 percent at the end of 1999 in the wake of political assassinations (IMF 
2001). According to the IMF, at the end of 2000, Armenia's external debt amounted to $862 million, the 
equivalent of the 45 percent of GDP or 194 percent of exports. From 1995 to 2000, external debt  more than 
doubled (IMF 2001). The latest value for external debt stocks, concessional (DOD, in US$) in Armenia was 
$2,564,586,000 as of 2011. Over the past 18 years, the value for this indicator has fluctuated between 
$2,564,586,000 in 2011 and $16,626,000 in 1993. 
(http://www.indexmundi.com/armenia/economy_profile.html) 
187There is a street story suggesting that Vazgen Sargsyan was heavily influenced by the U.S. policy in 
Armenia, advocated by then U.S. Ambassador to Armenia, Michael Lemmon. Sargsyan and Lemmon 
socialized, played tennis together. Ambassador Lemmon, enthusiastic about a peace agreement (it could become 
his biggest achievement as Ambassador), supposedly impacted Sargsyan's renewed position on the Karabakh 
solution. The slain Minister had even recently asked Washington to mediate an improvement in the strained 
Armenian-Turkish relationship (RFE/RL,Vol. 3, No. 219, November 9, 1999) 
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Meanwhile, Sargsyan was continuing to reinforce his political supremacy in the 
country.188 Securing political support in the Parliament through the politicization of the 
Yerkrapah was followed by another strategic move, the creation of the Miasnutyun bloc.189 
Petrosian (2005) points out that Sargsyan had an exceptional ability to build “most 
unexpected tactical unions in order to achieve his goals" and, as a good example of this type 
of tactics, he refers to the ruling “Miasnutyun” bloc. After the 1998 presidential elections, 
Sargsyan, recognizing the leader of the People’s Party Karen Demirchyan’s growing power 
and popularity among people, allied with him within the "Miasnutyun" bloc. Demirchyan, 
the former First Secretary of the Communist Party of Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic 
and the chairman of the Armenian Supreme Soviet (effectively the leader of Soviet Armenia) 
from 1974 to 1988, had managed to garner about 40% of votes in the 1998 presidential 
elections (based on official results), coming second after Kocharyan. Demirchyan became a 
major potential opponent for Kocharyan after the May 1999 Parliamentary elections, where 
the "Miasnutyun" electoral alliance achieved a total victory, winning the majority of 
parliamentary seats with 43% of votes.190 Sargsyan, in his turn, confirmed himself as the de 
facto decision-maker in Armenia. 
Since the creation of the "Miasnutyun" bloc, both Demirchyan and Sargsyan were 
considered more popular and more powerful than Kocharyan, despite Kocharyan’s 
presidential authority. The creation of such a powerful union of two significant figures of 
Armenia’s political field changed the state of affairs. Commenting on the creation of 
"Miasnutyun", a distinguished political journalist, Anna Israyelyan, noted: "As for Vazgen 
Sargsyan’s logic, I will have to remember a hypothesis about contradictions inside the ruling 
regime, which was frequently voiced at that time. No matter how much Sargsyan assured that 
there were "no problems" between him and Kocharyan, this step [the "Miasnutyun" alliance] 
                                                 
188 Kocharyan’s unprecedented rise to presidency did not deprive Vazgen Sargsyan of his extraordinary 
authority and substantial power within the ruling circles. With strong links to the military and a strong political 
base in the Parliament, Sargsyan then was extensively considered to be the first man to wield the political power 
in Armenia. He basically controlled the military resources of the country.  
189 "Miasnutyun" is translated into Armenian as "Unity" or "Merger".  
190 In the chaos of post-Soviet independence, many Armenians cultivated a sense of nostalgia for their Soviet 
life and experience. Demirchyan's popularity was derived to a large extent from those nostalgic feelings towards 
the Soviet years and, thus, from Demirchyan's experience as a Soviet-era leader.  
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testified the opposite." (Araratyan 2012).191 According to many, it was due to "Miasnutyun" 
bloc that Sargsyan became the Prime Minister in June of 1999. The union of these two types 
of power, with Sargsyan being the hard power as the winner of the war, an experimental 
Prime Minister with positive outcomes, and Demirhcyan, as the soft power, a non-military 
figure, a man of long-term experience in public administration, looked as a very beneficial 
channel for Sargsyan to advance to presidency. 
It is substantially important to stress that recently Sargsyan’s image among people as 
a hardliner was changing into a more popular leader, particularly because the short period of 
his premiership was distinguished with more or less successful attempts to take the country 
out of financial crisis and to fight against corruption. “All he had to do was get rid of the 
image he gained during the Nagorno-Karabakh war as a guerrilla … and to prove to the 
people that he was capable of governing the state” (Petrosian 2005). 
With such a powerful authority and a changing image, Sargsyan, as Prime Minister, 
thus, began to overshadow the new President, Kocharyan. At the same time, he was 
transforming from a formerly Russian-oriented politician towards a more pro-Western leader, 
distancing himself even more from Kocharyan’s explicitly Russian- inclined stance and 
diplomacy. For President Kocharyan and the political circle close to him, Sargsyan’s 
unexpected transformation was threatening. It was becoming obvious that while a few years 
ago Sargsyan promoted Kocharyan’s way to the presidency, he could easily oppose 
Kocharyan with the same manner he did the former President Ter-Petrossian. Media accounts 
reported about rumors that the Prime Minister was considering forcing the resignation of 
State Security Minister Serzh Sargsyan, a close ally of Kocharyan (Danielian 1999; 
Grigoryan 1999).    
In September, 1999, the first Armenia-Diaspora conference was held in Yerevan. 
Following the conference, as a new Prime Minister, Sargsyan made a visit to the United 
States, during which it became clear to him that financial support from the Diaspora was 
decreasing and it could not boost economic development of Armenia (de Waal 2003:263). 
                                                 
191 Please see Mediamax website, “National Assembly Elections: v1.0-v4.0”: 1999 elections" by Aram 
Araratyan, April13, 2012, (http://www.mediamax.am/printpage.php?lang=en&nid=4633) 
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Meanwhile, on October 11, 1999, Kocharyan met with the President of Azerbaijan Heydar 
Aliev. It is contended that the meeting finished with a hope for a final Karabakh resolution 
proposal in the imminent OSCE summit in Istanbul in November (de Waal 2003).192 
Such was the domestic political context, when on October 27, 1999, Demirchyan and 
Sargsyan were assassinated in the Parliament with other senior politicians. Their 
assassination happened less than six months after the 1999 Parliamentary elections. On that 
tragic day, five gunmen led by a former journalist and an extreme nationalist, Nairi 
Hunanyan, stormed the Armenian National Assembly and opened fire in the Assembly’s 
session hall. The terrorists carried out the parliament massacre, claiming that: “The country 
[was] in a catastrophic situation. People [were] hungry and the government [didn’t] offer any 
way out” (Avagyan and Tadevosyan 2005). Along with the Prime Minister Sargsyan and the 
National Assembly Speaker Karen Demirchyan other high ranking officials were murdered, 
among them Deputy Speakers Yuri Bakhshyan and Ruben Miroyan, Minister of Emergencies 
(Urgent Issues) Leonard Petrosyan, National Assembly Members Genrikh Abrahamyan, 
Armenak Armenakyan and Mikael Kotanyan. Many others were wounded and injured.  
The incident unfolded live on television, and upon terrorists' demands, negotiations to 
speak on TV began. The security forces were put on alert, but there was no further action 
taken. President Kocharyan was personally directing the security forces outside the National 
Assembly during the standoff. Meanwhile, citizens seemed unclear of what was happening in 
the country. As negotiations to free the hostages began, the process turned to be a daunting 
task, because the terrorists' comments and demands "seemed to lack coherence." Agreeing to 
the words of Armenia's Minister of Health that the gunmen seemed to be in a "state of 
possession", the Russian minister for relations with former Soviet states, Leonid V. 
Drachevsky, added: "It looks like a psychiatrist is needed – professional negotiators from the 
                                                 
192 This was the two presidents' fifth meeting in six months. According to de Waal (2003), the mood of the 
meeting was friendly, and Azerbaijainis even barbecued a sheep (de Waal 2003:274). De Waal writes that 
during the meeting, the two presidents reconsidered the "Goble Plan" ("land swap" plan mentioned earlier in  the 
chapter), despite the fact that the plan was previously not liked by either Armenian or Azerbaijani elites (ibid). 
The Azerbaijani elites rejected the plan in 1999, considering it as surrender of Karabakh. Perhaps, it was over 
this issue that in October 1999, three of Aliev’s most experience advisors – foreign affairs aide, Vafa Guluzade, 
the head of his secretariat, Eldar Namazov, and his foreign minister, Toﬁk Zulfugarov – resigned. The “Goble 
Plan” was also accepted negatively in Armenia, because by losing Meghri, Armenia would lose its southern 
border with a very important neighbor, Iran. 
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special services who would calm them down." (Sifakis, 2001) The members of the team were 
not capable of articulating a full political position, and they named almost everyone in 
Armenia as a co-conspirator. What made things even more complicated was that at the time 
of negotiations, government officials had difficulty defining the political background of the 
gunmen (ibid). 
The leader of the gunmen, Hunanyan, told the reporters that the eight deaths of the 
attack were all “innocent victims” except for the case of Sargsyan.193 According to 
Hunanyan, “Sargsyan failed the nation” ” (Avagyan and Tadevosyan 2005). Before 
surrendering, Hunanyan announced: “This is a patriotic action. This shake-up is needed for 
the nation to regain its senses.” When already captured, he added: “Today’s murder is going 
to be a shock for people. It was intended as a warning to the rest of the government. It 
doesn’t matter who’s going to replace those who died in the shootout today. From now on 
they will serve the people, because they see what can happen if they don’t” (ibid). 
After the gunmen surrendered the Parliament, they were carried away in a bulletproof 
van.  President Kocharyan promised the nation a “fair trial" of the gunmen. But the long 
process of investigation and trial discovered very little about the case and it failed to find out 
the real motives behind the attack. Numerous important questions that have been churning in 
the media during those days and still several years afterwards have not been disclosed 
concerning the case. Moreover, the trial rapidly and suddenly ended as the leader of the 
                                                 
193 There is not much detail about the biography of the leader of the gunmen, Nairi Hunanyan. It is known that 
he was born in 1965 in Yerevan, Armenia. Hunanyan, who was 34 at the time of the terrorist attack, was a 
former journalist, a graduate of the Department of Philology and Journalism of Yerevan State University (AZG 
Daily, April 20, 2001). Azg Daily reported that Hunanyan used to go in for various kinds of sports and had read 
about 4,000 books kept in his parents’ library. When he was 22, his parents divorced. According to Azg Daily, 
in 1987 Hunanyan actively participated in ecological rallies, then in 1988 in protest demonstrations for the 
unification of Karabagh with Armenia. In 1988 he went to Karabakh with the Karabakh Committee leaders 
Levon Ter-Petrossian, Vano Siradeghyan, Vazgen Manukyan and others and was involved in arranging the 
activities of Karabagh Komsomol (Young Communists) with those of Armenia. He first met Robert Kocharyan 
and Serzh Sargsyan in Stepanakert, Karabakh. He was the founder of the Horizon (translated into English as 
"horizon") information agency. Since 1990, he was a member of the “Dashnakcutiun” (Armenian Revolutionary 
Federation), the most radical nationalist Armenian political party, which was banned as a political party in 
Armenia by Ter-Petrossian, but later reinstated in by Kocharyan (Teymurazyan, 2007). He had close contacts 
with Hrayr Marukhian, the representative of the ARF Central Bureau (AZG Daily, April 20, 2001). "The party 
[ARF] was a means for me to realize my plans," Hunanyan said (ibid). Hunanyan was later expelled from the 
party on the grounds of stealing money, although he insisted that this story was not true. From 1994 to 1997, 
Hunanyan lived in Crimea, the Ukraine, and returned to Armenia in 1997 (Teymurazyan, 2007). When in 
prison, Hunanyian also denied allegations ascribed to him by the ARF that he had connections with Turkish 
special services. 
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group Nairi Hunanyan reportedly intended to reveal new information about the crime. By 
now, many members of the terrorist group are dead; allegedly they have made suicides in 
their prison cells.194 Thus, there are even fewer hopes to learn anything new about the case.  
With so much doubt and confusion behind the attack and no clear reasons discovered 
during the trial, the notorious attack left the nation wondering: Who might have been 
responsible? Who benefitted? What would the consequences be?  
Several views concerning the motives of the attack on the Armenian National 
Assembly have been conceived by political researchers and analysts. Some relate it to the 
potential resolution of the Karabakh issue and argue that it was organized by outside forces. 
Some consider the attack as an attempted coup d’état. This, however, was never a challenge 
to state authority [particularly to Kocharyan's power as President], nor was it an attempt to 
seize the state. Yet a few think it was just a criminal operation undertaken on social-political 
grounds, because the terrorists had emphasized “the miserable situation of our [Armenian] 
people” and corruption of Armenian politicians as the main reasons for their attack. Whereas 
Hunanyan was quoted as saying; “we wanted to save the Armenian people from perishing 
and restore their rights”, he articulated no clear political agenda of how to do so (Koran 
1999).  
Though Hunanian denied any relation of their actions to the situation concerning 
Karabakh, there is "a street-talk tale" that the Karabakh issue played a role in the 
organization and implementation of the attack. As mentioned earlier, less than a month 
before the Parliament shooting, there were closed talks between Armenian and Azeri leaders 
that many hoped would lead to an agreement at the next OSCE summit in November. The 
agreement was the land swap ("Goble Plan"), which was discussed earlier in this chapter. 
                                                 
194 In 2000, Norayr Yeghiazaryan, who had sold weapons to the gang, died under unknown conditions in an 
isolation cell. In 2004, Vram Galstyan (uncle of Nairi Hunanyan) committed suicide by hanging from a bed 
sheet. In May, 2010, Hamlet Stepanyan, 57, died of an apparent heart attack inside Nubarshen penitentiary. He 
is the third among six defendants of the controversial case who died in prison. There are also important 
witnesses of the case that died under suspicious circumstances. In 2002, Tigran Naghdalyan, 36, Chairman of 
the Board of the Armenian Public Television and a key witness of the case was shot dead at the doorstep of his 
apartment. In 2004, National Assembly deputy Mushegh Movsisyan, 47, another key witness of the case, d ied 
in a car accident. In 2004, Hasmik Abrahamyan, 45, an employee of the NA Protocol Department, who was on 
the witness list, was found hanged in the NA Protocol building (Abrahamyan, 2010). 
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Focusing on the prospective of a settlement, a few analysts supported the speculation that the 
attack was a "bid by Russia to sabotage ongoing talks to settle the Karabakh dispute with 
Azerbaijan" (Grigoryan 1999).195 Whereas the timing of the parliament attack and the above-
mentioned talks between Kocharyan and Aliev coincided, there was no evidence leading to 
the conclusion that this version was a likely reason for the parliament assassinations. The 
linkage was too indistinct.    
The most widely accepted view regarding motives of the 1999 Parliament violence, 
reflected in many political analysts’ articles and speeches, in numerous interviews given by 
the members of the Sargsyan and Demirchyan families, in the numerous videos related to this 
theme uploaded in the YouTube by oppositional groups, is that Sargsyan and Demirchyan 
were simply victims of a political assassination. This version presumes that Kocharyan was 
the mastermind behind the attack in efforts to get rid of his most influential political 
adversaries. The latter had effectively marginalized Kocharyan and Kocharyan’s allies in the 
last few months. This conviction is supported by the leader of the gunmen Nairi Hunanyan’s 
statement during the trial that “by killing Prime Minister Sargsyan, he had helped restore 
“constitutional order” by strengthening the position of then-President Robert Kocharyan” 
(Coalson and Tamrazian 2009). Grigoryan (1999) observes that the assassination of Sargsyan 
and Kocharyan would dramatically weaken the "Miasnutyun" bloc’s control of Parliament 
and government, leaving Kocharyan with little potential opposition.  
As it has been widely contested in media and believed by the public, Kocharyan 
seemed to be a major beneficiary of the situation created from the chaos following the attack.  
The speculations of many parliament members and leaders of political parties support this 
motive (Abrahamyan, 2010). Here are what some of Armenian politicians have said 
regarding the October 27 tragedy and the trial process: 
                                                 
195 There were allegations accusing Russia of organizing the violence in the Armenian Parliament. Former 
Federal Security Service (FSB) agent Alexander Litvinenko had blamed the Russian special services for the 
Parliament attack. According to Litvinenko, “Russia's political leadership managed to prevent the signing of a 
peace agreement resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict”. He concluded that Russian authorities hatched the 
plot to prevent a resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Nevertheless, Litvienko provided no evidence to 
support his accusation.  
The Russian Embassy in Armenia immediately denied any such involvement.   
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Albert Bazeyan (Republican Party; Mayor of Yerevan August 1999-January 2001): 
"We have come to the conclusion that the crime was aimed at making Robert Kocharyan's 
power unlimited and uncontrolled. By physically eliminating Karen Demirchyan and Vazgen 
Sargsyan, its organizers wanted to create prerequisites for Kocharyan's victory in the future 
presidential elections." (Martirosian and Meloyan, RFE/RL, October 2009)  
Artashes Geghamyan (Law and Accord party): “I think that president Kocharyan 
should have resigned when the passions died away to secure fair pre-time presidential 
election. He did not do it, which was followed by strange and obscure processes. … I think 
that president Kocharyan’s announcement that death penalty would not be applied in 
Armenia was premature.” (Abrahamian, 2001) 
Norik Petrosyan (Communist party): “I am sure that the authorities are not making 
special efforts to have the crimes revealed. This makes me believe that there were people 
behind this group, and I am not sure that these people will be revealed under these political 
conditions.” (Abrahamian, 2001) 
Aghvan Vardanian (Armenian Revolutionary Federation/ Dashnaktsutyun): “It was a 
crime, directed against the foundations of our statehood. We think that the law-agencies, if 
necessary, have to continue looking for who masterminded it even for decades. But it is 
beyond doubt that there were people behind Hunanian and his henchmen and they must be 
tracked down and punished." (Abrahamian, 2001) 
Myasnik Malkhasian (Hayastan group): “It is painful to see that two years have 
passed by but the crime is not discovered, and neither the politicians nor the public have any 
idea about how the trial will proceed. As the assassins are known, they should have been long 
ago executed; the debate whether death penalty should be applied or not seems to be quite 
unnecessary. We are disappointed with the trial process. The authorities should have 
undertaken quick action to reveal the organizers. The ongoing trial is keeping the public 
strained giving rise to suspicions and controversial comments". (Abrahamian, 2001) 
Other politicians have blamed Kocharyan for the bungled criminal investigation of 
the parliament attack. Levon Ter-Petrosian, the former president, announced in 2007: “The 
October [1999] massacre was the main milestone that cleared the broad way to the formation 
and development of Kocharyan's regime” (Danielyan, 2007, Eurasianet). Ashot 
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Manucharyan, a former member of the Karabakh Committee, accused the President 
Kocharyan of "concealing from the investigation the main version of the realization of the 
terrorist act of October 27 – V. Sargsyan's and K. Demirchyan's disagreement with the so-
called "Goble Plan" of territorial swap between Armenia and Azerbaijan" (Mediamax, 
October 26, 2000).  
Prison deaths of some of the terrorists have further fuelled more allegations of a high-
level cover-up of the parliament attack. Specifically the relatives and supporters of the 
murdered politicians suspected Kocharyan and then State Security Minister Serzh Sargsyan 
of masterminding the killings and mishandling the trial. 
Amidst widespread accusations, Serzh Sargsyan and Robert Kocharyan initially 
found themselves in a vulnerable position. Vazgen Sargsyan's followers in both the Defense 
Ministry and the "Yerkrapah" held Serzh Sargsyan and Robert Kocharyan partly responsible 
for the tragedy. They particularly demanded the State Security Minister Serzh Sargsyan's 
resignation (Sanjian 1999). But Kocharyan and Sargsyan were not the only ones at risk; the 
Armenian National Assembly was in disarray. The National Assembly significantly 
weakened by the assassinations and without a strong Parliamentary Speaker, was no longer 
able to assume the role of a powerful political counter-balance to the president (Petrosian 
2005). The governmental elite that could oppose and block the political domination of the 
new president was now demolished. "Miasnutyun" was unlikely to survive the death of its 
leaders; with Sargsyan and Demirchyan dead, no other party member was powerful enough 
or had the political vision to maintain the coalition. For the next few months, Kocharyan 
neutralized a few of his opponents, by appointing them to high positions, many of who he 
later dismissed.196 
After the death of the most powerful military person, Vazgen Sarsgyan, who could 
have potentially challenged the new president’s power, Kocharyan’s next mission became the 
formation of a new coalition, a new political team. The emphasis of the coalition was the 
establishment of a strong military team, a team that could protect Kocharyan in case of 
                                                 
196 For example, the assassinated Prime Minister's brother Aram Sargsyan was appointed Prime Minister. But 
Aram Sargasyan was dismissed by Kocharyan in May 2000, less than a year after the appointment, due to 
"inability to work" with Sargsyan's cabinet. 
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potential opposition and challenge to his power. In 2000, he made new appointments for 
Defense Deputy Ministers (Manvel Grigoryan, Gagik Melkonyan, Yuri Khachaturov, Arthur 
Aghabekyan, Michael Grigoryan). In May of the same year, in violation of the Constitution 
and bypassing the government, Defense Minister Vagharshak Harutyunyan was fired. 
President Kocharyan justified his decision by stating that “the Armenian army would have 
found itself on the verge of collapse if he [Harutyunyan] had stayed in office for another six 
months”. The president also claimed that Harutyunan “was the only general of the Armenian 
army who did not spend a day at the front”, adding that he [Kocharyan] “immediately 
participated in the creation of the army and could not stay indifferent to that.”197 The real 
reason behind the Defense Minister's dismissal was the fact that right after the tragedy of 
October 1999 (the Parliament attack), Harutyunyan had blocked all the roads to the city by 
his own initiative. Kocharyan publicly condemned the Minister, announcing that the latter 
didn’t have the right to take any steps without discussing it with the President.198 
Harutyunyan, consequently, was replaced with a long-time strong supporter and war-time 
friend Serzh Sargsyan. Kocharyan quickly managed to attain his political power and 
leadership. By the summer of 2000, he fully recovered his strength as president and 
dismissed all his opponents from key posts. 
The government became more authoritarian and politically exclusive, asthe use of 
force to resolve economic and political issues gradually became a predominant propensity of 
the Armenian state leaders. Armenia's evolution into a totalitarian regime that started with 
Ter-Petrossian's resignation continued.199 The country carried on its "slide into a semi-
                                                 
197 For more details, please see the website www.Karabakh.org, available online at 
http://www.karabakh.org/news/analysis/azerbaijans -army-and-armenias-armed-forces/4/). 
198 The Minister acted on his own due to the extreme situation. The chairmen of the legislative and executive 
branches were murdered, the whole National Assembly was occupied, and its members taken hostage by the 
terrorists. Supposedly, under these circumstances, the Minister made the right decision to block the roads to the 
capital city, assuming that this may be a large-scale terrorist attack against the country. There are also premises 
that Harutyunyan was not able to find Kocharyan urgently  (Seyranyan2008). 
199 One may counter-argue here that according to my presentation, Vazgen Sargsyan was a powerful hardliner 
during the last few years of Ter-Petrossian's administration and he was instrumental in Ter-Petrossian's 
resignation and the demise of democratic norms in Armenia. However, I have further highlighted that Sargsyan, 
soon after Ter-Petrossian's resignation, realized the genuine value of Ter-Petrossian's arguments on the 
Karabakh conflict resolution and, reportedly, was gradually changing to a less  nationalist leader. Whereas it is 
debatable whether Sargsyan would truly change to a more popular and less autocratic leader as Prime Ministe r, 
if not assassinated, it is unquestionable that his political presence, and moreover his changed attitude toward s 
Kocharyan's policies, was the strongest impediment to the monopolization of politics by Kocharyan, widely 
considered to be the shrewdest hardliner of the "Karabakh Party". In this sense, I agree to Israelyan's 
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authoritarian state dominated by a powerful president" (Coalson and Tamrazian, 2009). Anna 
Israelyan, a well-known journalist who reports for RFE/RL Armenia, wrote: "After October 
27, authority in Armenia became very monolithic, with a single center" (ibid). According to 
many, both in media and in political discourse, after this infamous episode president 
Kocharyan solidified his grip on power, and hopes for a more politically diverse atmosphere 
in the country became increasingly elusive.  
Whatever the real motive behind the Parliament attack of 1999, it plunged the country 
into crisis. It was an unprecedented event for Armenia, which traumatized the small 
landlocked country and shocked the world. It created a situation fraught with uncertainty. 
Political leaders of great powers expressed their fears that the attack would undermine 
attempts to resolve the Karabakh dispute. Then US president Bill Clinton condemned the 
violence and stated that "Prime Minister Sarkisyan’s death was a real blow to that country 
and that region” (Marsden 1999).  
The event had a major impact on the neighboring countries’ perception of Armenia’s 
internal strength. It created an image of Armenia with frail and fragmented political elites. 
This was specifically true on the part of Azerbaijan. The deputy chairman of the Azeri 
Popular Front (APF), Ali Kerimov, stated that Armenia could not be trusted to fulfill any 
conditions that might be made in a settlement in Nagorno-Karabakh (Avagyan and 
Tadevosyan 2005). The head of the Azeri Parliament committee of foreign affairs, Rza 
Ibadov, declared the shooting was “not only a powerful blow to the image of Armenia, but 
also an obvious demonstration of the inter-party political crisis in Armenia. It seems that 
concrete political powers stand behind the acts of the terrorists” (ibid).  
Besides creating huge shifts in Armenian local political scene and, perhaps, affecting 
Armenia’s foreign affairs, the Parliament shooting negatively influenced Armenia’s 
economy, specifically through a decrease in foreign investment. Ugurluyan (2001) states that 
the assassinations directly impacted theforeign investmentlevel in Armenia, which dropped 
92.2% from 1998 to 1999. "October 27 events adversely impacted the situation in the country 
                                                                                                                                                       
observation that Sarsgayn's assassination was critical in the establishment of a "monolithic political 
atmosphere" and the expansion of political exclusion in the republic.   
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in all aspects and spheres and its consequences will be felt for long, in economic, political 
and social expressions" (Human Rights and Human Development Action for Progress: 
Armenia 2000:15). It predicted a further decline in human development (ibid).  
Iskandaryan and Cheterian (2008) contend that the Parliament massacre and 
Kocharyan's capacity to outmaneuver his rivals led to the formation of a pyramid of power in 
Armenia, on top of which stood the president. "All competing political forces were 
eliminated, marginalized, or co-opted, creating the conditions for a pyramidal political 
system" (Iskandaryan and Cheterian 2008). Yet, while Kocharyan was a strong ruler, he 
lacked a popular base in Armenia. It made him rely even more on authoritarian methods, 
suppressing the media and falsifying elections (ibid).  
7.4.5. Post-electoral Violence of March 1, 2008 
Since 2000, state coercion has been particularly harsh against people at times of 
elections in Armenia. The political atmosphere during elections, specifically in the 2003 and 
2008 presidential elections, was marred with intimidation. In 2003, Kocharyan was reelected 
in an election that was acknowledged to be fraudulent by OSCE and international observers 
(OSCE/ODHIR 2003). The 2003 presidential elections occurred through two rounds. Since 
no candidate received a majority of votes in the first round of the elections held on February 
19, a second round was held on March 5200. After the first round, the opposition expressed its 
discontent by organizing large rallies in Yerevan. Police detained demonstrators and 
opposition supports on February 22.  Reports prepared by OSCE and Human Rights Watch 
state that more than 200 people were detained and many were sentenced to 15 days of 
administrative detention in efforts to ruin the opposition before the second round of elections 
to be held in March (OSCE/ODHIR 2003; Human Rights Watch 2003). In March, according 
to official results, Kocharyan defeated the main opposition candidate Stepan Demirchyan 
with about 67% of the electoral vote.  
                                                 
200 During the first round of elections, incumbent President Robert Kocharyan received a little less than 50% of 
the vote, not being able to defeat main opposition candidate Stepan Demirchyan, assassinated Karen 
Demirchyan’s son.  
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The Armenian government continued to use excessive force against disgruntled 
people in April of 2004, when Armenia’s political opposition and civil society united in mass 
peaceful protests. People, led by major opposition forces, demanded Kocharyan’s 
resignation. The cycle of state repression was repeated through violent dispersion of peaceful 
demonstrators, arrests, journalist attacks, raids of political party offices, and restriction of 
travel from regions to the capital city in order to prevent people from participating in 
demonstrations.  
After Kocharyan’s reelection as president in 2003, the Armenian Republican Party – 
the main government-supported political party – consolidated its grip on Parliament. 
Oppositional representation became very limited in the National Assembly. Therefore, the 
political environment was void of political diversity in the eve of 2008 presidential elections. 
President Kocharyan was serving his second and last term as President, and it was apparent 
that Prime Minister Serzh Sargsyan would become Kocharyan’s heir to presidency in the 
2008 presidential elections.  
The political apathy was broken on September 21 of 2007 by Ter-Petrossian, who in 
his first public speech since his resignation fiercely denounced Kocharyan and criticized his 
administration for the existing corruption, human rights violations, criminality and plutocracy 
(RFE/RL, September 2007). Later in October, Ter-Petrossian publicly announced his 
intention to run for the presidency and lead the opposition in the forthcoming elections. 
Armenia’s former president’s speech increased hopes of replacing the current regime in the 
upcoming presidential elections. Yet the incumbent government once again was facing the 
issue of maintaining power at all costs. Ter-Petrossian’s intentions to lead the opposition in 
the wake of elections leveraged the government to take exceptional steps against oppositional 
challenges. The state elites’ apprehension was particularly expressed by the fact that the pro-
government media, including all TV channels, were profoundly skewed in Sargsyan’s favor 
before elections. They sharply criticized the opposition and its leader (RFE/RL 2007; PACE 
2008; Arminfo 2008).  
Sargsyan and Ter-Petrossian were the main presidential candidates among nine 
candidates during the February 19, 2008 elections. According to official tallies, Prime 
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Minister Sargsyan won the elections and his main challenger Ter-Petrossian placed second. 
On February 20, the Central Election Commission declared Prime Minister Serzh Sargsyan 
the winner of the elections with 52.8% of the vote. Based on official results, Levon Ter-
Petrossian won 21.5%. Immediately after the elections, OSCE, Human Rights Watch, and 
other international observers criticized the 2008 Armenian presidential elections as non-
democratic and documented several cases of voter intimidation, threatening, violation of the 
right to secret ballot, ballot stuffing, and violent attacks of opposition party activists (OSCE 
2008; Human Rights Watch 2008). A majority of Armenian citizens also condemned the 
elections as unfair.    
The election results were particularly strongly disputed by supporters of Ter-
Petrossian. Thousands of citizens contending Sargsyan’s victory as fraudulent organized 10 
days of continuous peaceful protests in Yerevan’s Freedom Square after the election. Daily 
rallies were held in the streets of Yerevan. Hundreds of protestors camped out overnight in 
tents in the Freedom square. On March 1, 2008, this peaceful mass mobilization ended in 
deadly clashes between government forces and demonstrators. Early in the morning, the 
police attacked people, who were sleeping in their tents on Freedom Square in central 
Yerevan and dispersed the demonstrators chasing them for several kilometers (Human Rights 
Watch, 2008). Ter-Petrossian was forcefully taken to his residence and put under house arrest 
(RFE/RL 2008; Nazaryan 2011). Ten people died, more than a hundred were injured, and 
several dozen were arrested as political prisoners (Human Rights Watch, February 25, 2009; 
Fuller and Giragosian, April 26, 2011). Police charged those who were arrested with violent 
attempts of government overthrow, mass disorder, police resistance, and other criminal 
offenses. The opposition – in reality extremely organized and peaceful – was blamed for 
creating disorder, political turmoil and instability in the country. The recurring cycle of 
Armenian people demanding their right to equal law and fair voting resulted in an imposition 
of a 20-day state of emergency, including a complete ban on public rallies, by the Armenian 
government (Human Rights Watch, February 25, 2009; Tavernise 2008).  
According to the President’s decree, the media were forbidden to use any other source 
of information on the internal affairs of Armenia beside the official ones (Message of 
Armenian President Robert Kocharyan to the People of Armenia, March 1, 2008). In the 
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aftermath of protest crackdown, many newspapers, several radio stations, and most online 
news were banned. Foreign broadcasters’ reports on Armenia were shut down along with 
other local mass media (Yerevan Press Club, 2009). National Security Service officials 
censored newspaper contents and banned their publication when those were in favor of the 
opposition (ibid). The Armenian government also banned the Armenian- language broadcasts 
of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. In a March 7 editorial titled “Dark Days in Armenia,” 
the New York Times called on President George W. Bush, along with European leaders, to 
“make clear to Armenia’s government that such behavior is unacceptable and will jeopardize 
future relations” (NY Times 2008). “A clear signal of disapproval is needed in order to halt 
what the editorial described as a “slide into authoritarianism” by CIS states” (EurasiaNet 
2008).  
Nazaryan (2011) comments that although the purpose of the state of emergency was 
declared to “promote national reconciliation” (Kocharyan, 2008), the Armenian people 
lacked information about how many people had been killed and injured, or who was arrested 
and why (Human Rights Watch, 2008). Citizens’ attempts to organize protests in other cities 
and towns of Armenia were contained by local authorities in spite of the fact that the state of 
emergency was declared only for the capital city, Yerevan. 
After the state of emergency was declared, regular army troops were charged with 
maintaining public order in the country. The Armenian military deployed its troops in the 
city center. Addressing the Armenian nation, the Chief of the Armed Forces Seyran Ohanyan 
cautioned that any attempts of rallies by people will be “strictly” countered.  “I would like to 
warn all citizens that any attempt to organize or participate in events prohibited under the 
state of emergency would be adequately and strictly countered by the Armed Forces of the 
Republic of Armenia. … In particular, I am asking you to refrain from attempting to 
assemble in Yerevan even in small groups” (ArmTown 2008; Horizon Weekly 2008).  
Accordingly, the army would intervene at the “slightest” sign of such attempts, consequently 
making the Armenian army politicized and the Armenian state militarized.  
In contrast to Ohanyan’s announcement that the army would intervene in case of 
social mobilization, the Defense Minister Mikhail Harutyunyan had announced days earlier: 
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“No one will involve the army in political processes!” (Panarmenian.net, 2008)201 On 
February 23, four days after the presidential elections and a few days before the armed forces 
restrained protesting citizens, Harutyunyan said: “All Deputies to the Defense Minister are 
performing their duties. The army doesn’t deal with politics. We obey the orders of the 
Supreme Commander.” In the same speech, however, the Minister announced that the army 
and military leaders do not support Levon Ter-Petrossian and added that  “the dreams of the 
opposition will never come true” (ibid)202.  
Reporters and analysts conclude that the post-election process of 2008, specifically 
the violent repression of demonstrators, the use of not only police but also the army, and the 
declaration of a state of emergency, became a turning point for the delay of Armenia’s future 
democratization. Using the military in internal affairs is banned by the Armenian 
Constitution (Article 8.2; Article 55, part 13). Article 8.2 stipulates: “The armed forces of the 
Republic of Armenia shall ensure security, defense and territorial integrity of the Republic of 
Armenia, as well as inviolability of its borders. The armed forces shall maintain neutrality in 
political matters and remain under civilian control.”203 
Furthermore, part 13 of the Article 55 of the Constitution states: “In the event of an 
armed attack against the Republic, an imminent danger thereof or declaration of war, [the 
                                                 
201 In 1992-1994 Mikhail Harutyunyan has held different positions in the system of Armed Forces of the 
Republic of Armenia. Harutyunyan was one of the reliable figures in the government of Robert Kocharyan after 
the 1999 coup, having provided services to Robert Kocharyan and Serzh Sargsyan. In 2000, Mikhail 
Harutyunyan, First Deputy of Defense Minister, Chief of General Staff of the RA Armed Forces temporarily 
fulfilled the duties of Defense Minister. In 2007 again, Serzh Sargsyan assigned Harutyunyan as Defense 
Minister of RA. During the same time, Seyran Ohanyan was assigned the post of Chief of General Staff of the  
RA Armed Forces (Gabrielyan 2011).   
According to Gabrielyan (2011), the positions occupied in the Defense Ministry helped Harutyunyan and his 
family members to illegally convert money into real estate and many businesses. The Harutyunyan family is a  
shareholder of “Rome”, “Cactus” and “Central” restaurants, the “Le Boheme” chain of cafes, the clothing shop 
“Storm”, and Austrian Airlines in Armenia. It is rumored that the former Minister has apartments in the cen ter 
of Yerevan and Moscow, as well as private houses in Armenia. 
202 Ter-Petrossian and the opposition were not expecting either the Armed Forces or the Defense Ministry to 
support the opposition. However, they hoped that the Defense Ministry would not violate the 
ArmenianConstitution and would not interfere with the peaceful demonstrations. But according to the Defense 
Minister's words, the Defense Ministry had a predisposition against the opposition. Harutyunyan's statement 
that "the army and the military leaders [did] not support Ter-Petrossian" displays the non-neutrality of the 
military leaders. 
203 For Article 8.2 and Article 55, part 13, please see the Armenian Constitution, available online at: 
http://www.Parliament.am/Parliament.php?id=constitution&lang=eng 
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President of the Republic] shall declare a martial law, may call for a general or partial 
mobilization and shall decide on the use of the armed forces. In case of use of the armed 
forces or declaration of martial law a special sitting of the National Assembly shall be 
convened by force of law. The law shall define the legal regime of martial law.” With this 
Article, the Armenian constitution contemplates that the President cannot announce martial 
law, unless an extreme military situation arises threatening the security of the nation. The 
mandatory conditions allowing for the implementation of armed forces were absent in the 
post-election oppositional mobilization in the Republic of Armenia. “So, the administration 
of the new military structure … could not be justified by the formulation of “the assurance of 
constitutional duties of the RA armed forces”” (Gabrielyan 2011).  
Ignoring the constitutional ban discussed above, the army was brought to the streets 
of Yerevan on March 1, 2008. The DefenseMinister justified the decree of a state of 
emergency by the fact that it had been signed by the President, and that he was guided by the 
President’s decree. Reporters, therefore, claimed that “the Defense Minister superimposed 
the decrees of the President to the RA Constitution” (Gabrielyan 2011).  
When confronted by reporters regarding the President’s decree on state of emergency 
and its unconstitutionality, the Armenian authorities also stressed the military threat from 
Azerbaijan and tried to justify the legality of President’s order by the Armenian-Azerbaijani 
border line tensions. According to Robert Kocharyan’s press secretary, Victor Soghomonyan, 
“the acts of the Defense Minister of Armenia should be viewed in the framework of security 
and territorial integrity, and should be considered in the context of real threats, which are 
present in 2008 January-February. The Azerbaijani armed forces contact line tensions and an 
aggressive performance in the internal political situation in Armenia, shows the readiness of 
Azerbaijan to find a military solution to Nagorno-Karabakh conflict”. This kind of reasoning 
of Armenian officials and the extensive participation of the military in post-election 
processes yet again confirm that after the Karabakh war the Armenian state has continued 
militarization tendencies in handling the inner politics of the country. State elites 
aggressively used the military during the 2008 February-March events in order to keep the 
regime in power at any price.   
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The international reaction towards the actions of the Armenian government was 
disparaging. Giorgi Gogia, a researcher at Human Rights Watch, commented regarding 
March 1 events in the following way: “The authorities’ response to the March 1 events has 
been one-sided. The fact that police were themselves under attack at times by no means 
excuses them for incidents when they used excessive force.” Human Rights Watch also states 
that there was evidence that “the use of force went outside the boundaries of legitimate 
policing” and urged Armenian government to prosecute those responsible (Human Rights 
Watch 2009).   
There was a strong critique of Armenian authorities concerning harassment of the 
media. “We’re alarmed by this blatant attempt to censor news of the disputed election,” the 
Executive Director of Committee to Protect Journalists Joel Simon stated on March 2. “We 
call on Armenian authorities to withdraw the ban on independent news gathering and 
dissemination, and restore access to independent and opposition media” (Committee to 
Protect Journalists (CPJ) 2008). Three days later, the Broadcasting Board of Governors 
(BBG), which oversees all non-military U.S. international broadcasting joined the Committee 
to Protect Journalists’ criticism of socio-political exclusion in Armenia by a strong objection 
to blackout of independent media in Armenia. “Censorship and harassment of the media are 
the antithesis of democracy,” said James K. Glassman, Chairman of the BBG (Broadcasting 
Board of Governors 2008).  
Another harsh criticism from the Council of Europe was related to Levon Ter-
Petrossian’s house arrest and the restrictions on his freedom of movement. Terry Davis, the 
secretary general of the Council of Europe, indicated that “the limitations placed on the 
opposition leader constituted arbitrary action on the government’s part” (EurasiaNet 2008).   
Many Diaspora Armenians also reacted negatively to what was happening in their 
historic homeland. On March 2, more than 10,000 supporters of Armenia’s opposition staged 
a protest in Hollywood's Little Armenia district. Protestors condemned the Armenian 
authorities for corruption and unfairness in the country, for fraudulent elections and post-
election violence against people. Through speeches and a petition, the protest urged the US to 
intervene in “establishing democracy” in Armenia (Horizon Weekly 2008). 
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As in the aftermath of the 1999 Parliament shootings, the two other South Caucasian 
countries, Georgia and Azerbaijan closely monitored official behavior in Armenia. 
Representatives of civil society from both countries expressed relentless criticism of March 1 
repression. Georgia’s oppositional parties assailed the Kocharyan administration for resorting 
to force and called on Armenian authority to stop violence against the Armenian people. 
“Murder of citizens during demonstrations, arrest of oppositional activists, introduction of 
the state of emergency and censor, using of military detachments, equipment and armament 
confirms that the government of Armenia tried to use violence not having exhausted 
resources for dialogue with the opposition, which doubted official results of the president ial 
elections,” reads the statement released by the “Republican” party of Georgia (IDEE 2008).  
Azerbaijan also condemned the outbreak of violence in Armenia. Azerbaijani 
President Aliyev attributed the March 1 aggression in Yerevan to “the ill-considered policies 
of the [Armenian] government” (EuraisaNet 2008). At the same time, according to some 
political observers, Azerbaijan tried to take advantage of the unrest in Armenia and used the 
political tensions inside Armenia to attack the Armenian border near Mardakert on March 
4.204 The clash between Armenian and Azerbaijani armed forces on March 4 caused several 
fatalities and was considered to be one of the worst after the ceasefire. According to the 
speculation that Azeris initiated the attack, Azerbaijani authorities, frustrated with Armenia 
over the seized territories during the war, tried to please Azeri population and “score public 
relations” (EuraisaNet 2008). Regarding the clashes, Foreign Minister of the Republic of 
Armenia Vartan Oskanian emphasized: “If someone in Baku hopes to gain psychological 
dividends, thinking that we are too concentrated on our internal affairs, he is deeply 
mistaken” (PanArmenian News 2008).205 
While Armenia blamed Azerbaijan for initiating the attack, the Azerbaijani military 
accused the Armenian side of attacking Azeri positions in Karabakh’s Mardakert district. The 
Azerbaijani officials linked the border clash with the post-election tensions in Armenia, 
stating that it was a clear provocation by Armenia and an attempt to divert the attention of 
                                                 
204 It is, however, strongly argued that Armenian side provoked the border clash.  
205 Another source wrote that Oskanian told reporters: "Perhaps they [Azeris] thought we had focused all of our 
attention on our internal situation, and that this could provide them with a psychological advantage, but this 
hasn't proved the case." (RFE/RL 2008) 
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their citizens from the domestic political tensions (RFE/RL 2008).Some Armenian historians 
and political analysts believe that in this case the Azerbaijani interpretation was closer to the 
truth.  
Regardless of extensive local and international criticism, on March 17, 2008, the 
Armenian National Assembly passed amendments to the law on public assembly.206The 
“Law on amending and supplementing the Republic of Armenia law on conducting meetings, 
assemblies, rallies and demonstrations”was promulgated by the President of the Republic and  
entered into force on March 19, 2008207. The amendments, which severely restricted public 
gatherings, came into force just before the lifting of the state of emergency on March 21. 
More specifically, the amendments tightened provisions concerning spontaneous assemblies. 
They also limited the possibility for decisions on restricting assemblies, which deemed to 
pose a risk for public order, to be reviewed by an independent tribunal or court. Furthermore, 
a provision allowing for small events to develop spontaneously into bigger assemblies, which 
was considered a good practice example in the Law in its previous form, was repealed.  
The Armenian government’s tactic to amend the Law on Conducting Meetings has 
been widely considered by political analysts and human rights activists to be another 
violation of human rights and political exclusion of Armenian people. “The Armenian 
government should allow peaceful demonstrations, not ban them,” announced Holly Cartner, 
Europe and Central Asia director of Human Rights Watch. “The new restrictions effectively 
punish peaceful demonstrators for the violence that took place on March 1” (Human Rights 
Watch, 2009).  
The amendment was criticized by the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe 
and the OSCE. Both the Council of Europe’s Venice Commission and the OSCE’s Office for 
Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) raised serious concerns regarding the 
above-mentioned amendments. “On the basis of a preliminary assessment, the Venice 
                                                 
206 For details of the Law, please refer to the Armenian Legislation; Law on Conducting Meetings, Assemblies, 
Rallies and Demonstrations of the Republic of Armenia, available online at: 
http://legislationline.org/documents/action/popup/id/9046 
207 For details of the amendments to the Law, please refer to the Armenian Legislation; Amen dments to the 
Draft Law of April 2008 on amending and supplementing the lawon conducting meetings, assemblies, rallies 
and demonstrations of the Republic of Armenia, available online at: 
http://legislationline.org/documents/action/popup/id/9038 
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Commission and the OSCE/ODIHR Expert Panel on Freedom of Assembly do not consider 
the proposed amendments to be acceptable, to the extent that they restrict further the right of 
assembly in a significant fashion,” concluded Venice Commission of the Council of Europe 
and OSCE/ODHIR. Human Rights Watch also assessed the amendments incompatible with 
Armenia’s obligations to respect freedom of assembly under the European Convention on 
Human Rights, to which Armenia was a party (ECHR) (Human Rights Watch 2009).  
Armenian government officials themselves have realized the unlawfulness of their 
acts, and as a justification to their actions they passed amendments to the “Law on 
Conducting Meetings” as a window dressing.  The law provided government authorities with 
unfettered discretion to grant or deny permission to hold rallies.208 “Any justified opinion” of 
the Interior Ministry or the National Security Service, even if subjective, could have been 
used to terminate an assembly or to justify a denial to assembly. Those are some of the 
reasons that prompted international reports to note that “the conduct of authorities in many 
cases supported the claim they did not adequately appreciate the importance of freedom of 
assembly or its utility in helping a country resolve its national problems” (US Department of 
State, 2011:39).   
The March 1, 2008 events in Armenia were not only criticized as human rights’ 
abuses and basically, political exclusion of the Armenian people, but they were also 
condemned for the economic consequences they had on the Armenian nation. As a result of 
the March 1 crackdown of peaceful masses in Armenia, the Millennium Challenge funds, 
allocated by the US government to developing countries to establish democratic institutions, 
were cut for Armenia. The Millennium Challenge funds in the amount of 67million USD 
were frozen by the United States in Armenia. The Millennium Challenge Corporation 
explained the cuts with the slow pace of democratization in Yerevan, particularly 
highlighting the flawed presidential elections that ended with the government violently 
attacking peaceful protesters.  In relation to political exclusion, US officials stated: 
                                                 
208 The law contained loopholes that allowed authorities to be free in denying or terminating a meeting or a 
rally. For instance, according to the law, an authorized body was required to consider the notification of a mass 
public event (over 100 persons) within 72 hours of receiving it, and the decision of the authorized body sh ould 
be informed to the organizers of a meeting/rally immediately. But in reality, even if a decision is never made by 
the authorized body, the law forbids any assembly.  
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“Authorities used harassment and intrusive application of bureaucratic measures to intimidate 
and retaliate against government opponents. Police beat pretrial detainees and failed to 
provide due process in some cases. Courts remained subject to political pressure from the 
executive branch, with the selective prosecution of political opponents and absence of due 
process reflecting the judiciary’s lack of independence” (Kucera 2009).  
Political exclusion of Armenian citizens extended from brutality used during the 
protest crackdown to a broader repression of opposition supporters, including repeated 
harassment and interrogations of opposition candidate supporters in Yerevan and other 
regions of the country (Human Rights Watch, April 2008).  Meanwhile, the economic 
exclusion of Armenian citizens included tax audits of opposition-owned businesses and pro-
opposition press, and firing opposition supporters and their family members from their jobs 
(ibid). The government of Armenia occasionally deployed government agencies, including 
the tax and customs services, against political opponents (US Department of State, March 
2011). The government campaign of harassment against a Ter-Petrossian supporter, 
businessman Khachatur Sukiasyan, is an example documenting Armenian government’s 
retaliatory measures against pro-opposition businessmen.209 There were previous harassment 
efforts against Sukiasyan for his support of Ter-Petrossian, but this was the first attempt by 
the government of Armenia to destroy or seize one of his business assets (Grigoryan, 2008; 
Wikileaks, April 07, 2008; A1+, November 6, 2008).210 After the March events, the customs 
agency for several weeks was not releasing cigarettes imported by Pares Armenia, largely 
owned by Sukiasyan and his family. The customs agency claimed that the company did not 
pay the required payments, despite Pares' insistence that it has made all the required 
payments (ibid).211 According to the same source, as well as widely circulated in mass media, 
                                                 
209 More detailed evidence of the economic discrimination employed by the Armenian government against 
Khachatur Sukiasyan is presented in Chapter Seven, “Privatization and Social Exclusion”. 
210 Marianna Grigoryan, Shut Down for Standing up: Oppositionist’s Business Suffer “Political 
Vendetta”,ArmeniaNow, October 28, 2008, retrieved from: 
http://armenianow.com/news/9218/shut_down_for_standing_up_oppositi; Armenian Customs Service Joins 
Crackdown on Opposition Oligarch , Wikileaks, April 07, 2008, retrieved from 
http://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08YEREVAN297_a.html; Sukiasyan Declares that Their Assets Are 
Robbed, A1+ News, November 6, 2008, retrieved from: http://www.a1plus.am/en/politics/2008/11/6/7784 
211Pares Armenia, the official importer and distributor of Philip Morris brands of cigarettes in Armenia since 
1998, was Armenia’s eighth-largest taxpayer in 2007, paying USD 22 million in customs duties and other taxes, 
according to State Tax Service statistics (Wikileaks, April 07, 2008). Pares claimed to have paid over USD 1.4 
million for documentary stamps needed to clear three different shipments, none of which were released. On 
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the State Tax Service conducted unexpected tax inspections in many of the Sukiasyan-owned 
SIL Group businesses. Based on those inspections, the Director of SIL's Pizza Di Roma 
restaurant chain and the director of SIL’s Bjni bottled water operation were jailed, two Pizza 
di Roma employees were arrested, and a cashier was charged, all on tax-evasion charges. In 
early March of 2008, Khachatur Sukiasyan was stripped of his parliamentary immunity. He 
and his two brothers were either arrested or had fled the country (Wikileaks, April 7, 2008).  
Sukiasyan’s case of political and economic oppression was not a rare incidence. 
According to OSCE (2008, October 9), there were several dozens of similar cases of political 
exclusion after the 2008 presidential elections. Among them OSCE included Sasun 
Mikayelyan (Member of Parliament, Mayor of Hrazdan), Hakob Hakobyan (Member of 
Parliament,  President of a Civil-Political Organisation), Myasnik Malkhasyan (Vice 
President of the Yerkrapah Union), Aleksander Arzumanyan (Former Foreign Minister, Head 
of Levon Ter-Petrosyan’s Electoral Staff), Suren Surenyan (ANM Party member, Proxy of 
Levon Ter-Petrosyan), Nikol Pashinyan (Editor in Chief of “Haykakan Zhamanak” daily 
newspaper, Founder of “Alternative” Civil Movement and the Leader of Impeachment 
political bloc). OSCE reported that those cases “were fabricated on the basis of contradicting 
and vague testimonies given solely by Police” (OSCE, 2008, October 9). The arrests and 
detention of these politicians were reportedly conducted with numerous violations. 
Not only pro-opposition politicians and businessmen were under government radar, 
but also journalists, political activists, students, and blue-collar workers, who were identified 
for their support of the opposition candidate. A publicly-known example of government’s 
retaliation and economic exclusion exercised against nonpartisan journalism was related to 
the case of independent Gala TV station (ArmenPress, November 2007; Human Rights 
Report, Armenia 2007). In November, 2007, by launching a massive inspection of Gala’s 
accounting books, Armenian tax authorities allegedly discovered several financial breaches 
related to the TV station. The tax inspection occurred right after the TV station broadcastTer-
                                                                                                                                                       
March 1, Customs denied the request for the stamps (despite having received a payment of USD 128,000 
several days earlier), saying the length of the contract with the partner (Philip Morris) was not clear. Pares 
provided documentation of the contract on March 10, but Customs  did not release the shipment, or explained 
the reason for holding up any of the shipments (ibid). 
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Petrossian’s speech, in which he harshly criticized the Armenian state leaders (ArmenPress, 
November 2007). The TV station was forced off the air, after the tax authorities froze its 
assets and bank accounts over allegedly unpaid taxes (RFE/RL, April 9, 2010).  
In December, tax inspectors confiscated thousands of leaflets ordered by the 
“Alternative” opposition movement, announcing an opposition rally. An “Alternative” 
member, Artak Arakelyan, was taken into custody and fined 50USD on grounds that he had 
no document certifying the origins of the fliers (Human Rights Report, Armenia 2007). The 
State Tax Service also inspected the accounting books of the printing company that had 
printed the leaflets and briefly detained one of its employees (ibid). The same month, the 
office of the opposition newspaper “Chorrord Ishkhanutyun” was exploded; the office with 
its furniture was largely damaged, but there were no employees injured, as the explosion 
occurred before working hours. People linked the explosion to the newspaper’s critical 
coverage of the government. The examples of tax inspection and customs service activities 
against pro-opposition citizens were ample in the press, given that the Kocharyan’s 
administration and the newly elected government of Sargsyan used those agencies to 
intimidate resistance not only after, but also prior to the elections.  
The examination of the political events preceding and following the March 1 
demonstrations and killings of peacefully protesting citizens in Armenia, as well as the 
political discourse about the 20 days of the proclaimed state of emergency heavily support 
the hypothesis of post-war state militarization. The employment of martial forces against 
people and state of emergency launched by Kocharyan and Sargsyan administration was a 
typical means of political exclusion. It contained most of the elements described in the 
definition of political exclusion, such as political arrests, restrictions on freedom of assembly, 
limitation of freedom of speech, ban of civil liberties, and other human rights violations. All 
of the above discussed fundamentals constitute the non-classical form of state militarization, 
when in the absence of war, former and/or current military representatives  (in this case, field 
commanders turned into politicians) influence the state of political affairs in a country. 
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7.5 Conclusion 
This chapter was devoted to the analysis of war, nationalism, and state militarizatio n 
and their relation to social exclusion in post-Soviet Armenia. It argued that because of the 
state militarization after the Karabakh war the role of vital institutions that could increase 
political opposition's reinforcement, including its access to decision-making and leadership, 
was undermined. Armenian state elites, coercive and extremely nationalist, hindered the 
evolution of participatory institutions, institutional norms and informal structures that could 
tackle social exclusion and overcome deficiencies of private markets and social services. The 
lack of free and fair elections, party competition, independent judiciary and legislation, 
which are important structures for fostering social inclusion, has continuously reproduced 
social exclusion in post-Soviet Armenia.    
The chapter suggests that if nationalism and militarization were reinstated by a more 
pragmatic ideology within Armenian communities, Armenian state elites could more 
effectively evaluate national discourses/policies that would not perpetuate violence and that 
would alleviate societal problems. The primary goal of the chapter is to demonstrate that 
after the resignation of Levon Ter-Petrossian, the method of maintaining the "status-quo" on 
the resolution of Karabakh has been beneficial to state elites in preserving their own coercive 
power to solve "uncomfortable" domestic situations. Since the end of 1990s, the 
reinforcement of vibrant nationalist ideals among the nation by state elites has become the 
main channel to cultivate and nurture post-war state militarization. These nationalist-oriented 
tendencies allowed state elites to form elite coalitions or, on the contrary, when necessary, 
eliminate former allies in order to maintain opportunity hoarding and social closure, and thus, 
affect the expansion of social exclusion, particularly its political dimension, in the country. 
Summing up the evidence stemming from the war activities and the three post-war events 
described in this chapter, it is possible to draw the following conclusions.   
The first important observation is that in Armenia, victory in war resulted in 
hardwired nationalism, a more uncompromising position on the Karabakh question, an 
increasingly more militarized and more exclusionary tendencies. The victory granted 
representatives of the armed forces with huge leverage in the political arena and in policy-
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making. Karabakh’s military success was hailed by Armenians as a rare and historic victory, 
and it gave war-related leaders heroic reputations and great influence in Armenia (de Waal 
2004:256).  “The conflict over the direction of post-war policy set a precedent for a military 
veto over political outcomes in Armenia” (Horowitz 2003:39). Consequently, “politics in 
uniform has emerged as an alternative avenue to power, offering a new source of political 
legitimacy for ambitious elements of the military as the traditional path to political power has 
become discredited by rampant corruption and feuding political elites” (Giragosyan 1999). 
These feuding elites, once in power, banned more reformist political leaders from politics 
and policy-making, as we saw in the case of Levon Ter-Petrossian’s resignation. Many of the 
proclaimed war commanders developed siege mentalities, and were less tolerant to not only 
high-level political opposition, but also media criticism and civic political participation. 
Regulatory mechanisms against opposition have multiplied, financial pressure has increased, 
and non-conformist media have faced increasing persecution, culminating in the post-
electoral opposition crackdown in March 2008. Post-war state militarization often provided 
cover for political repression, economic cronyism, and led to coup threats and greater 
electoral turmoil, which all are elements of social exclusion.  
The people, on one hand, repeatedly mobilized against the state’s mayhem and 
lawlessness, but, on the other hand, they have often given up their confrontation against the 
state, recollecting the potential danger (often fabricated) against their rival nation. People 
have sacrificed their challenges and grievances for the sake of a more important mission – to 
maintain national strength and power against the Azeri threat. In these circumstances, a most 
significant consequence of militarization of the Armenian state has been the prevention of the 
development of adequate political and economic institutions, such as an independent 
judiciary, a satisfactory security system, and a developed civil society with free and objective 
mass media. Because of the weakness and lack of those institutions, resulting from the state 
militarization, Armenia has continuously failed to function as a viable democracy to the 
extreme detriment of its citizens.  
The Armenian victory defined the weakening of civilian authority and a reallocation 
of military and police power. In his interview, Grigoryan mentioned that he found victory in 
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war very important in the post-war militarization of the Armenian politics and economy.212 
According to Grigoryan, the victory politically strengthened the group of the volunteers who 
fought in the war and with them the military that had been already institutionally created in 
the Defense Ministry of Armenia. A lot of these volunteers became high-ranking officers in 
the Armenian military. This victorious Armenian military was politically very powerful. 
“That in itself was a problem in terms of distorting the country’s preferences, or not the 
country’s preferences as much as the system to match to the preferences of the military 
establishment because they were politically so powerful”(Grigoryan, 2010).213 But what 
made it worse was that Armenia had no other way of rewarding the volunteers, no other way 
of rewarding the victorious Armenian military but to grant them certain economic rewards, 
certain economic and political levers, which strengthened them further. Grigoryan argues that 
this reward-granting to the warriors of Karabakh war introduced a sort of economic behavior 
that was not really reconcilable with the liberal economic reforms. “You have anti-trust laws, 
for example, which are absolutely essential for any market to function properly. But at the 
same time it is the Defense Ministry that has to control the imports of gasoline and sugar. It 
makes no sense. But that’s how it happened” (ibid). 
The second and most essential observation revolves around the national versus the 
nationalist cause. In Armenia, Ter-Petrossian and his allies considered the Karabakh conflict 
to be a national cause, whereas Kocharyan and his associates looked at it as a nationalist 
cause. "In the first case, Karabakh is the problem of real people, living today, in the world of 
today. In the second case, the antagonist is the Armenian history, or one's memory of it" 
(Libaridian 1999:156).  By supporting the national cause, Ter-Petrossian did not contend for 
a simple foreign policy change. Instead, he attempted to transform the images of Turkey and 
Azerbaijan in the public perceptions and national political discourse from vicious enemies to 
vital neighbors for the prosperity of Armenia. As Libaridian wisely underlined, “Ter-
Petrossian could not see how Armenian or any other diplomacy could change the position of 
any other countries on territorial integrity and occupied territories” (Libaridian 
1999:66). However, the key political elites of independent Armenia, led by Ter-Petrossian, 
                                                 
212 Interview with Arman Grigoryan conducted in Ann Arbor, Michigan, on March 24, 2010. 
213 The quote is from the author’s interview with Arman Grigoryan conducted in Ann Arbor, Michigan, on 
March 24, 2010. 
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were not capable of swaying public perceptions and feelings concerning the national cause – 
peace and economic development – because Ter-Petrossian and his supporters became 
victims of nationalism that was revived and nurtured by the "Party of Karabakh".  
Whereas, in the background of the war circumstances, it was a significantly difficult 
task for the intellectual team of elites to promote the national cause, it turned out to be simple 
"elite manipulation" by the "Party of Karabakh", the nationalist core of elites, to advocate the 
nationalist cause. "To secure constituencies, political parties transformed resistance to change 
into respectable political agendas: "national ideology" provided a convenient cover for 
regressive politics" (Libaridian 1999:16)214. Consequently, real power in Armenia became 
basically wielded by the nationalist ideology, so much so that even people, who were not 
initially inclined towards nationalist ideas and practices, started to feel it necessary to support 
them.215 
The chapter extensively analyzed the discrepancies between the "step-by-step" and 
"package" approaches to the Karabakh conflict solution with the aim to demonstrate that 
these differences became the prime excuse for elite fragmentation within the Armenian 
government. Political analysts stress that this "ideological split [between the intellectuals and 
the "Party of Karabakh"] was a source of great contention and was one of the key reasons for 
the stagnation, poverty, and isolation of post-Soviet Armenia" (Shanazaryan 2010:2). 
 Ter-Petrossian, as a supporter of the "step-by-step" approach, believed that Armenia 
could not become economically powerful without the resolution of the Karabakh conflict. It 
was essential for Armenia, a landlocked and blockaded country, to open its borders with 
                                                 
214 By "change", Libaridian (1999) refers to the nationalist/"no-consessions" approach accepted by Kocharyan 
and allies versus the non-traditional/peace-oriented approach to the Karabakh solution. By "change", I believe, 
he means the institutional evolution of the Republic of Armenia.  
215 Suny (1999) contends that at first the Armenian public was willing to support the "unorthodox positions" on 
the resolution of Karabakh advocated by Ter-Petrossian, but the Diaspora and some of the local traditional 
parties were wary if not hostile (Suny 1999:158). The latter were more effective in their efforts to breed 
nationalist feelings within the society.  
It is worth mentioning here that the case of Karabakh strongly challenges the dominant discourse of nationalist 
studies, which argues that the shared ethno-religious, linguistic and cultural attributes of a homogeneous 
community unite its members so powerfully that no politically significant internal dis agreements could arise. 
Accordingly, the irreconcilable differences among Armenian political leaders on the Karabakh issue are very 
puzzling, given that Armenians in Armenia, Karabakh, and Diaspora share ethno-religious attributes 
(Harutyunyan 2009:188). 
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Turkey and have railroads to Middle Eastern and European markets. Turkey, nonetheless, 
had always mentioned that it would continue its blockade until there is a settlement of the 
Karabakh conflict. Ter-Petrossian’s judgment was based on the apprehension of the national 
interests of Armenia. A pragmatist like Ter-Petrossian realized that the achievement of 
international recognition for Nagorno-Karabakh or its attachment to Armenia was as good as 
impossible (Cornell 1999:127). As a pragmatic leader, he also feared that Azerbaijan’s 
economic performance and military prowess would develop rapidly as soon as oil profits 
would start to grow, threatening Armenia’s security even more. The former president stressed 
his concern about the non-resolution of the Karabakh conflict before resigning from the 
presidency in1998 by stressing, “No matter who rules Armenia, he will fail to ensure normal 
economic development of the country as long as the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict remains 
unresolved. It will be impossible to solve the existing public and economic problems without 
solving the conflict. The closed borders with Azerbaijan and Turkey, no railway access to the 
environment leads to increasing transport expenses, reduces Armenian’s export opportunities 
and looses interest in foreign investors to invest capital in our country” (Middle East 
Information Center, 2006). For Ter-Petrossian, Armenians won the battle not the war, and the 
international community would not tolerate the long-term status quo in Karabakh.  
It is often argued that over time, the "step-by-step" approach has emerged as the 
optimal basis for solution. It was an optimal blueprint for peace settlement as it envisaged a 
potential for creating a balance between two fundamentally contradicting principles of 
international law, that is, self-determination and territorial integrity. Aghasi Yenokian, a 
political analyst, said in 2008: "History has shown that a package solution, as such, does not 
exist. Ten years have passed since Ter-Petrossian was removed from power. And throughout 
all these years, every initiative that emerged was based on a step-by-step principle. The 
"package" solution was impossible, be it from a political or a technical perspective." 
(RFE/RL 2008).  It should be noted that current proposals to end the Karabakh conflict are 
remarkably similar to the 1997 peace plan, which Ter-Petrossian strongly advocated and 
which was rejected as "defeatist" by his political adversaries. " 
The third observation of the chapter is that the progression of the nationalist cause is 
strongly related to the deepening of social exclusion in Armenia. As predicted by Ter-
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Petrossian, the "maximalist" position taken by Ter-Petrossian's successor leaders, Kocharyan 
and Sargsyan, ignored the economic and social well-being of the Armenian people in 
Armenia, focusing mainly on the war victory and no concessions. After the resignation, the 
Karabakh conflict was politicized to the detriment of democratic reform. The country 
immediately started to move towards a political and human rights crisis, which culminated in 
the October terrorist attack of 1999. Since then, intimidation of political opposition, 
oppression of free and fair freedom of speech, fraudulent elections, human rights violations 
became frequent. Those and similar practices of political exclusion resulted in the violent 
breakdown of peaceful demonstrators in 2008. Post-war state militarization was then 
institutionalized.   
Finally, the last observation, closely related to the second and third observations, is 
that the maintenance of the frozen conflict is considered to be geopolitically and 
economically harmful for Armenia. Diplomats and negotiators have concluded that 
Armenia's national safety, economic development and societal well-being is permanently 
threatened unless the Karabakh conflict is resolved. In an interview to RFE/RL, Caucasus 
expert de Waal describes the frozen conflict as a "suicide pact", where both sides hurt 
themselves and everyone suffers (de Waal 2013). The non-resolution of the conflict harms 
not only the two nations, but the security of the whole region.  
Nonetheless, finding a solution is not an easy task. Thinking a way out of the 
Karabakh conflict requires a rethinking of conventional notions of nationalism (Libaridian 
1999, 2004; Laitin and Suny 1999). A long-term solution of the problem lies not in the 
antagonism and separation of Armenian and Azeri people and states, which nationalists of 
both countries advocate, but in building links between those people. From this point of view, 
the increasing arms race between the two countries and militarization of both states is an 
unnecessary condition for the conflict resolution.216 
Concluding this chapter, it is worth stating that the collective psyche of fear of the 
Armenian nation from its immediate neighbors, Turkey and Azerbaijan, allowed state elites 
                                                 
216 The increasing arms race in Armenia and Azerbaijan was discussed in Chapter 5, “Social Movements and 
State Coercion in Comparative Perspective”. 
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to exploit the idea of a continual state of war even after war. As Libaridian writes, “this fear 
both justified and imagined – of the Turk, the Muslim, Pan-Turkism, pogroms, massacres, 
and a new genocide – has been exploited and manipulated to rationalize, even welcome, the 
lack of independence and absence of democracy in Armenia” (Libaridian 1991).  
  
 236 
 
CHAPTER 8  
Privatization and Social Exclusion 
8.1 Introduction  
Armenia’s secession from the USSR was accompanied with the Karabakh territorial 
dispute, followed by economic blockade, war with Azerbaijan, and state militarization. 
Amidst this political, military and economic instability, with just newly emerging 
institutions, without any serious control mechanisms to ensure quality implementation of 
reforms, Armenia discarded Soviet ideals and transitioned from a planned to a market 
economy.  
This chapter provides a brief history of privatization in Armenia, particularly 
privatization of industries and services, with an emphasis on the inefficiencies of the process 
and how it triggered economic exclusion of particularly the low and middle classes of the 
society, which in its turn increased social marginalization and political polarization. The 
analysis of the overall social exclusion with its three dimensions, as presented in Figures 2.1 
and 2.2, will be discussed through the discussion of 1) the failures of industrial privatization, 
such as rapid de-industrialization with increased unemployment, low salaries and poor 
benefits, unequal hiring and firing procedures by the private owners, and unfair voucher and 
tender auctions; 2) the social impact of major social services, such as the energy sector and 
telecommunications; 3) administrative barriers to foreign investment; and finally 4) the role 
of oligarchy in the monopolization of economic resources and domination of the policy-
making outcomes. 
The privatization process started unwisely early in Armenia since Armenia of that 
time had still quite weak institutions and could not enforce for all citizens a fair access to the 
privatized resources. The efforts invested into the militarization processes displaced the 
efforts to create or strengthen the institutions that could make the effects of privatization 
more equitable and inclusive. As a result, a hectic privatization process facilitated in a 
permissive atmosphere,lacking the vigilant eye of control institutions, allowed the creation of 
a few wealthybusinessmen (oligarchs) instead of diffused ownership, and barriers to foreign 
investment.Above all, the privatization process with its new market relations negatively 
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influenced the capacity of labor unions’operations,and in general weakened the premises for 
collective civic action. The random complaints and scattered pressures from the public 
against the effects of privatization were unable to intimidate the emerged oligarchs from 
employing the new system for their own interests. 
During the privatization period, Armenia failed to alter the role of the state from a 
direct participant to a regulator of economic activities. Therefore, the framework of economic 
activities has not been properly regulated, free competition was not ensured, and the interests 
of private owners without connections and power were not safeguarded. The insurance 
system, and mechanisms of private investments and pension funds were not well-established, 
and the process of privatization was not established on stock exchange mechanisms, as well 
as methods of attracting investments and capital through issuing new securities. In short, the 
state’s regulative functions were not formed during the initial stages of privatization. The 
inability of government officials to create and enforce clear-cut laws and regulations in its 
turn encouraged the rise of corruption and inequitable deals during privatization transactions.  
Privatization in itself is a process and as such, it cannot be blamed for its 
inefficiencies. The inefficiencies of privatization in the case of Armenia were rooted not only 
in the method of privatization, but more importantly, the lack ofthe government commitment 
to transparent rules of privatization implementation. Therefore, in order to find the flaws of 
privatization, I have considered the context in which this process was executed, as well as the 
agents who implemented this process. The state with its institutions, the culture and informal 
rules, the historic timeframe, the nature of civil society, and other exogenous factors, such as 
war with Azerbaijan in the case of Armenia, are all important factors that have had their 
certain impact on the nature of privatization Armenia carried out, and the latter’s impact on 
social exclusion.217 This stipulation makes one wonder whether it was reasonable to 
                                                 
217 The historic, economic and political context in which privatization was implemented in Armenia has been 
partially presented throughout this dissertation in different chapters. Some of the factors mentioned in the above 
paragraph have been discussed to some extent in the militarization chapter. Nonetheless, it is impossible t o 
carry an exhaustive examination of all those factors within one chapter, particularly this chapter, as the aim of 
the chapter is not the examination of causes of efficient/inefficient privatization, but how privatization process 
affected the emergence of deprivation and inequality within large segments of the Armenian society. It is about 
the social consequences of inefficient privatization.  A more comprehensive study of the state, formal and 
informal institutions, culture and history, as well as how they affect the good or bad implementation of 
privatization would be a useful topic for future research.  
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implement privatization as an economic development policy in post-Soviet Armenia without 
first restructuring the Armenian state with its institutions. The problem of employment, for 
example, is reflected in the fact that the process of economic restructuring, with privatization 
as its main aspect, could not commence without the mentioned restructuring. 
The failure of the above-mentioned and other aspects of privatization negatively 
influenced overall social well-being and created social inequalities.As observed by UNDP 
experts in Armenia, “what had begun as an attempt to equalize the distribution of wealth 
ended with a concentration of wealth in a few hands, and this created the foundation for 
rising income inequality” (UNDP 2002:66). The new strata of the wealthy and a few 
oligarchs with tremendous economic power, who emerged as a result of privatization, began 
to close opportunities for others. Overall, it has been estimated that privatization had little if 
any efficiency, produced modest revenues and generated no social benefits in Armenia. It is 
true that periodically it generated double-digit GDP growth, providing for Armenia the title 
of a "Caucasian Tiger", but it failed to distribute this growth evenly for all layers of the 
population.Privatization, thus, served as an initial trigger for social exclusion, particularly the 
economic aspect of exclusion.  
Armenian state formation coincided with the transition to a market economy in the 
country, and the shortcomings of the state formation strongly affected the failures of 
privatization.  
When the state has to lead the society towards wide-raging structural reforms, and when 
transformation of the accepted forms of property is unavoidable, the risk of deflection from 
the intended course of development is dangerously high. Naturally it begets hesitations about 
the rightness of the selected course of development. If the authority accepts the course of 
reforms simultaneously ignoring the Social factor, then it is convicted.  … In the case of 
Armenia it was fairly proved, when the reforms got a negative impression in the people’s 
consciousness. The social basic principles didn’t serve as a basis for the republic model. … 
As a consequence, state formation became the privilege of a group of people, generating 
opposition of vast stratums. (Darbinian 2001:1-2).  
Privatization in Armenia has by and large led to a consolidation of control by 
incumbent managers, and a creation of a new wealthy class of oligarchs that are closely tied 
to government officials. The few individuals, who consolidated wealth in their hands, were 
particularly skilled at engaging in bribes and other forms of theft (Khachaturyan 2004:4). 
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This prototype of ownership acquisition and wealth concentration was similar to early 
experiences of some transition countries.  
Mass privatization, specifically before the mid-2000s, was not characterized by 
diffused ownership (ownership either by workers or by large numbers of citizens), and it did 
not produce significant improvements in enterprise performance. Even when previous 
managers became new owners of a company or factory, the companies still did not register 
positive achievements. Relative to other CIS countries, where on average management 
ownership tends to support restructuring, it is puzzling that in Armenia it has not yielded 
positive consequences, at least not yet.  The strategy of incumbent managers who became 
owners was typically focused on asset stripping.  
The initial privatization of industries and factories through the voucher system, 
followed by an attempt to implement the privatization of the larger assets and enterprises 
through bids and tenders resulted in the creation of a small number of very rich private 
owners, and the majority of the population with few opportunities to have investment shares 
or to open up new companies. The industrial privatization was futile, because most of the 
privatized companies were unable to operate successfully in the new environment of the 
early 1990s. Almost all of these initial companies have disappeared with their assets divided 
between the ‘owners’ who had ‘purchased’ the vouchers.218 Many of the assets were old and 
obsolete, while the rest were transferred into a few private hands. This type of privatizat ion 
may be called an ‘underground’ privatization, where most of the transactions were not 
conducted transparently, where the real prices were vague, and where only a small number of 
people knew the precise distribution of assets and their worth. There is a popular perception 
of the employees of the transition period that this type of privatization was inequitable, 
generating unemployment and increases in poverty, vulnerability, deprivation and despair.  
                                                 
218 While in Armenia for dissertation research in the summer of 2012, I had several informal talks/interviews 
with middle-aged middle class Armenians regarding the voucher privatization. The stories of their personal 
experience revealed that their vouchers were not only sold by them, but also taken away by department 
managers and company owners through fraudulent schemes and illegal methods. The most surprising fact was 
that some of those men and women believed that they still had their investment shares in the companies they  
used to work for, even though some of the factories were long ago inactive, asset-stripped, raided and robbed, 
or/and sold to foreign investors. Furthermore, these individuals did not have any documentation or legal 
paperwork on the sale of their vouchers.  
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The net effects of privatization impacted specifically the poorer families living in the 
margins of subsistence. The standard of living declined for most Armenians by the increase 
of unemployment, decrease of social service provision and increase in the costs of insurance 
for such services. Health and education costs increased as well. Privatization undermined the 
role of social services, decreased community involvement and narrowed the vision of a good 
society and good life (Starr 1988:20).  
Privatization in Armenia is often regarded as basically a political decision with little 
consideration given to the poverty and inequality impacts of privatizing state owned property 
and enterprises. Sharp falls in output and employment accompanied it. After the fall of the 
USSR, it was inevitable for Armenia, as one of former Soviet republics, to move to a market 
economy. Therefore, it becomes important not to just challenge the transition to a market 
economy and society, where power distributions inevitably change, but discuss alternative 
methods of privatization that could have had less ominous effects on social polarization and 
exclusion.  
Manukyan, who was Prime Minister of Armenia in 1990-1991, stated that while he 
was supportive of shock therapy and privatization, he was against the methods through which 
privatization was accomplished in Armenia, particularly the voucher privatization.219 He 
considers voucher privatization “idiotism” and declares that it provided the Armenian society 
with nothing except privation. Instead, Manukyan suggested that privatization could have 
resulted in more efficient outcomes if implemented based on the following principles: 1) 
distribute all assets into 3 categories (small, medium, and large enterprises); 2) for a small fee 
offer the small enterprises, such as cafés, hair salons, small industries and productions to 
their managers, who were practically their owners, instead of auctioning or publicly selling 
them. Previous managers would effectively operate them; 3) create cooperatives/cooperation 
from the medium-sized enterprises that were not of major industrial importance and then 
privatize them through public sale; and finally, 4) create large public corporations out of a 
                                                 
219Vazgen Manukyan was the Prime Minister of Armenia in 1990-1991. From 1992 to 1993 Manukyan was 
acting Minister of Defense. After Armenia gained its independence in 1991, he was elected in the National 
Assembly three times and ran unsuccessfully for President of Armenia in 1996, 1998 and 2003. Vazgen 
Manukyan is the leader of National Democratic Union (NDU) political party. Currently Manukyan is the 
Chairman of the Public Council since 2008. 
An interview with Mr. Manukyan was conducted by the author in Yerevan, Armenia on August 29, 2012. 
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couple dozen of large industrial units of major industrial significance the work and operation 
of which was impossible to restructure quickly without the existence of Soviet economic 
system, and postpone their privatization until the government could figure out reasonable 
methods to cooperate with international financial and industrial institutions.220 
All of the politicians and researchers interviewed for this research concur that 
industrial privatization, starting from voucher privatization, had several pitfalls in Armenia, 
except former Prime Minister (1993-96) Bagratyan, during whose years voucher 
privatization was implemented. Bagratyan justifies voucher privatization saying that 
“Armenian voucher privatization was a true example of social democratic capitalism, when 
the government distributed enterprises to their employees through vouchers”. Whereas the 
former Prime Minister acknowledges that this method has been widely criticized, he is 
convinced that another privatization method would create a bigger concentration of wealth 
and resources. According to Bagratyan, the voucher privatization was incomplete, because 
the subsequent Prime Minister halted the voucher privatization in 1996. Particularly under 
President Kocharyan’s administration, when all the major industrial assets were privatized,  
the so-called “investment privatization” started. “Program-based privatization” was the main 
mechanism of this stage of privatization, which means that an enterprise was being sold to an 
entrepreneur or company based on promises and/or plans of investment. Retrospectively, it is 
obvious that “this was a bluff, as there were rare cases of business plans submitted to the 
government”. Moreover, the privatized enterprises did not achieve output goals of the 
investment promises.221 The majority of investment privatization funds did not develop into 
viable financial intermediaries or key agents of corporate governance.222 
The Armenian state struggled to find appropriate mechanisms and enforcement 
strength for successful privatization coordination and productive property management. 
There was little reinforcement of the economic freedom based on protection of private 
property. According to Darbinian, “the [Armenian] private property management yields to 
                                                 
220 The ideas of the paragraph derive from the author's interview with Vazgen Manukyan conducted on August 
29, 2012. 
221 The quotes are from the author’s interview with Hrant Bagratyan conducted on August 20, 2012.  
222 The shortcomings of investment privatization are further discussed in the chapter, when I trace the 
development and barriers of foreign investment in the Republic of Armenia.   
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the Soviet model of the public property management by its efficiency”. Literature points to a 
couple of reasons for this: implementation of a free market economy with disregard for social 
welfare and assistance; failure to reassess the role of the state; and inability of the state to 
create real mechanisms and contractual certainty intended for ownership protection, 
particularly in the realm of legal institutions. (Darbinian 2000; Darbinian and Lalayan 2001; 
Ugurluyan 2001)  
The reformation of the legal system was delayed and not properly carried out in 
Armenia. It was more or less achieved when the process of property redistribution was nearly 
finished. “Legal reforms lagged at least 4-5 years behind economic ones, as a result of which 
the legal framework for protection of private ownership was established only in 1998 and 
became effective in 1999, while privatization started from 1992” (Darbinian and Lalayan, 
2001:5).Furthermore, Khachaturyan (2004) argues that in regard to privatization, thelegal 
systemhas never been effective in Armenia, which stems from tensions between written laws 
versus legal enforcement. According to Khachaturyan (2004), Armenia transplanted 
relatively “good laws,” but its legal system isinefficient and lacks legal clarity. Also, the 
judiciary lacks expertise to deal with commercial cases. Another problem in the judicial 
system is related to the conflicting interpretations of substantial and procedural aspects of 
many laws. Subsequently, Khachaturyan suggests that "Armenia lacks the most basic 
infrastructure to have an efficiently functioning capital market and its capital market reform 
agenda should be critically reconsidered (Khachaturyan 2004:66). The shortcomings of the 
legal system are also reflected in the relationship of managers and shareholders of firms. As 
Coffee points out, "managers do not either contract with shareholders or pledge a 
reputational capital that they have carefully built up over years of service; rather, managers 
and shareholders are thrown together as legal strangers" (Coffee 1999).  
While there certainly may be significant benefits from industrial privatization, in 
developing countries with weaker institutions there is the danger that business people exploit 
their power to access to public officials. The exploitation of power creates the opportunity for 
corruption, the “ugly stepchild of privatization” leading to public distrust of the democratic 
process (Hebdon 1995:2). At the start of privatization, Armenia had just obtained 
independence and, as a developing country, possessed weak institutions. With weak 
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institutions, the Armenian state could not protect social equity during privatization 
transactions. The industrial privatization provided government bureaucrats with ample 
opportunities for corruption and motivated the enhancement of corrupt networks due to the 
lack of market-supporting institutions.  
Administrative and fiscal inefficiencies were inherent in many auctions and tenders 
held in Armenia during privatization. Tender officials, who typically were government 
officials, had a privileged status that allowed them to manipulate the results of the tender and 
favor a particular bidder in return to side transfers (bribes).  In this situation not only revenue 
maximization of the company suffered, but also opportunities were closed for other bidders, 
who had fewer resources to offer to tender officials.  In Armenia, similar to many other 
transition economies that have experienced a rapid privatization with vast and heterogeneous 
assets being privatized, this problem was particularly severe.  
Gupta, Schiller and Ma (1999) mention several issues in assessing the social impact 
of privatization. Several of them, related to mainly the transformations of labor market 
resulting from privatization, are very important in assessing the impact of privatization on 
social exclusion in the case of Armenia. The first socially harmful effect of privatization was 
the downsizing of the workforce and therefore increasing unemployment rates. Privatization 
also had an adverse impact on salary levels and structure, working conditions, and 
employees’ benefits. Private companies reduced not only employment and wage rates, but 
also pay supplements as compared to state-owned enterprises and internationally-funded 
organizations. The tendency of reduced employment and wages created by privatizat ion, 
which was in stark contrast with Soviet-times overstaffed state-owned enterprises that used to 
pay excessive wages, were expected to be temporary. Over time, however, the Armenian 
privatized enterprises could not expand their activities or increase their efficiency, thus the 
adverse impact of privatization on employment and salary structure became a long-term 
problem.  
Privatization may also affect consumer prices negatively, which happened in 
Armenia. Privatization was not accompanied by an improvement in productive and allocative 
efficiency, and the prices of goods and services produced by newly private companies 
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increased. At the same time there were nearly no subsidies arranged by the state in the 
context of privatization that could lead to lower prices of goods and services. In this context, 
consumer prices were high. These price increases had an adverse impact on living standards 
of vulnerable segments of the population.    
According to Gupta, Schiller and Ma (1999) there is yet another issue related to the 
negative impact of privatization on consumer prices. It is the transition of public monopolies 
into private monopolies. There is a threat that a privatized enterprise might exploit 
consumers, and their welfare would not improve. This trend associated with private 
monopolies has been common in most of the former Soviet republics after their transition to 
capitalism. Armenia was not an exception. Armenian private monopolies pursued 
maximization of their profit through exploitation of a monopolistic position instead of 
through increased competitiveness. New monopolists and oligarchs created complications for 
competition and kept prices higher. Also, the new businesses typically did not deliver 
services in poor communities, as it was less profitable for them to do so. With the 
substitution of private goods for public goods, privatization endangered the availability of 
public goods to those who could not afford it. 
While privatization effects in Armenia were strongly conditioned by other contingent 
factors, such as Armenia’s heavy dependence on the Soviet economic system, the earthquake 
of 1988 that negatively affected industrial production, war and subsequent blockade, 
privatization in itself unambiguously increased income inequality with the transfer of state 
assets to private hands. Private owners, the majority of whom were sons of the local 
nomenklatura and new clan leaders, seized privatized assets and extended control over state 
and private institutions.223 They enriched themselves with previously state-owned assets, 
contributing to dramatic changes in income distribution. It created a new channel of social 
                                                 
223Nomenklatura (in Russian "номенклату́ра") used to be a set or class of people within the Soviet Union and 
other Eastern Bloc countries who held significant administrative positions in government, industry, agriculture, 
education and other key spheres of those countries. In other words, nomenklatura may be defined as a system of 
patronage to senior positions in the bureaucracy of the Soviet Union and some other Communist states, 
controlled by the leaders of the Communist Party. Nomenklatura positions were granted only with approval by 
the communist party of each country and they were basically granted  within only the members of the 
Communist Party.This system of patronage provided party leaders a stranglehold on all important or rewardin g 
jobs. 
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exclusion and inequality, that is, wage differentials between labor and owners. In this sense, 
Armenia was not an exception. An increasing wage difference between owners and 
employees is typically greater in the private than public sector; therefore privatization 
reinforced this differential in Armenia, too. 
The accelerated privatization process in post-Soviet Armenia after the fall of the 
Soviet Union in 1991 allowed a small segment of society to monopolize most of the wealth 
and exclude most Armenians from access to it. As Keane and Prasad (2001:4) write, “it is 
well known that in most of the countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union 
making the shift from central planning to market economies, income inequality increased 
substantially during the first decade of transition.” Not all citizens of the former Soviet 
republic benefited equally from market reforms and transactions, as demonstrated by high 
levels of income and consumption inequality (see Table 8:1). Among 27 countries (including 
the United States) Armenia had the second highest income inequality (56) at the end of 1990s 
after Romania (61). By high levels of consumption inequality, Armenia (41) was the third 
after Uzbekistan (47) and Kyrgyz Republic (42). 
Table 8.1: Gini Coefficients for Income and Consumption Inequality for Eastern European 
and CIS Countries in 1997 
Country 
Income Gini  
Coefficient 
Consumption 
Gini  
Coefficient 
Albania 43 29 
Armenia 56 41 
Azerbaijan 49 35 
Belarus 25 26 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
n/a 24 
Bulgaria 43 26 
Croatia 38 26 
Czech Republic  34 25 
Estonia 36 37 
Georgia 51 36 
Hungary 40 27 
Kazakhstan n/a 35 
Kyrgyz Republic 45 42 
Latvia 39 32 
Lithuania 40 34 
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Table 8.1 Continued 
FYR Macedonia 43 34 
Moldova 41 37 
Poland 37 33 
Romania 61 29 
Russia 42 34 
Slovak Republic 37 24 
Slovenia 34 28 
Tajikistan n/a 31 
Turkmenistan n/a 40 
Ukraine 42 33 
Uzbekistan n/a 47 
United States of 
America 
38 n/a 
Sources: UNICEF IRC TransMONEE 2008 Database, UNU-WIDER WIID 2008, World 
Bank Development Indicators 2011. 
Figure 8.1 and Figure 8.2 present average income and consumption Gini coefficient 
trends, categorized by the three main privatization methods (voucher, sale and management 
and employee buyout (MEBO)) from 1992 to 2002. Both income and consumption 
inequalities increased sharply during the period fromthe beginning of the 1990s untilthe mid-
1990s. It should be noted that countries with voucher privatization had nearly always higher 
inequality levels both income and consumption wise. Armenia was one of the former Soviet 
countries that adopted voucher privatization as the main privatization method, therefore the 
high levels of income and consumption inequality observed for Armenia in Table 8.1 is 
predictable.224  




  
                                                 
224 More about the characteristics of the voucher privatization in Armenia will be detailed in the following 
sections of this chapter.  
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Figure 8.1: Income Inequality Trends for Eastern European and CIS Countries by 
Privatization Method, 1992-2002 years 
Sources: EBRD 1999 Transition Report, Measuring Income Inequality Database 1996, 
UNICEF IRC TransMONEE 2008 Database, UNU-WIDER WIID 2008, World Bank 
Development Indicators 2011. 
 
Figure 8.2: Consumption Inequality Trends for Eastern European and CIS Countries by 
Privatization Method, 1992-2002 years 
Sources: EBRD 1999 Transition Report, Measuring Income Inequality Database 1996, 
UNICEF IRC TransMONEE 2008 Database, UNU-WIDER WIID 2008, World Bank 
Development Indicators 2011. 
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Income, wealth and consumption inequality, which were relatively new to Armenia, 
rose also due to the changes in capital markets and industrial labor force, more specifically 
the deindustrialization of the economy.225Deindustrialization increased social exclusion of 
middle and lower class Armenians and created economic struggles for their families. White 
collar and professional workers lost their jobs, and found themselves trapped, without the 
funds to improve their circumstances. Job cuts due to deindustrialization in Armenia led to 
long periods of unemployment, intermittent employment and increased underemployment. 
Deindustrialization created extremely low-paid employment of the poor in the informal 
sector and survival- level subsistence farming in the agricultural sector. Massive migration of 
thousands of industrial workers to Russia, USA, and European countries, where they could 
earn for their families, followed the unemployment of these workers.  
The effects of deindustrialization transcended simply the loss of salary and 
purchasing power. The economic exclusion of unemployed Armenians further increased their 
social marginalization and political polarization, as the financial strain created stress, 
depression, family tensions, loss of networks and social cohesion. Itproduced reduced 
standards of living and a variety of social disruptions not only for the displaced workers and 
their families but alsotheir communities. 
Before independence, Armenia was a heavily industrial country. As of 1990, the 
country had a high level of urbanization. About one third of all employed population was 
employed in the production sector, while in Georgia this rate amounted to about 20% and in 
Azerbaijan to 17% (Nranyan 2011:197). Even after the earthquake of 1988 that seriously 
damaged light industry (with about a 40% decrease), by 1990, the share of industry in GDP 
was about 45%. This was still a good indicator relative to other Soviet republics that would 
soon become the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). However, with the de-
industrialization of the economy, particularly since 2004, industry’s share of GDP declined 
from about 45% in 1990 to less than 20% in 1998. In 2000, its share was a little over 22%. 
                                                 
225The social costs of deindustrialization are wide and go beyond unemployment, poverty and consumption 
inequality. They manifest in a variety of ways. The deindustrialized communities wres tle with some core 
structural problems, such as declining populations, economic development, increased health and mental 
problems of their population, increased crime rates, suicide and domestic violence. These problems are 
exacerbated by the loss of social networks that come with deindustrialization. Hence, deindustrialization 
increased not only economic exclusion, but also overall social exclusion.  
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Both heavy and light industry had huge declines in production. The decline of these 
industries has hindered the process of labor-intensive growth. The impact of 
deindustrialization, as a result of the privatization process, on poverty was severe. By the end 
of the 1990s, different household surveys concluded that about half of the population in 
Armenia was poor. 
Post-privatization medium and large-scale industrial enterprises in Armenia had low 
output and employment levels. At the same time new small-scale private enterprises have 
been operating leisurely. The deficiency of property rights restructuring was one of the main 
reasons for the lack of growth in industry and the persistence of poverty and economic 
inequality. The privatization process was not employment- intensive. It did not keep up with 
employment levels of Soviet epoch, as it did was not able to generate widespread full-time 
employment. The problem was even worse for the middle class and for the poor of the 
society. The poor had fewer opportunities to gain secure employment due to several reasons, 
among which was not only lack of training and education, but also lack of powerful networks 
and acquaintances. Hence, privatization policies were not designed so that the economy 
would not exclude the poor from employment. McKinley mentions that “medium and large-
scale enterprises, which accounted for most of the country’s production, continued to “hoard” 
labor, i.e., to keep workers on their books even when they were not actually employed and 
earning wages” (McKinley 2002:75). The 1996 Labor Force Survey revealed that almost 
one-third of the employees registered as employed in a company were not employed or were 
on extended administrative leave (ibid). Official employment data however did not reflect the 
real deprivation of employees resulted from “labor hoarding”.  The problem of economic 
exclusion became even worse, when in mid 1990s private industries laid off about 100,000 
employees.   
Privatization of once state-regulated companies and the frail growth of new small-
scale private companies forced industrial labor to seek employment in the informal sector, 
the agricultural sector or to migrate abroad leaving their families alone for extended periods 
of time. While this was a common consequence of privatization in most post-Soviet 
republics, reports by Western experts reveal that Armenia’s level of unemployment, as well 
as income inequality was very high compared to other transition economics during the 
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transition to a market economy (UNDP 2002, World Bank 2002 & 2007). Throughout most 
of the 1990s, the percentage of unemployed people was above 20% (UNDP 2002). Besides 
unemployment, there was also extensive underemployment problem in Armenia. The number 
of people living below the poverty line, as well as the level of the Gini coefficient, increased 
between the 1990s and 2000s in Armenia. The country experienced a social deficit: lack of 
secure employment, low wages, and lack of healthcare and educational opportunities, which 
used to be universal during the Soviet times. There have not been many efforts to solve those 
problems because many of the social actors who had traditionally politicized such issues 
were not well positioned to do so during the period of structural reforms in Armenia.226 
In a personal interview, Armen Darbinian, stressed the importance of distinguishing 
between the objective and subjective causes of privatization’s unintended consequences for 
the emergence of widespread poverty and social injustice.227 One of the objective causes of 
poverty and inequality in Armenia can be considered the collapse of the Soviet economic 
system. To understand Armenia’s emergence as a market economy, it is important to 
highlight its Soviet legacy. For some of the small Soviet republics, such as Armenia, their 
economic growth was very much dependent on the interrelated Soviet economic system. 
With the breakdown of the Soviet economic system, the economy deteriorated and it 
worsened the living standards of the majority of the population in Armenia. Sarian (2006) 
observes that between 1960 and 1980, the economic profile of Armenia became that of a 
welfare state, which relied on the Soviet Union to sustain its economy. As a result, in 1989, 
50.8% of the total volume of industrial production and 71.9% of industrial credits in Armenia 
were dependent on Soviet subsidies. The total volume of industrial production was 28% and 
the total volume of industrial credits was 59% for Estonia, 28.9% and 72.4% for Tajikistan, 
28.4% and 48.2% for Moldova, and 31.4% and 66.9% for Georgia. The comparison of those 
figures shows the vulnerability of Armenia’s industrial production and how badly the 
collapse of the Soviet Union impacted its economy (Sarian 2006).  
                                                 
226 Those actors were not well positioned to deal with these problems during the restructuring mainly due to 
war, blockade, and somewhat due to local political events.  
227The interview with Darbinian was conducted in Yerevan, Armenia, September 3, 2011.  
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Another objective factor that Darbinian mentioned concerns human expectations. 
According to Darbinian, the collapse of the Soviet system was equal to a revolution. One of 
the characteristics of a revolution is that the people who carry on the revolution want their 
share. This was the case of Armenia. In his interview, Darbinian stressed the factor of human 
expectations out of the privatization process as a most important objective cause of poverty. 
People were used to receiving public goods and services through social welfare, and they 
continued to expect to receive social welfare without hard work and much effort. 
While a sharp reduction in equality across transition economies has been viewed as a 
common part of transition, there are also subjective reasons affecting the inequality and 
exclusion in each transitioning country. As 90% of my interviewees agreed, in Armenia, the 
privatization process affected social exclusion through voucher and auction fraud, lack of 
information/education about the use of vouchers by wide sectors of the population, 
emergence of local oligarchy, the misuse of recently obtained industries and businesses by 
the new capitalists, corruption in the distribution of wealth, and tax avoidance by the very 
same people. Following is a brief summary of the interviewees' accounts regarding these six 
points and their effects on the exclusion of ordinary Armenians: 
Voucher fraud: In Armenia, unlike some other post-socialist countries, vouchers were 
publicly tradable.This fostered a voucher market, which allowed citizens to sell their 
vouchers, and also made it easy for managers to buy vouchers that could be traded for shares 
in their own companies. Managers often acquired the funds to buy vouchers by illegally 
“privatizing” company funds. They continued to accumulate control after the voucher 
auctions were completed, by convincing or coercing employees to sell their shares.Moreover, 
the face value of the voucher was very low. The average citizen, after having received the 
voucher, decided that the voucher wasn’t worth anything. Hence, most Armenians 
immediately sold their vouchers on the street for an extremely low cost.  
Lack of information/education about the use of vouchers by wide sectors of the 
population: Vouchers were a new phenomenon in post-Soviet Armenia. With very small-
scale to almost no awareness-raising action initiated by the government on this theme, 
ordinary citizens remained largely uninformed of the vouchers' value and access to them.   
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Emergence of local oligarchy: While only a small group of the Karabakh war 
participants later became the government, a few others who also stood out during the war and 
felt close to the former peers now running the country, informally served as the peripheral 
units or the support groups of the new government. They had more information about the 
reform discussions, felt privileged, exchanged favor services with one another, supported 
their friends in the implementation of reforms, and as a result, during the privatization they 
had more and, usually, not deserved access to the public resources.With this, they stole many 
other deserving citizens’ access to the reform processes and the benefits emerging from those 
reforms. Local oligarchy was a by-product of the permissive environment with weak 
institutions, absence or lack of control mechanisms and absence of civil society throughout 
the implementation of one of the most serious reforms determining the future of the country. 
Misuse of recently obtained industries and businesses by the new capitalists: Most of 
the new owners of the assets were not economists or managers, neither by education nor by 
experience. Facing the absence of the coordinated Soviet trade system where one republic 
served as a supplier, and the other a customer, they now had difficulties in treating these 
industries as a source of stable wealth. Therefore, instead of designing long-term strategic 
business plans and making the investments necessary to refresh the business to serve the new 
market demands, they set to generate as much cash as possible in the shortest period in the 
easiest ways.  Most of them sold out the equipment; some started to employ their own keens, 
without complying with the rules of quality-based administration and merit-based 
employment; some started employing people without contracts and without fixed contractual 
agreements, earning more and paying less. 
Corruption in the distribution of wealth: During the privatization reform of the larger 
industries, business merged with the government, allowing a lot of room for corrupt ways of 
decision-making. The business “sponsored” the government, and the government enforced 
laws which allowed unfair market competition and encouraged accumulation of growth in the 
hands of a few. Citizen groups remained without a right to consult and contribute into the 
wealth distribution processes. They operated as mere receptionists and passive users of the 
new welfare system.  
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Tax avoidance: Feeling privileged and enjoying friendly relationships with the new 
government, many oligarchs started new unlawful practices, among them avoiding paying 
tax, without being punished for that. This resulted in artificial reduction of state budget and 
created favorable climate for increasing the wealth distribution gap. 
8.2 History of Privatization in Armenia 
During the early 1990s, like many post-Soviet Republics, the Republic of Armenia 
experienced economic stagnation and crisis. There was a huge drop in output, and all 
macroeconomic indicators worsened. Compared to 1989, GDP decreased by 60% in 1993. 
Consumer prices increased 110% in 1993 (Arakelyan 2005). Within this environment, the 
Armenian government, under the guidance and advice of Prime Minister economist Hrant 
Bagratyan, started its structural reforms, which included liberalization of prices, 
liberalization of trade and foreign exchange, and development of private markets.  
Armenia adopted the Law of “Privatization of the State Enterprises and Incomplete 
Construction Sites” in August of 1992. The law aimed at the development of an efficient 
market economy in Armenia through a juridical basis for setting a private relationship 
towards basic production funds. This law and subsequent laws regarding the privatization 
process in the Armenia have been frequently amended with the verification and confirmation 
of Ministry of State Property Management of the Republic of Armenia, the government 
agency that was established in July 1999 to oversee and govern privatization.228 
Two principal laws of privatization were enacted in 1996 and 1997, replacing the 
earlier privatization law.  These laws have been amended later, but with little changes. The 
first one was the Law of the Republic of Armenia on Joint Stock Companies, (JSCL) adopted 
by the National Assembly in 1996. The JSCL of 1996 was revised in 2001 to reflect the 
changes introduced by the Civil Code and the Law “On Regulation of Securities Market” 
                                                 
228 For the most current information related to state property privatization and alienation of the liquidating 
companies, rental of property consigned with participation of commercial organizations, as well as other 
information related to state property management in the Republic of Armenia, see the official website of the 
Department of State Property Management by the Government of the RA: http://www.privatization.am. 
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(SMRL) adopted by the National Assembly in 2000.229 The revised JSCL came into effect on 
December 6, 2001. Theoretically, this law defined the establishment and registration of 
privatized companies, stipulated the legal status of joint-stock companies, the procedure of 
their operation and termination, the rights and responsibilities of shareholders, as well as the 
protection of the rights and lawful interests of shareholders and creditors. Companies could 
decide on the amount of shares to issue, the value of each share, and the rights pertaining to 
each type of share that were stated on the share certificate. The joint stock companies could 
have been open or closed. Open companies were publicly-held companies that sold shares 
through a public offering and allowed shareholders to sell their shares. Closed companies 
could not have more than 25 shareholders who could sell shares only to members of the 
board and predetermined persons who had priority in acquiring the sold shares (Ugurlayan 
2001:438).230 
The second law, the Law of the Republic of Armenia on Privatization of State 
Property, enacted in 1997, regulated legal relationships concerning privatization of state 
property, including unfinished construction sites.231 The government decided which type of 
privatization process (auction, tender, or direct sale) to use in privatizing a state property. In 
deciding whether to privatize a company or not, several criteria were taken into 
consideration, such as the financial condition of a company and the amount of investment 
needed. Foreign corporations were allowed to participate in the privatization process by 
bidding on enterprises through a tender offer. The government had a final decision in 
maintaining full or partial control of an enterprise. Employees of enterprises were provided 
with equal rights to purchase an enterprise that was being privatized, with preferential 
treatment granted to certain employees in the case of direct sales of privatized property.  
                                                 
229 See Law of the Republic of Armenia on Joint Stock Companies, available in the official website of the 
Government of RA, http://www.parliament.am/law_docs/271001HO232eng.pdf?lang=eng  
230 Later, the law on state property privatization program for 1998-2000, stated that the Armenian government 
should shift closed joint stock companies in which state-owned shares comprised 50% of the authorized capital 
into open joint stock companies (“Armenian Government Redistributes State-Owned Shares in Joint-Stock 
Companies”, SNARK News AGENCY, Jan. 14, 2000) 
231 See Law of the Republic of Armenia on Privatization of State Property, available in the official website of 
the Government of RA, http://www.parliament.am/leg islation.php?sel=show&ID=1657&lang=eng .   
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The privatization process in Armenia occurred through three stages: initial (1991-
1994), large scale or mass (1994-1997), and finally cash or decelerated (1998-2001).232 The 
process continues until today case by case. During the first stage, the Armenian government 
privatized 4% of the total small enterprises to the employees of these enterprises through 
direct sales at a nominal price. Around 1.6 Million USD, which was equal to 173.1 million 
rubles (the Soviet or Russian currency) was collected at the end of the first stage of the 
privatization. While there was a small effort to privatize small enterprises, the first stage of 
privatization in Armenia is primarily characterized by land privatization.  
8.2.1. Land Privatization  
Armenia adopted a law on land privatization in 1990, becoming the first Soviet 
republic to privatize land.  With the breakup of the collective and state farms in early 90s, 
Armenian farmland shifted from state ownership into the private sector at a faster rate than in 
any other Soviet republic since 1991. Within two years, by 1992, 63% of cultivated fields, 
80% of orchards, and 91% of vineyards of the previously state and collective farms were 
privatized and belonged to family farmers. The result of land privatization was the creation 
of a small peasant farming system comprising about 335,000 family-owned farms with small 
areas of land. Farmers among Armenia’s 35% rural population received a parcel of land that 
averaged about one hectare (2.5 acres) in size. 
The international community has praised Armenia as one of the most thorough 
privatizers of land among the former Soviet Republics. The consequences of land 
privatization in Armenia were similar to land reform in China in 1950s. As a result of both 
reforms, many peasant households owned their piece of land for the first time ever. The 
Chinese land reform, however, was implemented in the context of a growing economy, while 
in Armenia land reform was implemented within an environment of war, depression, and 
structural changes.  
Land privatization in Armenia was an outstandingly equitable process. Land was 
distributed to each family according to its size. The location of land that each family received 
                                                 
232The next sections of this chapter discuss the three stages of the privatization process in Armenia more 
specifically. 
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was determined by lottery, making the allocation of land even fairer. Farmers had to pay for 
their newly acquired land, and the standard payment was equivalent of 70% of net farm profit 
for two years. This amount of payment was not considered much. These pieces of private 
land, although often difficult to cultivate for the new farmers without collective efforts and 
machinery that during Soviet times were provided by the state collectives (famously known 
as ‘kolkhoz’ in Russian), became very effective social safety nets in rural areas. They 
represented a significant value for the famers, particularly when the state owned few 
resources to finance transfer payments to poor households and provide social welfare. This 
may be one of the reasons that there was basically no trade of land after land privatizatio n. 
Contrary to industrial privatization in Armenia, during which virtually the majority of 
shareholders sold their vouchers, there was basically no buying or selling of land by farmers, 
because those pieces of land were the mere guarantee of subsistence for the new owners of 
land. 
Through land privatization, the dominance of the private sector transferred from 
urban areas to rural areas. Whereas in 1990 the private sector accounted for 35% of 
agricultural output, land privatization increased it to about 98% (UNDP 2002). Land 
privatization prevented the increase of poverty. Compared to other sectors of the economy, 
land privatization definitely prevented a much wider prevalence of poverty, particularly in 
rural areas.In rural areas only those families were impoverished, who did not own land.233It is 
a popular view that land privatization played an important role in alleviating widespread 
hunger and poverty in 1991-1994 (Suny 1997:347-387 in Hovannisian). During an economic 
crisis, agriculture also became the “last employer” for most of the unemployed, particularly 
in the rural areas (ibid). 
Whereas it is widely considered that Armenian land reform completed by the end of 
1993 was fair and equitable, Vardanyan and Grigoryan (2007) mention that the effectiveness 
of land management and the development of land market activities were hindered by factors, 
such as insufficient legal framework to local conditions; economically not viable land parcels 
(land fragmentation); the absence of the privatized land titles; the absence of maps of 
                                                 
233 On a more detailed account of land privatization, see UNDP 2002 Report “Growth, Inequality and Poverty in 
Armenia”. 
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property lines and ownership (cadastral maps); and the absence of the value of the obtained 
land, as well asprice estimation principles.  
8.2.2. Large Scale or Mass Privatization 
Large scale or mass privatization in Armenia began in 1994. During the mass 
privatization period, a majority of firms were privatized. Mass privatization was mostly 
voucher-based in Armenia. According to EBRD’s categorizations of privatization methods, 
as published in its 1999 Transition Report, voucher or mass privatization refers to 
privatization in which citizens are given or can inexpensively purchase vouchers that 
represent shares in a state-owned company.  
Mass privatization was the first serious step to privatize medium and large scale state 
owned enterprises, when 240 such enterprises were converted to private ownership. Other 
613 enterprises were privatized in 1996 and another 397 in 1997. 1996 and 1997 were the 
two peak years of mass privatization in Armenia. By 2001, a total of 1643 medium and large 
enterprises were privatized, and the sate played a trivial role in the administration of 
industrial enterprises by the end of 2001 (McKinley 2002). 
Table 8.2: Privatization of Small, Medium and Large Enterprises in Armenia,  
1995-2001 (number of enterprises) 
Year Small Enterprises Medium and Large Enterprises 
 Annual Number Cumulative 
Number 
Annual Number Cumulative 
Number 
1995  n.a. 1833 240 240 
1996 2130 3963 613 853 
1997 2058 6021 397 1250 
1998 599 6620 210 1460 
1999 186 6806 54 1514 
2000 43 6849 40 1554 
2001 78 6927 89 1643 
Source: UNDP 2002 report, “Growth, Inequality and Poverty in Armenia”. 
In the early stages of privatization, mass privatization and MEBO (management and 
employee buyout), 20% of the value of state owned enterprises was distributed as free 
vouchers to the employees of the enterprises who had worked in them for at least one 
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year.234During this phase of the privatization, many enterprises were transformed into open 
or closed joint stock companies. First, they were sold to employees through a closed share 
subscription. After the closed share subscription, the enterprises that were not purchased by 
their employees were sold through open share subscription.  As a result of the voucher 
distribution, about 127,000 employees ‘obtained’ ownership of their enterprises.235 
According to Arakelian (2005), this was an unprecedented result among all former Soviet 
Union countries.236 Each voucher had a nominal value of 10,000 Armenian drams (AMD), or 
approximately 25 US dollars (USD) in September of 1994, but it was raised to 20,000 drams 
or about 50 USD in March of 1995 to make up for the effects of inflation. While 50 USD was 
then quite a valuable amount, without investment funds or operating stock exchanges and 
appropriate market infrastructure, citizens did not find it reasonable to keep their certificates. 
They converted their certificates into cash by selling them in markets at about 12.5-40% of 
their nominal value.  
According to international reports, by the end of the MEBO phase of privatization, 
about 60% that is about 6000 of all small enterprises were privatized, and there were around 
150,000 shareholders in Armenia. This is a large sector of the population for a country with 
roughly 3 million population.237 Based on this fact, one may argue that the mass privatization 
should have been economically favorable for the majority of the Armenian society. The 
problem, however, was that most of the shareholders had no elementary knowledge about 
joint stock companies, how to manage and conduct business with them. Not only were they 
clueless about the idea of shareholding and stocks, but also about their lawful rights. People 
sold their certificates not only because of the lack of information on how to use those 
certificates, but they also sold their certificates because of their dire living conditions and 
insufficient financial resources. Those, who could purchase vouchers, were the wealthy and 
well connected. Human Development Armenia Report 1997 estimated that only 7% of the 
                                                 
234 For more details on the distribution of vouchers, s ee World Bank, “Armenia: Growth Challenges and 
Government Policies”, Vol.II: Main Report, November 2001, p.32. 
235 Some sources, such as the UNDP 2002  report on Armenia, mention that 20% of the value of public 
enterprises was distributed to the population, other sources, such as Vazgen Arakelian (2005), state that 
according to the law, 30% of the enterprises was given to RA citizens.  
236 Later in this chapter there is a more detailed explanation of why this high rate of shareholders, which is 
considered a success, turned into a more concentrated ownership of enterprises.  
237 The number of shareholders ranges from about 127,000 to 150,000 people in different sources. In any case, 
this is considerably large number for Armenian population.   
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population participated in the privatization process as shareholders by the end of 1997 
(Human Development Armenia Report 1997:36).  
The voucher stage of industrial privatization in Armenia failed to create real 
businessmen and generate visible results in Armenia due to several reasons as observed by 
Arakelian (2005): 1) lack of knowledge and information on operating and managing joint 
stock companies; 2) frequent violation of shareholders’ rights; 3) violation of rules of 
corporate governance; 4) non-transparency of activities of joint stock companies; and 5) 
inefficient performance of management tasks. Similarly, many cross-country studies on post 
privatization process in Central and Eastern Europe and former Soviet countries conclude 
that the worst performance was observed in the countries that implemented mass 
privatization, such as Russia and Armenia (Spicer et al., 2000; Sunita Kikeri and J. Nellis, 
2002). 
Mass privatization ended in 1998 without yielding the expected results. Also, it did 
not generate the predicted amount of revenues. While it was projected to collect revenues of 
3.5 billion dram ($700,000,000) by the end of the first stage of the industrial privatization, 
only $700,000 to $800,000 was generated by the state (Astourian 2000:14). These figures are 
important, because they show that privatization revenues were only one thousandth of the 
projected amount. Astourian argues that the huge disparity between the projected and actual 
revenues shows that majority of the privatized enterprises were sold for a few hundred 
dollars only.238 
When the campaign for privatization was in full swing, the principle of “forward at 
all costs” acted. In some cases it caused such situations where the value of the enterprise 
under privatization looked in the least suspicious. For example, the Yerevan Auto factory 
was sold off for 11,541 vouchers (the market value of these at the time of privatization 
equalled 57,705 US dollars which corresponded to the average price of a 3 or 4-room 
apartment).The enterprise “Armelektroaparat”, producing mechanisms and accessories for 
                                                 
238 The example of the cheese factory privatization in Vardenis, Armenia serves as a piece of evidence for this 
speculation. With its buildings and machines, it was sold for $400 (Astourian 2000:15). Whereas it is nearly 
impossible to find accurate data on the prices at which companies, plants and factories were sold, there are a 
few accounts that reflect the surprisingly low prices. One of those reports written by Russian economist 
Puzanov (1998) will be discussed later in this chapter.   
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industrial elevators, was privatized for 26,800 US dollars, the Yerevan furniture factory for 
33,600 US dollars, the Tin Can factory for 10,600 US dollars (Puzanov 1998:237-238).  
Practically no attention was paid to the availability of business-plans and the capacity 
of new owners to fund the modernization and restructuring of obtained enterprises. For 
example, in the case of the aforementioned Yerevan Auto factory the question of its 
reconstruction was not even on the agenda, since the new owners, just like the state, did not 
have sufficient finances for the company’s modernization.  
In the press, other more mysterious prices were quoted. For example, the Vardenis 
Sеwing Factory and Cheese factory were sold off for 62 and 70 vouchers correspondingly, 
Ararat Greenhouses for 36, Dilijan factory of Mineral Water for 56 vouchers, Yeghegnadzor 
Sеwing Factory for 46, the one in Echmiadzin for 51, Shahumyan Bird factory and Aragats 
Cheese Factory for 48 vouchers. It is important to note that although sold at a very cheap 
price, Vardenis Cheese Factory was a profitable firm, occupied a territory of 2.2 hectares, 
and had a 0.5 hectares platform of industrial and administrative sections and an auto park of 
16 operational vehicles. This factory was not the only one that was fully operational among 
the inexpensively privatized enterprises.  
Based on the 1997 "Human Development Report on Armenia" estimates, by the end 
of 1997, only 7% of the population participated in the privatization process as shareholders. 
Another source, the ministry of privatization in Armenia evaluated the number of 
shareholders of medium and large enterprises as of November 1998 to be 143,000 citizens, 
that is, about 4.5% of the population that received vouchers. Astourian (2000) suggests that 
the concentration of wealth was greater than these figures suggest. According to his sources 
(Markosian 85-86), 2.5% of shareholders controlled 60% of the shares of 713 companies 
privatized through open share subscription. 
While enterprises were formally offered for public sale, the process through which 
the bidding was conducted was not truly accommodating and comfortably comprehensive for 
ordinary citizens, therefore, it was not truly oriented towards the benefit of the latter. The 
voucher certificate distribution thus produced an "illusion of social justice", because in reality 
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people lacked the appropriate knowledge, tools and regulations to make investments with 
their certificates (Arakelyan 2005:196).  
Concerning voucher privatization, Paruyr Hayrikyan, the leader of the Union for 
National Self-Determination (UNSD) party and one of the founders and most active leaders 
of the democratic movement in the Soviet Union, mentioned that “the traditions of 
corporative philosophy and action were not only discouraged since the start of the industrial 
privatization in Armenia, but also were totally ignored”.239 According to Hayrikyan, the idea 
of financial dividends, as portions of corporate profits paid out to stockholders, was 
absolutely lacking in Armenia. Businessmen who were major shareholders of joint stock 
companies were automatically becoming the owners of the companies, treating the rest of the 
shareholders like their servants. Hayrikyan also stressed that it was a widely popular practice 
for managers and directors of enterprises to often buy vouchers at extremely low prices from 
workers, telling the latter that in any case they would never get any profit from their 
vouchers. Hayrikyan said that when he addressed this issue to the government implementing 
the voucher privatization, then Prime Minister Hrant Bagratyan (1993-1996) replied that the 
problem would not exist if shareholders kept their own vouchers and did not sell them with 
minimal prices. Perhaps Bagratyan was right, but considering the transitional moment and 
the ignorance of most of the population on economic issues, a fundamental question arises: 
what type of informational training related to the use of vouchers had the government 
implemented for the society, who had just broken free from the centrally planned economy 
and a socialist system?  
In general, 99% of the politicians and researchers interviewed for this dissertation 
agreed that the voucher privatization in Armenia occurred in animproper way and that the 
small shareholders' property rights were not protected from the beginning of the process. The 
latter were doomed to falling out of market competition too soon. “On the other hand, well-
connected entrepreneurs became millionaires within a night without minimal business 
efforts.  These people, unlike famous businessmen such as Rockefellers and Fords in the US 
who became wealthy based on their entrepreneurial talent and hard work of decades, did not 
                                                 
239The quote is borrowed from theinterview with Paruyr Hayrikyan conducted in Yerevan, Armenia, August 8, 
2011. 
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work hard; they achieved wealth and power essentially by exploiting speculation in the 
privatization process. This was the case in many post-Soviet states, such as Russia, 
Azerbaijan and Armenia” (Hayrikyan 2011). Similar to Hayrikyan, many other politicians 
and economists I have talked to, while disinclined to contradict to the principles of free 
market society, believe that in the above-described situations the state has to be practical and 
flexible, especially if the people face extremely poor social conditions. They agreed that a 
government needs to intervene in the market whenever the market creates social exclusion.    
Mass privatization was unsuccessful not only because of equality and impartiality 
issues, but also because of inefficiency. Whereas the privatization literature widely 
speculates that the shift from planned to market economy stimulates new managers to 
increase efficiency, in Armenia this premise did not work for many sectors of the newly 
privatized economy. As described earlier, after the massive voucher sale by workers, 
incumbent managers were able to consolidate company ownership very quickly. Through a 
survey of 145 large joint-stock companies in 1999, the Securities Market Inspectorate of RA 
found out that on average 2-3 largest shareholders held about 70% of company stock (World 
Bank 2002).  But the new owners in Armenia were less supportive of restructuring compared 
to other CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) countries. After privatizing a company, 
the Armenian managers primarily exported the existing equipment of the company, due to 
which the company stayed idle for most of the time.The export of equipment was a deliberate 
deindustrialization, and industrial productivity was a comparative advantage of Armenia after 
independence.  
Three factors explain the weakness and/or unwillingness of the new management to 
restructure their companies. One reason was the lack of fair entry competition and thus 
insufficient management change. Another reason was the uncertainty and lack of market 
control in a geopolitically unstable country. Because of this factor, many company owners 
decided that it was more profitable to enrich themselves with profits of stripped company 
assets than invest their time, skills, and finances into a long-term strategy of restructuring the 
company. Finally, a third reason was simply the lack of information and management skills 
for an efficient restructuring. The World Bank Country Study "Growth Challenges and 
Government Policies in Armenia" (2002), in efforts to evaluate growth trends in Armenia for 
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the period of 1994-2000, after the mass privatization was over, identified three elements as 
critical constraints to sustainable economic growth in Armenia: “a poor business and 
investment environment, weak managerial skills, and uncertainty about the country’s 
economic and political prospects in an unstable region.” (World Bank 2002:VII)  
The new private sector was unable to respond to the restructuring of property rights, 
and it became a major obstacle for the growth of industry, persistence of poverty, and 
vulnerability of small entrepreneurs. There has been registered growth in the service sector in 
the late 1990s but its growth did not have a big impact on growth and poverty reduction. 
Industrial sectors, such as power generation and food processing increased. Smaller, export-
oriented sub-sectors, such as jewelry and computer software, were noted to be successful. 
None of these activities, however, were developed enough to compensate for the continuing 
decline of industry. The sector of de novo firms was too small to make a significant 
contribution to the economic development of small and medium entrepreneurship, and to 
affect overall poverty levels. The new companies have not been active, and they did not 
absorb excessive labor. Self-employment rates after mass privatization were also small in 
Armenia. This is a reflection of existing barriers for both new entry and factor reallocation. 
The World Bank (2002) estimated self-employment in Armenia to be at least three times 
lower than in leading economies in post-Soviet region.   
The data obtained from National Statistical Service of the Republic of Armenia 
(NSS)shows the overall number of registered companies in Armenia for the years of 1994-
2000 (see Table 8.3). In 2000, there were about 44,000 registered businesses in Armenia, that 
is, 14.5 businesses per 1,000 residents.240 According to these numbers, privatization resulted 
in a rather decent level of entrepreneurship in Armenia. But according to the World Bank, 
these numbers provide a biased picture that overstates success. The majority of the registered 
firms did not operate based on business surveys conducted between 1996-2000 years. For 
example, surveys of small businesses conducted by the National Statistical Service (NSS) in 
1997-98 showed that between 56% and 61% of participating businesses were not operating 
                                                 
240 The calculation is based on the official number of the population in Armenia, which is about 3 million. In 
reality, the population is even less than 3 million due to high rates of migration from Armenia. Thus, the 
number of registered businesses could have been even more per 1000 residents, if we considered not the 
official, but an approximate real number of the population of Armenia.   
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during the year of survey. The 1999 similar survey found out that this number increased to 
about 80%. From the registered 44,000 businesses in 2000 about only 30,000 operated. This 
means that there were less than 10 businesses per 1,000 residents. This number is small, 
compared to the numbers of small and medium enterprises (SME) in modern market 
economies for the same year, such as 37 registered SMEs per 1,000 residents in Germany, 45 
in Slovenia, 74 in USA (World Bank 2002, page 42).  
Table 8.3: Number of Registered Business Entities in Armenia, 1994-2000 
Years 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Number of 
Registered Business 
Entities 
5,089 21,238 29,836 37,687 41,241 43,327 44,164 
Growth Rate, %  317 40 26 9 5 2 
Source: National Statistical Service of the Republic of Armenia (NSS). 
Business registration since 2000 has slowed even more in the republic. The number of 
registrations continued to decrease considerably in 1999-2000. The World Bank mentions 
that the low rate of small and medium business operation was accompanied with a high rate 
of business liquidation. In 2000, per each 3 new registrations, two companies were 
liquidated.This type of new private sector suggests that business transactions were governed 
by informality instead of legal regulations. Entrepreneurs, particularly small and medium 
ones, typically stayed in the informal sector because of shortcomings in the regulatory system 
and enforcement practices. Major challenging issues experienced by new businessmen 
included specifically tax administration arbitrary practices. Those entrepreneurs, who 
managed to stay in the formal sector, “pursued survival, defensive strategies. These were 
“forced entrepreneurs”, who had been waiting for an opportunity to return to their traditional 
occupation as hired labor. Such businesses had a rather limited development potential. 
(World Bank 2002:42).  
Since 2000, the pace of business registrations did not accelerate. In fact, it slowed 
down dramatically. According to the World Bank Entrepreneurship and Survey Database, 
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there were 2,576 new businesses registered in the years of 1999-2003. Within the following 
four years, 2004-2008, the database indicates 2,523 new businesses.241 
The privatization literature widely speculates that the shift from planned to market 
economy stimulates new managers to increase efficiency. In Armenia however, this premise 
did not work for many sectors of the newly privatized economy. After the massive voucher 
sale by workers, incumbent managers were able to consolidate company ownership very 
quickly. Through a survey of 145 large joint-stock companies in 1999, the Securities Market 
Inspectorate of RA found out that on average 2-3 largest shareholders held about 70% of 
company stock (World Bank 2002).  But the new owners in Armenia were less supportive of 
restructuring compared to other CIS countries. After privatizing a company, the incumbent 
managers primarily exported the existing equipment of the company, due to which the 
company stayed idle for most of the time. 
A survey of fifty representative privatized enterprises from seven different economic 
sectors, conducted in 1997 by the Center for Economic Policy Research and Analysis 
(CEPRA), aptly captured the impact of mass privatization in Armenia through the end of 
1997. Related to CEPRA findings, it is worth quoting Astourian (2000:14) at length: 
 About eight percent of enterprises were owned and controlled by their former directors, 
who automatically became executive directors and chairmen of the board of the newly 
privatized enterprises. Although experienced in manufacturing, they did not have 
sufficient knowledge in management and strategic thinking. 
 The majority of surveyed enterprises were not being restructured. Among the reasons 
mentioned were the poorly developed institutional infrastructure and an unclearly 
formulated legal framework. 
 Low liquidity and huge arrears of enterprises, caused by lack of markets and ignorance in 
marketing, was a large problem. The utilization of production capacity in the sample for 
large enterprises was less than ten percent, while it was 20-30 percent in small and 
medium enterprises. 
 Downsizing by more than 40 percent and low salaries (the average salary was $30 per 
month) were other major problems. There was a low level of accounting and auditing 
services. In many cases, tax records were the only available accounting documentation. 
                                                 
241 See World Bank Entrepreneurship and Survey Database: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IC.BUS.NREG 
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8.2.3. Decelerated and Case-by-Case Privatization 
Since 1998, the privatization process slowed down in Armenia. The mass 
privatization was transitioning into monetary privatization. In 1999, 48 medium and large 
enterprises were privatized, producing about 8 million USD sales revenues and about 15 
million USD of investment commitments. During the case-by-case privatization in Armenia, 
about 60 enterprises were privatized by foreign investors. Those enterprises included power-
generating factories, diamond processing companies, food processing factories, breweries, as 
well as light industries. The case-by-case privatization was completed with the support and 
advice of international consultants. For instance, Merrill Lynch was a main contractor in the 
privatization of 14 key enterprises. Among those enterprises were the Armenian 
telecommunications monopoly, ArmenTel, Yerevan Konyak (Brandy) factory, and Hotels 
"Armenia" and "Ani". All those enterprises were sold to foreign investors and generated huge 
revenues and cash transactions.242 
In this stage of the privatization process insufficient attention was paid to important 
issues, such as transparency and public relations (Arakelyan 2005). As in the previous stage 
of industrial privatization process, those discrepancies, whether intentional or unintentional, 
were the beginning of unequal access to assets and resources by the citizens of Armenia. 
Privatization transactions, therefore, chiefly affected the development of social exclusion of 
ordinary citizens by more powerful members, groups and networks of the society. The more 
powerful were those who were well-connected with state elites, former managers of 
enterprises, and of course, those who had more wealth accumulated during Soviet times.    
According to Gevorgyan and Melikyan (2004:5), the privatization process, 
specifically the decelerated privatization, was characterized by the following conditions:  
1. Absence of stock market financial intermediary (investment funds, investment 
companies, etc.);  
2. Weakness of state institutions in charge of privatization;  
3. Very low savings among the majority of the population;  
4. Low interest in the process of privatization on the part of external investors;  
                                                 
242 These data are taken from Vazgen Arakelian, 2005.  
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5. Majority of companies at the time of privatization were non-functioning.  
These conditions first of all suggest that there was very little competition, high 
concentration of ownership supported by low market prices of companies on sale. Companies 
were purchased mostly by former senior management, thus blocking opportunities for 
outsiders to bid. There was little participation on behalf of foreign investors. This was due to 
the fact that privatized companies were not well presented to potential foreign investors. All 
these circumstances created an environment leading to an ownership of most of the 
privatized enterprises by a small number of shareholders, mainly insiders.   
While conventional wisdom suggests that ownership of a company by insiders may 
improve work incentives and company loyalty, and positively affects restructuring of the 
company, the experience of transitioning countries that went through insider privatization 
presents a different picture. In the case of post-Soviet Armenia, for example, insiders hailing 
from the planned economy of the Soviet times lacked necessary skills, information and 
knowledge, access to foreign markets, and technologies necessary for company restructuring 
and reorganization. This consequently led to poor privatization outcomes. Also, literature 
argues that the role of foreign ownership with better knowledge of market processes 
increases the opportunity for firms to have better performance in transition countries 
(Deardorff and Djankov, 2000; Havrylyshyn and McGettigan, 1999). Insignificant 
investment level from foreign investors was another reason for unsatisfactory consequences 
of decelerated privatization in Armenia.  
During this stage of privatization the Republic of Armenia experienced major issues 
regarding the evaluation of the property that had to be privatized. The Armenian government 
greatly undervalued its industrial assets, 'failing' to come up with substantiated and applicable 
methods to define a proper price for the property that was being privatized. The 
undervaluation of industrial assets by the governmentduring the third, decelerated, phase of 
the Armenian privatization was one of the avenues for economic exclusion, considering the 
fact that the insiders were given preference during the privatization. The new management 
(insiders of the privatized company) reserved the right to buy shares from outsiders at a price 
it dictated. The result was that chiefly insiders ended up buying the shares, and of course it 
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was the managers who had the money to buy the vast majority of those shares and who ended 
up benefiting from the auction.243The low price of companies supported and led to high 
concentration of the ownership by insiders. 
Decelerated privatization practices in Armenia were not free of the “faults” typical of 
industrial privatization processes in other countries of CIS. For example, the status of 
privatization for a profitable enterprise, in comparison with similar but not profitable 
enterprises, assumed a higher privatization “value”. In order to avoid paying a high price for 
the profitable enterprise, usually the team of the enterprise, intending to buy it from the state, 
in an operative and conscious manner brought it down to a bankruptcy condition (Puzanov 
1998).244 
These and many other problems of privatization occurred because of a practical 
absence of a functioning state, as well as lack of public control over the privatization process 
(Puzanov 1998:238). Such practices became one of the reasons of privatized enterprises’ low 
efficiency: in 1996 only 30% of their overall number increased the scope of industry, about 
40% stood paralyzed, and another 30% were close to bankruptcy. The value of companies 
after revaluation varied from 242,000 USD to 2.37 million USD, which, according to 
Puzanov(1998), is significantly lower from the international value for similar companies. As 
he mentions, the following enterprises were included among those under-valued companies: 
 The chemical plant “Nairit” (produces rubber-technical products for automobile, oil, 
electro-technical, footwear, optical and medical industries); 
 The “Polyvinil” plant with the capacity of 35,000 tons annual production (met up to 28% 
demand of polyvinyl and vinyl acetate of the entire USSR). By the end of 1990s, it was 
idle because of the lack of raw material;  
                                                 
243 A good example of enterprise undervaluation in Russia, where industrial privatization was conducted in a 
similar manner to Armenia's industrial privatization, is provided by Paul Klebnikov, the author of "Godfather of 
the Kremlin: Boris Berezovsky and the Looting of Russia". Lebnikov reports that the price at which Gazprom 
was privatized in 1994 through the vouchers was $250 million, which is 160 times less than the price the st ock 
market would put on the company a mere three years later. Thus, it was less than 1 percent of the stock market 
value of the company. "That makes it one of the great robberies of the century." (The Multinational Monitor, 
2002)  
244Examples of this problem, such as the sale of the Yerevan Auto Factory, the Vardenis Sewing factory, the 
Vardenis Cheese factory and other enterprises at surprisingly low prices, were reported earlier in this chapter.  
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 The former USSR Military Industrial Complex “Rubin” is extended in 100 buildings, 
occupying a territory of 77 hectares, nearby Yerevan. The plant's main product is 
artificial synthetic crystals (including products for the jewelry industry); 
 The chemical Plant “Vanadzor” (produces acetate fiber, 95% of which is exported to 
England, to South Korea, Syria and Egypt);  
 The Yerevan Cognac/Brandy Factory (annually produces 5mln bottles which comprises 
55% of its capacity); 
 The textile factory of “Gyumri” (cotton and linen); 
 The footwear factory “Araks”; 
 The electrolamp factory “Luys” (produces all types of light bulbs and chandeliers); 
 The national telephone company “ArmenTel”;  
 The enterprise “Mars” (built by British firms for production of complicated electrical 
devices; including integral microchips; before its privatization, about 200 million US 
dollars were invested in improvements, including systems of computer design). 
8.3 Social Impact of Privatization of Energy Sector and Telecommunications 
There have been a few successful privatization deals of large companies that resulted 
in overall welfare of the population. They increased company employment rates, made social 
conditions of their employees better by raising salaries and offering good benefits. This was 
the case of the privatization of the cigarette industry in Armenia.245 Moreover, the prices of 
the products produced by the company were reasonable and accessible to the majority of the 
population.246 The privatization of tobacco production has been one of the rare instances of 
efficient privatization transactions, generating favorable conditions for their employees and 
making their product obtainable for many in the society.  
                                                 
245 Whereas there are no available data on pre-privatization and post-privatization salaries in tobacco producing 
companies in Armenia (even if they were available, a comparison would have been incompatible due to 
hyperinflation and change of currency), the estimates of salaries in the period of 1998-2001 show that the 
average salary in cigarette industry was higher than that of all other industries in Armenia. In the first half o f 
2001 the average salary amounted to an equivalent of 32,727 AMD monthly (an equivalent of 59.5 USD) in the 
industrial sector, and 59,000 AMD monthly (107.3 USD) in the cigarette industry. Also, the annual average 
salary growth in cigarette industry was higher than in other industrial sub-sectors. While the average salary in 
the industrial sector increased by 49%, in the cigarette industry it increased by 136% for the same period.  
246 The fact that smoking is bad to human health should be disregarded in this case, because the discussion here 
concerns not health side effects for the smoking part of the population, but the efficiency of the company based 
on the price of the product and on how available the company makes its product for an ordinary person, who 
consumes the specific product.   
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A good example of mismanagement and non-transparency in the privatization process 
has been the privatization of the energy sector in Armenia. In 1998 the Armenian Parliament 
passed a law to privatize the country’s electricity supply network. This law allowed potential 
investors to buy minority stakes in four distribution networks – Yerevan, Central, Northern 
and Southern – which served around 750 000 users. The state retained control of the 
generation facilities. Following this development, the European Bank of Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD) signed an agreement to purchase a 20% share in each of the networks 
pending participation from an international investor. Subsequent tenders were released for 
75% stakes in 2 networks (Black and Veattch, 2002).  
A total of fifteen foreign companies had initially applied for the tender. Later, some 
of the bidders decided that did not want compete. Others, including such world leaders as 
Electricite de France and the Swedish-Swiss Asea Brown Boveri, withdrew late in the game. 
By that time, this privatization project had become overly politicized in Armenia, and the 
government tinkered with the tender’s terms in the endgame phase (Khachatrian 2001). 
Energy privatization encountered political difficulties almost from the start: first it was 
slowed by the campaign leading up to Armenia’s parliamentary elections in May 1999, and 
then by the political government upheaval sparked by the October 1999 parliament 
assassinations. Anti-privatization resistance gained momentum in April, when the two tender 
favorites, the American corporation AES Silk Road and Spain's Union Fenosa, failed to file a 
formal bid. Some observers suggest that the missed deadline was a signal of waning foreign 
investor interest in Armenia (ibid).  
The process of privatization of the electric sector was met with difficulty. Due to a 
lack of interest in investment the privatization process was halted in March of 2001, and for a 
long time the international tender for the state energy distribution network has raised 
questions about Armenia’s openness to foreign investors. Besides political reasons for the 
difficulties in the energy sector privatization, there were also governance issues related to the 
mismanagement of the process. A major difficulty in the sale of the electricity distributio n 
networks was the fact that the Armenian government was influenced and severely pressured 
from the Russian energy giant Gazprom despite of the pleas of Armenia’s largest lender 
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World Bank to conduct a fair bidding process.247 In February 2000 RFE/RL reported that the 
World Bank urged the Armenian authorities to ensure transparency in the ongoing bidding 
for the country’s energy distributing network. In response to past scandals linked with the 
sell-off of other major government owned assets, the World Bank also asked the government 
not to collude with Russian firms on tender results.248 
Whereas Armenian officials were publicly puzzled about the reasons behind the 
tender’s failure, a few of the officials expressed concerns related to the decisions of the 
government.  For example, Justice Minister David Harutiunian, indirectly acknowledged that 
the government had changed some of the terms in the final stage of the tender process. The 
2001 Jamestown Monitor reported that the changes would have curtailed the new owners’ 
managerial authority and would have limited their leeway for legal recourse in the event of 
disputes. As such, the changes could have enabled corrupt and shadowy local groups to 
meddle with the privatized networks. 
Several World Bank assessments judge Armenia’s energy reform successful from the 
point of view of commercial losses and collection rate. Table 8.4 represents the data available 
on energy losses and collections for Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Georgia, and 
Tbilisi.249 Those are countries in the region that have undertaken some degree of power 
sector reform. Whereas Tbilisi managed to improve collections, losses remained relatively 
high and constant. Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan were able to reduce losses, but their 
collections decreased or remained relatively constant. According to the World Bank 
accounts, only Armenia managed to unambiguously improve in both collections and 
commercial losses during this time period. 
                                                 
247 Armenia relies heavily on Russian gas for power generation and Armenia’s entire gas infrastructure is 
dominated by a Gazprom-controlled joint venture. Moreover, the "Metsamor" nuclear plant, which accounts for 
about 40% of Armenia's electricity production, is also heavily dependent on Russian loans and nuclear fuel.  
248 In February of 2000 “Azg”, a local Armenian newspaper informed that Russia's Gazprom monopoly, with 
Moscow's backing, was lobbying hard to get preferential treatment for its subsidiary, the ITERA Corporation . 
ITERA was taking part in the tender in conjunction with another Russian  firm, Rosatomenergo, and was 
reportedly shortlisted for the last phase of the contest. The newspaper alleged that the interruptions in Russian 
gas supplies to Armenia that occurred during that phase of the tender could have been a sign of Russian threat 
and a method of putting pressure on Armenia to win control over its power grid.  
249 The capital city of Georgia, Tbilisi, is included separately in the table, because the data on losses in Georgia 
is not available after the year of 1997, but it is available for Tbilisi. Therefore, Tbilisi is included, so that we can 
have an overall perspective of losses and collections in the Republic of Georgia.  
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Table 8.4: Losses and Collections (in percentages) in Selected CIS Countries, 1994-2002 
Losses   
 
              
  1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Kazakhstan 13 15 18 20 21 21 13 13   
Armenia 40 40 34 29 26 27 25 26 26 
Georgia 
    
  50 50 50 50 
Tbilisi 
    
  37 52 48 38 
Azerbaijan 18 21 19 21 17 16 15 12 16 
Collections                   
  1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Kazakhstan 99 77 85 63 82 74 62 62   
Armenia 39 54 60 61 77 88 89 81 90 
Georgia 20 22 42 38 39 40 42 45 47 
Tbilisi 
    
  32 44 77 91 
Azerbaijan 35 39 57 50 43 46 18 26 34 
Source: Power’s Promise Dataset adapted from World Bank 2006 report on Armenia’s 
Energy Reform, available online at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/ARMENIAEXTN/Resources/Chapter3.pdf 
The Armenian energy reform was far from being successful considering the 
continuously increasing service costs, although the World Bank calls those costs effective 
price increases (World Bank 2006). From the perspective of the ordinary citizen, the 
privatization of energy raised its price, increased the energy share of household budgets, and 
decreased family standards of living. Natural gas prices, for instance, have been continuously 
rising. On April 18, 2008 Tigran Sarkisian, the Prime Minister of Armenia, announced that 
the government would lift natural gas subsidies beginning May 1.  This meant that retail gas 
prices increased from 59 AMD per cubic meter (about 19 US cents) to 84 AMD (about 27 
US cents).  In April, 2006 the government had decided to subsidize prices for imported gas 
with an aim to ease the burden placed on private consumers and companies through 
allocating about $190 million dollars to in order to cover the subsidy for three years. Only 
two years later, almost a year before the subsidy schedule of three years was over, the 
government indicated that the funds for the subsidy ran out (Grigoryan 2008). Similar to this 
case, gas and electricity price hikes have always posed a serious challenge to the socially 
vulnerable strata of society.  
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Another report, prepared for the Second ECA Poverty Forum of 2001 in Hungary, 
assesses the 1999 electricity tariff increase with particular attention to questions of service 
accessibility and affordability for the poor. The report findings were based on a survey of 
2,010 randomly selected households conducted in December 1999 and January 2000.  The 
report mentions that household tariffs in Armenia were raised to reflect the high cost of 
supplying low voltage electricity. Thus, in order to improve the financial sustainability of the 
utilities, in January 1999 the increasing block tariff was eliminated in favor of a single price 
of 25 AMD per kWh.250 “Elimination of the increasing block tariff was predicted to raise the 
average price of electricity 30% (from 19.2 to 25 AMD per kWh). However, the household 
survey indicates the new price of 25 AMD per kWh represented an unexpected 47% increase 
(from 17 to 25 AMD per KWh). The difference between the expected and actual tariff 
increase occurred because the calculation of average price was based on aggregate utility 
data rather than household level data.” (Lampietti, Kolb, Gulyani, and Avanesyan, 2001:1)  
The increase of nearly 50% in electricity prices was a huge blow to majority of the 
population in Armenia. As the authors imply, the sampled household’s response to this 
change in the electricity tariff offers key insights into electricity pricing policy and energy 
sector strategy. For the surveyed households, electricity consumption records dropped on 
average 17%. Apparently, as a substitute to electricity, consumption of wood and natural gas 
increased. From the point of view of social exclusion, it is important to note that compared to 
the non-poor, the poor cut consumption more, the percentage of households with arrears was 
higher, and the average size of arrears increased more (ibid).  
At the end of 1990s and the beginning of 2000s, most Armenian households, 
particularly the poor, experienced a large burden of energy expenditures. Electricity made up 
the bulk of these expenditures, and additional increases in tariffs, without access to low cost 
substitutes, created maximum hardship for the urban poor. The urban poor used to spend 
16% of monthly cash expenditures on electricity. Besides, they possessed the least access to 
wood as a substitute. 
                                                 
250 Energy related 'block tariff' is the tariff in which the charge is based on a series of different kilowatt -hour 
rates applying to successive kilowatt-hour blocks of given size, supplied during a specified period.  
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Before the failure of the energy sector privatization, the Armenian Republic had 
already faced another failure, in the privatization of telecommunications system, which was 
yet another significantly valuable sector of public services and an important component of 
service privatization.  
Armenia’s privatization of its telephone monopoly was even worse than the initial 
privatization effort of the energy sector. ArmenTel, Armenian telecommunications network, 
was established in 1995 as a joint venture between Armenia’s Ministry of Communications 
and Transport (with 51 % of the shares) and a consortium of U.S. and Russian companies 
called Trans-World Telecom Ltd. In 1997, the Greek government-owned Hellenic 
Telecommunications Organization (OTE) purchased ArmenTel, becoming the sole owner of 
90 % of ArmenTel. The Armenian government retained 10 % of the company.  
The privatization of ArmenTel was marred by serious weaknesses in the decision to 
grant ArmenTel a monopoly in international telecommunication services including the fixed 
line market and mobile communications for 15 years. ArmenTel was entitled to decide on its 
rates unilaterally. So the company introduced increases starting January 1, 1998. In addition 
to an increase in charges for international calls, the basic monthly telephone service charge 
for local lines was raised from 600 to 900 Dram (about $1.70) with only four minutes a day 
allotted for free calls. The company introduced the per-minute billing for telephone service in 
September of 1998, a move that caused up to a three-fold rise in phone costs. With a 
population of about three million, Armenia then had 585,000 telephone lines in service. In 
1997 ArmenTel reported $34 million in pre-tax earnings in the first half of the year alone, 
compared with $47 million for the whole of 1997. These figures rose to about $70 million in 
1999 (Tchilingirian 1999:18). 
Growing dissatisfaction with OTE’s management of ArmenTel became evident early 
in 1999. ArmenTel allegedly failed to make many of its promised investments. This hindered 
the development of Armenia’s telephone system, which at that time lagged behind those of 
its neighbors. According to World Bank reports, compared to Azerbaijan and Georgia, fixed-
line and mobile tariffs were higher, fixed-line teledensity had grown at only half the pace, 
and mobile penetration was at only 0.2 % of the population (compared to 3.5 % and 1.8 % in 
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Azerbaijan and Georgia, respectively). According to press coverage, ArmenTel was 
perceived to have stifled Armenia’s growth in potentially competitive markets for Internet 
service provision and cable television through excessive access fees for international data 
transfer, another service over which ArmenTel had exclusive monopoly rights.251 
Multi-layered problems caused by unfulfilled original objectives, mismanagement 
and failure to meet investment expectations surfaced. There were also bribery charges 
reported. While major administrative problems related to the OTE handling of the 
telecommunications services exasperated the government’s patience, the Armenian people 
were more irritated about the escalating service costs OTE started to introduce. There was 
enormous dissatisfaction with ArmenTel by the frustrated population in Armenia. Many of 
the ArmenTel customers, among them Arminco, which is the largest Internet provider in 
Armenia, the National Academy of Sciences, and Noyan Tapan News Agency, started to 
challenge ArmenTel, when communication lines were cut unexpectedly and without reason. 
The Armenian Union of Internet Users complained against ArmenTel’s monopoly stating 
that it “hindered the development of Internet services in Armenia. For example, to lease a 
64kb/s Internet channel costs $5,000-$6,000 in Armenia, some “seven to ten times more than 
in other countries in the world”” (Tchilingirian 1999:19).  
Angry protests were launched against ArmenTel, for its unfair monopoly, 
unimpressive services and price hikes. Some political parties, particularly the opposition 
parties, actively campaigned against ArmenTel, advocating people to refrain from using their 
services. In spite of huge public negative reaction against ArmenTel, then Prime Minister 
Armen Darbinian stated that the 1997 deal with the Greek telecommunications company, 
OTE, was “the best in the CIS”. He argued that the sale to OTE has advanced the quality of 
telephone services and that “high quality has to be paid for. Telephone services that are free 
of charge existed only in communist times.” (Tchilingirian 1999:19) Another government 
official that tried to justify the privatization of the telecommunications system the way it was 
achieved in Armenia was Artak Vartanian, the Minister of Postal Services and 
Telecommunications. While admitting that it was politically wrong to introduce the highly 
                                                 
251 World Bank, "Regional Study on Telecommunications in the Caucasus",available online at: 
http://web.worldbank.org/archive/website01023/WEB/IMAGES/REGIONAL.PDF 
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unpopular per minute fee, specifically before the parliamentary elections, he asserted: “Yes, 
we do have low salaries and grave social problems, but we must have a growing economy, 
which is impossible without investments.” (ibid) 
Finally, following the public outcry against ArmenTel, the government of Armenia 
adjusted ArmenTel’s license in 2003, depriving ArmenTel of its monopoly over mobile 
phone services. ArmenTel initiated a dispute, which was settled in November 2004, reducing 
ArmenTel’s license from 15 to 11 years. World Bank experts find that the most obvious 
problem with ArmenTel’s license was its exclusivity over fixed-line and mobile services, just 
as mobile telephony and Internet communications entered the mainstream and began to be 
established as competitors with fixed-line telephone service. As mentioned before, OTE was 
given a 15-year exclusive license for fixed-line telephony (local, long distance, and 
international) and GSM services. Exclusivity over fixed-line and mobile telephony for 15 
years obviously hampered the growth of telecommunications infrastructure in Armenia. 
Other problems included lack of appropriate regulation and lack of appropriate incentives 
embedded in the legal and regulatory framework and licenses (World Bank 2006:32).  
A July statement of Noyan Tapan reported that ArmenTel’s activities and 
privatization did not correspond with the Armenian law. An interim commission on 
ArmenTel announced that “its activities conflicted with numerous legislative acts of the 
Republic of Armenia” (Asbarez 1999). ArmenTel’s monopoly allowed the company to 
derive immense profits failing to make any serious investments directed to Armenia.  
The transfer of natural monopolies and major strategic enterprises into private hands 
was the policy of a decreasing role of the state in the economy. “Strategic enterprises of 
energy and gas supply, communications, water supply, transport, etc. were either privatized 
or operated on a concession basis. This policy was justified by the statement that the state 
was a bad manager” (Nranyan 2011:201-202). Based on the logic of this policy, the 
privatization of Armenia’s telecommunications and energy distribution networks were 
supposed to be key elements of the country’s economic development strategy. Many 
considered their privatization as an important stage in the transition to the free market. 
However, Armenia’s power and telecommunications privatization were far from being 
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examples of fair and efficient privatization in a country that needed them so badly for its 
economic development and for its people to have appropriate access to energy and 
telecommunications.   
It was difficult for the Armenian people, extremely used to the Soviet system of the 
state control for equal distribution of resources, to easily trust the privatization of services, 
especially as they witnessed the mal-administration of the privatized first major 
infrastructures such as transportation, power and telecommunications. People feared that new 
owners would raise service costs based on their monopolistic power, and those fears were not 
imaginary. Immediately after privatization, practically all natural monopolies of the country 
raised tariff rates and prices of services for several times. Since the privatization of gas, 
energy, and telecommunications, costs for those services have increased dramatically, 
worsening the living standards for most Armenians and maximizing daily hardships 
experienced by the poor, a majority of Armenians.  
8.4 Privatization and Administrative Barriers to Foreign Investment 
A major problem of privatization in Armenia was related to foreign direct investment 
(FDI). Armenia lags behind many transition countries with its FDI per capita rates or the 
share of FDI in GDP. Literature on Armenia-Diaspora-related economic relations mentions 
that the Armenian government’s strategy was not as favorable for Diaspora Armenians, as 
well as other foreigners to invest in Armenia. This strategy has generated mainly small scale 
investments that could have potentially been massive.   
According to the Armenian Development Agency (ADA), investment and trade 
policies of Armenia are considered to be the most open in the CIS by international 
organizations.252 Foreign companies are encouraged to invest and are entitled by law to the 
same treatment as local companies, moreover they have certain advantages. The Law on 
Foreign Investment, adopted in July 1994, regulates foreign investment in Armenia. It 
provides guarantees to foreign investors and protects investors from changes in the business 
                                                 
252 The information in the next two paragraphs is taken from the Armenian Development Agency, available 
online at http://www.ada.am/eng/for-investors/fdi-statistics/.   
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related laws for 5 years. According to the Law a “Foreign Investor” is any foreign company 
or citizen, a person without citizenship, an Armenian citizen permanently residing outside of 
Armenia, or an international organization that invests in Armenia. “Foreign investme nt” is 
any form of property, including financial assets and intellectual property, which is invested 
by a foreign investor directly in the territory of Armenia, in any economic or other venture. 
Foreign investors can make investments in Armenia through the establishment of 
fully foreign-owned companies (including representations, affiliates, and branches), the 
purchase of existing companies and securities, or the establishment of joint ventures. The 
company registration process takes about a week. There are also incentives for exporters – no 
export duty and a VAT refund on goods and services exported. There are no limitations on 
the volume and type of foreign ownership, the number of foreign employees and access to 
financial sources. Although foreigners can only lease land, a company registered by a 
foreigner as an Armenian business entity does have the right to buy land. Foreigners may 
obtain permission to use land under long-term leases, and concessions for the use of 
Armenian natural resources with the participation of an Armenian company.  
Similar to ADA, literature on post-Soviet economic reforms often honors Armenia, 
acknowledging that market reforms have been more advanced and foreign investment 
climate quite favorable in Armenia than in other post-Soviet republics. While this was a 
widely accepted view among Western observers, economists and international organizations, 
at the end of 2000s foreign investment in Armenia decreased tremendously due to ongoing 
political and military insecurity resulting from theKarabakh conflict and its unclear 
prospects. It declined from $240 million in 1998 to $100 million in 1999 (Ugurlayan 
2001:436). Another reason for the decline in foreign investors’ willingness to invest in 
Armenia was due to political assassinations during that period.  
As mentioned in the introductory part of this chapter, corruption in the process of 
privatization was another hindrance for the successful and fair sale of companies. Armenian 
mass media have frequently cites the corruption issue, mentioning that there were charges of 
bribery and mismanagement. These also served to minimize investor confidence and thwart 
foreign investment in Armenia. Although important for Armenia, proper measures were 
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rarely undertaken to ensure open and accurate management of foreign investments. 
Typically, lack of appropriate economic information regarding the market value of firms that 
were being privatized and reluctance to implement the sale process based on real market 
values resulted in the corruption problem. 
In 2000, ArmenPress, citing State Property Minister David Vardanian, indicated that 
Armenian government faced serious challenges in its attempts to privatize around 2,500 
small and medium enterprises, which failed to find buyers.253 According to Vardanian, the 
lack of appropriate information about these enterprises prolonged the process of their 
privatization. The minister complained, “There are four approaches towards evaluating their 
real prices, but all of them have shortcomings. However, the biggest problem is the absence 
of demand.”254 
Research shows that developing countries similar to Armenia have achieved solid 
economic progress by incurring FDI in various sectors of industry and agriculture (Bevan 
and Estrin 2000, Marino 2000, Shiells 2003, Zarsky 2005). It has been estimated that FDI is 
strategically the only way to guarantee a sufficient rate of employment and economic growth, 
as well as social and political stability in Armenia (World Bank 2002). But despite ADA’s 
optimistic description of foreign investment policies in Armenia, foreign investment has not 
been flourishing in the republic. The investment climate has not been conducive in the 
republic. Besides the fact that geopolitically Armenia was not attractive for FDI, the 
Armenian government in its turn has not taken specific steps to draw FDI in potentially 
significant sectors, such as internet technologies and software development, jewelry, mining, 
tourism, textile production, etc.  
Table 8.5 shows that based on FDI per capita, Armenia had a better position relative 
to many of the former USSR countries in 1990s (except the resource-rich countries, such as 
Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and the Baltic states). A more careful look of the table, however, 
                                                 
253 A major Armenian news agency operating since 1918, ArmenPress is the oldest and biggest agency in 
Armenia. ArmenPress currently is acting as a closed joint stock company with its shares held by the government 
of Armenia. It produces domestic, international, regional news bulletins, photo news and provides a wide range 
of analytical stories covering politics, economy, culture and other areas. News items are issued on a daily basis 
in Armenian, Russian and English. 
254 “Privatization of Big Enterprises Opposed, Says State Property Minister”, ARMENPRESS, Nov. 17, 2000, 
available online at http://hyeforum.com/index.php?showtopic=6066 
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indicates that Armenia's investment rate was very low compared to the Eastern European 
transition countries. Besides, as World Bank reports, these data are misleading because they 
are inflated by high privatization proceeds received from privatization of telecommunicatio n 
and gas distribution companies. Approximately one third of total reported FDI in Armenia 
during the period of 1992-1999 came from these transactions. Small and medium investment 
transactions, including those in start-up companies, have been very low.  
Table 8.5: FDI Per Capita for Selected Transition Countries, US dollars, 1994-1999 
 Annual average 
1994-1999 
1999 
Albania 17.9 13.2 
Armenia 18.8 40.5 
Azerbaijan 73.8 104 
Belarus 9.1 18.5 
Bulgaria 33.4 83.3 
Croatia 91.7 163 
Czech Republic  178.5 339.8 
Estonia 183.3 233.3 
Georgia 6.6 17.8 
Hungary 218.6 156.9 
Kazakhstan 51.8 53.3 
Kyrgyz Republic 13.9 13.9 
Latvia 105.7 60 
Lithuania 75.9 108.1 
FYR Macedonia 14.2 14.3 
Moldova 13.4 39.5 
Poland 109.3 168.4 
Romania 36.2 59.8 
Russia 17.2 23.9 
Slovak Republic 60.6 92.6 
Slovenia 88.5 75 
Tajikistan 2.6 4.9 
Turkmenistan 11.9 20.8 
Ukraine 8.4 12 
Uzbekistan 5.9 9.4 
Total for the 
region 40.4 57.2 
Source:A World Bank Country Study, “Growth Challenges and Government Policies in 
Armenia”,2002. 
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According to the World Bank data, even when large privatization transactions were 
included, the per capita FDI rate in Armenia in the mentioned period was below many of 
other former socialist countries, regardless of the fact whether those countries had oil or not, 
a resource that would be conducive of more investment. Some of the included countries have 
large assets of oil, such as Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, and therefore they attracted more 
FDI. But even some of the non-oil countries have had higher FDI rates than Armenia, despite 
Armenia’s strong human capital that could have been very effectively utilized in sectors, 
such as telecommunications, software development, chemical industry, and despite the 
willingness of thousands of wealthy and nationalistic Diaspora Armenians all over the world 
to invest in their historic homeland. For example, Armenia’s overall per capita FDI for 1992-
1999 was nearly 3.5 times below that of neighboring Azerbaijan’s. It was 6 times below 
Poland’s FDI, and 10 times below Estonia’s FDI. The existing opportunities for FDI 
promotion have been grossly underutilized.  
Another source, “The Role of the Diaspora in Generating Foreign Direct Investments 
in Armenia” by Hergnyan and Makaryan (2006), evaluates FDI comparatively in some 
transition countries for the period of 1997-2003. It shows that by per capita net FDI rates 
Armenia lagged behind all of the countries selected for comparison, except Uzbekistan in 
approximately all of the years. For example, if we compare per capita net FDI inflows for 
Armenia (39.56) and Azerbaijan (399) in 2003, we observe that it was 10 times less in 
Armenia.  
Table 8.6: FDI Statistics for Selected Transition Countries, in US dollars 
Armenia 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
GDP per capita 1,839 2,079 2,209 2,422 2,733 3,138 3,671 
FDI, net inflows (% of GDP) 3.2 11.7 6.6 5.5 3.3 4.7 4.3 
Net FDI Inflows, per capita  16.1 69.4 38.8 33.5 22.6 36.1 39.6 
Azerbaijan        
GDP per capita 1,816 2,002 2,177 2,571 2,877 3,218 3,617 
FDI, net inflows (% of GDP) 28.1 23.0 11.1 2.5 4.0 22.3 46.0 
Net FDI Inflows, per capita  142.2 129.3 63.9 16.1 27.9 170.4 399 
Bulgaria        
GDP per capita 4,990 5,216 5,399 5,990 6,483 6,906 7,501 
FDI, net inflows (% of GDP) 4.9 4.2 6.3 7.9 6.0 5.8 7.1 
Net FDI Inflows, per capita  60.7 65.1 99.8 124.3 102.8 115.0 181.4 
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Table 8.6 Continued 
Estonia        
GDP per capita  7986 8453 8665 9779 10803 11806 12913 
FDI, net inflows (% of GDP) 5.4 10.4 5.5 7.1 9.1 4.0 9.8 
Net FDI Inflows, per capita  190.1 418.8 221.8 282.8 397.7 209.5 658.4 
Georgia        
GDP per capita 1,569 1,688 1,775 1,990 2,151 2,333 2,666 
FDI, net inflows (% of GDP) 6.91 7.34 2.94 4.31 3.42 4.93 8.46 
Net FDI Inflows, per capita  49.5 54.7 17.2 27.8 23.5 36.3 74.0 
Kazakhstan        
GDP per capita 3,602 3,624 3,903 4,594 5,330 5,897 6,663 
FDI, net inflows (% of GDP) 6.0 5.2 9.4 7.0 12.8 10.5 6.8 
Net FDI Inflows, per capita  83.9 74.2 103.8 85.2 190.2 173.7 140.4 
Russian Federation        
GDP per capita  6,000 5,894 6,360 7,086 7,573 8,130 9,033 
FDI, net inflows (% of GDP) 1.2 1.0 1.7 1.0 0.8 1 1.9 
Net FDI Inflows, per capita  33.0 18.8 22.6 18.6 17.1 24.0 55.5 
Uzbekistan        
GDP per capita  1,328 1,371 1,435 1,516 1,600 1,664 1,737 
FDI, net inflows (% of GDP) 1.1 0.9 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.7 
Net FDI Inflows, per capita  7.1 5.8 5.0 3.0 3.3 2.6 2.7 
Source: Adapted from Hergnyan and Makaryan (2006:27). 
The history of bad investments, low purchasing power of local population, the 
geopolitical risks, corruption and inadequate legal regulations to protect investors made 
Armenia less desirable than other former socialist nations for foreign investment in 1990s. 
The trends of the 1990s continued in the 2000s. The investment climate was still challenged 
by factors, such as limited local market, weak governance, and weaknesses in the legal 
system (Shiels 2003). Privatization of Armenian state companies and public services through 
international tenders has also been complicated by the fact that the Armenian society could 
not accept easily the fact that foreigners might manage local property and Armenian 
employees. This trend was characteristic of the mentality of nearly all post-socialist societies. 
In September 2000, after attending United Nations Summit of the Millennium, 
President Kocharyan held meetings with Diaspora Armenian businessmen in New York and 
later in Geneva to discuss potential and prospects of more active participation of Diaspora 
businessmen in the economic life of Armenia. Kocharyan then stated that there existed 
positive conditions for supporting business and investments in Armenia. Nonetheless, many 
of the investors, particularly Diaspora Armenians, who represent a large percentage of 
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foreign investors, were skeptical. Sarkis Hacpanian, a businessman, who has lived in 
Armenia for 10 years, told RFE/RL that conditions for doing business in Armenia had 
become worse. “The laws which are supposed to support business and investment do not 
work, they exist only on paper. Sometimes even court decisions in favor of the investor do 
not work” Hacpanian said. He dismissed the Armenian authorities’ assurances as “just 
words.” (Hyeforum, November 2000) 
Several surveys and research (Amirkhanian 1997; Gillespie and other 1999; 
Freinkman 2001; Gevorgyan and Grigoryan 2003: Gillespie and Adrianova 2004; 
Manasaryan 2004; Hergnyan and Makaryan 2006; Khachatryan 2011) have tried to 
determine the perceptions existing in the business community regarding the business 
environment and barriers for foreign investment in the republic of Armenia. As surveys of 
entrepreneurs have shown, there existed numerous barriers for investments in Armenia. 
Those barriers were even more intricate for diaspora Armenians, whose economic role has 
been important during structural reforms in Armenia.  
Diaspora Armenians were the first generators of business investments in Armenia 
after the Karabakh war and the start of the privatization program in Armenia. Since the 
launch of structural reforms and privatization initiatives in the republic, Diaspora investors 
have experienced a series of conflicting political, economic and cultural events in Armenia 
that either stimulated or discouraged them from investing. When in 1994, the Armenian 
government banned the activities of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF), one of 
the most influential political parties in the diaspora, Armenia became a less attractive 
destination of investment for Diaspora Armenians.255 On the contrary, the annulment of the 
restrictions on ARF by President Kocharyan, and an official declaration of strengthening 
cultural, economic and business ties with the Diaspora in 1998 boosted Diaspora-related FDI 
rates. However, the 1999 Armenian parliament shootings and assassination of important 
politicians, negatively affected the Diaspora-related investments in 2000.  Their share of all 
foreign investments decreased to 57% (Hergnyan and Makaryan 2006:8). “Such an interplay 
of contradictory factors (convergence of “opportunity” and “shock”) to a large extent 
                                                 
255 The context, political origins and consequences of the ban initiated by President Levon Ter-Petrossian’s 
administration on ARF have been described in Chapter 7.   
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contributed to “freezing” of the Diaspora involvement in investing in Armenia at a very low 
level compared to the potential (from 1994 to 2004, there were only 2,526 DCIR (number of 
Diaspora-connected investors) from the Armenian Diaspora which exceeds 6 million 
people)” (ibid).  
A major barrier for FDI was related to the willingness of top officials to ensure an 
adequate infrastructure for investors. Sufficient steps were not initiated by government 
officials to attract and support foreign investors from the beginning of the privatization 
process. State elites in Armenia have been concerned that the new investors would reduce 
their power both politically and economically, especially in the long-run (Amirkhanian 
1997). They were reluctant to split their political and economic share with new players. 
While for the short-run, it has been beneficial to the Armenian government to fill the state 
budget with proceeds of foreign, as well as domestic investment, there has been significant 
opposition towards the critical role of FDI, particularly from diaspora Armenians. According 
to Amirkhanian, the local Armenians could not "afford to share their limited resources and 
opportunities with the outsiders” (Amirkhanian 1997:21). But besides the issue of local 
Armenians' reluctance, there was also the issue of Diaspora Armenians' credibility Diasporas 
towards the Armenian government. 
Examining the Diaspora’s contributions to the socio-economic development of 
Armenia, Amirkhanian (1997) emphasizes a complex relationship between the Armenian 
Government and the Diaspora. Freinkman (2001) also highlights the imbalance between the 
lack of Diaspora contributions to Armenia’s development and the efforts of the Armenian 
state to hone Diaspora investments in Armenia’s transition to a market economy. The 
Armenian government lacked credibility with the Diaspora Armenians, who were considered 
a vital part of the economy. 
Fourteen large organizations of the Diaspora have provided assistance of about 900 
million USD to Armenia. The total amount of material assistance granted to Armenia since 
independence has reached 1,493,760,000 USD (Manasaryan 2004). While Diaspora 
Armenians’ contributions to Armenian socio-economic development are irrefutable, the level 
of private investment on behalf of Diaspora has been limited. According to Manasaryan 
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(2004) important factors related to Armenia-Diaspora economic relations are affected by the 
lack of a long-term cooperation strategy towards Armenia’s development agenda from both 
sides. Whereas the Armenian government has not made sufficient attempts to expand 
diaspora investors’ business initiatives, Diaspora businessmen in their turn have failed to 
adjust their cultural and nationalistic agenda in their efforts to collaborate economically in 
Armenia. Their historical and cultural connections are weak with Armenia, and they have 
less tolerance for potential risks associated with doing business in Armenia.  
With a case study of three large Armenian Diaspora initiatives to support business 
development in Armenia, Gillespie and Adrianova (2004) conclude that there are significant 
constitutional constraints, including barriers to personal involvement in project management. 
Instead, investors have to entrust management to local partners, such as government agencies 
and other local firms. The lack of investors’ direct participation in project/program 
management blocked small and medium companies in Armenia from key advantages of 
Western experience, such as strategic advice on customers, suppliers, and personnel.  
Based on a survey of 35 foreign firms in Yerevan, Khachatryan (2011) concludes that 
foreign companies experienced problems, such as monopolies, corruption among top 
government officials, and uneven access to information. About half of the investors 
complained about the limited openness of the economy, mainly due to the problem of 
privileges for certain families or individuals. Also, they were not satisfied with post-entry 
restrictions. The survey found out that the Armenian government did not support small 
businesses sufficiently and it did not implement business regulations successfully and fairly. 
It failed to support small businesses but was always supportive and protective of big 
businessmen. A major problem mentioned by the survey respondents was the 
underdevelopment of insurance industry. According to the investors, insurance services 
should be more essential and developed, particularly since subsidies for small and medium 
businesses are not common in Armenia (Khachatryan 2011, pages 71-72). 
Since the end of 1990s, Armenian banks have been able to perform foreign currency 
transactions. They can also conduct foreign exchange auctions. Many companies and 
organizations have international accounting standards in place. All these factors were 
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conducive of foreign investment. Yet, relevant legislation was not in place to ensure a 
consistent pace and process of investments. As a barrier to efficient investment, USAID 
experts, for example, indicate to the 2000 February rejection of a draft law on Securities 
Market Regulation by the Armenian National Assembly. This bill was aimed at protection of 
investor rights and creation of transparent market transactions, including preventions of 
fraud, and disclosure of transparent information by issuers of securities and other market 
participants (USAID 2000; Ugurlayan 2001). 
There are certain barriers that have been worrisome for both local and foreign 
investors in terms of the investment environment in Armenia. A major problem is that 
personal connections and networking are practically required for the success of businesses. 
The ability to protect their assets due to the lack and deficiency of property rights protection 
has been another main concern for businessmen. 
8.5 Privatization and Oligarchs 
It is typical of scholars of Soviet transition to consider that the increase of inequality 
and the rise of social exclusion are closely related to privatization. While wage 
decompression created income inequality, it was mainly due to privatization and subsequent 
consolidation of ownership that produced much-spread wealth inequality in most of the 
former Soviet countries (Guriev and Rachinsky 2006). The privatization process influenced 
the dynamics of wealth inequality in the following way: state assets were channeled into the 
hands of a few, government had a limited role and ability to fund previously public goods 
and services, and many citizens were left out of economic opportunities.  
With the analysis of Russian oligarchs, Guriev and Rachinksy (2006) argue that in 
Russia and many CIS countries inequality remains high because of post-privatization 
oligarchic activities, while in CEE countries the governments prepared institutions, as well as 
entrepreneurs, for greater equality of opportunity prior to privatization.256 In Russia and some 
of the CIS countries such as Armenia and Azerbaijan, the transition from planned to market 
                                                 
256 The data includes the following information on the examined oligarchs: income tax; employment and sales 
rates (World Bank estimates); companies/firms they own, major sector(s); employment (in thousands (% of 
sample)); sales (in billions of rubles (% of sample)); wealth (in billions of U.S. dollars). 
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economy produced a new class of affluent individuals, whose business activities in the 
perception of the median voter were basically illegitimate.257 Following privatization, there 
has been an extreme concentration of wealth in Armenia, which suggests that the industrial 
and commercial assets generating this wealth were also strongly concentrated. The wealthiest 
households accrued very high incomes and large amount of wealth. Table 8.7 provides the 
income distribution in Armenia in 1999. It reflects the enormously high concentration of 
income among the richest households. The top decile of the population possessed 45% of all 
income, while the bottom decile had only 0.7% of all income. The bottom half of the 
population together received only 15% of income. These estimates of inequality are striking. 
Moreover, it is a reflection of the fact that not only the poorest, but also the middle and lower 
middle classes were deprived of appropriate wages and resources. On the other hand, at the 
top decile of the population were a handful of businessmen, who controlled sufficient 
resources to influence politics, policy-making and implementation, and judiciary in order to 
increase their wealth even more. The top decile is comprised of Armenian oligarchs, who 
emerged as a consequence of consolidation of ownership after the voucher privatization. 
Table 8.7: Income Distribution in Armenia by Decile, 1999 
Decile  Share of Gross Income ( percent)  
I  0.7 
II  1.9 
III  2.9 
IV  4.0 
V  5.0 
VI  6.4 
VII  8.1 
VIII  10.7 
IX  15.3 
X  45.0 
Total  100 
                                                 
257 For instance, in 2004, the World Bank researched the activity of 1.3 thousand enterprises in Russia, and 
based on the research suggests that the achievement of major oligarchs was determined not by their successful 
management of enterprises but by their monopoly power. Besides, from the viewpoint of efficiency of resource 
use, these enterprises were less efficient than the smaller companies (http://www.rg.ru/2004/04/08/Ryul.html). 
Although a similar research study has not been conducted on Armenia, there are a few accounts that mention 
about the same problem of inefficiency in RA. Nranyan (2011) mentions that before the transfer into private  
operation, the losses of water in the water supply systems amounted to about 40%. Today, the water tariff is 
several times higher and losses amount to about 80%. For example, in 2010 losses of the company “Yerevan 
Jur” amounted to 83.5%, losses of "Armvodokanal" amounted to 85.1% (Public Service Regulatory 
Commission of the Republic of Armenia http://www.psrc.am/download.php?fid=17236).   
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Source: Oxfam, “Growth with Equity: Policy Choice for Poverty Reduction Project,” 
Yerevan, 2002. 
This trend continued in the 2000s. Whereas in 2002 Armenia’s GDP reached 83.2 
percent of its pre-reform level, and equaled to it in per capita terms, the Gini coefficient 
increased by 0.258 and became 0.528, which caused a significant increase of poverty 
incidence from 20 to 50.9 percent.258 For the period of 2004-2009, income inequality and the 
income gap between the poor and the non-poor were slightly reduced (Table 8.8).259 The Gini 
coefficient decreased as well for this period, but it is still high compared to other 
transitioning countries.  
Table 8.8: Indicators of income distribution inequality, 2004-2009 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Monetary income ratio between the richest 
20% of the population and poorest 20% of the 
population 
10.6 9.5 7.6 8.0 7.8 8.0 
Monetary income ratio between the richest 
10% of the population and poorest 10% of the 
population 
20.8 17.9 13.9 15.6 14.1 14.5 
Gini coefficient  0.395 0.395 0.369 0.371 0.339 0.355 
Source: "Social Snapshot and Poverty in Armenia", NSS RA, 2007, 2008, 2010 in IMF 
Country Report, "Republic of Armenia: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper—Progress 
Report", No. 11/191, July 2011. 
Plato’s ideas on the evolution and nature of oligarchy are very relevant to the origins 
and character of today’s Armenian oligarchy. According to Plato (551b), oligarchs value 
property and honor wealth more than anything else. Righteousness and merit are not 
honored. In an oligarchy, the wealthy rule, and the poor are ruled. The latter do not 
participate in politics. One of the major defects of an oligarchic state is that rulers are 
appointed on the basis of wealth and not on the basis of qualifications. Oligarchs rise to 
power unlawfully (Cartledge 1998). 
Privatization has been flawed by insufficiencies inherent in the phenomenon of 
oligarchy, such as favoritism and corruption, during all three presidencies of post-
                                                 
258See Economic Development and Research Center, "Modeling of Economic Policy, Income Distribution and 
Poverty: Case of Armenia", available online at: http://old.edrc.am/user_files/42.pdf, last access December, 2013   
259 See IMF Country Report, "Republic of Armenia: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper—Progress Report", No. 
11/191, July 2011, available online at: 
http://planipolis.iiep.unesco.org/upload/Armenia/Armenia_PRSP_Progress_Report_2011.pdf 
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independent Armenia. Irrefutably, the oligarchic notion emerged since the initial stages of 
privatization in Armenia, and there were big businessmen during Levon Ter-Petrosyan’s 
presidency. But the oligarchic power started to meddle into the political affairs of the country 
towards the end of 2000s. Since then, oligarchs, most of whom are also politicians, have 
continued to enrich themselves (in most cases unlawfully) without facing challenges from 
either the government or the legal system. 
In my conversation with a former Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia, Hrant 
Bagratyan, it was revealed that the first oligarchic clusters emerged in Armenia beginning in 
1997-1998, with fuel imports. Bagratyan concluded that in a small country like Armenia the 
concentration of capital is very typical. “But there is a distinction between concentration of 
capital occurring in a natural way and concentration of capital, which is organized 
intentionally through government policies in order for state elites to deal with maximum 20-
30 people, the wealthiest ones. This was the politics of Armenian state elites since the end of 
1990s.”260 
Mass media accounts indicate that companies and factories privatized in the mid-
1990s were small and most often non-operating. But since 1999-2000, the industrial 
privatization included the biggest, most lucrative and most profitable enterprises, specifically 
in the construction sector and production of certain commodities. Based on the evidence 
provided by the independent press these enterprises were purchased for nominal prices – 
much lower prices than their book values. This type of transactions transformed new 
capitalists into wealthy industrial tycoons. In return to the granted fortune, the new oligarchs 
had to offer political, as well as financial support to the government top officials, specifically 
in times of elections.  The basis of private sector development was grounded on “influence-
peddling” (borrowed from Astourian 2000:16) between high-rank government officials and 
owners of the private companies. The officials had “direct, indirect, partial or hidden control 
over the new companies”.261 The hidden control of the officials was through hidden 
                                                 
260 The citation is taken from the author's interview with Hrant Bagratyan conducted on August 20, 2012. 
261 The information is borrowed from Astourian (2000), whose statements are based on a report of U.S.-
Armenia Business & Investment Association, “Corruption”, in Investment Climate Report on Armenia , 15 
January 2000. 
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partnership and shareholding, and the indirect control was based on partnership or 
shareholding through a family member (of the official) or a friend. 
Whereas some believe that oligarchs became an engine for Armenia’s economic 
growth, for many more oligarchic elites who nourish one another have weakened the 
Armenian economy by creating unfair competition, by stripping assets from companies and 
by dodging taxes. Some others speculate that they have had a negative impact on the 
evolution and consolidation of democratic institutions in Armenia by manipulating state 
politics and policies. “As the market institutions were underdeveloped, there were huge 
“institutional economies of scale” – large owners have been able to influence the rules of the 
game through capturing regulators, courts and legislatures” (Guriev and Rachinsky 2006:16). 
According to Crisis Group Europe (2012), Armenian oligarchs control the economy 
and influence policy. They are “centered on several informal commodity-based cartels and 
semi-monopolies” in specific economic sectors, particularly in the trade of commodities, 
such as gasoline, sugar, flour, and alcoholic beverages. Two companies reportedly control 
virtually all cement production and sales. Oligarchs possess most of the mining industry. 
Taking into account the small territory that Armenia has, it may be considered that the 
country is rich with valuable resources such as molybdenum and gold. All profits from those 
lucrative resources are said to belong to a few oligarchs. Among those are Parliament 
Speaker Hovik Abrahamyan, member of Parliament Tigran Arzakantsyan, and former 
Minister of Environmental Protection Vardan Ayvazyan.262 
There have not been effective legal methods that would encourage small and medium 
entrepreneurs to enter into fair competition with those oligarchs. For instance, every other 
small-scale businessman or potential importer of sugar or gasoline knows that sugar, flour, 
gasoline, etc. are monopolistic businesses and do not try to import those commodities. Efforts 
to import any of the known monopolies by other entrepreneurs have been doomed to failure. 
                                                 
262Aghajanian (2012) records that Ayvazyan was accused of corruption and fraud in the mining business  in 
2012. A U.S. court ordered him to pay $37.5 million in damages to a U.S. mining company that was accusing 
him.  
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One of my interviewees, Arman Grigoryan, provided very illustrative examples of 
how the interests of the society at large clashed with the interests of the politically well-
connected businessmen.263 According to Grigoryan, “the artificial high rate of the Armenian 
currency, which was devouring the savings of the poor people, was detrimental to the 
politically weak exporters and very beneficial to the politically powerful importers of 
Armenia”. For a long period of time there was a lot of political demand in the society to do 
something about this issue, but the President did not initiate any steps, the Parliament did not 
intervene, and the Central Bank did not do anything to protect the rights of the small 
entrepreneurs.  
Another example of how state policy outcomes have been beneficial to both 
politicians and large businessman was related to arbitrary practices used by the customs 
officials. “Well-connected businessmen have their imported goods cleared through the 
customs very quickly. The not so well-connected businessmen or the ones who are 
sympathetic to the opposition have their goods lying in the customs for 2-3 months. 
Sometimes these are perishable items of seasonal goods, so by the time they get it cleared, 
they are out of competition in the market. This way the latter businessmen are easily 
defeated”.264 As a most interesting case to support his statements, Grigoryan provided the 
example of Khachatur Sukiasyan, some of whose assets were stripped by the government in 
efforts to bankrupt the businessman in 2008. Grigoryan concluded that the gamut of the 
government ran from very vulgar and very direct ways, such as seizing one’s business 
through fraudulent law-enforcement cooperation and keeping goods in customs for a long 
period of time, to very subtle ways, such as keeping the exchange rate of the Armenian 
currency high or low to benefit the government-connected businessmen.  
                                                 
263Interview conducted with Arman Grigoryan on March 24, 2010. 
264 The quote is from the author’s interview with Arman Grigoryan on March 24, 2010. There were other 
interviewed politicians and researchers, who used similar examples regarding subsidized tax privileges for 
certain businesses and businessmen. Among those were Richard Giragosyan (mentioning the import of fuel/gas 
and sugar), Heghine Manasyan (fuel), Paruyr Hayrikyan (fuel and cars), Gevork Manoukyan (cars and cellular 
phones) and Stepan Safaryan (all of the mentioned products and services).     
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ACRPC Chairmain Gevorg Manukyan presented two other examples of privileges 
granted to businessmen favored by top officials.265 One was regarding a famous case of fire 
extinguishers for cars, imported to Armenia by a big businessman during Interior Minister 
Vano Siradeghyan’s years. So, the government required all cars owners to purchase fire 
extinguishers. As Manukyan indicated, it was not a bad idea to introduce car fire 
extinguishers in Armenia; the unfairness of the deal was that the fire extinguishers had to be 
exclusively of the type that the mentioned businessman imported into the country. It was, in 
principle, a violation of constitutional rights of other entrepreneurs in the same business, as 
well as of car owners, who were fined if found by police not to own that exact type of fire 
extinguisher.  
The other example concerned professional photos for Armenian passports, when all 
citizens were required to change their Soviet passports after independence when the 
Armenian government began issuing its own national passports after the adoption of a new 
Armenian Nationality Law.  The passport issuing government entities accepted photographs 
for these new passports taken only by a single photo-making company. According to 
Manukyan, behind this scheme there was a simple business calculation and certain amount of 
profit for the state-favored photography business: Armenia had 3 million people, each 
photograph cost a certain amount of money, so a single photo company would make a certain 
amount of profit. The requirement of photographs to be taken by the particular company 
created an outcry by other photographers, who were losing customers. Their protest and 
complaints however were very quickly silenced by local officials.  
Both of these cases, that occurred as consequences of private/market economy, are 
minor considering the size of finances involved in those deals as compared to tax evasion and 
other fraudulent activities involved in bigger businesses, such as for example, import and/or 
production of fuel, sugar, cell phones, cars, dairy, etc. Yet they clearly illustrate how corrupt 
networks of large businessmen and government officials have created inconveniences for 
ordinary people through unconstitutional actions.   
                                                 
265 The following two examples are from the author’s interview with Gevork Manoukyan conducted on May 20, 
2009 in Vanadzor, Armenia. 
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Oligarchic monopolies are acknowledged to have been a major obstacle to business 
development in Armenia.266 They also eliminated large groups of the society from the labor 
market by curtailing workers’ rights in many aspects. With the increase of oligarchic 
businesses, the interests of ordinary people decreased and became a minor priority for the 
government. Workers’ rights protection became minimal on the grounds of protecting the 
interests of large entrepreneurs.Nranyan (2011:201) mentions that trade unions were almost 
absent in the country. Moreover, the reform of the Labor Code first adopted in 2004 puts the 
employer and employee in unequal positions; hence a preference for a policy of low-salary, 
poor-benefits and low-standard of living for workers is prevalent.267 The few labor unions 
that operate in Armenia hardly ever challenge business owners over worker rights. 
A simple mechanism is behind the process of social exclusion practiced by oligarchs. 
First, oligarchs weakened democratic institutions and generated corruption of large-scale 
levels based on their wealth, resources, and connections, hence excluding all other potential 
businessmen from entry into business. They also evade and dodge taxes and customs through 
patronage networks. And finally, oligarchs enjoy customs benefits. Arbitrary practices are 
frequently used to collect levies and duties, which yet again automatically closes 
opportunities of new entries into the business sphere. In fact, there are claims that only about 
10% of imports pass through proper customs procedures. This is one reason why the 
                                                 
266 More specifics on the hampering nature of oligarchic businesses on equitable business development may be 
found in several reports and observations of international financial institutions, such as “Strategy for Armenia”, 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, April 21, 2009 ;“OECD Anti-Corruption Network for 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Istanbul Anti-Corruption Action Plan, second Round of Monitoring Armenia, 
Monitoring Report”, September 29, 2011, p. 7; “Progress Report on the Country Partne rship Strategy for the 
Republic of Armenia”, World Bank, June 3, 2011, p. 10. 
267 While the Armenian Labor Code provides a few incentives for certain employees, such as for example, 
maternity benefits, overall it does not include strong worker protection. As  Parliament member Artsvik 
Minasian, a trained economist, said "employers' interests are taking precedence over employees' interests” (RFL 
2010, http://www.rferl.org/content/Armenian_Labor_Law_Reforms_Raise_Concerns/2033931.html). The 
following is some evidence of poor employment benefits and absence of worker protection laws in Armenia:  
 According to the 2004 Labor Force Survey (LFS), 23% of Armenian employees in private companies worked 
based on a verballabor contracts/agreement (National Statistical Service of the Republic of Armenia, 2005). 
This is evidence for the need to deepen the legal and contractual regulation of labor relations.   
 Overtime work is particularly common in Armenia: by the LFS data, 26% of the workforce works 51 or more 
hours per week (World Bank 2007). Moreover, there is no wage premium for the overtime employment, 
particularly if the overtime is verbally agreed between the parties.  
 According the World Bank “Doing Business 2009” database employment indicators, severance pay for 
redundancy dismissal after 20 years of employment is very low in Armenia. As compared to the most 
generous severance pay in other post-Soviet countries, such as Albania (42.9 weeks of pay), followed 
Slovenia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina (28.9 weeks of pay), Armenia offers the lowest severance pay, only 
one month of pay. Bulgaria, Georgia, Kazakhstan and Ukraine are similar to Armenia in this reg ard.  
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Armenian government collects only about 19.3% of GDP in taxes, compared to the 40% 
average in the European Union (Crisis Group Europe 2012).  
Guriev and Rachinsky (2006) argue that the post-Soviet authoritarian rulers are so 
affluent that they may be considered the “ultimate oligarchs” of their countries. In the case of 
Armenia, this speculation is reasonable. U.S Ambassador to Armenia Marie Yovanovich 
similarly observed in 2009: “The murky ownership of Armenia’s major industry clusters is a 
hidden driver of Armenian politics and elites’ inter-relationships. … Business elites are thus 
deeply intertwined with political power, and vice versa, and each has an incentive to preserve 
the status quo, fearing that regime change could kick off a new campaign of economic 
redistribution at the expense of today’s oligarchs”. She mentions that there existed two main 
political/economic pyramids of oligarchs in Armenia, one belonging to the second President 
Robert Kocharyan, and the other to the current President Sargsyan. According to 
Yovanovich, a third major cluster of business enterprises was soon to emerge led by 
Parliament speaker Hovik Abrahamian (for the years of 2008-2011), who tried to break free 
of the Kocharyan pyramid.268 
Not only are many state elites oligarchs in Armenia, but the rest of the oligarchs are 
‘endorsed’ and sponsored by the ruling regime. Under top elite’s patronage, oligarchs plague 
elections with electoral irregularities, such as fraud, bribery, ballot stuffing, intimidation of 
oppositional voters and party leaders. Garo Yegnukian, an executive board member of Policy 
Forum Armenia, a U.S.-based research organization, reported that oligarchs influence on 
Armenian elections is huge. “They’re the ones who distribute election bribes, who intimidate, 
who break people’s knees, if they have to” (in Aghajanyan 2012). 
                                                 
268 Whereas this information is not covert and is frequently discussed among the population, there have been 
rare, if any efforts by journalists, political scientists, analysts and researchers to officially touch upon this data. 
There have been a few published stories in the media, which will soon be highlighted in this chapter.  In fact, 
Yovanovich herself has not mentioned the business of politics openly and publicly; the information was found 
in a U.S. embassy cable leaked in 2009. There are a series  of confidential cables leaked on the topic of 
oligarchy and how it generated discrepancies and shortcomings in the society related to economic and political 
issues. Some of these accounts will be discussed here.  
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The Armenian Constitution does not allow members of Parliament or government to 
own or run a business, but this law is commonly ignored.269 For the majority of oligarchs 
trying to secure a seat in the Armenian Parliament is not so much about influencing 
policymaking, but more about the immunity and prestige that they get by becoming a 
government member. Especially prestige is very attractive to those tycoons. In 2011, the first 
President of post-independent Armenia, Levon Ter-Petrossian claimed that 76 of 131 
members of the Armenian Parliament were businessmen. He added that “All of them keep 
violating the constitution. But they constitute a majority and nothing can be done without 
them. Today, the parliament is in the hands of oligarchs.” (Ter-Petrossian 2011) 
There has never been a detailed examination of the Armenian oligarchy in literature, 
except spontaneous newspaper coverage on this or that oligarch addressing a specific socio-
economic issue that was relevant for a certain period and/or generated public outcry. 
Although there is very little research or official statistics related to the distribution of assets 
in the Armenian economy, press coverage and anecdotal data on the wealth of oligarchs in 
Armenia, who are known and referred by nicknames among people show that a large fraction 
of this class became rich through controlling the mining and exporting of Armenia’s 
diamonds, copper, and gold, to name a few270. They also dominate major commodity 
imports, such as gas, wheat, oil, butter, sugar, etc. Aprhamian and Yekikian (2010) state that 
“business interests of the oligarchic class reflect the makeup of Armenia’s skewed economic 
landscape as a whole, with imports making up 40% of the GDP, while exports only account 
                                                 
269 Article 65 of the Armenian Constitution stipulates: “A Deputy may not be engaged in entrepreneurial 
activities, hold an office in state and local self-government bodies or in commercial organizations, as well as 
engage in any other paid occupation, except for scientific, educational and creative  work. [Upon entering into 
business activities] A Deputy shall [resign from his/her parliamentary seat]”. A non -official translation is 
available on the website of the Armenian government, www.parliament.am.   
Furthermore, The National Assembly and the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Armenia does not want to 
or has been so far incapable of enforcing Article 67 of the Constitution of the Republic of Armenia, which 
states: “The powers of a Deputy shall terminate upon the expiration of the term of office of the National 
Assembly, dissolution of the National Assembly, violation of the provisions stipulated in Part 1 of Article 65 of 
the Constitution, loss of citizenship, absence from more than half of floor voting in the course of a single 
session, prison sentence, legal incapacity and resignation from office.” (italics added) 
270For instance, the following are the nicknames of oligarchs who are at the same time members of Parliament: 
Lfik (brassiere) Samo, Alyuraghatsi (flour mill) Lyovik, Tsaghik (flower) Rubo, Kombikormi (animal food) 
Vlad, Lady Hagop, Nemez (Nazi/fascist) Rubo, Dodi (idiot’s son) Gago, etc. Armenians know these 
businessmen by their nicknames. It wouldn’t be easy for many people to give their real names. Some of these 
nicknames are based on the products related to which these oligarchs had small businesses before becoming 
affluent, and some nicknames refer to a feature of their characteristics. 
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for 10%”. Aprahamian and Yekikian write that 70% of exports are comprised of raw 
materials, minerals, and stones. Based on this information, one may assume that export 
activities do not include manufacturing, which in its turn suggestsa poor level of employment 
by these businessmen. 
I have compiled an informal chronicle of “who owns what in Armenia”, with the 
caveat that some of the information is based on rumor, speculation, and interview 
discussions. Many of the local tycoons included in the list possess businesses that are 
registered on the names of family members and friends, therefore their wealth presented here 
may be considered incomplete. For instance, second President Robert Kocharyan’s family 
assets are estimated to be around 4 billion U.S. dollars. Subsequent president Serzh 
Sargsyan’s wealth does not lag behind Kocharyan’s wealth.271 The two presidents are 
reported to share a significant amount of revenues from a number of government and 
business revenue streams. According to the US Embassy in Armenia, “it is safe to assume 
that the sources of this revenue stream include customs proceeds, bribes, and other illegal 
payments”. Some other oligarchs in the Kocharyan and Sargsyan pyramids are so affluent 
that their wealth could have been easily included in the international Forbes list. Among 
them is member of the National Assembly and “Bargavaj Hayastan” (“Prosperous Armenia”) 
political party leader Gagik Tsarukyan. “The former arm-wrestler started out as a minority 
shareholder in one of Armenia's two largest breweries in the late 1990s. The brewery has 
claimed to be loss-making since then, and it is not clear how exactly the unusually beefy 
tycoon, who is very close to the ruling regime, has earned his millions” (Danielyan 2005). It 
is ironic that Tsarukyan’s way to the world of big business and politics began with arm-
wrestling. According to Danielyan (2005), Tsarukyan arguably the wealthiest man in the 
country, owns more than 40 medium and large companies. Only one of the assets belonging 
to Tsarukyan family, the Bulgarian water bottling company “Gorna Banya”, which was 
purchased in 2009 by the businessman and his wife Javahir, cost almost 25 million Euros. 
The mogul’s wealth is rumored to be 400-500 million.  
There are no reliable published sources related toactivities of oligarchic nature during 
Ter-Petrossian's presidency. The only businessman hailing from the Ter-Petrossian 
                                                 
271 Kocharyan's and Sargsyan's businesses and ownerships wealth are presented in Tables 8.9 and 8.10.  
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administration, who may be considered to be an oligarch, is Khachatur Sukiasyan.272 
Sukiasyan – a member of the National Assembly (1999-2003 first term and 2003-2012 
second term) – continued to hold some businesses after Ter-Petrossian’s 1998 ouster. 
According to the U.S. Embassy Yerevan cable (2011), Sukiasyan owns Restaurant chains 
Pizza di Roma, Queen burger, Chalet; SIL Hotel and SIL Plaza department store; official 
distributorship of Phillip Morris; real estates in downtown Yerevan; Golden Wood 
International (hardwood lumber, flooring strip and finger-joint panel manufacturer); Yerevan 
Furniture Plant panel manufacturer; Armeconombank (a leading commercial bank); Bjni 
mineral water plant; Yerevan Polyplast OJSC (manufacturer of various plastic household 
items, pipes, sanitation piping units, polyethylene film and bags, linoleum and artificial 
leather); Zovq Factory OJSC (Zovq natural juices factory); a construction business (wood 
and panel); Star Valley Co. (Dubai): SIL Group’s representative in United Arab Emirates; 
Masis Gofrotara (cardboard and napkin production); and Sevan Grain Milling Company. 
Yet again, Sukiasyan family and companies became government targets in retaliation 
for his support of Ter-Petrosyan's 2008 presidential candidacy. The fact that Sukiasyan’s 
main business, SIL Group, has been substantially disassembled and its most lucrative assets 
effectively transferred into the hands of President  Sargsyan’s supporters serves as a good 
example of how economic power changes in Armenia with the change in political power. For 
example, in 2008 the government brought tax and other charges against the Bjni Mineral 
Water Factory, previously belonging to Sukiasyan. The factory was seized by the 
government and later purchased by another businessman, Ruben Hayrapetyan, a president’s 
loyalist. Sukiasyan supporters say that those charges were fabricated because of Sukiasyan’s 
support for Ter-Petrossian. The government tried to do the same with the “Byuregh” spring 
water factory, one of the best mineral and spring water production factories in CIS countries, 
and “Pares Armenia”, the exclusive distributor of Phillip Morris tobacco products in 
Armenia, belonging to Sukiasyan. 
                                                 
272Khachatur Sukiasyan is widely known by the nickname “Grzo” in Armenia. The word ‘grzo’ does not have 
any special meaning and is not translated. 
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Asset stripping, along with bribery, illegal customs proceeds and tax evasion, is 
considered to be one way of wealth hoarding for some of the oligarchs presented in the 
following pyramids.  
 
 299 
 
Table 8.9: Robert Kocharyan Pyramid  
 Type of Business/ 
Ownership 
Government Member/ 
Public Office 
Relation to 
President/Other Top 
Official 
Robert 
Kocharyan 
MAP CJSC (One of the leading companies in 
Armenia, manufacturing brandy, wine and canned 
food) (50% co-owner); 
Areksimbank (co-owner); 
Unibank (co-owner); 
ABB Bank (co-owner); 
- Zangezur Copper and Molybdenum Plant (90%); 
- Complex Kaputan Sevan (100%); 
- Medical Center Nairi (50% together with the 
Minister of Health Harutiun Kushkyan); 
- Brand shops (Emporio Armani, Stefano Ricci, etc.); 
- Renko Construction; 
- Construction Company “BiShin” (100%); 
- Chain stores SAS (50% through Deputy Prime 
Minister Armen Gevorgian); 
-  “Noah” konyachno-vinovodochny Mill - 50% (co-
owner Gagik Tsarukyan); 
- Airport Zvartnots - 50% (30-year lease, co-owner of 
a citizen of Argentina, Eduardo Eurnekian); 
- “K-Telecom” (trade mark VivaCell); 
- Agro-industries Ltd. (1870 ha); 
- “AraratCement” (33%) 
-  A large shopping complex in Moscow (co-owner); 
- A Casino in Moscow; 
- Russia’s “AFK” Sistema273 
Second President of post-
independent Armenia 
(1998-2008) 
N/A 
                                                 
273 Kocharyan is a shareholder and a member of the Board of Directors of Russia’s AFK Sistema. Moscow-based London-listed AFK Sistema is a sprawling 
operation with interests in some 200 companies ranging from microchips to toy stores. Early on, Sistema create d a joint venture with Moscow's municipal 
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Table8.9 Continued 
Gagik 
Tsarukyan 
“Kotayk” Brewery (a joint venture with Castel Beer); 
“Manana” Grain (one of Armenia’s major wheat 
importers); 
Aviaservice CJSC (Airline ticketing; food 
preparation and service for air passengers); 
Armenian International Airways (AIA); 
“Ararat” winery; 
- Multi Group Dairy; 
Multi Leon chain (gas stations and natural gas 
stations):  
“Multi Stone” Plant (travertine export to Europe); 
Casino Club “Cleopatra”, along with a new casino 
(“Pyramid”) under construction; 
Gyumri Textile plant (hidden co-owner); 
Farm projects (including most of the vegetables sold 
to the Armenian Military forces); 
Furniture Salon network (the largest importer of 
European furniture in the country); 
Two major retail markets (GUM and Mashtots Ave.); 
Bulgarian water bottling company “Gorna Banya” 
Member of Parliament, 
2003-current 
Related to Hovik 
Abrahamyan, Speaker of the 
National Assembly; 
Also related to Andranik 
Manukyan, who has held 
several top positions in the 
Armenian government 
Sedrak 
Kocharyan  
Converse Bank (30% - 50%)274; 
Ardshininvest Bank (over 50%); 
“H2” Television station (about 35%); 
Representation of Toyota company in Armenia; 
Construction company “Downtown Yerevan”; 
Network of shops “Star” (30%); 
Armenian postal service, “HayPost” (50%); 
No Son of the second President 
Robert Kocharyan 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
telephone network (MTS) and later received a controlling stake in the network, along with its main assets, which included MTS  (now the largest cellular operator 
in Russia, traded on the NYSE). Since 2008 Sistema has controlled the Indian Sistema Shyam Teleservices Ltd.  
274 Converse Bank is officially owned by billionaire Eduardo Eurnekian, a wealthy businessman from Argentina. He is also the owne r “Zvartnoc” airport 
(Armenia International Airport CJSC) and Gyumri airport. Eurnakian also purchased the Armenian postal service, “HayPost” in 2006.  
 301 
 
Table 8.9 Continued 
 Import of mobile phones (80% of the market); 
Golden Palace Hotel in Yerevan (83%) 
  
Andranik 
Manukyan  
A monopoly on the import and distribution of 
Russian Lada cars in Armenia (a booming segment 
of car market);  
A share of the Vivacell MTS mobile phone service.  
Downtown “Metropol” Hotel; 
Import of Ford, Nissan, and Renault vehicles; 
A broad range of smaller businesses 
Deputy in the Supreme 
Council of the ASSR, later 
Member of the National 
Assembly (1990-1999); 
Member of the Finance, 
Credit, Fiscal, and 
Economic Affairs 
Committee in NA (1999-
2000);  
Minister of State Revenues 
(2000- 2001); 
Minister of Transport and 
Communication (2001-
2008); 
Advisor to President 
Sargsyan and RA 
Ambassador to Ukraine 
(2008-current) 
Related to Gagik 
Tsarukyan, a member of the 
National Assembly 
Hovik 
Abrahamyan  
A monopoly of  significant-scale agribusiness; 
“ArtFood” company (Armenia’s leading processed 
food company); 
A number of alcoholic beverage plants; 
A considerable percentage of Armenia’s cultivated 
land and the produce thereof 
 
 
 
 
 
Member of the National 
Assembly (1995-current); 
Minister of Territorial 
Administration (2000-
2008); 
Speaker of the National 
Assembly (2008-2011) 
Related to Gagik 
Tsarukyan, a member of the 
National Assembly 
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Table 8.9 Continued 
Davit 
Harutyunyan 
A number of businesses, which Harutyunyan does 
not report275 
Deputy Minister of Justice 
(1997 to 1998) 
Minister of Justice (1998-
2007) 
No 
Yervand 
Zakharyan 
A number of businesses, of which there are no 
published records or reported disclosures 
Deputy Minister of Energy 
(1992-1993); 
Minister of Transport 
(1998-2000); 
Vice Minister of State 
Revenues (2000-2001);  
Minister of State Revenue 
(2001-2002); 
Head of state tax service 
(2002-2003); 
Mayor of Yerevan (2003-
2009); 
Head of State Committee 
of Real Estate Cadaster 
(2009-present) 
No 
Armen 
Avetisyan 
A number of businesses, of which there are no 
published records or reported disclosures 
Chairman of the State 
Customs Committee 
(2000-2008) 
 
Source: Adapted from Petrov (2010); U.S. Embassy Yerevan cables (2003 and 2009) available online at 
news.am/eng/news/72188.html and www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=09YEREVAN798 
 
 
                                                 
275 Press accounts relate Harutyunyan to a number of businesses, although he reports his salary as his sole source of income and asset disclosures. For example, in 
2011, “Hetq” investigative Journalists online declare that Harutyunyan’s reported income and the cash deposits in his bank account at the e nd of the year were 
very different.  The same source states that the Minister is known to be an antiques aficionado with a collection of 198 gold and silver Russian coins and a 
collection of expensive paintings. These items, according to his asset disclosure, are worth some 8 million AMD. (http://hetq.am/eng/articles/16464/mp-davit-
haroutyunyan-8-million-amd-worth-of-o ld-coins-and-paintings.html)  
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Table 8.10: Serzh Sargsyan Pyramid  
 Type of Business/Ownership Government Member/ 
Public Office 
Relation to 
President/Other Top 
Official 
Hrant 
Vardanyan276 
Grand Candy (most dominant Armenian producer of 
chocolates, sweets, ice creams.); 
Grand Tobacco (major cigarette producer); 
Grand Sun (production of  
and lamps); 
Alcohol production; 
Several Company stores and cafe chains 
No Father of Mikhael 
Vardanyan, Member of the 
National Assembly 
Ruben 
Hayrapetyan 
Co-owner of Grand Tobacco; 
“Aragats” textile production plant; 
“Harsnaqar” hotel on Sevan shore (one of the 
paramount hotels in Armenia); 
Several gas stations; 
Other additional minor businesses 
Member of the National 
Assembly (2003-current) 
No 
Alexander 
Sargsyan277 
Large shares in a wide array of big businesses 
without dominating any sector in particular 
Member of the National 
Assembly (2003-current) 
Brother of President Serzh 
Sargsyan 
Harutyun 
Pambukyan278 
“MaxGroup” (one of the largest commercial and 
industrial structures of Armenia, the scope of which 
ranges from fuel imports to agribusiness); 
A chain of large retail gas station (GPS); 
A large candy enterprise; 
Lusakert Poultry Plant; 
Member of the National 
Assembly (1999-2011) 
No 
                                                 
276 Vardanyan formerly supported both Serzh Sargsyan and Robert Kocharyan, but currently he has devoted his loyalty to t he current President Sargsyan and is 
purely a Sargsyan ally. Thus, Vardanyan has been included in the Sarsgyan Pyramid. This concerns most of the oligarchs economically (frequently also 
politically) active during the last two administrations.    
277 It is widely acknowledged in Armenia that if a businessman faces any problems with taxes, police or other authorities, the easiest wa y for the businessman to 
overcome the problem is to give up a significant stake of his business to the brother of third President Sargsyan, Alexander Sargsyan, known as “Sashik”. 
278 “Haykakan Jamanak” declares that Pambukyan was a businessman that managed to sell a number of Armenian enterprises to Russians. His biggest de al was 
selling Armenian distributor electricity networks company to Russians. 
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Table 8.10 Continued 
 Yeghvard Animal Feed Plant; 
- Stakeholder in Midland Resources (electricity 
distribution networks) 
  
Misha 
Minasyan 
- Pares Armenia ( exclusive distributor of Philip 
Morris tobacco products in Armenia)279 
Senior presidential staffer 
and advisor 
Son-in-law of President 
Serzh Sargsyan 
Aghvan 
Hovsepyan 
“Shant” Television; 
“Shant” Dairy 
Prosecutor General (1998-
cuurent) 
No 
Samvel 
Alexanyan280 
Lusastgh (Shining Star): produces vodka and 
vegetable oil, owns supermarkets; 
Informal ‘Feudal Lord’ of Malatia (a district in 
Yerevan); 
Natali Pharm (a chain of pharmacies, imports and 
distributes drugs; 
Major importer of wheat, sugar and butter; 
Other additional minor businesses 
Member of the National 
Assembly (2003-current) 
No 
Barsegh  
Beglaryan281 
Flash Ltd. (One of the two most dominant fuel 
import companies); 
Ararat Bank 
No Claimed to be President 
Sargsyan’s Godfather 
Mikhail 
Baghdassarov 
ArmSavings Bank, privatized in 2001; 
Viktoria Trade (a major wheat importer); 
Mika Trading (oil products imports and distribution, 
including 40% of gasoline imports); 
Armavia (chartered flights to major Russian cities); 
Hrazdan Cement Plant, renamed to Mika Cement; 
MIKA Ltd (one of the two most dominant  gas 
station chains; 
No Classmate and best friend of 
President Serzh Sargsyan 
                                                 
279 Minasyan owns Pares Armenia, the exclusive distributor of Philip Morris tobacco products in Armenia, when the government deployed the customs service 
(now the State Revenue Committee) to take control of Pares Armenia from Khachatur Sukiasyan.  
280Aleksanian, known as “Lfik Samo”, is considered to be a semi-criminal oligarch. He maintains an army of bodyguards and boasts little formal education 
(maybe the least educated among oligarchs). 
281 Beglaryan is dubbed as “Flash Barsegh”. He is considered to be one of the most loyal businessmen to President Sargsyan, as well the latter’s Godfather.  
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Table 8.10 Continued 
 Mineral water bottling in Dilijan (Dilijan Frolova); 
Other major businesses in Russia and Europe 
  
Serzh 
Sargsyan 
Assets of “Flash” (co-owner) 
Network of gas-fueling stations; 
Three wine factories in Nagorno-Karabakh; 
Distillery (1/3 of all vodka sold in Armenia, 2.3 
million liters); 
Bank “Ararat”; 
Chain of restaurants “Ararat”; 
Assets of the company “MIKA” (co-owner), 
including “Armavia” airlines, imports of fossil fuels, 
gasoline, kerosene (monopoly), diesel fuel; FC 
MIKA (estimated 40-50 million USD); Mika-
Cement (a construction company), “MIKA House” 
(more than 5 large elite houses in Yerevan); 
A Hotel Complex in Moscow; 
A private house in London; 
VTB Bank (bought for 300 thousand dollars, sold for 
$ 28 million); 
Network of stores “Jazve”; 
Supply of small arms by private producers of 
Bulgaria in the Third World countries; 
Owner of “Armenakob” and “A1TV” stations 
Third President of post-
independent Armenia 
N/A 
Hayrapetyan 
Family 
- “Hayastan” Department store; 
- Hotel Ararat; 
- BMW dealer; 
- “Erebuni” textile production plant; 
- A Hotel on Lake Sevan shore; 
- Other additional minor businesses 
No Close to the President’s 
office, especially to advisor 
Alexan Harutiunyan 
Source: Adapted from Petrov (2010); U.S. Embassy Yerevan cables (2003 and 2009) available online at 
http://news.am/eng/news/72188.html and www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.php?id=09YEREVAN798 
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Petrov’s article (2010), which followed “the first edition of the Armenian Forbes”, 
reveals that six of the businessmen in the below list (those written in italics) have been in the 
executive branch of the government of the Republic of Armenia (including former and 
current presidents). The other three businessmen are Members of Parliament. Hrant 
Vardanyan, who is neither a MP nor a government member, has close ties with the political 
elites of the country through his son Michael Vardanyan, who is a Member of Parliament. 
According to law, these politicians were obliged to live ‘solely’ on their salaries.  
1. Gagik Tsarukyan - Chairman of the “Prosperous Armenia” political party; 
2. Armen Avetisyan - Head of Customs; 
3. Mikhail Bagdasarov - President of MICA and the owner of Armavia; 
4. Hrant Vardanyan - President of the “Grand Tobacco” and “Grand Candy”; 
5. Khachatur Sukiasyan – Owner of “SIL group”; 
6. Yervand Zakharyan - Mayor of Yerevan; 
7. Robert Kocharyan - 1st President of Armenia; 
8. Serzh Sargsyan  - Minister of Defense, 2nd President of Armenia; 
9. Andranik Manukyan - Minister of Transport and Communications; 
10. David Harutyunyan - Minister of Justice 
With the presentation of the Armenian wealthiest people, I showedthat business 
interests are closely interrelated with the state's decision-making and the policy outcomes. As 
observed in Tables 8.9 and 8.10, more than 80% of the top businessmen in the country are 
government membersand representatives of the executive branch, which is illegal by the 
Armenian law, or closely connected to state elites. It is just a small group of powerful people 
who control much of the Armenian economic resources and political affairs. This is perhaps 
common in the world, even in western democracies. The dilemma, however, is that in 
Armenia as in many transitioning countries the concentration of wealth and power is usually 
achieved illegally and through violence, which makes the problem of social exclusion more 
acute. 
Regarding the list of the richest people in Armenia, economist Edward Aghajanov 
said: “If these people paid at least 20% of their incomes to the state budget then good for 
them. Being rich is not a crime. The only thing that worries our society is what the relations 
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of these people are with the state budget. As the institute of tax publication is not very 
developed in our country it is not easy to know the number of rich people and the amount of 
their capital. In foreign countries this is a quite transparent process. … In our country rich 
men do a great job in hiding their actual incomes.” Aghajanov also stated: “If you are from 
the wing of the government it is not dangerous to be rich. If you are not linked to the 
government you may be subject to government racket. I know many people, who being 
successful average businessmen fear to expand their businesses and instead prefer to buy 
apartments in Armenia.” (Avagyan 2006) 
Many believe that Armenia can achieve consolidated democracy, economic success 
and social equity by eliminating oligarchic monopolies and by reducing oligarchic 
interference with politics and socio-economic affairs of the country. One of my interviewees, 
Vazgen Manukyan, for example, believes that social exclusion in Armenia is prevalent 
because capital and political power are interrelated. While in most countries of the world, 
including democratic ones, financial elites and political elites support and serve each other, 
“in Armenia this bond is so tight and massive that the government practically dictates who 
can become wealthy”. For the rest of the society, specifically those, who have entrepreneurial 
abilities and motivation to enter into financial markets, the doors are thus shut. The 
competition is limited not only in economic but also in political sphere. Manukyan added that 
“it was erroneous of Armenia not to have a law or an act similar to the US Sherman Antitrust 
Act, a law that restricts and limits a certain level of monopolies and prohibits business 
activities that reduce competition in the marketplace.”282 
8.6 Conclusion: Results of the Private Sector 
This chapter showed that the privatization process in Armenia increased exclusion of 
many Armenians from economic life, creating unequal assets, incomes and employment 
opportunities. Besides the increased economic exclusion, social marginalization of thousands 
of Armenians also grew, as they lost key channels to education, health care and medicine, 
basic infrastructure, and social protection due to their reduced purchasing power. The 
availability, quality, accessibility and affordability of the mentioned social services became 
                                                 
282 Quotes are fromthe personal interview with Vazgen Manukyan conducted onAugust29, 2012.   
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inequitable within the Armenian society. The decrease of financial opportunities and loss of 
social welfare of the poorer consumers in the private market not only shifted the economic 
viability and profitability towards the private owners, but it also provided a dominant role for 
the latter in Armenia's political affairs and policy making. In the absence of inadequate 
institutions that could protect the rights of the excluded, the latter have persistently 
experienced insufficient representation in the decision making process. For example, the 
National Assembly of Armenia has been packed with businessmen and representatives of 
oligarchic networks, with very little accountability from the public sector. Private ownership 
of the economy, thus, has increased social exclusion and also made it difficult to ensure 
political participation for the lower and middle classes of the society.As mentioned in 
Chapter Two, government leaders together with large business owners "shaped the character 
of economic and social arrangements, the very stuff of social politics, to their own advantage 
and to the disadvantage of others” (Byrne 2005). Effectively denied of the economic, 
political and social rights of citizenship, the disadvantaged groups could not successfully 
counterbalance the dominant groups.  
With the above said, however, it cannot be generalized that privatization process is 
always a cause of social inequalities, as it has had different outcomes in various Eastern 
European and post-Soviet countries. The variance in privatization consequences depends on 
many factors, among them initial conditions of a country, such as geographical location, 
natural resources, educational and income level of its population, prior economic growth rate, 
etc. While Armenia’s initial conditions (before the structural reforms)that would lead to a 
successful transition are not considered to be satisfactory, the structural reform itself was 
poorly conducted in Armenia.283 
It can be concluded that overall private solutions of the transition period that 
successfully occurred in some Eastern and Central European countries have not occurred in 
Armenia. The restructuring process was fraught with unwanted consequences in the Republic 
of Armenia. An obvious conclusion is that the private sector has played a very weak role in 
                                                 
283 Based on initial conditions, such as the level of income, its geopolitical situation, urbanization rate, and 
natural resources, Armenia was far below the average level of the USSR’s initial conditions  for a successful 
transition. The only comparative advantage regarding initial conditions was the very high educational level of 
Armenian population.  
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generating employment in Armenia, creating widespread poverty and inequality within the 
society. Large segments of the population were excluded from productive employment. 
While the new firms did not secure public employment, the state was not able to guarantee 
adequate social assistance to the unemployed and underemployed. The main beneficiaries of 
privatization were the wealthy, the well-connected to government elites, and top government 
officials themselves. There was a very tiny percentage of really talented entrepreneurs, who 
were able to secure an economically beneficial place for themselves during privatization due 
to their knowledge and skills. A majority of the equally talented employees, who could have 
been new owners of the privatized firms, were excluded from the process, becoming 
unemployed, underemployed or emigrants working in foreign countries.   
State elites in Armenia have nearly always avoided or failed to turn the society into a 
vigorous participant of political, economic and institutional reforms. While during the first 
stages of the privatization process, the country lacked an organized civil society, recently 
developed Armenian civil society has constantly faced enormous objectives in claiming their 
demands to the state. This concerns public grievances related to transparent information in 
privatization transactions, discrepancies in the tax system, barriers of business entry and 
registration for small and medium entrepreneurs, etc.  
A very rapid implementation of mass privatization, which was carried out in Armenia 
through sale of vouchers, implied an already developed level of knowledge and skills, 
effective methods of corporate management, and institutional capability to create a fair and 
transparent capital market. However, none of those existed at the beginning of 1990s in 
Armenia. Instead, privatization transactions were marred with irregularities, most of the 
auctions were rigged, and illegitimate property rights resulted in expropriation. Armenian 
mass privatization hampered the production of diffuse ownership of private enterprises due to 
the following:  
a) Obstacles for entry into the market that impacted the exclusion of specific market players; 
b) fair competition, which implied that market players could influence price formation, either 
individually or as a group; 
c) transaction costs that were not set reasonably and transparently to all market players; and 
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d) asymmetry of tax system, i.e., different parties to the same (type of) transaction paid 
different tax rates.  
It also affected social conditions by creating massive unemployment, low salaries, 
high prices of goods and services due to the following: 
a) Creation of monopolies and a new strata of society – oligarchs; 
b) lack of information and skills to operate companies, due to which newly privatized 
companies were idle and had to lay off employees; and 
c) asset stripping for gain maximization by new owners.  
Most post-privatization companies had to deal with restructuring problems. 
Maintaining the existing employment levels was for most companies impossible. Financial 
sustainability and maintenance of high employment levels were conflicting for most 
companies, particularly the small and medium ones, thus a majority of company employees 
were fired in order to maintain economic effectiveness. In retrospect, it has been realized that 
several years were necessary for the players of the privatization process to learn the adequate 
knowledge necessary to deal with efficient market transactions. An alternative concept of 
privatization through direct sales and tenders, specifically of medium and large companies 
with the highest numbers of employees, was not even considered as an option until late 1998.  
Instead, by 2000 most of the newly privatized companies had low turnover index, which had 
a direct impact on increasing losses and growing insolvency. Irregular payment and 
cancellation of salaries for months decreased employees’ standard of living. The reaction in 
terms of protection of rights of the employees and the guaranteed level of minimal payment 
was the growing dissatisfaction of the masses in Armenia. In conclusion, it is worth bringing 
in former Prime Minister Darbinian’s statement about the role of the state in relation to social 
protection: “Within the countries in transition, Armenia is among them, re-comprehension of 
state’s role has a definite preponderance, as in the existing conditions the state not only 
should ensure the undisrupted activity of state institutions and productive substructures, but 
as well create favorable conditions for the development and progress through protection of 
human and citizens’ rights and their liberty” (Darbinian 2001:2).  
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CHAPTER 9  
Conclusion 
“The disposition to admire, and almost to 
worship, the rich and the powerful and…neglect 
persons of poor and mean condition…is the great and 
most universal cause of the corruption of our moral 
sentiments.” - Adam Smith 
9.1 Theoretical Implications 
This dissertation contributes to understanding the concept of durable social exclusion 
by focusing on the factors that explain the emergence and persistence of social exclusion in 
the context of post-Soviet Armenia's twin transition. The aim of the study was not simply to 
understand what durable social exclusion is in a non-European context, which is the most 
widely applicable geographic site for the problem, but also to explore alternative factors that 
would lead to more inclusive societies. This being the primary focus of the dissertation, the 
particular emphasis was placed on the post-Soviet Armenian society that, based on the 
available data, was plagued by high degrees of social exclusion. The overarching research 
question was the following: "What factors contributed to the development of durable social 
exclusion in post-Soviet Armenia from 1988-2008?" 
Based on my theoretical framework, I argued that the industrial and service 
privatization was an initial trigger for the emergence of social exclusion of the majority of 
Armenian society in post-Soviet Armenia. It particularly affected the exclusion of citizens 
from economic opportunities and resources.  State militarization after the Karabakh war 
exacerbated the problem of social exclusion in Armenia, by further intensifying the processes 
of opportunity hoarding and social closure in the political sphere of public life. In the 
analysis of the privatization and the state militarization processes, the role of the state, as an 
important agent that malfunctioned and hampered the development of democratic 
institutions, was emphasized. The Armenian state elitescreated an institutional vacuum, 
which has hindered the promotion of democracy, vibrant civil society, rule of law, human 
rights, tolerance and non-discrimination, basic prerequisites of social inclusion.   
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The state apparatus guaranteed the supremacy of the ruling class by the co-option of 
the main instrument of coercion, the repressive apparatus (army, police, paramilitary forces, 
etc.). The exploitive domination of politics with a civilian façade, but actually military force, 
controlled state institutions, particularly the legislative and the judicial branches of the 
government. This type of state militarization seriously weakened the development of other 
institutions that could restrict the concentration of the executive power and create more equal 
social opportunities, thus producing persistent civil unrest. Some of the political and social 
institutions of the civil state, such as the Armenian political parties and the Armenian civil 
society, whereas still new, have rapidly developed and strived to protect the rights of 
ordinary citizens. Nonetheless, the repressiveness of the state, which peaked during president 
Robert Kocharyan's administration (1998-2008), has gradually eclipsed the rest of the 
institutions that could support the formation of a socially inclusive society. 
Social exclusion is not only important to investigate because many elements of social 
inclusion, such as economic opportunities and assets, political participation, and social 
networks are valuable resources in their own right, but also because they influence the 
success of new generations in basic domains of life, like education, health, family formation. 
The mentioned elements of social inclusion are also critical for the pace and type of the 
democratization process in a country. This dissertation contributes to the research literature 
on social exclusion by studying the following elements of social exclusion: 1) the exclusion 
of ordinary citizens from economic opportunities and processes, such as unequal and 
discriminatory prospects in the job market; difficulties in starting a business and investment 
initiatives; and non-transparent tax system; and 2) political and social marginalization of the 
same citizens, such as through deficiency of sufficient political participation; resistance to 
political opposition; deprivation of citizens' rights to influence policy-making; the 
exploitation of nationalism to achieve political aims; and finally; alack of access to vital 
social services. 
Within the social exclusion literature, the causes of social exclusion were 
systematized into three main groups: 1) agency-related causes, 2) structural/institutional 
causes, and 3) causes originating from perverse, pathological, antisocial, and self-destructive 
values and lifestyles. Causes stemming from the third category were not applicable  to this 
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dissertation, since they are discussed in relation to exclusively social groups at risk (such as 
the homeless, the alcoholics, drug addicts, pregnant teenagers, etc.), therefore very little 
attention was paid to causes of exclusion originating from perverse, pathological, antisocial, 
and self-destructive values and lifestyles.284 The agency-related causes of social exclusion are 
somehow related to the third category, and they basically blame human behavior for their 
own exclusion. Finally, authors, who focus on structures, as the main cause of social 
exclusion, argue that humans respond to the structures of one kind or another, in which they 
are situated. A person's economic opportunities, social lifestyle, and political involvement are 
therefore predicted according to various structures such as class, race and gender, and how a 
person reacts to the constraints and incentives of those structures.  
A myriad of factors that include institutional sources of social exclusion lies within 
the structural causes of social exclusion. Addressing the particular effects of each of these 
factors lay outside of the scope of this dissertation, but a few of them, considered to be 
important in determining social exclusion in the case of Armenia as a transitioning country, 
were addressed in the theoretical framework of the dissertation. Some were briefly discussed, 
including the weak/strong civil society, the natural resource abundance, the privatization 
process and changes in the market labor were briefly discussed. The vital role and 
significance of courts, the Constitution, and civil society was also mentioned. 
Acknowledging the importance of the institutional factors, such as the Constitution and 
Courts, I emphasized that they did not function according to their design in the presence of 
authoritarian states, nationalist history and culture. Thus, the institutional perspective alone, 
so widely cited for deepening social exclusion in western societies, does not fully explain the 
problem of social exclusion in Armenia.  
The limited applicability of the Western society-characteristic accounts of social 
exclusion to the case of post-Soviet Armenia requires alternative explanations of the 
problem. It is flawed to discuss social exclusion without the analysis of political power. 
Consequently, I focused on the various interacting aspects of the problem through the notion 
                                                 
284 In the analysis of the problem of social exclusion in post-Soviet Armenia, the emphasis was neither on 
categorically bounded social groups nor on social groups at risk. The focus was placed on the marginalization of 
the vast numbers of the society, particularly workers, by powerful state elites and their networks.    
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of power and employed a range of theories and concepts to study the impact of privatization 
and state militarization on social exclusion. Each perspective/theory was used to frame some 
aspect of social exclusion. In particular, the core arguments of the dissertation were basically 
grounded in the following theories and approaches: 
Through the application of the social closure and opportunity hoarding theories, 
"instruments of social stratification" (Marshall 1964:110), I analyzed key features of the 
privatization process in Armenia that resulted in the polarization of the middle and working 
classes. According to this type of theory of social exclusion, the government was responsible 
for the regulation of the distribution of resources.285 “Powerful class and status groups, which 
have distinct social and cultural identities as well as institutions, use social closure to restrict 
the access of outsiders to valued resources (such as jobs, good benefits, education, urban 
locations, valued patterns of consumption)” (Saraceno 2002:7-8). The disadvantaged groups 
of the society often do not challenge those elites because they are incapable of enforcing 
rights that undergird inclusion and/or power to do so. I argued that exclusion arose as a 
consequence of discriminatory policies and practices of Armenian state elites during different 
stages of the privatization process, who have pursued privileges for themselves excluding 
other members of a society. The opportunity hoarding was achieved through deficiency of 
knowledge and skills of ordinary workers to sufficiently operate in the free market totally 
unfamiliar to them; non-transparent privatization auctions and tenders; artificial barriers to 
register a private business for the poor and middle class representatives, biased competition 
practices in the export and import market that favored oligarchs, who, as a class, were created 
as a result of privatization, and other processes that were discussed in Chapter eight.   
Weber's (1919) theory of state's monopoly on the use of force or violence, together 
with Tilly's (1978) concepts of revolutionary situationsand outcomes were helpful in the 
comparative analysis of the post-Soviet Armenian state's coercive strength. Incumbents' 
organizational power, specifically how state elites exercise monopoly on violence, was 
applied to five post-Soviet countries to emphasize the repressive power of the Armenian 
                                                 
285 The assumption derives from state-centered theories of inequality that critique market-driven theories on the 
basis that capitalists, embroiled in the unregulated market, will act to increase their own wealth, exploiting the 
lower classes. 
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regime. The Armenian state's coercive strength was further studied in the context of the 
Karabakh war. Finally, the consequences of the Armenian state militarization through war 
was examined in relation to local socio-economic and political affairs, and in this assessment, 
the social closure and opportunity hoarding phenomena were re-applied. War-related elites' 
positioning towards expansion of nationalist politics, by means of which they achieved the 
elimination of liberal political representatives, as well as the breakdown of social protests and 
opposition in general in order to maintain their regime, underlined the high degree of 
political polarization and marginalization in the Armenian society. More than in other post-
Soviet countries, the Armenian state elected to "delegate its coercive power as it saw fit", 
containing revolutionary situations and maintaining alterations in the distribution of power 
advantageous to economically, politically and militarily powerful members of the society.  
A brief outline of the findings of each chapter sustain this dissertation's claim that the 
combination of the privatization and state militarization processes are relevant to the 
examination of social exclusion in the post-Soviet transition period of Armenia. In the next 
section, the main findings of the chapters are discussed and summarized. 
9.2 Summary of Findings 
To wage an effective attack on the determinants of social exclusion, it was vital to 
identify the nature and extent of the problem. The first three chapters of the dissertation 
contributed to this task through a series of analysis. The Introduction chapter focused on the 
centrality of studying the consequences of social exclusion, highlighting the nefarious effects 
of the problem on human development in all aspects of life. It underlined the lack of research 
that deals with causes of the problem in the post-Soviet societies, specifically that its causes 
and consequences vary significantly in developed and developing countries. 
The multidimensional nature of social exclusion, specifically in contrast with the 
problem of poverty, was the primary discussion of the second chapter. Social exclusion refers 
to multidimensional disadvantage, whereas the problem of poverty is restricted to monetary 
shortage. To be labeled "socially excluded", a person/a community/a society needs to be 
simultaneously excluded along several dimensions. The analysis conducted in the next 
chapter (Chapter Three) revealed that this is the situation in Armenia. Many Armenians 
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experience the three forms of exclusion concurrently, adding up to the situation of 
multidimensional disadvantage. Consequently, if the concept of social exclusion refers to 
multidimensional disadvantage, "which involves dissociation from major social and 
occupational milieux from society" (Room 1995:25), it is then relevant to address the issue of 
social exclusion in discussing economic, social and political problems in post-Soviet 
Armenia. 
The third chapter concerned the problem of social exclusion in post-Soviet Armenia 
exclusively. The intention to substantiate the critical situation on the problem for the selected 
case was accomplished through the discussion of the three dimensions of social exclusion 
(economic, social, and political) separately. Once dubbed the ‘Soviet Silicon Valley’ because 
of its high-tech industries, the country became one of the most impoverished in the region 
(Torosyan 2004). Armenia has lost approximately 20% of its population in recent years; from 
a population of 3.5 million in 1989, it is estimated that somewhere between 800,000 and 1.2 
million Armenians have left the country for employment or residence elsewhere by mid-
2000s. It is estimated that 50% of Armenians live below the poverty line, with an average of 
570 USD yearly income (Torosyan 2004).  Massive unemployment, substantial labor rights 
violations, migration, the wide gap between the rich and the poor, human rights violations, 
corruption, political intimidation add to the sense of a society under threat. Moreover, there is 
an absence of state control over vital spheres of life and weak development of democratic 
institutions, which have a toll on the moral and psychological atmosphere in society 
(Nranyan 2011:213-214). 
The chapter also demonstrated the durability of social exclusion in Armenia, 
presenting available data and information on the Gini coefficient, employment trends, 
challenges of low income families in the educational and health sectors, and human rights 
issues throughout the 1990s and 2000s, showing that it persisted for more than a decade.  
In Chapter Four, I specified the research design of the dissertation, with a thorough 
discussion of the hypotheses and the operationalization of the important concepts of the 
study. Given the dearth of theoretical explanations regarding causes of social exclusion in 
non-Western societies, the analysis of this study was limited to two hypotheses that focused 
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on the role of the privatization process, and the role of the Karabakhwar and state 
militarization. It is almost certainly accurate to state that those two factors had a significant 
effect on the re-structuring of the Armenian society towards a more stratified society. 
However, the question of whether the consequences of privatization or state militarization on 
increasing social exclusion should be treated separately or together with other national and 
international processes and their dynamics merits further exploration. Acknowledging that 
this is one of the limitations of my study, I note that the examination of social exclusion 
needs further fine-grained analysis buttressed with alternative hypotheses. Similarly, the 
recently increasing similar scenarios in the world, with mounting publics grievances, social 
movements, 'refolutions' aiming to overthrow their repressive regimes, and states' responses 
to those grievances present an interesting laboratory for a comparative study of militarized 
states and social exclusion. The latest examples of the March 2011-present Syrian civil war, 
2012-2013 Egyptian protests, and more recently, the political turmoil in Ukraine, most 
famously known as Euromaidan (literally Eurosquare) that started in November of 2013 are 
excellent cases of comparison. On the other hand, in the background of rapidly mounting 
violence in those countries, it is important to discern when the 'militarization' features 
transmit to the society, and the socially excluded become the aggressors of violence rather 
than advocates of social inclusion. 
In Chapter Five, using student surveys, I gauged public perceptions of key issues 
central to Armenian self-perceived exclusion. Results of the survey data revealed public 
attitudes of overall social exclusion in Armenia that were similar to the social exclusion 
situation described in Chapter Three. Similar to political elites and researchers interviewed 
for this dissertation, the surveyed public confirmed that social exclusion exists in Armenia as 
a serious problem and that it is intensely acknowledged by ordinary citizens.  
It was also critical to understand whether the hypothesized factors are crucial for the 
Armenian citizens in evaluating the problem of social exclusion. What other factors, besides 
the regime type and the alterations of the labor market due to privatization, affect self-
perceptions of exclusion? In this regard, the results pointed towards the direction of primary 
institutions of the state. The survey concluded that Armenian people relate their dire socio-
economic situation and grievances particularly with their president's choices and actions, the 
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National Assembly's (the parliament) policy-making ability, and the authoritarian nature of 
the security sector, more than to any other institution or factor, either local or international.  
This finding is in line with prior research in Armenia that has dealt with the 
consequences of latest political regimes on anti-democratic tendencies in Armenia. 
Harutyunyan (2009), for example, contends that the current political elites and the national 
identity endorsed by them are predominantly ethno-nationalist; consequently, policy 
decisions made by state officials are to a large extent "unreflective of citizenry choices".286 
Fraudulent elections are a norm rather than an exception, and elected officials are not obliged 
by their promises to represent publicly approved policies and societal demands. Based on the 
survey results, Armenians agree that Armenia’s politics does not fit into minimalist 
procedural definitions of democracy, where electing leaders competitively is a minimum re-
quirement for democracy and where the legitimacy of public decisions and decision-makers 
is guaranteed as a result of their competitive electoral victory (Harutyunyan 2009).   
The core discussion of the sixth chapter was an effort to connect failed social 
movements to the explanation of growing social exclusion through a comparative 
examination of five post-Soviet states (Georgia, Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan, Armenia and 
Azerbaijan) that experienced similar waves of repeated social movements against social 
exclusion and different outcomes based on their states' repressive capacity.287 The chapter 
focused on the conditions that made certain post-Soviet states in transition, namely Armenia 
and Azerbaijan, more repressive than others. It also analyzed the waves of massive protests 
in Armenia and Azerbaijan that did not manage to turn into revolutions, in contrast to the 
Rose revolution in Georgia, the Orange revolution in Ukraine, and the Tulip revolution in 
Kyrgyzstan. First, through the quantitative examination of the military budgets and 
                                                 
286 The ethno-nationalist type of identity as a norm is resistant to and intolerant of alternative explanations and 
new ideas pertaining to national self-definition. State elites endorsing the ethno-nationalist type of identity 
block any new ideas that challenge the collectivistic sense and the conventional interpretation of national 
identity. 
287 One may argue and it is important to note that those five countries experienced different levels of social 
exclusion. However, although the overall social exclusion might have been less severe in one country than in 
another, certain dimensions of the problem had high degrees in all of them. Ukraine, for example, might hav e 
been characterized with less economic exclusion, than, for example, Kyrgyzstan, Azerbaijan or Armenia, but its 
social and political dimensions were as critical as of the latter countries. Therefore, if protests and 
demonstrations resulted due to even one or two forms of social disadvantage, I still considered those 
movements as grievances against social exclusion in general.    
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manpower ratios in the selected cases and secondly, through a descriptive analysis of 
revolutionary situations and outcomes in the mentioned countries, based on the state-centrist 
approach, I demonstrated the highly militarized nature of the Armenian state. The chapter re-
emphasized that the Armenian state elites are indeed apathetic to the demands of the 
citizenry, and they manage to maintain their aloof dominance by strengthening and co-opting 
the coercive apparatus. The main conclusion of this chapter was that Armenia, along with 
Azerbaijan, was more militarized than Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan, because of an 
external war, and that it affected negatively the outcome of social movements. 
State and politics each become militarized, when there is an increase in military 
prerogatives (Bowman, 2002:19; Stepan, 1988). The expansion of the military prerogative in 
Armenia was rooted in the Nagorno-Karabakh armed conflict. Chapter Seven was devoted to 
the analysis of this military prerogative, arguing that assertive war-affiliated leadership of 
Armenia, although not a majority, posed an alarming threat to the development of social 
democratic reform in the country. It increased social exclusion through arbitrary, forceful 
sacking of pragmatic and democratic politicians and shifting political developments and 
socio-economic reform to their own benefit.  
The Karabakh war did not create militarization through only symptoms such as rush 
to obtain armaments, increased military budgets and military manpower, but also through the 
growing role of field commanders in national affairs even after war. A few of those leaders 
have been inclined to make Armenia’s security a very strong basis for breeding 
nationalism.288 They made it a political tool to avoid resolving many serious political and 
socio-economic problems dominating the public agenda. In this sense, the Armenian 
militarized state is very similar to a "racketeering state", a state that manipulates insecurity of 
victory in war (Tilly 1985; Lynch 2002). “Someone, who produces the danger and, at a price, 
the shield against it is a racketeer” (Tilly 1985). The fear of the Armenian nation not to attain 
hard-achieved victory became a source of exploitation for the Armenian racketeering 
state.289The racketeering nature of the Armenian state that resulted from victory in 
                                                 
288 In Chapter Seven, a detailed discussion regarding those leaders, representatives of the "Party of Karabakh", 
was provided.   
289 The conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh has the characteristics of a "protracted conflict", which denotes hostile 
interactions between groups or nations that are embedded in deep-seated racial, ethnic, religious and cultural 
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Karabakhwar thus became a critical source of social exclusion in Armenia. Through the 
racketeering dimension, coupled with the absence of the rule of law – rudiments of state 
militarization in Armenia and Karabakh – opportunity hoarding and social closure as a means 
of exploitation took place. The group of elites, most typically those who had control over 
armed forces as a result of war, have monopolized resources by closing opportunities for 
other members of the society and shared their power only with networks supportive of their 
activities.  
One of the findings of the chapter was that the victory in war encouraged 
“feudalization” of the Armenian state in the military realm, which emphasizes a clientelistic 
relationship between the state and another institution or [an] individual(s). In exchange for 
support or for a service, the state allows an official/an individual or an institution to exploit 
certain resources (Fairbanks 1999). When the “feudalization of the state” expands to the 
military realm, the “multiple militaries”, including the Interior Ministry, the National 
Security Service, and the Armed Forces also ““moonlight” as bodyguards, protectors of 
private shipments and warehouses, and the like, relieving the budget while doing political 
favors. Only a thin line separates this activity from a protection racket.” (Fairbanks 1999:48) 
The three post-war events analyzed in Chapter Seven were the causes and consequences of 
the “feudalization of the state” in the military realm, through which government leaders 
continued their nationalist policies and resource monopolization.290 
As a result of those nationalist strategies Armenia has a poor economy with a huge 
gap between the wealthy and the poor. The latter has in its turn also increased the 
demographic problems in the country, and thousands of people leave the country every year. 
Those policies have starved Armenia of the opportunities for regional integration and trade. 
According to the World Bank, with the opening of borders with Turkey (which were closed 
after the war), Armenia’s exports would double in the short term, and its GDP would 
                                                                                                                                                       
hatreds, and that persist over long periods of time with sporadic outbreaks of violence (Fisher 2001:308). 
Whereas the roots of Karabakh war are not embedded on religious or cultural hatreds, but a territorial 
disagreement, it is the most prolonged frozen conflict in the post-Soviet space, and tensions between the two 
nations prevail up until today. Both Armenians and Azeris believe Karabakh to be an ess ential element of their 
national identity and nationhood, both believe in their historic claims over the region, and this belief creates a 
sense of insecurity in the face of the threat by the other side. 
290 Those events were: 1) the resignation of president Levon Ter-Petrossian in 1998; 2) the 1999 Parliament 
shooting, and 3) 2008 March repression of post-electoral protests. 
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increase by an estimated 30 percent (Polyakov 2001:37). Meanwhile, corruption permeates 
every aspect of daily life due to legal uncertainty. This dynamic is both an outcome and 
supporter of the status quo on the Karabakh issue (King 2001). 
Armenia is currently less significant in the region and its relations with the West have 
been undermined. At the same time its dependence on Russia has increased, as Armenian 
leaders allow Russian military presence in the country for security reasons. Also, the 
economy is chiefly governed by Russian business interests. An example of an economically 
negative consequence of the Armenian nationalist policies was that Armenia was bypassed as 
a transit country in the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline project, because Armenian 
officials refused to withdraw from occupied Azerbaijani territories.291 Similar examples are 
the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzrum (BTE) natural gas pipeline and the Kars-Tbilisi-Baku railway.292 
Both of these projects, similar to the BTC, directly bypass Armenia despite the economic 
logic and geographic convenience of incorporating Armenia. Armenia, which has no coal, 
natural gas or oil of its own and had long been suffering from severe energy shortages, 
should strive to be involved in those types of projects, instead of casting itself out. A key 
observation here is that the consequences of Armenia's poor economy first of all affect the 
livelihoods of middle and poorer families, depriving them of employment opportunities. 
Some authors, among them Tchilingirian (2005), argue that it is a mistake to attribute 
democratic deficiencies and the problem of social inequalities in both Armenia and 
Azerbaijan to the Karabakh conflict and its consequences. Tchilingirian supports his 
argument by the fact that other post-Soviet states, such as Belarus or Turkmenistan which, as 
opposed to Armenia and Azerbaijan, lack secessionist conflicts, are not characterized with 
successful democratic transitions. He instead believes that the absence of democratic 
development in Armenia, Azerbaijan and other states in the region is due to “a combination 
of regime- induced and inherited systemic problems” (page 64). Whereas I agree that regime-
                                                 
291 The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline (BCT) is a 1,768 kilometer-long (1,099 miles) crude oil pipeline that 
carries oil from the Caspian Sea to the Mediterranean Sea. BCT connects Baku (the capital of Azerbaijan) and 
Ceyhan, a port in the south-eastern coast of Turkey, through Tbilisi (the capital of Georgia). Being the second 
largest oil pipeline in the former Soviet Union after the Druzhba pipeline, the BCT marks the Caspian region as 
a new force in the world's oil markets. The pipeline bypasses Armenia, and thus deepens the economic isolat ion 
of Armenia. The first oil was pumped from the Baku end of the pipeline and reached Ceyhan in May, 2005. 
292 TheKars-Tbilisi-Baku railway was a project initiated after theclosure of the Kars-Gyumri-Tbilisi railway, 
which was passing through Armenia. 
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induced problems, as well as other structural problems inherited from the Soviet legacy are 
important, I also stress that there are certain factors that make those regimes more autocratic 
and dictatorial. While nearly all Soviet states inherited systemic problems and non-
democratic practices, not all of the post-Soviet states have high levels of state militarization 
that substantially affect the social exclusion problem through different channels. Those 
nations, such as Armenians and Azeris, Russians and Chechens, which have gone through a 
conflict with another country, are more susceptible to nationalist ideas and practices, which 
often become the basis of coercion and violence on behalf of their states. A nation’s 
vulnerability towards extreme nationalism becomes its own peril. This has been the case of 
the Armenian nation. 
Tchilingirian (2005), although discounting the Karabakh conflict as a cause of the 
lack of democracy in Armenia and Azerbaijan, describes Armenian and Azeri presidents’ 
statements regarding the settlement of Karabakh as essential for understanding state-society 
relations in those countries. In September of 2005 President Ilham Aliyev announced: “We 
are creating a strong military potential, and the enemy must know that Azerbaijan is capable 
of liberating its lands at any moment”293. The Armenian president Robert Kocharyan, a 
native of Karabakh, retorted putting it more bluntly: “Nagorno-Karabakh has never been part 
of Azerbaijan and never will be. This is the bottom line. Beyond [that] one can think of some 
solutions and invent new statuses.” (page 64) According to Tchilingirian, political leaders’ 
deterministic judgments like these have had a great impact on public perceptions. He 
considers that the resolution of the conflict has become a major problem for the Armenian 
society and its egalitarian development because the Armenian people over-depend on 
individual leaders. Thus, the centrality of those leaders, rather than institutions and civil 
society, is a key factor for the development of autocratic practices in Armenia. 
Tchilingirian disregards that after independence there was a lack of institutions and 
civil society in the Republic of Armenia. In those circumstances, it was natural that people’s 
over-dependence on certain political leaders would become a tendency in solving socio-
political matters, among them resolving the frozen conflict. Moreover, it is not so much the 
                                                 
293 In the same speech, Aliyev publicly stressed that Baku was intending to double it s military budget in 2006 to 
about US$600 million.  
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over-dependence of people on individual leaders per se that create non-democratic tendencies 
in the country, but rather the constant fear of the small nation to be defeated and, therefore, 
its powerful nationalistic stance on both domestic and foreign affairs. It is this nationalism 
among the people that allows state leaders to constantly manipulate the danger of a potential 
war in order to have a strong hold on military forces and use it to their own advantage.    
Concerning conflict resolution, Tchilingirian (2005:66-67), also argues that “the 
extreme forms of ‘othering’, that is the demonization and exclusion of the ‘other group’, 
whether Armenians in Azerbaijan or Azerbaijanis in Armenia and Karabakh”, has become a 
formidable and yet an overlooked problem for conflict resolution in South Caucasus.294 
Besides the structural weaknesses of states, the social discourse of ‘othering’ becomes a 
major factor for both nations and states to have predominantly military-oriented politics and 
government leaders, who exploit this idea of ‘othering’. Thus, agreeing with the ‘othering’ 
discourse, yet disagreeing with Tchilingirian that Karabakh conflict has not been essential for 
the democratization process and the development of equal social, political and economic 
rights for Armenian citizens, I argued that the above-discussed powerful sense of 
nationalism, which in post-Soviet Armenia basically was expressed within the framework of 
the Karabakh conflict, facilitated the exploitation of the idea of ‘othering’ by state elites.295 
Indeed, one of the most emotional issues in Armenia, the issue of Karabakh, "both a source 
of inspiration and a cause for concern, ... elevates, but it also makes Armenians vulnerable to 
manipulation from within and without" (Libaridian 1999:14).  
                                                 
294 For the Azeri people, the ‘othering’ discourse is embedded in their military defeat in the Karabakh war, loss 
of territory and the issue of about 800,000 refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs). For the Armenians, 
it is mainly embedded in the memory of the 1915 Armenian genocide by Turks, the 1988 Sumgait Pogroms of 
Armenians in Soviet Azerbaijan by Azeri ethnic groups, as well as the sense and mentality of national 
victimhood and constant fear of a small nation to be attacked and annihilated (Tchilingirian 2005, pp. 66-67). 
295 This argument may be supported, for example, by the conduct and statements of both Armenian and Azeri 
authorities in the aftermath of the 2008 post-electoral tumult in Armenia. Close attention to Azeri officials’ 
indication that the Armenian government organized the clashes on border of Mardakert right after elections in 
order to distract local grievances reveals the significance of ‘othering’ in controlling public dissent a nd 
rebellion. Animosity towards the neighbor nation   (in this situation the notion of ‘othering’) serves a 
‘reasonable’ ground for an easy distraction. No other cause would be as valid to grip people’s attention, as the 
cause of external threat.  
In their turn, the Armenian authorities blamed Azeri attempts to violate the ceasefire of the 1994 between 
Armenia and Azerbaijan and organizing the borderline clashes with hopes to make Azeri people’s sense of 
‘othering’ even more profound.  This would allow the Azeri government to restart war with Armenia. In this 
regard, Azerbaijan's President Aliyev has stressed several times that his country was ready to re -take the region 
by force and has been buying the military hardware and ammunition to do so. 
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Two issues that have strong political implications for the governing elites in Armenia 
– to maintain their regime and exclude the less powerful – have dominated recent narratives 
in Armenia. One, as discussed in Chapter Seven, has been the rhetoric of the Armenian 
state's military power, legitimized by the power structures and spiced up with national 
sentiments. The second was the rhetoric of economic growth, manipulated by the neoliberal 
oligarchy. The main discussion of Chapter Eight related to this rhetoric of 'growth' that was 
assumed to be a consequence of private market transactions in Armenia. The result of this 
growth was an increased social polarization, instead of the recovery of existing social 
problems. 
Double-digit growth was recorded due to the privatization in Armenia, but it has been 
subject to much controversy. “Economic polarization is too high for the greater part of the 
population to benefit from the rapid economic growth. Worse still, the growth, combined 
with polarization, serve[d] to further enhance social inequality,” mentioned Delovoy Express, 
a leading business weekly in Yerevan (AGBU News Magazine, 2008, page 7). “Just a few 
families are the country’s main employers,” said Hrant Bagratian, Armenia’s 1993-1996 
Prime Minister. “In the US, ten wealthiest families control 2.3% of the country’s gross 
domestic product. In Armenia, they control 55%”. (AGBU News Magazine, 2008, page 7) 
Many experts agree there is a middle class emerging in the country, although 
estimates of its size and basic parameters vary. The Armenian Sociological Association 
estimates it at 10-12% of the population; a study by the Armenian Center for National and 
International Studies, at just over 15%. Also, one should not over-estimate recent economic 
development in Armenia. According to data given by Armenian banks, 15% of the GDP is 
dependent on foreign remittances, and if one includes remittances that take place outside the 
banking system, this figure could go up to 30% by some estimates (AGBU News Magazine, 
2008, page 7).  
The chapter concluded that Armenian privatization hampered the production of 
diffuse ownership of private enterprises and increased dire social conditions by creating 
massive unemployment, low salaries and poor employment benefits, and high prices of goods 
and services. The process also created monopolies and oligarchs that have rigorously 
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excluded other market players from business deals. Those oligarchic interests were not only 
dominant in the economic realm, but also in the policy-making process (please refer to the 
Oligarchic Pyramids, tables 8.8, 8.9, 8.10). These socially inefficient consequences of the 
privatization process were due to several factors. At the initial stages of the industrial 
privatization, Armenian state failed to become an adequate watchdog of economic activities, 
and market transactions were not properly regulated. Due to the shortage of knowledge and 
experience related to free-market transactions, free and fair competition was not ensured. At 
further stages, in the privatization of bigger industries, the interests of entrepreneurs without 
connections and power were not safeguarded, increasing economic exclusion.  
9.3 Key Findings and Contributions 
A number of studies exploring social exclusion in developing countries focus on 
mainly causes and correlates of poverty. Focusing on the identification of merely the 
economic dimension of social exclusion, these studies have ignored political change and 
neglected socio-political processes. Moreover, the social exclusion frameworks, particularly 
the few developed for the context of the post-Soviet region, predominantly analyze 
characteristics of social exclusion rather than processes that lead to social exclusion. Their 
theoretical suggestions and practical recommendations are mainly directed towards poverty 
alleviation policies. The exploration and rectification of political processes that result in 
overall social exclusion are therefore left behind. A most noteworthy feature of this study is 
that it brings a shift in the emphasis from outcomes to processes. Such an emphasis in the 
social exclusion approach will help divert the attention of the research engaged with the 
problem in developing countries towards political correlates and bring the examination of 
processes of exclusion to the fore.  
I argued that because of high levels of social exclusion coexisting with strong social 
movements against it, Armenia is an ideal case for empirically testing theoretical 
expectations pertaining to social exclusion. Indeed, the case study of social exclusion in post-
Soviet transitioning Armenia offers a number of valuable insights with broader theoretical 
implications. 
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Overall, the findings of my research suggest different possible expansions and 
revisions of earlier empirically based research of the social exclusion problem on one hand, 
and possible developments of concepts regarding the problem, on the other. The key findings 
of my research and possible expansions of earlier research are presented in the following 
section.  
The study presents evidence in support of the hypotheses of privatization and state 
militarization to explain the vexing problem of social exclusion, and this is a rare approach 
within the scholarly and policy debates on the issue not only in Armenia but in most 
transitioning countries. One of the novelties of this research is that it emphasizes the 
centrality of state elites and their interaction with other structures and layers of the society in 
the reduction or durability of social exclusion problem. This dissertation, thus, has developed 
a state-oriented theoretical perspective on the success of social movements, economic growth 
with an equitable distribution of resources, democratic consolidation, human rights 
development, and social inclusion prospects in the context of post-Soviet Armenia's 
transition. 
Indirectly and largely, I argued that the mere presence of certain institutions, able to 
decrease economic or political exclusion, has minor consequences for a more inclusive society, 
in case the state structure, more specifically the regime type, is not favorable for the former's 
productive performance. As one of my colleagues put it, "the problem is not so much about 
the de jure laws ..., but in the de facto administration and enforcement of those rules. ... The 
key finding in this respect is that de jure laws can be simple but the actual practice of dealing 
with officials along the way can be quite cumbersome without proper administration" 
(Kobonbaev 2010:190). Agreeing with Kobonbaev (2010), I should stress that the above-
mentioned 'actual practice', 'proper administration', and the 'de facto administration of rules' 
greatly hinge upon the willingness, will and decency of state elites, at least in the case of 
peripheral countries.  
The main theoretical contribution of this dissertation is that in post-Soviet Armenia 
the exclusionary character of militarized state elites has been the main driver of durable 
social exclusion. Particularly a few hegemonic elites, specifically the members of the 
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"Karabakh Party" ascended from the Karabakh war that have been able to effectively 
monopolize the privatization benefits on one hand and use the coercive apparatus of the state 
on the other hand, were detrimental in the marginalization of many citizens in economic and 
political affairs of the country. Therefore, broadly speaking, this dissertation puts forward a 
focal policy lesson that controlling social unfairness is not fundamentally about the existence 
of credible institutions, but more importantly ensuring that in the interaction of state elites 
with those institutions and different clusters of the society, the checks and balances work 
appropriately so that the power is not unilaterally skewed towards the executive.  
The case of Armenia provides additional evidence supporting the conclusion that 
institutions in transitioning countries have often great designs with poor performance. In 
other words, even though the Armenian Constitution is relatively well-written, Armenian 
civil society is strong and continuously maturing and the Armenian citizens are 
technologically and intellectually developed, it does not necessarily enhance social inclusion. 
The courts and the constitution are highly subject to the executive's whims in regard to 
policies and their implementation. The rest of the institutional framework, such as the 
unofficial norms and behavior, is consequently, weakened and heavily reliant on the 
irrational structure and implementation of official rules and norms, or in other words, the 
government's practices. "In Armenia, where electoral victory largely is not dependent on 
effective functioning of institutional-procedural mechanisms, politicians neither can 
reasonably be held responsive and accountable for their decisions nor will they have electoral 
incentives to confine their decisions to reflect wishes of the electorate" (Harutyunyan 
2009:317).  
More specifically, first, the findings of this study challenge the extensive literature on 
the link between privatization and socially positive consequences of economic growth 
resulting from privatization. Empirically, this finding challenges the simplistic view that 
privatization promotes economic equality through economic growth and the “trickle-down” 
effect of that growth to wide segments of the population.296 It reinforces the argument that 
                                                 
296 The "trickle-down" effect is a market-related phenomenon that refers to economic benefits, such as tax 
breaks, provided to businessmen and the wealthy, which in the long-run are supposed to benefit poorer 
members of the society by improving the overall economy. The term has been attributed to humorist Will 
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that fast-paced privatization produced greater income inequality between the top and bottom 
social groups in post-Soviet Armenia, generated unemployment, under-employment and low 
salaries. Whereas many aspects of capitalist economy and governance, among them private 
and corporate ownership of goods, services and industries, might be economically and 
socially progressive in certain economies, the privatization process did not work efficiently 
for the Armenian society. Both the quantitative analysis and the qualitative analysis 
confirmed that the majority of the society, particularly the working class, was excluded from 
labor markets due to the privatization failures in post-Soviet Armenia. Ordinary citizens had 
also problems with voucher use and with business registrations; therefore, very few of them 
could become private owners. These anomalies of privatization remained largely undetected 
in the extensive post-Soviet literature on privatization, as well as in the rare post-Soviet 
literature on social exclusion.  
Theoretically, the analysis of the hypothesis related to the link between privatization 
and social exclusion offers a critical discussion of boundaries and processes of social 
exclusion in the Armenian labor market. Privatization produces and maintains income 
inequality in developing market economies. An important implication, therefore, concerns 
the speed and scale of a privatization policy, and that social boundaries are often reinforced 
by the practice of privatization.  
Scholars have long established a link between state militarization and social cohesion. 
As a second theoretical contribution, this study offers a cautious observation regarding the 
classical school of state militarization (Andreski 1954 and 1968, Janowitz 1977). It addresses 
the misleading argument of the traditional assumption that high military participation ratios 
flatten social stratification and supports the more recent literature that criticize this view, 
emphasizing that wars benefit elites and leave the brunt of the cost on the masses to bear, 
particularly in developing countries (Hewedy 1989, Ross 1999, 2001; Bowman 2002; Torvik 
2002; Robinson, Torvik, and Verdier 2006; Mehlum, Moene, and Torvik 2006; Scherbak 
2008).  
                                                                                                                                                       
Rogers, who said during the Great depression that "money was all appropriated for the top in hopes that it 
would trickle down to the needy" (Hunt 2011). 
 329 
 
Essentially, the analysis developed in Chapter Eight, demonstrates that assuming 
unproblematic relationships between the promotion of nationalist policies, intolerant foreign 
diplomacy, and an extremely coercive state on one hand and a socially inclusive society, on the 
other, obscures the examination of social exclusion, particularly its political dimension. 
Consistent with this rare scholarly consensus, I argue that state militarization implies 
constant failure of social movements, collapse of social demands, consequent political 
alienation and apathy among people, all of which reflect systemic problems in the durability 
of social exclusion.  Consequently, advancing the scholarship of social exclusion in the 
framework of opportunity hoarding by repressive state elites is a useful alternative for policy 
debates concerning the tolerable boundaries of militarized states and their consequences on 
economic redistribution, political polarization and social marginalization.  
As a general conclusion, this research contributes to our further understanding of social 
exclusion, with implications for societal and structural changes. Most fundamentally, it 
suggests that fast-paced privatization of industries and social services in institutionally week 
societies and concurrently repressive/militarized states is not compatible with policies aimed at 
social inclusion and social welfare. The creation of a more inclusive society requires a twin 
commitment of creating opportunity and a bedrock of support. This type of commitment is 
impossible within militarized states. Unless an autocratic state changes its tendency towards 
increased militarization, particularly in peacetime, the probability of greater social inclusion in 
a society is slim. However, since the findings of this research are based on a case study, the 
generalization of the above suggestions into a grand theory or a policy lesson may be 
misleading without further comparative studies, as the findings might overlook significant 
differences existing within other post-Soviet republics and other developing countries. This 
leads me to the limitations and shortcomings of the current research, which will be discussed 
in the following section.  
9.4 Limitations 
There are several limitations of the current research that need to be acknowledged. 
This dissertation provides mainly qualitative evidence for the assertions regarding the 
negative effect of privatization and state militarization on the maintenance of social exclusion 
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in post-Soviet Armenia based on historical analysis of political events, but it cannot 
quantitatively test all implications directly due to the shortage of consistent longitudinal data.  
Another shortcoming is related to the idea of examining social exclusion of not 
bounded groups, but as a problem of a larger section of a society versus a small class of 
powerful people. Here the emphasis is on the power relations rather than particular policies 
directed to certain marginalized groups. It is not about state policies against a societal class or 
a group discriminated based on gender, ethnic belonging, creed, or religious practices. It is 
about the powerful elites, who exercise domination and hegemony over the powerless that 
are defenseless against the former. It is about a few individuals on top of the state hierarchy 
and their networks versus the vast majority of citizens.    
Indeed, one may collectively call these socially excluded people the underclass, but 
then there exists the problem of measurement. What are the benchmarks for measuring the 
excluded? How do we define and measure the underclass without limiting them to poverty 
lines? Or how do we define and measure the excluders, without including specifications? As 
mentioned several times in this dissertation, there was a lack of precise benchmarks of social 
exclusion for the excluded populace over the studied period, therefore durable social 
exclusion here was examined in a mixed combination of indicators of the three dimensions of 
social exclusion. Due to this specification issue together with the shortage and inconsistency 
of annual data on quantitative measures of social exclusion, I have presented a very broad 
picture of social exclusion in Armenia with broadly defined and measured excluded groups. 
One may also notice that indicators of economic exclusion, such as high Gini coefficient 
rates, may have been strong in mid-1990s, and indicators of social and political exclusion, 
such as political arrests, assassinations, human rights violations, and unconstitutional 
breakdowns of social protests, have been more prevalent since the end of 1990s; thus the 
durability of social exclusion in Armenia was not persistently and necessarily expressed by 
all three aspects in different administrations of the examined period.  
Achieving greater social inclusion implies, first of all, the refinement of exclusion 
measurements. Whereas this study is based on mostly a qualitative evaluation of the problem, 
one may always think of more accurate, more creative and more quantitative ways of 
 331 
 
measuring social exclusion within a society. The choices are ample, but finding the best 
method to measure social exclusion in a certain society may require a unique approach. In 
future research, in order to avoid methodological errors and present a more consistent picture 
of social exclusion over a time period, a specifically narrow layer of the society that is 
deprived of certain resources and opportunities should be chosen. The importance of a 
straightforward differentiation between social groups (the excluded and the excluders) is also 
important in order to meet effectively the needs of the excluded. 
A third irksome issue is related to the dynamic nature of the phenomenon of social 
exclusion. On one hand, a researcher has to consider the multidimensional and durable 
character of the problem, on the other, he/she needs to be very specific about what factors 
cause which form or aspect of the problem. For example, it is possible that whereas an 
agency-related factor explains the emergence of social exclusion more accurately, the same 
factor may not have a significant influence on the durability of the problem. The durability of 
social exclusion might be conditioned by structural factors, rather than agency-related 
factors. Since the effect of certain factors on social exclusion as a multidimensional 
phenomenon is complicated to capture, the different dimensions of social exclusion must be 
disentangled for analytical purposes. A failure to do so may lead to overlooking fundamenta l 
causal differences existing among each dimension of social exclusion.  
The united analysis of the three aspects of social exclusion has been a major research 
approach in Western mainstream literature on the theme, which I followed. However, in the 
case of post-Soviet Armenia, where a narrow-specified group of the excluded was not 
chosen, the disentangled method of examining economic, political and social dimensions of 
the problem may have been more appropriate. Also, a clear separation of causal factors in 
future research is essential. Whereas in this dissertation I have tried to show that the 
privatization process has impacted the economic aspect of social exclusion in Armenia, and 
state militarization has affected predominantly its social and political aspects, the task should 
be handled more distinctively in the early stages of future research on social exclusion.  
In the course of conducting this research, comments have been made on both the 
advantages and shortcomings of the case study as the research design of this dissertation. The 
first reason for the methodological preference of an exploratory case study over a 
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comparative study for this research was related to the shortage of research on social 
exclusion in potentially comparable post-Soviet studies.297Comparative research embodies 
the logic of hypothesis testing with a greater strength and validity and leads to the formation 
of new perspectives and theories. It allows to discriminate, to connect, and to challenge 
existing theories by providing historical explanations of several cases. Nonetheless, whereas 
it is beneficial to conduct comparative research on social exclusion, because it broadens our 
comprehension of social phenomena, only certain countries can be successfully measured 
cross-nationally. I have not chosen the comparative method because of the latter's potential 
limitation to comprehend socio-political actors, institutions, structures and phenomena 
characterized by the boundaries of a single nation as thoroughly, as a case study can do.  
The existence of social exclusion cannot be explained by the same factors in all 
countries.  The formation of social exclusion and emergence of social movements against it,  
for example, may be the consequence of quite similar welfare policies and similar formal 
institutional frameworks, but different historical-cultural factors and other contextual 
variables, which in turn affect a state's structure, alliances between different clusters of 
society, elite cohesion, strength or weakness of political parties in policy making, and many 
more. Differences in the institutional frameworks, the state structure, policies and norms can 
make the comparison between countries difficult, and the more different the countries are the 
more difficult it can be to make sense of the comparison. The interpretation of the findings 
then becomes a challenge. In this sense, it is not reasonable, for example, to compare the 
multidimensional problem of social exclusion of a periphery or a semi-periphery, which 
Armenia is, with that of a liberal democracy. As already mentioned, the comparison is also 
difficult, because social exclusion in all its three dimensions has not been studied thoroughly 
either in Armenia or in most of comparable countries in post-communist transition. 
Therefore, first of all, a case study with multiple measures of analysis was a most appropriate 
initial step to my research question.  
This research, as a case study, allowed me to conduct an in-depth investigation of 
economic, social and political processes related to social exclusion and to provide a great 
                                                 
297 Earlier in this dissertation, I have explained my choice of the case study as the research method. The 
reasoning behind this choice was more clearly specified in the "Research Method" section of chapter 4.  
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amount of detailed description about each of those processes. Whereas it did not intend and 
did not produce results that account for the emergence of social exclusion in a number of 
transitioning countries, it generated new perspectives and conjectures that, if applied to other 
cases, might be expanded into a grand theory. In this regard, this case study provides only a 
blueprint for generalizing the findings of this research to other transitioning countries. The 
privatization and the state militarization factors have yet to be tested on other cases in order 
to be considered valid. Therefore, a cross-national comparative study involving countries 
with similar socio-economic status, but different degrees of social exclusion (or different 
socio-economic status, but similar degrees of social exclusion) is an intuitive continuation of 
this research. Armenia may be relevant to be compared with the South Caucasus countries 
and Central Asian countries, but difficult, if not irrelevant, to compare with Russia and the 
Baltic states in the post-Soviet region, or a few of the Eastern European countries in the post-
communist space. The latter comparison may indeed lead to remarkable findings but it will 
require extensive research not only regarding the history and transitional trajectories of the 
compared countries, but also regarding their geo-political situation, natural resource wealth, 
and why some have inherited or have been able to design institutional frameworks with 
separation of powers and the rule of law, while others have failed to do so. Even then, the 
more paradoxical inquiry is that similarly designed institutional frameworks perform well in 
one of the compared countries and dysfunction in another, thus increasing social exclusion in 
the latter.  
9.5 Future Research and Prospects of Greater Social Inclusion 
As I was writing this dissertation, some interesting themes were nurtured for further 
research. A particular interest towards the association of militarized state elites, the defeat of 
social movements, and the increase and durability of social exclusion was developed. Several 
inquiries in this regard are important: Is the state militarization hypothesis valid for other 
transitioning countries experiencing the problem of social exclusion? If it is valid for other 
transitioning/developing countries, does it also pertain to developed countries? For example, 
in the context of the US, does American involvement in a war (whether direct or indirect), 
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have any impact on income inequality or other expressions of economic exclusion in the 
US?298 
Another question left for additional research is how strongly does recent experience 
of an external war matter for the militarization of state elites and the failure of repeated 
collective action?299 Since state militarization in Armenia was reinforced by individuals, who 
were in fact civilians with no military training, but became militarized due to war 
participation, it becomes critical to understand the role of field commanders and 
paramilitaries as opposed to traditional military officers in non-classical state militarization, 
modern revolutions, and patterns of social exclusion. Similarly important is whether the 
experience of a civil war has the same kind of effect on the non-conventional militarization 
of the state? To test whether the manipulation of an external threat, a potential war, as well as 
a civil war is a foundation of state militarization and social polarization in developing 
countries (and not just in post-Soviet Armenia), we can compare the recent modern 
revolutions that are reactions against several forms of social exclusion.  
This dissertation has mostly focused on role of the state elites in explaining social 
exclusion, paying minor attention to the role of formal and informal institutions. The 
exploration of a wide range of domestic factors was clearly beyond the scope of a single 
dissertation project, and is a separate topic for further research. There is definitely need for 
more research on the complex relationship between not only state elites and socially 
excluded groups, but also between institutions, economic development and social equality.   
                                                 
298 Jonathan Caverly, for example, strongly challenges the prevailing view that democracies are necessa rily 
more casualty averse. At the same time, Caverly (2013) believes that as militaries become more highly 
capitalized, the idea that wars benefit elites and damage the poor is reversed.This is a view that the findings of 
this dissertation do not support. Caverly, being a former military officer, argues: “[...] democracies will build 
larger, highly capitalized militaries as inequality in wealth rises" (Caverly 2013:2). According to him, 
militarizat ion limits military casualties, and most importantly, shifts  the cost burden to tax payers. This makes 
relatively poorer citizens more supportive of increased defense spending. Caverly emphasizes that an increase 
in income inequality makes the mentioned trends more pronounced. 
299 In the comparative chapter of this dissertation, I argued that those states that experienced an external war are 
more militaristic and authoritarian towards their own societies. But, indeed, authoritarian elites can rise without 
the incidence of a recent war. However, first, war-related elites obtain authority and power more easily. Second, 
they also more easily sway public perceptions regarding national security, nationalism and the need for 
militarizat ion. And finally, they use the militarization tendency for national security as a foundation and a cover 
for their coercive strength in general.  
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Furthermore, in this dissertation I did not take into account the effects of internat ional 
factors on social exclusion persistence, leaving the role of the international community to 
future research. The effects of transnational factors, both constraining and beneficial to social 
inclusion, were briefly acknowledged but not discussed. Most of the local factors explaining 
social exclusion in any of the South Caucasus countries, for instance, are often greatly altered 
by the international involvement in the region. International factors, such as foreign aid, 
economic sanctions and prospects of diplomatic ties, and the presence of international 
security forces, interact with domestic conditions to explain the overthrow or persistence of 
authoritarianism and its effect on democratic consolidation in the post-Soviet region. This is 
particularly vital for a country like Armenia that is small, poor, has no routes for external 
trade and is surrounded with countries that egregiously apply economic sanctions on it. 
Therefore, in the light of the recent wave of political transitions in the Middle East, Asia and 
more recently in Ukraine and the Crimea, the significance of international dimension in 
regard to political exclusion, revolutionary successes and democratic consolidation becomes 
more essential and will offer valuable lessons for policymakers and academics. Numerous 
international factors that can potentially influence social exclusion should be identified and 
their interdependence on each other and on domestic factors should be described.  
Our knowledge of the subject matter may also be substantively improved by the 
analysis of specific policies that hamper the economic, social or political inclusion of certain 
social groups. Earlier, I pointed to the analysis of political processes leading to social 
exclusion as one of the strengths of the current study. Yet, the present analysis can be 
expanded and advanced by further narrowing its focus to particular policies. For example, 
examining particular tax policies unfavorable for the establishment and development of small 
and medium businesses, granting economic opportunity basically to the wealthy in the 
country, would lead us to a better identification of economic exclusion of the mentioned 
social groups. Another specific way of capturing social closure and opportunity hoarding 
could be achieved by investigating the policy positions of business leaders (to the extent 
possible) to establish linkage between their policy preferences, state policymakers’ 
preferences, and policy outcomes that discriminate against the poor and the middle classes in 
several aspects, such as exclusion from basic rights, basic capabilities and basic welfare 
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rights (access to health, nutrition, education, housing, water supply, sanitation and social 
security); exclusion from the employment market; and finally, exclusion from political 
participation and leadership. Research into the mechanisms used to block legislative 
opposition to these policies would strengthen claims of all three aspects of exclusion. In 
terms of social implications, addressing the identified policy priorities will permit 
counterbalancing stratification and supporting the excluded with more concrete measures.  
While the situation in Armenia is challenging for many in the society, the hope is that 
with additional research the problem of social exclusion will be better understood by more 
citizens and political leaders.  Greater understanding and awareness of the problems 
exacerbated by this level of social exclusion may lead to the formulation and implementation 
of policy recommendations that will result in more people being included in the decision-
making process and treated more equitably within the economic, political and social systems 
of Armenia.  Such changes would improve the lives of many Armenians and allow Armenia 
to assume a more important political and economic role in the Caucasus region.   
The scenarios of greater social inclusion in Armenia are varied, but, considering a 
socially inclusive transition as a lasting process that takes time to root, an optimistic stance 
can be taken. The most general recommendation based on this study is to emphasize the 
significance of an impartial method of economic redistribution in the process of transition to 
capitalism and the development of anti-militarist frames in the fight against social exclusion 
in countries with authoritarian regimes, such as Armenia. The privatization process of 
transition is nearly over in most of the world, and more so in Armenia. Consequently, there is 
little help that policy recommendations regarding drawbacks of privatization can do in 
alleviating social problems, such as social exclusion. However, the redistribution of resources 
and opportunities that were unfairly allocated between different social groups as a 
consequence of the privatization process requires thorough political reforms and new socio-
economic policies. In the case of Armenia, for example, developing regional cooperation by 
ending the Karabakh conflict, which is a fundamental obstacle to the economic and political 
dimensions of greater social inclusion, will produce deep socio-economic reforms beneficial 
to middle classes. Particularly, it will offer prospects of new economic opportunities that 
might constitute an enhancing factor in economic inclusion of the larger society. In these 
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political processes, "the role of the elites in power should not be underestimated as a 
blocking force to reforms that might undermine particular interests" (Freire and Simão 
2007:20). 
Considering the economic and political processes discussed at length in this 
dissertation that hinder the formation of egalitarianism and inclusion in the Armenian 
society, at this point it is difficult to transfer the knowledge stemming from this dissertation 
to concrete action items. Incapable of providing specific policy recommendations to decrease 
social exclusion in post-Soviet Armenia, except the more general suggestions related to the 
private markets and militarized elites, the chapter concludes that the only possible foundation 
for socially inclusive societies is "a morally and democratically inspired view of the respect 
due to the dignity of every human being" (O'Donnel 1996:2).300 
"Ultimately ... [it] can only be a moral argument: the decent treatment that is due to every 
human being. An additional argument is one of public interest: the improvement of the 
quality of our democracies is tantamount to advancing toward such decency. (O'Donnel 
1996:19-20) 
A "decent treatment of every human being" seems to be a good moral agenda of 
advancing social inclusion. Another most important aspect of this moral agenda is the 
development of intolerant attitudes towards and punitive treatment of those, who create and 
perpetuate social exclusion. In the case of developing countries with repressive state elites 
and with institutions of poor performance, a disciplinary and punitive treatment of elites 
practicing exclusionary activities should be a primary requirement of achieving greater social 
inclusion. A first prerequisite of this task is the need to guard against excessive concentration 
                                                 
300 Some of the social inclusion scenarios, general guidelines and policies that I came across in existing 
literature have potentialities but also limitations that prevent us from applying of these strategies to mitigate the 
increased social exclusion in the case of Armenia. A few of those recommendations are: 
 Equipping the excluded individuals with the necessary knowledge and skills to access economic 
opportunities, therefore supporting them to avoid the poverty trap of welfare dependency;   
 Determining participatory techniques that can help facilitate the involvement of the excluded people in 
political processes and policy-making; 
 Ensuring that intermediaries (NGOs, local government, etc.) working with the excluded communities 
have expertise in working with these groups; 
 Embedding the social economy into formal partnerships will provide an opportunity to improve social 
inclusion (for example, creation of co-operatives and trade unions stimulate multi-sectoral development);  
 Investigating how local institutions can be made more responsive and inclusive of the excluded groups 
(OECD/Noya 2008; Percy-Smith 2000; World Bank 2013). 
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of power and to support healthy democracies through effectively functioning institutions, 
such as an independent security system, fairs courts, and a parliament with plural political 
representation. This type of requirement has been largely unaddressed and has certainly been 
out of the scope of effective policy interventions in regard to the problem of social exclusion. 
Carving feasible steps towards approaching this agenda may be the target of intellectuals, 
who are concerned about the problem of social exclusion in developing countries.  
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Department of 
Political Science 
347 SSB, One University Blvd 
St. Louis, MO63121-4400 
Telephone:  314-516-5521 
E-mail: amc06@umsl.edu 
Information for Participation in this Survey 
You are invited to participate in a survey, which is part of a research study about the impact 
of privatization and state militarization on social exclusion in post-Soviet Armenia conducted 
by Anna Martirosyan, a doctoral student of Comparative Politics at the University of 
Missouri-St. Louis. You have been asked to participate in the research because of your 
student status (I have identified students as a comparatively politicized and informed group 
representative of Armenian society). Please read this form and ask any questions you may 
have before agreeing to be in the research. Your participation in this research is voluntary. If 
you decide to participate, you are free to withdraw at any time.   
 
What is the purpose of this research? 
The purpose of this survey is to develop data capturing public perceptions and attitudes of 
social exclusion in Armenia.  
What procedures are involved? 
If you agree to participate in this research, you will be asked to complete a one-time survey 
of twenty five (25) questions. Completing the questionnaire will take approximately 20 
minutes. About 300 students from different universities of Yerevan, Vanadzor and Gyumri 
are expected to be involved in this research.  
What are the potential risks and discomforts? 
There are no significant physical or psychological discomforts, as well as costs, that may be 
associated with this research. No other type of risks will arise from the answers provided by 
the participants, specifically that all the participants will remain anonymous and their 
answers confidential. There is no question in the survey indicating the identity of the 
participant.  
Are there benefits to taking part in the research? 
There are no direct benefits to participants for taking part in this research. The primary 
benefit for participation is to help create an original dataset presenting public perceptions of 
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social exclusion in post-Soviet Armenia. Without this dataset, the overall research 
concerning social exclusion will not be completely accurate, which means that your 
participation is invaluable for the results of the research. If requested, a copy of the findings 
will be provided at no charge.   
What about privacy and confidentiality? 
The only people who will know that you are a research subject are members of the research 
team (I, my dissertation advisor and the IRB members). No information about you, or 
provided by you during the research will be disclosed to others.  When the results of the 
research are published or discussed in conferences, no information will be included that 
would reveal your identity. Any information that is obtained in connection with this study, 
and that can be identified with you, will remain confidential and will be disclosed only with 
your permission or as required by law.   
Data collected via this survey will be stored in a database on a campus file server which 
requires a specific user id and password combination that only I have access to.    
Can I withdraw or be removed from the study? 
Your participation in this research is voluntary. You may withdraw from participating in this 
research at any time without consequences of any kind. You also may refuse to answer any 
questions you do not want to answer and still remain in the study. 
Who should I contact if I have questions? 
The researcher conducting this study is Anna Martirosyan, a PhD student at the University of 
Missouri-St. Louis. You may ask any questions you have now. If you have questions later, 
you may contact the researcher at amc06@umsl.edu or at (374-10) 34-65-73.  
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Public Perception of Social Exclusion 
Survey Questionnaire for University Students in Yerevan, Vanadzor and Gyumri 
1. Age 
2. Residence 
3. What is your understanding of social exclusion? 
 Labor market exclusion – because exclusion from the labor market is a very important 
concept to cause poverty and inequality; 
 Service exclusion, such as access to health, educational or social services; 
 Political incapacity or passiveness– not being able to participate in politics or policy-
making because of poverty and/or social status; 
 Exclusion from social relationships, networks and/or events;  
 All of the above 
4. Do you think there is social exclusion in Armenia? 
 Yes No  
5. Do you think that after independence social exclusion has increased in Armenia? 
Yes        No   
6. Are both you and your parents currently employed?   
Yes No 
7. Are your parents currently employed? 
Yes No 
8. If ‘yes”, are you and/or your parents: 
 Self employed 
 Employed by a governmental entity 
 Employed by a local or international non-governmental organization (NGO) 
 Employed by a local or international private /business company 
 Other 
9. If ‘no’, what is the reason? 
 Can’t find a job 
 Can’t find a job with decent salary 
 Family matters 
 Retired 
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 Disability 
 Other 
10. How far above or below the level of absolute poverty would you say your household 
is?(“Absolute povertyrefers to a condition characterized by severe deprivation of basic 
human needs, including food, safe drinking water, sanitation facilities, health, shelter, 
education and information. It depends not only on income but also on access to 
services.” (UN, 1995: 57) According to ArmStat, in 2006, the complete poverty line was 
21,555 AMD (about US $70) per month for an Armenian household). 
 Considerably above 
 A little above 
 About the same 
 A little below 
 Considerably below 
 Don’t know 
 
 
11. How far above or below the level of overall poverty would you say your household is? 
(Overall poverty includes “lack of income and productive resources to ensure 
sustainable livelihoods; hunger and malnutrition; ill health; limited or lack of access to 
education and other basic services; increased morbidity and mortality from illness; 
homelessness and inadequate housing; unsafe environments and social discrimination 
and exclusion. It is also characterized by lack of participation in decision-making and 
in civil, social and cultural life. It includes also the poverty of low-wage workers, and 
the utter destitution of people who fall outside family support systems, social institutions 
and safety nets.” (UN, 1995: 57))  
 Considerably above 
 A little above 
 About the same 
 A little below 
 Considerably below 
 Don’t know 
12. Does your family receive remittances from Russia or any other country abroad?  
Yes No 
13. If you were granted an opportunity to leave Armenia for studying, working or just 
residing in another country, would you accept it?  
Yes No 
14. Do you think that Armenia is comparatively an egalitarian society?   
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 Considerably egalitarian 
 A little egalitarian 
 Somewhat egalitarian 
 A little non-egalitarian 
 Considerably non-egalitarian 
15. Do you think you are excluded of (doing) something that you deserve to have or to do? 
Yes  No  
16. Would you say that you often use public or private services, such as usage of cell-phone, 
visiting a doctor, public or private sports facilities, dentist, post-office, cinema or theatre, 
cafés or restaurants, medium to large supermarkets for clothes and other products, or go 
for holidays/vacation in or outside Armenia?  
Yes No 
17. Has anything happened in the last 10 years that makes you feel better about your social 
and economic status? 
Yes No 
18. Is there anything that you expect to happen in the near future that will improve your 
standard of living?  
Yes No 
19. Have you or a family member currently or in recent years been actively involved in civil 
activities or organization, such as labor unions, social clubs, political party, pre-election 
campaign, women’s organization, or other volunteer or civic group?  
     Yes  No 
20. Is there anything that you expect to happen in the near future that will increase your 
participation in policy making or political activities? 
 Yes    No 
21. Have you ever participated in demonstrations?  
Yes    No 
22. If yes, what was (were) the reason(s)? 
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23. What/who would you change in order to make Armenia economically, politically and 
socially a more egalitarian country to live in: (you can mention 1, 2, 2 and more of the 
options)  
 Your own lifestyle (your mentality, education, aspirations and habits) 
 The President 
 The National Assembly of Armenia 
 The domestic security system (military and defense system, law and jurisdiction, police 
activities, customs rules, etc.) 
 Political parties 
 Mass media 
 Human rights organizations and the Ombudsman 
 Local NGOs 
 The international approach to Armenia, such as more foreign aid and/or fewer sanctions  
 All of the above 
 Other 
 N/A 
 
24. Among these institutions which one(s) do you trust more? Please rate each of those on a 
scale of 1-10, 1 being the lowest and 10 being the highest score. 
a) The President 
b) The National Assembly of Armenia 
c) The domestic security system (military and defense system, law and jurisdiction, police, 
customs rules, etc.) 
d) Political parties 
e) Mass media 
f) Human rights organizations and the Ombudsman 
g) Local NGOs 
h) The international NGOs 
i) Diaspora Armenians 
j) Market relations/businesses 
k) Other 
 
 
 
Thank you for your participation!  
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Department of Political Science 
347 SSB, One University Blvd 
St. Louis, MO63121-4400 
Telephone:  314-516-5521 
E-mail: amc06@umsl.edu 
 
Information for Participation in this Interview 
You are invited to participate in an interview, which is part of a research study about the 
impact of privatization and state militarization on social exclusion in post-Soviet Armenia 
conducted by Anna Martirosyan, a doctoral student of Comparative Politics at the University 
of Missouri-St. Louis. You have been asked to participate in the research because, as political 
elites and representatives of research organizations, you have excellent knowledge and 
awareness of the political environment in Armenia. Please read this form and ask any 
questions you may have before agreeing to be in the research. Your participation in this 
research is voluntary. If you decide to participate, you are free to withdraw at any time.   
 
What is the purpose of this research? 
The purpose of this semis-structured interview is to gather data that will help us understand 
the type of interactions between state elites and (para)military figures in post-Soviet Armenia 
that act as obstacle of social inclusion.  
What procedures are involved? 
If you agree to participate in this research, you will be asked 15-18 questions, to which you 
will answer orally. The interview will take approximately 45-60 minutes. About 15 political 
elites, representatives of research organizations and think tanks are expected to be involved 
in the interview process of this research. I will meet with each interviewee individually.  
What are the potential risks and discomforts? 
To the best of my knowledge, there are no significant physical or psychological discomforts, 
as well as costs, associated with this research. If there are any, even minimal, risks 
threatening your well-being that I am not aware of, I would like to ask beforehand if you 
would like to remain anonymous. Your request to remain anonymous will be honored.  
Are there benefits to taking part in the research? 
There are no direct benefits to you or any other participant for taking part in this research. 
The primary benefit for participation is to help understand the factors that affect social 
exclusion in Armenia and the ways that the Armenian government has dealt with it. Without 
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stories about specific policies and relationships uncovered during these interviews, the 
overall research concerning social exclusion will not be completely accurate, which means 
that your participation is invaluable for the results of the research. If requested, a copy of the 
findings will be provided at no charge.   
What about privacy and confidentiality? 
Any information that is obtained in connection with this study, and that can be identified with 
you, will remain confidential if you require and will be disclosed only with your permission 
or as required by law. When the results of the research are published or discussed in 
conferences, your ideas will be cited and due credit will be recognized, if you do not wish to 
remain anonymous. 
Can I withdraw or be removed from the study? 
Your participation in this research is voluntary. You may withdraw from participating in this 
research at any time without consequences of any kind. You also may refuse to answer any 
questions you do not want to answer and still remain in the study.  
Who should I contact if I have post-interview questions? 
The researcher conducting this study is Anna Martirosyan, a PhD student at the University of 
Missouri-St. Louis. You may ask any questions you have now. If you have questions later, 
you may contact the researcher at amc06@umsl.edu or at (374-1) 34-65-73.  
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State Elites' and Researchers’ Opinion on Privatization, 
State Militarization and Social Movements 
Interview Questions for political party members, research organizations and think tanks, 
Diaspora Armenians involved in Armenian socio-economic and political life 
1. According to several surveys, the Gini coefficient in Armenia is one of the highest among the 
post-Soviet states. Other socio-economic indicators have also deteriorated for a large number 
of citizens after the independence in Armenia. Do you think that these facts indicate the 
emergence of social exclusion in Armenia? Can you talk about the problem, particularly 
focusing on factors that could have played a role in its emergence and further persistence? 
 
2. How has the Armenian government ever dealt with the problem of social exclusion in the 
country?  
 
3. How would you describe the privatization process, specifically privatization of firms and 
social services in Armenia’s dual transition? What impact did it have on the labor market?  
 
4. Can you comment on individuals that have acquired firms/factories during the privatization 
reforms?  
 
5. Can you talk about policies or a policy that have (has) been exclusively beneficial to business 
leaders in Armenia during the last 15-20 years? 
 
6. What are the existing tax policies regarding the establishment and development of small and 
medium businesses? 
 
7. Are there any linkages between business leaders’ policy preferences, state policymakers’ 
preferences, and policy outcomes? What are, if any, the mechanisms used to block legislative 
opposition to these policies? 
 
8. How do you explain the repeating waves of demonstrations in Armenia (1996, 2004 and 
2008)? What are the claims and demands of the demonstrators? 
 
9. Do you see any similar trends in those demonstrations?  
 
10. Do you think that the demonstrators have fair basis to mobilize? 
 
11. Who are the actors and groups involved in those movements? Do you see any linkages 
among these social groups and opposition political parties? 
 
12. How important is the role of the Armenian military leaders in the failure of those social 
movements? 
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13. Can you describe the military establishment in Armenia, and the role of the Nagorno 
Karabakh war in the post-war military involvement in the Armenian government and policy 
making?  
 
14. How would you describe the state elites’ relationship with the military authorities in 
Armenia?  
 
15. Do you have any recommendation or policy lessons for restoring a measure of greater social 
equity for Armenia’s transition to a democracy and capitalism? 
 
16. Do political forces capable of proposing and implementing them exist? Who and why? 
 
17. What can the Diaspora Armenians do to help or can they help at all? 
 
18. Do you have any other comments? 
 
Thank you for your time and insights! 
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University of Missouri - St. Louis 
Application for Exemption from Review by the Institutional 
Review Board  
 
 
1. Using categories described in item II(a) of the Guidelines, list the category of research 
activity that you believe applies to your research. 
My research method is based on the SURVEY and the INTERVIEW procedures, II (b and c).  
2. Briefly describe the nature of the involvement of the human subjects (personal interview, 
mailed questionnaire, telephone questionnaire, observation, etc.) and the reason you 
believe this project qualifies for exemption from review. 
Based on my preliminary assessment, the survey procedure includes at least 300 students 
(older than 18) from universities in 3 largest cities of Armenia (Yerevan, Gyumri and 
Vanadzor). Since computer assisted, email and online questionnaires are not feasible to 
conduct in Armenia due to the lack of Internet and computer technologies in the country, I 
will personally attend the selected universities and deliver the questionnaires through the 
support of student friends and/or of university administrators. The survey tries to capture 
public perceptions and attitudes of social exclusion in post-Soviet Armenia. Students are a 
comparatively politicized and a representative sample of the Armenian society.     
The research also includes structured interviews with elected or appointed officials and main 
political party elites in Armenia. There will be at least 10 personal interviews conducted. 
Undertaking interviews with political party elites will enable me to better assess coalition-
building processes between the military and state elites in Armenia, and how they transform 
the Armenian state and class structures, creating social mobilization. On the basis of the 
data gathered in these interviews, I will be able to pinpoint key (para)military leaders active 
in state politics, and the type of interactions between state elites and those (para)military 
figures, that act as obstacle of social inclusion.    
I firmly believe this research qualifies for exemption from review due to the nature of the 
interview and survey questions that I have constructed. The answers of the participants could 
not place the subjects at risk of criminal or civil liability and cannot be damaging to their 
financial standing, employability, or reputation.  
The survey participants are older than eighteen years. Moreover, the survey will be 
anonymous. The interviews will be similarly anonymous, provided the interviewee requests 
for it. If the interviewee requests for anonymity, their request will be honored.      
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3. Are the data recorded in such a manner that subjects can be identified by a name or 
code?  
Only the interviews will be conducted in such a manner that subjects can be identified by 
their names. If subjects request for anonymity, their names and positions will not be revealed 
in the research.  
If yes:  
a) Who has access to the data, and how is it being stored? 
The interviewees will be identified by their names and positions they hold within the 
government or the political party they represent, unless they require to stay anonymous. The 
interview digital recordings will be stored in my UMSL student online storage and in my 
personal computer, both of which are password-protected. I will be the sole individual to 
have access to that data during the research, which I will share exclusively with my 
dissertation committee advisor and those, who have legal right to view it, such as IRB 
members.  
b) If you are using an assessment tool (e.g., the Beck Depression Inventory), what is 
your procedure for referring the subject for follow-up if his/her scores are significant?  
N/A 
c) Will the list of names and codes be destroyed at the end of the study? 
The list of names and codes will be destroyed after the defense of my dissertation.  
4. Age of subjects: Adults (persons age 18 and older) Yes _X__ No____ 
Minors (persons under age 18) Yes ____ No____ 
5. If your project uses a questionnaire or structured interview, attach a copy of the 
questionnaire or interview questions to this form.  
Both survey and interview questionnaires are attached to this form. 
 If a consent form will be used, attach a copy to the protocol. 
A consent form will not be used. 
Submit an original and 1 copy of this application, with attachments (number all pages), to the 
Office of Research Administration, 341 Woods Hall. 
 
